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Although an element of our quotidian existence the manner in which 
national identity is produced is one of the most contested problems in the 
contemporary social sciences.  One method of examining the production of 
national identity is to study the mechanism through which such identities are 
constructed in discourse.  This study considers the use of historical narratives in 
the construction of differing formulations of national identity in the Russian 
Republic of Karelia.  
  
Using the tools of critical discourse analysis this study surveys the 
production of varying historical narratives in the Republic of Karelia and the 
fashion in which such narratives contribute to producing or deconstructing 
competing conceptions of national identity.   This thesis uses an analysis of both 
mass media discourse and interview data to provide a thorough illustration of the 
production of narratives of Karelian history on public and private levels and their 
use in engendering or refuting opposing notions of Karelian identity.  It shall 
examine how various historical events and tendencies are incorporated into 
contrasting narratives of the historical development of the Karelian people and 
their Russian, Finnish and Vepsian counterparts and how such narratives are 
used to justify or invalidate current political and social realities.    
 
The relationship between such narratives of history and other aspects of 
identity production is investigated alongside the difficulties of ethnic Karelians 
in producing and promoting such narratives to sustain an image of Karelian 
national identity.  It shall also demonstrate the manner in which Karelian identity 
can be positioned through the use of such historical narratives as closer to or 
more distant from Russian or Finnish national identity.  The narration of a 
history of Karelia as an area and the manner in which this can be deployed to 
incorporate or distance the region from conceptions of Russian or Finno-Ugric 

























































Examination of the phenomenon of national identity often encounters the 
problem of an apparent dichotomy between our conceptual understanding of the 
nation and its actuality; that is to say, between theory and reality.  Our ideas of 
the nation state and theories of ethnic or civic nationalism often do not seem 
readily applicable to the reality of the nation as it exists around us. When 
addressing the phenomenon of national identity it is also important to attempt to 
understand how the construction of identity on an individual level relates to the 
production of group identities.   Arguably our Western conceptions of nations 
and nationalism are particularly ill-suited to the examination of the Russian term 
национальность and the manner in which it is understood and articulated by 
members of that society.  It is arguable that the term ‘nationality’ within the 
former Soviet Union is more akin to what Western researchers would term ethnic 
identity than the more politically driven nationalism that is familiar in a Western 
context.  In an examination of national identity within the Russian Republic of 
Karelia these difficulties are particularly acute.  Karelia has been divided, 
reimagined and reinvented by both Russians and Finns in a manner almost 
unparalleled in the modern age; it has been both the birthplace of Finnish identity 
and the westernmost outpost of Russian identity as well as a homeland for the 
eponymous Finno-Ugric minority.  The relationship between ethnic, political and 
other understandings of nationality and how this sense of identity is produced are 
thus exceptionally complex in a Karelian context.  The complicated history of the 
area known as Karelia and the multitudinous, politically driven conceptions of 
‘Karelian’ identity this has spawned, together with the modern marginalisation of 
self-identified Karelians and their language in a society overwhelming dominated 
by a Russian minority make a very interesting social context for the potential 
production of variant national identities.   
The starting point for this study is a contention that identity is a social 
construction, constituted discursively by its performance, its production and 
reproduction in social interaction.  In particular it is argued that narratives of 
history are a particularly important strategy by which individuals can perform 







identity allows an individual to integrate change, that is to say all that is unstable, 
contradictory and variable, and the perceived constancy of the individual.  The 
narration of a ‘national history’ performs an analogous role for an individual’s 
sense of national identity.  This construction of national identity is therefore 
contingent but rooted, as is the individual, in social reality; it is thus tied to a 
repertoire of potential identities constituted by apparent objective linguistic, 
geographic, political and historical ‘facts’.  Consequently the next chapter of this 
study shall examine the history of Karelia as a region and its modern 
demographics in order to survey the potential historical referents available for 
use in the construction of narratives of Karelian history.  It shall also review the 
main sources available within Western, primarily Finnish, and Russian 
historiography on this subject. 
Researchers, in the main from a Western intellectual background, have 
already explored the usage of historical narratives in the construction of national 
identity.  Indeed the link between history and the production of national identity 
in the former USSR has been quite extensively studied by Abedlal (2002), 
Bagger (2007), Kuzio (2002, 2006), Uldricks (1998) and more generally by 
Bhaba (1990), Megill (1998), Ricoeur (1985) and Wodak et al (2009) to name 
but a few, hence the examination of this particular relationship is hardly 
innovative in and of itself.  The conception of identity as socially constructed is 
also not exceptionally contentious having been explored in a nuber of fields.  The 
dynamics of social construction are not universally agreed and there is room for 
considerable debate on the mechanics of this process.  This study is intented to 
examine these mechanisms and hopefully shed further light on this interesting 
field whilst also revealing certain aspects of the processes at work within the 
Republic of Karelia today.  The second chapter of this study shall therefore 
outline the particular theoretical underpinnings of this research and the exact 
methodology used in the analysis presented here.   
The starting point for this study is therefore an attempt to apply these 
ideas to the Karelian context and examine their relevance.  The tools of Critical 
Discourse Analysis were utilised to examine how historical narratives were 
created and exploited both within mass media and private contexts through 







media texts complied from an official publication, Kareliya, and an independent 
newspaper, Karel’skaya Guberniya, has been undertaken to examine the manner 
in which the Russian-language press of the Republic of Karelia produces 
narratives of Karelian history and how these narratives relate to the construction 
of national identity within the region.  It shall be argued that, although there are 
differences in presentation and focus between the official and unofficial 
publications, as a whole the Russian language press produces a hegemony or 
orthodox narrative in which Karelians and other Finno-Ugurs are either 
marginalised or associated with the Russian majority.  The interview data 
comprises material collected during fieldwork in the Republic of Karelia in 2010.  
These interviews were conducted, in the main, with representatives of what 
might be termed the Finno-Ugric intelligentsia of the region and therefore 
illustrate the manner in which the narratives of Karelian history they construct 
differ from the mainstream Russian-language consensus and support a more 
distinctly Finno-Ugric conception of identity.  Taken together these two sets of 
data illustrate the manner in which narratives of the history of ‘Karelia’ or the 
histories of the Karelian, Russian, Finnish and Vepsian peoples are utilised to 
promote or subvert orthodox notions of Karelian identity.  It demonstrates the 
manner in which these narratives position such conceptions of Karelian identity 
closer to or more distant from other formulations of national identity and 
established nationalities such as Russian or Finnish. 
The ideas of Stuart Hall and Lesek Kolakowski, which differ in the detail, 
on the production of national identity through the narration of five key elements 
shall also be examined.  It shall be argued that whilst some of the elements of the 
narration of the nation they identify are present and relevant to the Karelian 
context others are much weaker.  The attempts of the local authorities to 
constitute a form of ‘civic’ Karelian nationalism shall be examined with regards 
to the commemoration of the foundation of the Karelian Trudovaya Kommuna.  
These attempts are, as shall be demonstrated, frustrated by the lack of resonance 
of both this date within Karelian society and also this form of nationalism within 
the Karelian context.  The primary form of national distinction employed within 
Karelia is, it shall be argued, centred overwhelmingly around the usage and 







The analysis also reveals the manner in which the Finno-Ugric minorities 
of the Republic of Karelia are marginalised through this process in a variety of 
ways, and how understandings of ‘national’ identity in Karelia are often localised 
to the level of the district or village.  It highlights the complexity of the relations 
between special understandings of ‘Karelia’, ‘Russia’ and ‘Finland’ and ideas of 
national identity.  The manner in which both the Finno-Ugric minorities and the 
Russian majority seek to propound understandings of Karelian ‘space’ and the 
continuity of their place within it to bolster their sense of ‘belonging’ as a group 
to the area shall be detailed.  This includes the use of the construction of Karelia 
as part of a Russian cultural sphere and its constitution as a ‘model’ Orthodox 
territory.  The ritualised, commemorative discourse of the war years within the 
mass media and its usage to cement conceptions of Karelia as Russian, including 
the areas annexed from Finland in 1940, and the unity of Karelian and Russian 
identity shall also be revealed.  This can be placed alongside the usage of such 
narratives more broadly to incorporate Olonets, in particular, but also the 
Karelians as a group as part of the Russian state and the eternal allies of the 
Russian people against outside aggression; in this manner Karelians are again 
associated with Russia from time immemorial.  The role of intertextuality in this 
context shall be examined as the mainstream media discourse reacts in 
opposition to its Finnish counterparts; it shall also be glimpsed in the manner in 
which Karelians invoke this narrative to refute unspoken questions over their 
loyalty when they address a Russian audience.  These narratives will be 
contrasted with the more heterodox constructions found in the interview material 
which subvert this unity and posit an alternate association with Finnish identity 
or simply a more distinctly ‘Karelian’ identity which rejects aspects of this 
Russifying agenda.  In particular the narratives used by those who are active in 
organisations campaigning for more rights for the Finno-Ugric minorities to state 
their claims to such concessions and to distance their group from the dominant 
Russians shall be explored. 
This study underlines that although historical narratives are a key tool for 
the production of national identity they must be understood in their broader 
social, political and linguistic context.  The discursive strategies employed to 







and analysed with regards to this social context.  This shall include a 
consideration of the sources Karelians use to produce narratives which are in 
opposition to those produced within the media and the limitations of this process.  
The study shall also demonstrate that such narratives are often employed by 
Karelians in association with negative self-presentation, the narration of a dead 
or dying national group and the increased appropriation and commercialisation 
of such narratives and symbols of such narratives and symbols of national 
identity to promote a de-ethnicised Karelian identity; in other words the 
increasing use of Karelian identity as a ‘brand’.  The relatively weak ability of 
Karelians themselves to produce such narratives is also identified in comparison 
to other more dominant national groups and the potential reasons for this 

































The Historical, Linguistic, Legal and Institutional Background to 
Problems of Karelian Language and Identity 
 
1.1 A Short History of the Republic of Karelia 
 
 To examine the manner in which Karelian identities are produced within 
discourse and the role of the narration of history within this process it is 
necessary to first examine the broader social context.  The history and 
historiography of The Republic of Karelia must be analysed as they form the 
background from which historical narratives may be derived.  An examination of 
the development of Karelian history is necessary to illustrate the possible range 
of historical narratives which can be created to assist the development of 
differing conceptions of national identity.  A cognisance of the general trends in 
the historiography of the area is likewise of importance as it impinges on the 
production of potential competing ‘national’ or ‘regional’ histories of Karelia 
and the Karelian people.  It is also of importance to detail linguistic, institutional 
and other related factors which may play a role in establishing this broader social 
context.  As shall be discussed further below the actual administrative framework 
of the area, both in spatial and more general organisational terms can contribute 
directly to the development and propagation of varying conceptions of national 
identity.  
Firstly some basic facts about the area in question must be established.  
The Republic of Karelia is one of 21 semi-autonomous republics of the Russian 
Federation (if Crimea is excluded) differentiated from the 46 oblasts and 9 krais 
by being, in theory, the territory of a specific ethnic group.  The Republic of 
Karelia is, therefore, officially recognised and indeed constituted as the 
homeland of an indigenous people, the eponymous Karelians.  The Republic 







has been termed Karelia, nor does it cover all areas where Karelian populations 
have historically been known to reside.  Two of the most south-eastern provinces 
of modern Finland bear the title Karelia, and the name ‘Karelian Isthmus’ is still 
generally applied by geographers to refer to that area of present-day 
Leningradskaya Oblast’ which was historically considered to be part of ‘Karelia’.  
The contemporary Republic of Karelia unlike this more general conception of 
‘Karelia’ can be said to have very definite boundaries; in the north this border 
divides it from the Kola Peninsula and Murmanskaya Oblast’ until the land 
meets the White Sea, which sweeps across Karelia’s eastern border until both 
meet Archangel’skaya Oblast’; in the extreme south-east Karelia shares a short 
border with Vologodskaya Oblast’ and is bounded to the south-west by that part 
of Leningradskaya Oblast’ once reckoned a part of Karelia and once legally a 
part of Finland.  The boundary with Finland encompasses the entire western edge 
of the Republic.  The Republic of Karelia to a large extent covers the area once 
commonly termed Karelia, yet certain parts lie in other Federal Subjects or in 
another state entirely.  Furthermore, the present Republic of Karelia also 
incorporates areas which were, arguably, not at certain points considered 
historically to form parts of ‘Karelia’.  The adjective ‘Karelian’ is also rather 
ambiguous in that it may be used to refer both to the actual language and people 
and also in a broader sense anything to do with the Republic of Karelia.  It must 
also be noted that a large population of Karelian speakers historically resided in 
what is now Tver’skaya Oblast’, which is quite distant from the modern Karelia.  
It should also be borne in mind that Karelian as a language does not have a 
standard literary form.  Speakers of Karelian are divided into those who speak 
‘Proper Karelian’, predominantly in the northern half of the modern Republic of 
Karelia, and those who speak the Ludic and Livvikovian Dialect, who 
predominantly reside further south.  Ludic is spoken in the areas around Lake 
Onego and is considered closer to Vepsian whereas Livvikovians (ли́ввики  or 
livgilaizet in Russian and Karelian respectively) traditionally inhabit the areas 
around Olonets; this dialect is considered to be more influenced by Russian.  The 
northern Karelians, those who inhabit Vienan Karjala, are considered to have a 
dialect closer to modern Finnish.  







paucity.  Much of that which exists is devoted to study of the interwar period of 
1917-1940 and follows two broad thematic concerns: spacial and linguistic 
policies and planning.  In this regard the theme of identity is often an important if 
not primary concern to the researchers involved.  In terms of spacial histories the 
work of Paasi (1996) and Baron (2007a, 2007c) are concerned with the 
development of ideas of ‘Karelia’ as regards conceptions of space, boundaries 
and the centre-periphery dichotomy, in particular during the initial period of 
Soviet power.  Soviet regionalism has been tackled more broadly by Rees (2002) 
and Harris (1999).  In addition to such studies there has been some scholarly 
interest in Karelia as an example of the implementation of Soviet nationalities 
policy, in particular as it related to the development of linguistic policies.  In 
large part this has been due to the somewhat anomalous implementation of such 
policy as it was developed more broadly across the remainder of the USSR.  
Most such studies follow the seminal work of Austin (1981, 1987, 1992) which 
charted the various stages of the development and implementation of language 
policy with Karelia during the 1920s and 30s as it related to the ideological and 
administrative goals of both local and central authorities.  Schrad (2002) has 
followed Austin in his analysis of the linguistic policies of the Soviet authorities 
in Karelia and the manner in which they were utilised to construct conceptions of 
Karelian identity, although his analysis is somewhat brief and mainly 
comparative with other areas of the USSR.  Soviet nationalities policy in general 
has been examined by Martin (2001), Hirsch (2005), and Smith (2001), which 
have examined the manner in which such policies were formulated and 
implemented more generally across the Soviet Union, as shall be discussed 
below.  A related study is the work of Gleb (1993, 1996) which has examined the 
experience of the Finnish diaspora within the USSR, but particularly within 
Karelia.  This work has also touched upon the manner in which such immigration 
acted to alter the social-linguistic background of the then KASSR and is thus 
invaluable as a resource when considering the formation of national identities 
within this period, although this is not the primary concern of the research.  The 
Finnish researcher Kero (2001) addresses this question more directly in an 
examination of the period, although both works are more descriptive than 







Kero in particular the contemporary Karelian press.  
A much larger volume of material has been devoted to this topic from 
within Finland, and thankfully some of this has been translated into either 
English or Russian and hence is accessible to this researcher.  This literature 
examines Karelian history and linguistic, ethnographic and cultural identity from 
a variety of viewpoints and is extremely complex.  Useful studies include Laine 
and Ylingklas (2002), Sihvo (1989), Kangaspuro (1998, 2002), Lahteenmaki 
(2007) and Suutari (2010) which have examined the links between the evolution 
of spacial and cultural conceptions of Karelia.  These works have also 
investigated the use of such conceptions to bolster or subvert conceptions of 
Finnish and Karelian identities.  The development of the linguistic situation and 
language policies within Karelia have also been examined by Poyli (1998) and 
Saarhima (1996), in particular as regards the correlation between differing 
language policies and levels of Karelian language use.   Kangaspuro (1998) in 
particular has also examined Karelia as a case study of the impact of Soviet 
nationalities policy on language development and demographic change.  Since 
1991 Finnish and Russian researchers have increasingly cooperated on the 
examination of such themes.  The main conduit for such research has been 
collaboration between the Karelian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
in Petrozavodsk and various Finnish institutions, in particular the Karelian 
Centre at the University of the East of Finland (formerly the University of 
Joensuu).  This has led to a sharing of data and methodological approaches 
between these institutions and the publication of a number of volumes of joint 
work including those edited by Kababova (2009) and Suutari and Shikalov 
(2010) which contain the work of both researchers in Russia and Finland.  
Suutari has examined Karelian identity from an ethnographical and cultural 
studies standpoint, an approach also followed by some researchers within 
Petrozavodsk, however much of the work in these collaborations has focused 
once again on issues of language policy.   
Russian research on Karelian themes is also heavily slanted towards an 
ethnographic or language based examination of Karelian identities although this 
is not universal.  Research from the Soviet period tended, in accordance with the 







dissolution of differing identities and developments in material and political 
culture; this approach was not always explicitly or indeed intrinsically Marxist 
but did follow aspects of Soviet ideology.  This approach to the subject has 
persisted to an extent even after the collapse of the Soviet state by which it was 
promoted.  This tendency is exemplified in the work of Klement’ev and 
Kozhanov (1998), Barantseva (1988), and Dubrovskaya (1991).  One important 
aspect of this research which has persisted within the scholarly approach to 
identity within the Republic of Karelia, and arguably to an extent in 
contemporary Russia society, is a fundamental reliance on a Stalinist conception 
of national identity.  The theoretical implications of this approach will be 
considered further below, however here it is important to note that this approach 
views a distinct language (amongst a range of other factors) as an essential 
qualifying characteristic of any putative national group.  To this end much 
scholarly attention is devoted to the problems of language policy and the past and 
future of the Karelian language itself in any examination of ideas of Karelian 
identity; indeed the development of the language and its prospects are often 
synonymous with that of the very idea of Karelian identity in such studies.  There 
is therefore much attention to the problem of the decline and in the language and 
subsequent perceived Russification.  Since 1991 there has also been increased 
historical attention to issues that were implicitly ‘off-limits’ to researchers during 
the Soviet period.  Given the preoccupation with the Karelian language 
mentioned above much of this work has concentrated on critical examination of 
language policy issues, however it has also (see Dubrovskaya 2009, Chukin 
(1990), Ivnitskii and Makarov (1991)) examined others historical issues of 
relevance such as the Civil War and Stalinist Terror which were not previously 
given much if any attention and has used archival material not previously 
available.  The development of ethnic Karelian civil society itself has become 
another key area of research endeavour within Petrozavodsk.  Much attention has 
recently been devoted to ethnographic and political theory based examination of 
the emergence of various groups advocating increased attention toward the 
minority groups of the Republic of Karelia.  To this end the various collections 
of material prepared by the Karelian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 







Karelian identities.   
     To appreciate the potential historical resources which might be 
commandeered for the production of various narratives of Karelian history some 
attention must be paid to this history itself.  As alluded to above there are a 
number of schools of researchers with differing backgrounds and research 
interests which have attempted to examine the history of ‘Karelia’.  A general 
outline of this history and associated historiography shall be given below in order 
to develop the main facts of the subject.  This is necessary to serve as a reference 
against which the narratives analysed in the following chapters may be critically 
examined.  It shall also illustrate the complexity of Karelian history and its 
potential for the creation of opposing narratives of history and thus identity.  
Indeed it is hoped it will become clear how its contentious, disputed and in no 
small measure ambiguous nature provide an exciting arena for the testing of the 
putative use of such narration in the formation of national identities.  It is also 
necessary to examine how the Republic of Karelia came to exist in its current 
form and state, and the background to the linguistic, administrative and policital 
development of the area and the Karelian people.      
In terms of recorded history the Karelians first appear through references 
to a tribe of ‘Korela’ and the town or fortress of Olonets in Novgorodian 
chronicles from 1137, although some modern authorities actually date the 
reference to 1228 (Kochkurkina 1994: 48).  As Pöyli (1998: 128-30) has pointed 
out it is virtually certain the ancestors of this tribe had been resident in the area 
around Lake Ladoga since around the fifth century and Slavic settlers must have 
had some contact with these peoples from the sixth century onwards.  It is not 
possible to make an accurate assessment of the territories held by these Finno-
Ugric tribes or their relations with one another in this prehistoric period.  There is 
some evidence that Vepsian settlement in some arrears of what is now the 
Republic of Karelia predates that of the Karelians, as evidenced in some areas, 
particularly around Lake Onego itself, by toponyms derived from the Vepsian 
language (see Agapitov (1989: 91-5) and Mullonen (1989: 84-91) for an 
examination of this evidence) and archaeological data (Kochkurkina 1989: 64-
76).  Indeed it would appear from such place-name evidence that the Sami were 







89) and that they were displaced by Vepsian settlement.  At some point the 
Vepsians themselves appear to have been partially displaced by the Karelians as 
they in turn moved northwards.  This northward movement appears to be linked 
to the almost incessant fighting between Russia and Sweden, the emerging great 




 centuries.  Despite the long 
duration of this conflict the essential division between Russian and Finnish 
Karelia was established in 1323 when the treaty of Noteborg delimited the border 
between Sweden and the Novgorodian state.  This had two very important effects 
on the development of the region.  Firstly the language of the elite, the language 
of administration and the clergy in Finland was to be Swedish, whereas Russian 
would increasingly come to dominate in Karelia (Baron 2007a: 10-11, Poyli 
1998: 130).  What impact this can be said to have on the internal development of 
the Finnish and Karelian languages, and for that matter other languages of the 
region such as Vepsian or Votic, is a matter for further research, however it must 
be pointed out that it prevented the development of written forms of these 
languages, which became the preserve of the predominantly rural poor rather 
than the more urbanised elites.  Secondly the areas under the control of Sweden 
received Swedish clergy and administrators and eventually developed a Lutheran 
church in opposition to the Russian Orthodox Church which took root in Karelia.  
Evidently even if there was not much essential linguistic difference between 
Finland and Karelia the border, however arbitrary, by the very fact of its 
imposition, would start to create different conceptions of identity.  As Bourdieu 
(1991: 222) has argued, “the frontier, that product of a legal act of delimitation, 
produces cultural differences as much as it is produced by it.”  It may be noted 
that the actual frontier in this remote and rugged region may not have been at all 
clear, or a matter of great concern, to much of the relatively isolated population 
during this period.  It is not certain as to when precisely much of Karelia fell 
under the control of any Russian authority and to what extent in the medieval 
period this control could be realised.  In fact Korpela (2007: 45) points to this 
isolation and the lack of influence church and state had upon the local Finnic 
tribes of medieval Karelia to contend it is meaningless to speculate as to their 
nationality or ethnicity; these Finno-Urgic forest dwellers had little contact with 







 Sweden continued to push the border eastwards, with a new treaties in 
1595 and 1617 recognising this advance.  These advances also brought Finnish 
settlement in the annexed areas, increased taxation and attempts at conversion to 
Lutheranism which caused Karelian populations to flee to the remainder of 
Russian Karelia or the Valdai Hills area of Tver’ (Klement’ev 2008: 35-38).  
Russian interest in Karelia deepened from the era of Peter the Great onwards.  In 
accordance with his desire to advance the frontiers of his empire westwards he 
began the process which ultimately incorporated Finland into the Russian 
Empire.  There certainly had been, as Laine (2001: 53) has noted, Russian 
settlements in the modern Republic of Karelia, particularly around the White Sea 
and Lake Onego, but from this period onwards the area became more firmly 
incorporated in Russian state.  In 1703 Peter founded the city of Petrozavodsk on 
the Onego which was at a later date to surpass Olonets as most important 
administrative centre in the area.  It must be stressed, however, that a good deal 
of the area had been at least nominally under the control of the Russian 
government prior to this, and that the actual frontier in large areas of Karelia 
must have been rather obscure.  Most of what is now the Republic of Karelia was 
then administered as Olonets Guberniya, the remainder being administered from 
Arkhangel‘sk, and was administered in the manner usual to an ordinary Russian 
province and received little of the autonomy Finland was to achieve as a Grand 
Duchy of the Empire.  During this period Karelian as a language was rather 
ignored by the Tsarist government, and a process of passive Russification can be 
said to have been fostered.  Karelians were generally assimilated into Russian 
life through commercial, educational, religious and personal contacts.  As Pöyli 
(1998: 129-31) contends the only medium of exchange in most contacts between 
Karelians and Russians would have been the Russian language.  Finland was 
annexed to the Russian Empire in 1809 and this further obscured the boundary 
between Karelia and Finland, although the frontier was retained for customs 
purposes.  The new Grand Duchy was also ceded certain areas in the Karelian 
Isthmus and ‘Old Karelia’ which led to the rapid assimilation of local Karelians 
into the new Finnish administration (Lahteenmaki 2007, Klement’yev 2008).  
The 19
th
 century was also the period of the flowering of Finnish nationalism 







primary importance.  Karelia was seen by Finnish nationalists as being a 
repository of purely Finnish cultural values untainted by Swedish or, especially 
Northern Karelia where the dialect was closest to Finnish, Russian influences.  
This region in particular was the destination for Elias Lonnrot on his many field 
trips during the 1830s to collect the folk-poetry he would turn into the epic 
Kalevala.  The role Karelia played in creating notions of Finnish nationalism can 
be glimpsed in Sihvo (1999), Homen (1921) and Passi (1996).  As a consequence 
of this ‘Karelianism’ Finnish nationalists undertook cultural and educational 
work within Karelia, a movement which was characterised at the time as ‘pan-
Finnic propaganda’ by the Russian authorities, and was at least in part motivated 
by a desire to unite the area with a broader Finnish state at some future date (for 
the Finnish influence in Karelia in the early 20
th
 century see Vitukhnovskaya 
2009).  These dreams of a ‘Greater Finland’ including Karelia did receive some 
support from Northern Karelians in particular; in 1906 a ‘Union of White Sea 
Karelians’ was founded after a conference in Ukhta (now Kalevala) (Baron 
2007b: 56) which subscribed to the idea of a closer union of some sort with 
Finland.  They also however engendered something of a backlash from the 
authorities who sought to counter any such nationalist feeling from the numerous 
minority nationalities of the Russian Empire. 
 The first attempts to provide any kind cultural and political autonomy to 
the area date from the period immediately following the Russian revolutions of 
1917.  Although there is much controversy about many aspects of this period, 
most historians can agree on certain fundamental points regarding Soviet policy 
towards the area.  As shall be seen, relations between the local and central 
administrations were often fraught with misunderstanding and tension resulting 
in two very different conceptions of what Karelia was or should become.  These 
conceptions were also always heavily influenced by Finland and the aspirations 
of both communist and nationalist Finns.  Finland declared independence from 
the emerging Soviet state in December 1917 and was soon immersed in civil 
strife as pro-Soviet Red Guards and White Finnish forces vied for supremacy 
(for the Finnish revolution see Upton 1980).  Aided by their German allies the 
White forces soon managed to expel their Red adversaries who naturally sought 







refugees arriving in the new Soviet state.  These Finnish émigrés were to prove a 
highly influential force in Karelian politics for decades to come.   
In Karelia itself the Revolution and Finnish independence generated a 
range of differing political responses across the region.  The border villages of 
Repola and Porajarvi held votes which led to these settlements announcing a 
wish to join the new Finnish Republic (Vitukhnovskaya 2009: 71).  In Olonets 
the new authorities took the decision not to join Finland, although some 
Karelians did cross the border to join the Finnish forces.  In Ukhta the 
provisional authorities decided to offer support neither to the Finns nor the 
Bolsheviks (Dubrovskaya 1991: 228).  The new Finnish government then offered 
substantial support if not official sanction to a volunteer movement called the 
Olonets or Aunus expedition which attempted and failed to seize Petrozavodsk 
(Vihavainen 2007: 176).   The situation in the north was complicated by the 
presence of British forces of intervention during the period 1918-19 (for a study 
of this period see Baron 2007b).  The Entente powers were by summer 1918, as 
Dubrovskaya (2009: 254) contends, the real power in the Kola peninsula and 
northern Karelia.  They had little interest in Karelian national aspirations but 
were concerned by Finnish reliance on German assistance during their civil war 
and also by the possibility of the Germans or their allies seizing Murmansk with 
its stores of war materials.  They had also been tasked with assisting the White 
Russian forces who controlled Murmansk in the struggle with the Bolsheviks, 
who were esteemed to be German agents (see Baron 2007b: 57-62).  An unlikely 
alliance of Entente forces, Karelian volunteers and Red Finnish refugees then 
together fought off a White Finnish column at Uskozero and then chased them 
back to and beyond Ukhta.  Around 4,000 Karelians then formed a ‘Karelian 
Regiment’ under British command which throughout 1918 and 1919 fought 
against the Bolsheviks; the Entente forces with their aid advanced as far as the 
shores of the Onego (ibid: 75).  The military success of the Karelians did not 
translate, however, into political capital; the allies were entirely unwilling to 
consider the idea of Karelian independence and autonomy.  In January 1919 they 
attempted to petition the British government for protectorate status, however 
their request went unheeded; the British instead began introducing White 







Karelians then attempted to arrange a National Committee in Kem’, in order to 
arrange elections to a National Assembly of Karelia; this step was seen as deeply 
worrying by the Russian and British authorities, who then accelerated their 
efforts to assimilate the Karelians with White Russian forces.  Karelian demands 
for some degree of political independence from Russia were seen as Bolshevism 
and the regiment was reformed and kept away from the front, while the rate of 
desertion increased markedly.  The military situation for the White Russian 
forces deteriorated rapidly upon the evacuation of the Entente forces at the end of 
1919 and they were soon routed by the advancing Bolsheviks, with Murmansk 
falling by February 1920.  The Karelians had, meanwhile, been left with little 
option but to attempt to secure Finnish support against both factions in the 
Russian Civil War; by 1919 many Karelians were openly backing the Finnish 
incursions into southern Karelia (ibid: 99).  In this rather hopeless situation the 
last flowering of an independent Karelian political movement took place; in July 
1919 a Provisional Government of White Sea Karelia was declared in Ukhta, and 
it declared Karelia independent in January 1920.  This government was highly 
dependent on Finnish aid, and although it managed to survive whilst Bolshevik 
attention was directed elsewhere it was soon under intense pressure; in March 
1920 the Red Army occupied Ukhta.  An assembly of 120 Karelians from across 
the area initially persisted in their demands for independence pending a 
constitutional settlement and prevailed upon the Bolsheviks to temporarily 
withdraw; their patience was exhausted by the 18
th
 of May, however, and the 
government fled to Finland.  In a somewhat farcical coda to these events some 
Red Finns then retaliated against their nationalist fellow-countrymen by raiding 
Finnish Karelia and proclaiming a Soviet Republic to a group of astonished 
lumberjacks.  They then retreated across the border to the USSR, having 
achieved nothing more than provoking some consternation in both Helsinki and 
Moscow (Upton 1973: 144-5).   The Karelians, who had hoped to maintain a 
political course separate from that envisaged by White or Red Russians and the 
warring factions of Finns, had attempted and failed to assert their political 
independence.   
 Finnish refugees displaced from their mother country after defeat in the 







persuade Lenin to create the first autonomous area for the Karelian population 
(Baron 2007a: 20-23).  Gylling and his deputy Rovio were close personal friends 
of Lenin and were thus allowed a large degree of lassitude to organise the 
region’s government as they saw fit (Upton 1973: 210).  The Karelian Worker’s 
Commune (KTK) was created in 1920 across much of what is today the modern 
Republic of Karelia.  The idea of founding the KTK was that of these Finnish 
immigrants, as neither the Petrozavodsk nor Arkhangel’sk local authorities had 
any interest in Karelian autonomy and the Karelians involved in previous 
attempts to create it were not Bolsheviks (Takala 2009: 110-114).  It must be 
noted, however, that large areas of what is commonly termed Karelia were 
excluded from this new creation.  The Karelian speaking population around the 
city of Tver’ (later Kalinin) was excluded, although in pure numerical terms this 
was largest area of Karelian settlement, with 127,000 speakers recorded here in 
1933 (Austin 1992: 21).  Also excluded from the new autonomous area were 
those areas of Karelia within the new Finnish Republic, including most of the 
Karelian Isthmus and the area to the east of Lake Ladoga.  Gylling had envisaged 
a much more extensive territory for his autonomous area, incorporating the Kola 
Peninsula (Baron 2007a: 21).  The creation of this autonomous area could be 
seen as a natural outcome of Soviet policy of the period.  It had always been 
Bolshevik policy to offer cultural and linguistic autonomy to the minority 
populations residing on the territory of the Russian Empire, an issue which 
became more pressing following the failure of the German revolution and Polish 
war (Smith 1999: 21-22).   Gylling’s vision of his autonomous region also found 
favour in Moscow due to the delicate relations between the Soviet state and its 
Finnish neighbour.  During this period the nascent Soviet state was still 
vulnerable to armed intervention even from the relatively weak Finnish state, and 
hence the question of Karelia had to be resolved as a matter of some urgency.  
Whilst the Red Army opposed autonomy in case it compromised the defence of 
the border, Narkomindel argued it would be a good way to appease popular 
Finnish sentiment whilst avoiding the cessation of territory (Baron 2007: 22).  
Therefore when Gulling and other Red Finns presented their plans to Lenin they 
met with a much more favourable reception than they may otherwise have 
expected (Kangaspuro 2002: 28-33).
 







defeated, the Finnish negotiators of the Tartu treaty of 14
th
 October 1920 
dropped demands for a plebiscite on Karelian autonomy or the annexation of the 
entirety of Karelia, including Petrozavodsk, and both sides agreed to peace with 
merely the addition of a formal statement guaranteeing Karelian autonomy (ibid 
32-22 and Lahteenmaki 2007: 155-9).   
In this period the new Soviet state offered political autonomy to, in 
theory, all of the various national minorities that had been denied such freedoms 
within the centralised, Russifying imperial system of governance (see Smith 
1999: 19-29 and Bassin and Kelly 2012: 3-4).  In this context it is not at all 
surprising that such autonomy was granted to Karelia despite the apparent 
reluctance of some of the new regime’s officials.  In line with the Bolshevik 
theoretical understanding of what nationality actual meant, as developed by 
Stalin in Marxism and the National Question, any group which fulfilled certain 
critical criteria had the right to be considered a national group and thus gain 
political autonomy.  These criteria were, broadly speaking, a distinct territory, 
language, culture and economy.  The Karelians could claim to meet these criteria 
and thus should have been automatically entitled to such autonomy.  The 
implementation of such an ideal system of national delimitation unsurprisingly 
proved more complicated in practice than Stalin’s apparently neat theoretical 
summation of national identity appeared to suggest.  In a number of cases, 
including arguably the Karelian, although a minority met these criteria it did not 
necessarily possess a developed sense of national identity.  Whilst in other areas 
there existed a national intelligentsia eager to seize this opportunity to develop 
their nationality within Karelia the impetus for political autonomy came from 
without.  The main leadership of the Karelian autonomous area came from the 
Finnish émigrés in Petrozavodsk, whose arrival in Karelia had increased the 
Finnish population greatly, leading to it rising from just 990 in 1920 to 2,500 in 
1926, although this was still merely 0.9% of the population of the Republic.  The 
Finns formed an educated, literate and pro-Bolshevik elite, particularly as they 
tended to be from more proletarian backgrounds than the Karelians, and quickly 
established themselves as the leadership of the region.  As Austin argues the 
Finns had all the advantages except numbers.  Although they constituted only 







administration due to the fact they tended to be more literate in both Russian and 
Finnish than the less-educated Karelians (Austin 1992: 19-20). They were also 
an urbanised population, unlike the Karelians who generally occupied rural 
areas, and were better positioned to exercise control over the Republic.  Initially 
these Finns viewed their stay in Karelia as temporary, pending an inevitable 
revolution in Finland itself and the creation of a communist Greater Finland 
incorporating Karelia.  To this end Gylling envisaged an autonomous area that 
was economically as well as politically self-sufficient, and for this reason 
obtained the inclusion of Petrozavodsk as well as other areas of majority 
Russian, rather than Karelian or Finnish, population, whilst ignoring and 
excluding some Karelian and all Vepsian populations in the area.  
Unsurprisingly, ethnic Karelians in the area were upset at their exclusion from 
power and what they saw as the ’dilution’ of their ethnic area (Baron 2007a: 36-
7) and the dominance of a Finnish leadership which, as Laine argues, “did not 
remotely represent” their interests (2002: 11), and there were similar complaints 
from the Russian areas transferred to the jurisdiction of Petrozavodsk.    
The Bolshevik policy of ‘korenisatisya’ had the aim of allowing minority 
groups to develop their own culture, language and administration with the 
minimum of interference from Russians or other ethnic groups.  In Karelia this 
policy was inverted by the Finnish influence into a policy of active 
‘finnicisation’, rather than a policy of ‘karelianisation’  The Finns in 
Petrozavodsk decided to use Finnish as a literary language for Karelians as they 
saw no essential differences between the languages and indeed viewed Karelians 
as the Eastern part of the Finnish ethnos (Klement’ev 2009: 149).  No attempt 
was made to create a literary Karelian language, as had been attempted in similar 
situations in Central Asia for example, as Moscow accepted the Finnish ‘expert’ 
opinion and implemented a policy of encouraging the use of Finnish across the 
Republic (Kangaspuro 2002: 31).  Standard Finnish was adopted as the official 
language despite, as Austin contends, the fact that a literary Karelian ’would 
have been the most sensible solution on purely linguistic grounds’ (1992: 19).  
The existing Russian bureaucracy in Petrozavodsk, supported by certain Olonets 
Karelians, proposed the development of a Karelian language for at least the 







the central authorities: they were, however, overruled and the Finnish project 
adopted (Takala 2009: 115-6). This resulted in Finnish schools (Ilukha 2002: 51-
2) being provided for where no schools existed, and all existing schools in 
Karelian areas, and also many in predominantly Russian-speaking areas, which 
were Russian given the non-literary nature of Karelian, being converted into 
Finnish schools.  In 1929 all instruction given to Karelian children was to be 
given in Finnish only, although this could not be implemented due to a lack of 
qualified Finnish speakers (ibid: 52).  Dozens of Finnish periodicals were 
launched and a large-scale Finnish publishing industry was created in 
Petrozavodsk.  The adoption of Finnish rather than a standardised Karelian is 
also a matter of some dispute.  Schrad, for example, contends that the adoption of 
Finnish rather than make any attempt to create a Karelian language was ‘the 
more practical option’ for a ‘Finnic population’ (2004: 465)
. 
 Austin (1992: 29) 
has also acknowledged that given the close relationship between North Karelian 
and other Finnish dialects it may well have been possible over a period of time to 
integrate these Karelians into a Finnish-speaking society, and contends that the 
Soviet government had little interest in creating a bespoke language for the 
25,000 or so North Karelians themselves.  Finnish was of some use in eradicating 
illiteracy, as Takala (2009: 130-1) has noted, within the Karelian population, 
however she also notes the adoption of Finnish was not welcomed and indeed 
was resisted by Karelians in many areas (ibid: 138).  From these disputes it can 
be noted that those scholars who see little essential difference between Karelians 
and Finns are generally supportive of this attempt at integration.  Schrad in fact 
views the Karelians as exemplifying a ‘rag-doll’ nation, an artificial, somewhat 
unnecessary construct that has divided an essentially unified population for 
unrelated geo-political reasons. 
 The ambitious plans of Gylling were partially stymied by the fact, as he 
himself was aware, that the most able and ambitious Finnish émigrés tended to 
remain in Moscow and Leningrad, immersing themselves in the affairs of the 
SKP or Finnish Communist Party and its underground work in Finland itself.  
Karelia was somewhat of a backwater and became a “dumping ground for the 
misfits and failures” of the exiled Finnish community (Upton 1973: 211). 







Finnish language however; in fact it was claimed educated Karelian speakers in 
general could not understand Standard Finnish by the academic Bubrikh (1932), 
and that Karelian and Finnish vocabulary were almost entirely different.  It is not 
at all certain that speakers of other Karelian dialects, who were by far the 
majority, could actually fully understand Standard Finnish, nor would it seem 
that the new Karelian administration was overly concerned by this.  It was 
assumed that these Karelians would soon in turn become a minority in a larger 
Finnish-speaking state, if much attention was paid to them at all.  The Finnish 
community in Karelia had basically attempted to create a Finnish Karelia that 
would one day be reunited with Finland proper, and had for the most part 
disregarded the status of Karelians themselves and their language.   
This policy of ‘finnicisation’ can be contrasted to the experience of the 
Karelian population of Tver’ Oblast’, who were allowed a great deal more 
influence in their own cultural and linguistic development (Baron 2007: 97).  
There were few Finnish émigrés in this area and it was of little interest to the 
Finnish elite in Petrozavodsk, lying as it did outside their political control and 
also, it may be argued, outside of their conception of a greater Finland-Karelia.   
In these circumstances the local Karelian population and also linguists from 
central Soviet institutions were allowed more freedom in their efforts to achieve 
korenisatsiya.  No effort was made in this area to promote the speaking of 
Finnish, in complete contrast to the situation in the KTK, and therefore it must be 
assumed that the Karelian population and, perhaps more critically, the 
professional Soviet linguists of the day were by far from convinced of the 
essential unity of Finnish and Karelian.  In this area the academic Bubrikh and 
others created a Karelian language based on the local dialects and the Latin 
alphabet (for the history of this language see Anttikoski 2010).  This language 
was used for a newspaper and some other publications, and education for the 
Karelian population was done in this new, Karelian language.  There was no 
interest from Gylling and his Finns in adopting this language in the KTK, indeed 
there was open hostility towards the language and the Karelian population in this 
area, whom, they considered, ought to have been resident in the KTK (Austin 
1992: 30).  In line with the general withdrawal of korenisatsiya the programme 







publication of newspapers and journals in this Karelian language.  The later 
experiment in a Cyrillic Karelian was applied to this area also, and failures in this 
scheme together with the growing official antipathy towards the Finnish and, by 
extension, the Karelians, led to the liquidation of any political and cultural 
autonomy for this area altogether with the dissolution of the Karelian 
Autonomous Okrug in the Tver’ area.    
The Karelian Worker’s Commune, which Gylling insisted must have 
complete control over its own economy, almost achieved this in 1921 (Baron 
2007a: 43).  To protect this status and also to counter Finnish accusations the 
autonomy of Karelia was a fiction, the Karelian Workers’ Commune was 
expanded into the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KASSR) on 
the 25
th
 of July 1923
.
  Already, however, the ‘national’ nature of the autonomous 
area was something of a fiction.  Gylling had wished to exclude Pudozh region 
from the new republic, swapping this for Murmansk region in order to roughly 
balance out the numbers of Karelians and Russians.  This was denied, and the 
Karelians and Finns became a minority in their own national area.  A further 
setback was the cessation of 15,000sq km of Karelian territory to the Murmansk 
railway as ’colonisation territory’ which the Karelian authorities subsequently 
had little control over.  Ironically Soviet policies of industrialisation, of which 
the Karelian leadership were in full support, the completion the railway from 
Murmansk to Leningrad and the exploitation of Karelia’s natural resources 
undermined the ’Finnishness’ of the young Republic.  Thousands of workers, 
which the rural Karelian population and the small Finnish elite could not provide, 
were required for these new undertakings, and these were provided by other 
areas of the USSR.  These immigrants were mainly Russian, although there were 
also thousands of Byelorussians and Ukrainians.  The construction of the White 
Sea Canal project also involved a large influx of labour from outside Karelia, but 
much of this was involuntary and hence not necessarily of a long duration.  Due 
to this large number of newcomers the proportion of self-identified Karelians 
dropped from 67% in 1897 to just 39% in 1926, and fell to 23% in 1939 despite 
there being an actual increase in pure numerical terms over the same period.  To 
maintain or enhance the Finnish character of the Republic Gylling persuaded 







into Karelia and also the large-scale immigration of Finns from outside the 
USSR, starting from 1931 onwards (see Takala 2007, 2009 for more details on 
this Finnish immigration).  As Gleb has argued it is likely this was also seen as 
an opportunity to offer an example to disaffected minority groups of enlightened 
Soviet policy towards their minority groups (1993: 1091).
 
  The number of Finns 
who moved into Karelia during this period is hard to determine with any 
exactitude.  Up to 25,000 Finns may have emigrated to Karelia during this 
period, however not all ended up staying for very long, after having become 
disillusioned with the actual economic situation in Karelia.  Laine, for example, 
estimates only around 5,000 Finns from North America out of ’several 
thousands’ (2001: 54) who initially emigrated to Karelia in this period actually 
stayed in the USSR, adding to this around 8,000 immigrants who came direct 
from Finland.  Ironically the SKP in Finland, which was more interested in 
building a revolutionary party in that country than socialism in another, actually 
dissuaded workers from crossing the border to the ‘paradise’ of Karelia to 
conserve its own forces (Upton 1973: 212).  What can be said with certainty is 
that these influxes of Finns were not enough to provide anything like a Finnish 
majority in the area or even provide much of a counterbalance to the increasing 
waves of economic migrants from other areas of the Soviet state.  These 
immigrants added to the Finnish dominance of political and cultural life.  The 
impact of this immigration and the adoption of Finnish as an official language 
are highly controversial.  Gleb maintains that the Finnish immigrants enriched 
the cultural life of Soviet Karelia, he does also admit, in passing, that they 
enjoyed a privileged status regarding supplies and were not as badly affected by 
the hardships of the initial five-year plans (1993: 1092).   
The influence of the Finns over the fate of Karelia was not fated to last, 
however.  With the growth of a more authoritative, repressive, and Russified 
Stalin-centred Soviet administration there came increasing pressure on the 
various minority nations to adopt a ‘Soviet’ nationality rather than persist in 
attempting to assert their autonomy.  Across the USSR national minorities 
experienced a curtailment of their polticial autonomy and a growing compulsion 
to abandon what were seen as the anti-Soviet, bourgeois trappings of national 







to the extent that it was compatible with overall central political control.  From 
the beginning of the Stalinst period pressure increased to develop a national 
culture ‘national in form but socialist in content’ (see Bassin and Kelly 2012: 
60).   In practice this meant an increasing pressure to adopt Russian norms and 
the Russian language even if the ideas of national autonomy and cultural 
development were never explicitly renounced by the Stalinist bureaucracy.  The 
various national intelligentsias which had been encouraged to develop by the 
policies of the 1920s, alongside their associated cultural and political products, 
were subject to increasing repression. This pressure was particularly dangerous 
for the Finns, as they were a nationality mostly resident outside the Soviet Union, 
they occupied a border area and spoke a language that was not purely a ’Soviet’ 
one.  As Austin has noted, the fact that Finnish was the main language of a 
‘bourgeois’ state led to accusations it was in fact a ’bourgeois’ language (1992: 
21).  The Finnish notion of unification between Karelia and Finland could be 
seen as a nationalist project, rather than a purely revolutionary one if there were 
suspicions that the actual union was more important to some of the elite in 
Petrozavodsk than how it was accomplished.  The creation and expansion of the 
Karelian gulag system also contributed to the dilution of the ‘national’ 
population, as forced labour was brought in from across the RSFSR.  The camps 
were also under the control of the OGPU, who operated with little regard for the 
Karelian authorities (Baron 2007a: 83-88).  Gradually the growth of this 
apparatus, which culminated with the establishment of the Belomorsko-Baltiiskii 
Kombine (BBK) which was given authority over large areas surrounding the new 
canal and was able to operate with almost total disregard for the desires of the 
local administration.  Karelia’s economic autonomy was also severely 
compromised by the advent of the Five-Year Plan.    
 In 1928 the Karelian-Russian opposition to the Finnish administration 
had attempted to take control, but had been defeated with the aid of the 
Leningrad party leadership.  By the early 1930s the hostility of many local 
Karelians and Russians, who had throughout the 1920s felt disenfranchised by 
the Finnish leadership, was utilised by the centre.  There was also some concern 
amongst the authorities about the growing discontent amongst the Finnish 







attempts to leave the USSR (Gleb 1993).  The Tver’ Karelians had already, in 
1931, unsuccessfully, attempted to get Finnish replaced in the KASSR by 
Karelian, arguing that the use of Finnish was an example of chauvinism (Baron 
2007a: 97-8).  It has been noted above also that it was in 1932 Bubrikh (see 
Bubrikh 1932) asserted that Karelian and Finnish were separate languages and 
therefore, according to Stalinist linguistics, must be separate peoples.  It cannot 
be ascertained whether this change in academic thinking was made on the merits 
of the evidence alone; as we shall see Bubrikh was certainly malleable enough 
with his views regarding Karelian later on.  In fact Bubrikh made several far-
reaching and rather surprising statements related to the Karelian language.  
Whilst dismissing Finnish as a language ‘not suitable’ for use in the USSR at all, 
and inferring it was in and of itself a ‘fascist’ language, he also stated that 
Russian was the source of future development for Karelian and even that the 
richness of Karelian grammatical structure was an impediment to this 
development, stating it was overly complex and, most importantly, entirely 
different from Russian.  Bubrikh also alleged that the language policy of the 
Finns was motivated by ‘White Finnish’ plans to found a greater Finland (see 
Takala 2009: 128-30).  In 1932 there appeared a series of articles in Pravda 
which attacked Finnish nationalism and a perceived Finnish chauvinism towards 
Karelians (Austin 1992: 23).  As Karelian was now considered to be a separate 
language in accordance with policies of korenisatsiya the Karelian population 
ought to have their own language as a literary language rather than a foreign 
tongue imposed upon them.  The Finnish administration in the KASSR around 
this time looked at trying to implement a process of ‘karelianisation’ of the 
Finnish language used in the Republic by using more Karelian words.  In 1935, 
after the Finns had lost political control, attempts were made to ‘Sovietise’ 
Finnish, which was still the official language of the KASSR, and also to create a 
‘dialect literature’ based on Olonets Karelian.   
In January 1934 the central committee had declared that, in contrast to 
previous declarations, Finnish and not Russian chauvinism and nationalism was 
the primary concern in Karelia.  This opened the door for a widespread purge of 
the Finnish influence in the Republic.  This purge must be set in the context of 







Stalinist state began to consolidate its power through increasing centralisation 
and standardisation.  Elements considered to be inimical to this process were 
brutally purged from society by either dismissal from office, arrest, incarceration, 
execution or a combination of these measures.  In terms of policy towards 
national minorities much of the local intelligentsia and administration that had 
flourished during the first years of the Soviet regime was now not only hindered 
in its work but actively repressed and removed from office and influence.  In 
Karelia this process saw the almost complete destruction of Finnish influence.  
From 1935 onwards Finns were systematically removed from almost all 
positions of authority within the KASSR and the USSR in general.  Both Gylling 
and his close associates in the Karelian leadership such as Rovio were 
summoned to Moscow and shot.  In January 1937 A. Zhdanov attacked Finnish 
nationalism in a closed meeting in Leningrad and this opened the door for the 
extension of the terror of what was termed the Yezhovschina to the Karelian 
population.  Gelb (1993: 1100-10 ) and Schrad (2004: 470) contend that up to 
20,000, or 80% of the immigrants to Karelia were shot, jailed or exiled together 
with large numbers of the indigenous population, although it may be noted this is 
more than some figures for the actual numbers of immigrants in the first place.  
Laine gives a figure of 8,744 convictions of ‘enemies of the people’ by the 
NKVD in Karelia for the period March 1937 to April 1938, which was the height 
of the terror (2001: 54).  Of this number 3,771 are identified as Karelians and 
1,929 as Finns.  Takala estimates that Finns comprised 40% of those repressed in 
the KASSR, whilst the Karelians and Russians comprised 27% and 25% 
respectively (2007: 202-3). Regardless of the exact figures what can be said with 
certainty is that the design of these purges was to remove all Finnish influence 
from the KASSR and that whilst in statistical terms the losses amongst the 
Russian and Karelian populations, whilst tragic, were a small proportion of the 
entire population, almost all Finnish families were effected and virtually all 
Finns of any note in the administration were denounced and arrested.  Together 
with this repression of the actual Finnish populace the authorities embarked on a 
policy of repressing the Finnish language.  In October 1937 the Karelian 
Commissariat for Education had entrusted Bubrikh with the creation of a Cyrillic 







population in their own language.  Concomitant with the promotion of this new 
language was the elimination of Finnish from the life of the Republic.  From 
January 1
st
 1938 Finnish was abolished as an official language in the KASSR and 
all books in the language, including those of Marx, Lenin and Stalin were 
publicly burnt.  All Finnish schools were closed and all instruction in Finnish 
was forbidden.  Finnish was now assumed to be a ’fascist’ language in reference 
to the Finnish relationship with Nazi Germany, and a further purge of Finns was 
undertaken from all state institutions.  In fact the 1939 census in Karelia failed to 
discover any Finns resident there whatsoever, presumably as those remaining 
were either too afraid to identify themselves as such or were officially prevented 
from so doing.  The repression went so far that it proved difficult to find Finns to 
fill the ranks to the KFSSR in 1940; aside from Kuusinen almost all Finns of any 
influence had been purged.   
Despite the associated repression of Finns and Finnish culture the 
adoption of a literary Karelian might have been the chance to finally allow the 
indigenous population to influence their own cultural and linguistic development.  
This does not ever really seem to have been the intention.  The language created 
by Bubrikh was based mostly on the Olonets dialect, which had more borrowings 
from Russian than other Karelian dialects, and he assiduously added more of 
these.  The  Political reasons also influenced the morphology of the new 
language; in 1932, Bubrikh had distinguished 13 cases in Karelian, revising this 
down later to 12 in accordance with the then prevalent Finnish practice, and in 
1937 deciding on a mere 9 cases.  Bubrikh characterised this as the elimination 
of archaic features found only in North Karelian, but the motivation was 
primarily political, as Austin argues: 
“In political terms this was seen as striking a blow against bourgeois 
Finland and Greater-Finland nationalists.  At the same time it emphasised 
Russian and allowed for the introduction of many Russian words into the 
vocabulary.  Since the southern dialects, Olonets and Lude, had been less 
researched, there were fewer accepted phonemic or morphological norms and so 
the creators of the new language had a carte blanche in their development of a 
language that would suit their political prerequisites (1992: 21).”   







were many words of common Finnish and Karelian derivation in order to 
‘cleanse’ the language of negative influences (Belikova 2009: 170-2).  The 
Cyrillic system poorly represented Karelian sounds, however, and the new 
language was basically heavily based on Russian vocabulary, particularly at 
higher levels of education, and grammatical rules that were hard for most 
Karelian speakers to understand.  The introduction of such a strange form of 
Karelian and the overnight total abandonment of Finnish led to a great deal of 
confusion, as education and administration in general had to be carried out 
without appropriate resources in a language not understood by most Karelians.  
In some districts there were no textbooks for schools at all, nor qualified 
teachers, as the Finnish ones had been disposed of and no new Karelian 
alternatives had been provided.  In 1939 yet more purging of Finnish borrowings 
was undertaken from Karelian, as well as the borrowing of yet more 
Russianisms, although the chaos still continued.  As Austin puts it, “no Karelians 
could actually understand their literary language” (1992: 25).  The language thus 
created was useless for the purpose of the development of the Karelian 
population, and was rather merely a hurried, ill-conceived attempt to destroy 
Finnish influence and reorientate linguistic development towards Russian. 
 This failed attempt to create a literary language had been embarked upon 
for political motives and was abruptly dropped in 1940 for much the same 
reasons.  In November 1939 the USSR had in fact offered a segment of Karelia 
to Finland in return for the border between the states being moved 25km back 
from Leningrad.  This offer was, predictably, refused, as the area of Karelia was 
mostly uninhabited and of little value compared to the piece of territory the 
USSR had demanded.  The refusal of this demand initiated the ‘Winter War’ of 
1940 between the USSR and Finland.  That it was the initial aim of the USSR to 
occupy Finland can be seen from the ‘reconstitution’ of the Finnish Democratic 
Republic under Kuusinen in Zelenogorsk (Terijoki), purporting to be the 
legitimate government of Finland, as a continuation of the Finnish Socialist 
Workers’ Republic of 1918.  Soviet military efforts were not very successful, 
however, and attempts to break Finnish defences proved costly and prolonged.  
A belated victory was obtained, however, and as a consequence the Moscow 
Treaty of the 12
th







10% of the area of pre-war Finland, to the USSR.  This area was almost 
immediately merged into the Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (KFSSR), 
a full Union Republic of the same status as areas such as the Ukraine, Georgia or 
Russia (RSFSR) itself.  Although areas such as Kandalaksha region which had 
been transferred to the RSFSR from the KASSR during the purges were not 
returned, the area was expanded to include Vyborg and most of the area around 
Lake Ladoga.  This new Union Republic was the only such in which the titular 
nations were a minority in their own republic.  More notably, Finnish was now 
readopted as an official language together with Russian, and the Karelians were 
once again left without a literary language of their own.  Ironically the same 
arguments used in the 1920s by the now-purged Finnish Bolsheviks were 
resurrected to justify the imposition of Finnish on the Karelians: the languages 
were similar therefore the Karelians would be able to learn Finnish, a ready-
made literary language, and integrate the two peoples in their new Union 
Republic (Austin 1981: 171-7).  As most of the Finnish population had been 
evacuated from the occupied area, around 400,000 individuals in total, 
immigrants had to be brought in to populate the newly-acquired territory.  Most 
of these would have been ethnically Russian, however Laine (2001: 54) has 
noted a few thousand Finns being moved from Murmanskaya Oblast’ to the 
KFSSR to bolster its Finnish credentials.  A faculty of Finno-Ugric studies was 
established at the State University of Petrozavodsk and Finnish schools were 
reopened across the Republic.  It must be noted, however, that the KFSSR was 
almost certainly intended as an interim solution, and that ultimately Soviet 
ambitions were directed towards the incorporation of Finland within the USSR at 
a later date.   
 The promotion of Finnish during this period was not given a good deal of 
time to work any effects.  On June the 25
th
 1941 Finland allied itself with Nazi 
Germany and attacked the USSR.  Large areas of Karelia, both that which had 
been ceded to the USSR a year earlier and areas which had never been part of the 
Finnish state, were occupied by Finnish forces and, to a lesser extent, their 
German allies, a total of roughly 70% of Soviet Karelia.  Petrozavodsk was 
occupied, together with most of Karelia to the West of the Onego, and the Soviet 







acknowledged the area was administered with a view to its inclusion in a 
’Greater Finland’ should the war come to a victorious conclusion (2001: 55).  
Ironically the occupying Finnish forces adopted much the same policies as had 
been pursued by the fellow-countrymen during the 1920s, advocating schemes of 
’finnicisation’ and ’dekarelianisation’, aimed at stressing the shared heritage of 
Finnish and Karelian populations, and constructing a shared identity.  All 
education was now in Finnish once more, and the populace treated as future 
citizens of a new Finnish state.  It must be noted, however, that due to 
evacuations only around 30% of the pre-war Soviet population was under 
Finnish occupation.  The attitude of the Karelians and other Finno-Ugrians under 
Finnish occupation is difficult to gauge and quite controversial as shall be seen 
below.  The divisive policies of the occupiers are adjudged to have failed by 
Lahteenmaki (2007: 163) who contends the Karelians did not waver in their 
loyalty to the USSR as had been hoped.  This period ended in 1944 with the 
launch of a large Soviet counter-offensive, which pushed the Finns back to pre-
war borders.  Finland sued for peace and managed to secure a treaty which did 
not move the border westwards a great deal further than that of 1940.  The 
Karelian population, however, was once again devastated.  It seems some of the 
population evacuated to other areas of the USSR was either forbidden to return 
by local authorities who were desperate for labour or chose to remain in their 
new homes.  Certainly they much have not had much to return to, as much of 
Karelia had been devastated by the recent fighting.  These factors, and also the 
simple fact that unfortunately many Karelians had been killed during the conflict, 
meant there was a ten-year delay before Karelia regained its former level of 
population. 
 During the remainder of the Stalinist period the KFSSR continued to 
function and Finnish was at least theoretically promoted as an official language 
although there seems to have been little enthusiasm in these efforts.  A final 
immigration of Finns took place when Ingrian Finns, or those Finns who had 
been resident in the area surrounding Leningrad, were encouraged to relocate to 
Karelia.  These Finns and others who had been resident in the USSR were now 
regarded as being part of a ‘suspect nationality’ which had fought on the fascist 







Finns and Germans to Finland in 1943/4, but were however repatriated in 
1944/5.  As this made them of dubious loyalty in the eyes of the authorities 
restrictions were placed on their residency, and that of Finns in general, in 
various areas of the USSR including their former home of Leningrad and its 
environs and also Karelia.  Gennady Kupriyanov, the First Secretary of the 
Karelian Communist Party, recognised that there was a shortage of skilled labour 
in Karelia and that these Finns would help alleviate this.  To this end he managed 
to persuade Moscow to allow the restrictions on their residency in Karelia to be 
lifted, hoping to attract around 60,000 of these Finns.  In the end only 21,000 
emigrated before Kupriyanov was purged and his replacement, Yuri Andropov, 
rescinded the order and all such immigration was halted.  Immigrations 
continued into Karelia from other ethnicities throughout the USSR, further 
diminishing both the Finnish and Karelian nature of the area.  Finnish influence 
was declining in any case as the prospects for a union between a communist 
Finland and the USSR receded.  As Finland pursued a careful policy of neutrality 
and diligently paid its reparations Stalin lost interest in the area.  The teaching of 
Finnish was abandoned in all but 27 schools and it seems although it was 
retained as an official language little effort was made to promote it.  
 With the death of Stalin and the decline in influence of Kuusinen there 
next to no enthusiasm in Moscow for the continuation of the KFSSR and it was 
promptly dissolved in 1956 as part of the general wave of de-Stalinisation.  
Those areas around Vyborg and the Karelian isthmus annexed from Finland were 
incorporated into Leningradskaya Oblast’, and all further promotion of Finnish 
was ceased.  The KASSR was re-established within the RSFSR.  From 1958 all 
education was to be in Russian only, and the department of Finno-Ugric studies 
in Petrozavodsk was closed.  Finnish was retained in theory as an official 
language (Austin 1981: 176-7) however it could only be used in special schools 
and only then with the consent of the parents.  In numerical terms it was 
variously estimated that during the 1980s 27-30 such schools catering for 
between 2,000-2,700 pupils existed in the KASSR.  In terms of demographics the 
abolishment of the KFSSR was entirely logical.  The entire population of the 
area in 1954 was only 606,300, which was considered too small for a full Union 







merely 13%, or 85,000 individuals, and that of Vepsians had dropped to just 
1.1%.  In contrast the immigration of Ingrian Finns actually increased the 
proportion of Finns to 4.3%, which was ironically the highest proportion of Finns 
ever achieved in the Republic.  This small Finno-Ugric population was dwarfed 
by the 78% of the population of Slavic origins.  What went together with the 
abandonment of the political aspirations of a Soviet Greater Finland, however, 
was the almost total abandonment of any political attention towards the Karelian 
population for the remainder of the Soviet period.  During this period the 
KASSR was unique in being the only autonomous area where the titular minority 
held no rights regarding their language, which did not have a written form, was 
not an official language in any sense and did not exist within the educational 
system.  The situation was similar for the Veps language and as stated Finnish 
enjoyed a marginal position in the educational system at least.   
 Partially as a consequence of this educational and institutional neglect the 
Karelian language and population steadily declined throughout the remainder of 
the Soviet period.  By 1979 the percentage of the inhabitants of the KASSR 
defining themselves as Karelian dropped to 11.1% or 81.274 individuals, of 
whom only 61.8% claimed to be native Karelian speakers.  The Finnish 
population, although also declining and numbering a even smaller percentage of 
the population (2.7%) did however enjoy continued if rather limited educational 
rights and access to its own newspaper, journal, theatre and some television 
programming, however at least some of this may have been more to do with 
potential of earning foreign currency from Finland than catering to the needs of 
this minority (Austin 1981: 175-7).  Due to a lack of opportunities for its 
development Karelian as a language and identity increasingly became 
marginalized, and subsumed under their dominant Russian counterparts.  This 
lack of administrative enthusiasm for the development of minority languages in 
Karelia must be seen alongside the broader trend from the Khrushchev period 
onwards to emphasise the creation of a general ‘Soviet’ identity over that of the 
various constituent nationalities of the USSR (see Bassin and Kelly 2012: 4).     
 
The late 1980s and 1990s were a period of profound social change across 







openness of Soviet society allowed the promotion of ideas that had previously 
been outwith the limits of acceptable discourse.  Such ideas included a revitalised 
sense of national identity amongst the minorities of the Soviet Union, which in 
turn contributed immensely to the collapse of the state itself. In this period the 
politics of identity and relations between the federal centre and the regions were 
subject to much debate and rapidly evolved through a number of phases.  In the 
initial period after the collapse of the Soviet Union much emphasis was placed, 
both within the emerging post-Soviet societies and within scholarly examinations 
of the same, on the inversion and destruction of prior political symbols and 
national myths.  The unifying mythology of Bolshevism and the Soviet ‘nation’ 
had been upturned and new unifying narratives and symbols were required to 
replace them.  It was assumed by many that Soviet symbols and myths would no 
longer be applicable to an emerging Russian society and that they would need to 
be substituted for a new ‘national’ mythology.  In a similar fashion it was 
assumed that existing Soviet institutions, spacial geographies and centre-
periphery relations would similarly need to be radically revised or entirely 
abandoned.  This process also forced Russian society to confront the question of 
what Russian identity should mean with an unprecedented urgency.  It formed as 
argued by Ryazanova-Clarke what Bourdieu would have termed a ‘heretic break’ 
from the existing linguistic order and forced the revaluation of existing norms 
(2008:224).  It has been convincingly argued (see for example Six 2008, Pantin 
2010, Ohan 2008, Solovei 2008) that the collapse of a sense of Soviet identity 
was experienced by most Russians as a somewhat traumatic event; the sudden 
destruction of the USSR and its attendant identities and symbolism was 
expressed in Russian society as a ‘loss’, an event that left the Russian nation 
‘orphaned’ or somehow diminished.  Within this apparent void new identities, or 
at the very least newly-negotiated understandings of existing identities, would 
have to formulated and propagated.   
 At the outset there was little consensus as to what the Post-Soviet form 
of Russia should be.  In political terms the ruling class were split between a 
clique of liberal reformers centred around Yeltsin who wished to shape Russia in 
the mould of Western capitalist states and a more authoritarian group including 







Soviet system (for an examination of the two groups see Chafetz 1997).  The 
politics of the liberal politicians who had influence in the early years of Yeltsin 
period had significant implications for questions of Russian identity.  Their 
attempts to mould Russia after the form of its Western competitors has been seen 
by some commentators such as Solovei (2008:70) as fostering a sense of Russian 
inferiority and to have marginalised Russian culture as inadequate or 
substandard.  During this early period the ruling elite unsuccessfully attempted, 
as described by Pantin (2010: 4-20) to develop a kind of civic nationalism for the 
Russian Federation, partially by the use of the term российский, a term which 
denotes ‘Russian’ by citizenship in opposition to the more ethnically charged 
term ‘pусский’.  This initial period was characterised, however, like the 
developing Russian state itself, by a large degree of disorientation and confusion 
in the expression of Russian identity.  Even the commemoration of the Great 
Patriotic War, identified by Ohan (2008: 70) as the key defining historical myth 
in Russian discourses of national identity was characterised by the fragmentation 
of meaning and a lack of a clear narrative of national history (see Ryazanova-
Clarke 2008: 227-230).     
The opening up of the Soviet system during the period of reforms 
initiated in the 1980s offered the population of the KASSR the first opportunities 
to demand enhanced rights in a variety of respects.  As Tsygankov (2002: 252-3) 
has contended the foundation in November 1988 of the Popular Front of Karelia, 
sometimes called the National Front of Karelia, was the first direct challenge to 
the authority of the CPSU.  It must be stressed that this organization was not 
campaigning necessarily for any sort of settlement of issues of Karelian 
sovereignty; the adjective ‘Karelian’ seems here to be more geographical than 
ethnic.  The Popular Front of Karelia managed an unprecedented victory in 
Petrozavodsk in 1989 by defeating candidates selected by the local 
administration in elections to the Supreme Soviet.  It did not, however, represent 
a serious challenge to the authorities in the manner of similar movements in the 
Baltic states.  The movement had no clear programme beyond opposition to the 
ruling elite, and as it did not have a broad base of support outside the local 
intelligentsia of Petrozavodsk failed to succeed in its attempt at mass 







resources in terms of culture and identity as its counterparts in the Baltic states 
(2002: 191), and was not able to organize around a single issue but instead 
splintered into its respective components.  The number of individuals involved in 
the Popular Front is estimated by Tysgankov at no more than 400 at any one time 
(2002: 255-6), although this would be slightly more than estimates for similar 
regions in the north of the RSFSR such as Murmanskaya Oblast’, and the 
Republic of Komi.  On 17
th
 March 1991 88.6% of the population of the KASSR 
voted to preserve the USSR.  In June of the same year, however, 53.3% of the 
population voted for Yeltsin as President of the Russian Federation, with only 
18% backing the Communist candidate Ryzhkov.  Evidently voters in the 
KASSR were not in favour of continuing with the rule of the Communist Party 
nomenklatura even if they did wish to maintain a common political and 
economic space with the remainder of the USSR.  Events elsewhere were making 
the continuation of the USSR increasingly unlikely, however, and on November 
13
th
 1991 the Karelian parliament voted to rename the area as the Republic of 
Karelia.  
 The liberalising clique around Yeltsin managed to assume power and 
push through a series of economic and political reforms despite strong opposition 
which culminated in the political crisis of 1993.  Inspired by the apparently more 
democratic and liberal agenda of the Yeltsin period some of the constituent areas 
of the new Russian Federation attempted to assert a larger degree of political 
autonomy up to and including full political independence from the new state.  
Certain autonomous republics declared their independence, including Tartarstan 
and Bashkiria.  Even in Russian-majority areas some researchers found an 
increased detachment and alienation from the federal centre and an increased 
‘parochialism’ (see White 2004 and Petersson 2001).  The limits of such moves 
for autonomy were, however, quickly established by the federal centre which 
quickly moved, albeit at the time unsuccessfully, to uphold its authority by force 
in the case of Chechnya.  The Republic of Karelia remained relatively stable 
during the tumultuous years of the 1990s and was not involved to any significant 
degree in any tensions with the federal centre.  This may be partially explained 
by the fact the former Communist head of the region, the Karelian Viktor 







Alexandrov (2001: 11) has ventured no doubt helped integrate the area into the 
new system somewhat more smoothly than elsewhere.  Stepanov successfully 
managed to create a new administrative and economic structure in Karelia whilst 
not compromising the position of the traditional elite.  During the early part of 
the 1990s the republican authority also devolved a significant amount of power 
to local authorities; the Chairman of the Government of Karelia did, however, 
become the supreme position, directly elected and therefore not as responsible to 
subordinate power-structures.  In fact this local constitutional arrangement was a 
mirror of the emerging federal system in which executive power was 
concentrated in the hands of the president, even if the Karelian system was to a 
degree one of the least centralised in Russia (Alexandrov 2001:12-13).    
In a Karelian context the first groups advocating a particular ‘national’ 
agenda were founded at this time (for this period in general see Klement’ev 2002 
and Tsygankov 2002, for the Karelian ethnic movement see Shananina 2009).  In 
1989 the Ingrian National Revival movement or League of Ingrian Finns was 
established in the KASSR.  Although such movements had appeared at an earlier 
date in other areas of the USSR, notably Estonia, this was the first challenge to 
the status quo in terms of nationalities policy in Karelia.  It was followed shortly 
afterwards by societies for Vepsian and Karelian culture.  The demands of these 
groups were generally not particularly radical and for the most part were limited 
to extensions of cultural and linguistic rights.  A more radical approach was 
advocated, from 1991, by the leaders of the Karelian Movement, later the 
Karelian Congress.  Led by A Grigoriev and O Bobin this group advocated 
various types of national sovereignty for the Karelian people.  In 1990 Bobin 
proposed Karelia become an autonomous area of Finland as opposed to Russia, 
whilst Grigoriev proposed the joint administration of at least parts of Soviet 
Karelia by both countries.  It must be stated that although their group was 
registered as a political party in 1991 it has gained little support amongst the 
population of Karelia, presumably due to the fact that only around 10% of the 
population are actually now ethnically Karelian.  In fact even the ethnically 
Karelian population was distinctly lukewarm to the ideas of Grigoriev; in June 
1991 the Republican Congress of Karelians, held in Olonets and including 







Grigoriev to establish ‘Karelian autonomy inside the Republic of Finland’.  
Writing, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, in Kareliya, the official newspaper of 
the Republic, the academic Zinadia Strogal’shchikova argued that the Finns, 
Karelians and Veps were the indigenous peoples of the Republic and ought to 
enjoy special status (see “Непростая история Карелия: кто есть кто на данной 
земле” Kareliya no.22 1993).  This provoked some debate within the Karelian 
media, however no official measures were taken at this time to increase the status 
of such groups and indeed Alexandrov (2001: 24-5) notes much of the ensuing 
debate was critical of Strogal’shchikova’s ideas.  Unlike certain other federal 
subjects of the Russian Federation such as Tartarstan or Chechnya there has 
therefore never been a strong political movement for greater autonomy or 
outright independence within Karelia.  It should be noted, however, that this 
situation is by no means unique to Karelia and is mirrored in a number of other 
autonomous republics such as Udmurtia or Komi.       
  
In 1998 however a power struggle took place in Karelia which led to the 
replacement of Stepanov by the then head of the administration of Petrozavodsk, 
Sergei Katanandov.  He retained his post in elections in 2002 by gaining more 
than 60% of the votes available, and was reappointed as governor of Karelia in 
2006 by Vladimir Putin following the abolition of direct elections to such posts. 
The constitution of the Republic of Karelia explicitly stated the head of the 
government must be directly elected and had to be amended to accommodate 
this.  Katanandov had previously supported the strengthening of the ‘vertical’ of 
power through this measure and presumably expected to benefit from it (see 
“Чем сильнее вертикаль, тем строже порядок” Kareliya 116 2004).  These 
local developments mirror in a broad sense the increasing centralisation of power 
which has taken place across Russia since the election of Vladimir Putin in 2000 
and the reduction in power of regional elites (see Godzimski 2000:24).  
Katanandov’s authority was seriously undermined by his perceived inefficiency 
and negligence surrounding the response of the Karelian authorities to the 
Kondopoga affair.   The town of Kondopoga lies approximately 50km to the 
north of the republican capital Petrozavodsk and is a relatively large town in 







population of 30,000, the majority of whom are ethnically Russian or of other 
Slavic origin.  Although the town is home to a large pulpwood, paper and 
cellulose plant and other forestry-related enterprises which are considered to pay 
above-average wages, the level of unemployment is also above the republican 
norm.  Although not generally considered of much importance in national terms 
the town achieved a level of regional, national and indeed worldwide notoriety in 
August-September 2006.  On the night of August 29th/30th, a scuffle between 
two ethnic Russian customers and an Azeri barman at the ‘Chaika’ restaurant 
degenerated into an armed brawl between Russian youths and a number of 
individuals of differing Caucasian nationalities resulted in the deaths of two 
ethnically Russian men.   A mass meeting was called on September 1st at which 
it is reported anti-Chechen sentiments were expressed and demands were voiced 
for the removal of all non-Russians from the town.  This was followed by mass 
civil unrest during which the ’Chaika’ and other businesses not owned by ethnic 
Russians, in particular the market, were destroyed.  Most ethnic Chechens and 
other families of non-Slavic origin fled the town to Petrozavodsk.  Order was 
generally restored by the authorities by the 4th-5th of September, with the 
support of soldiers and Militsiya reinforcements from elsewhere in Russia.  
The Kondopoga affair must be set in the broader context of increasing 
ethnic tensions and discrimination within the Russian Federation as a whole.  As 
Solovei has noted what he terms ‘ethnophobia’ has increased dramatically within 
the Russian Federation since 1990 (2008: 56-67).  An increase in racist and 
radical nationalist discourse and ideology within Russia has also been 
documented by the work of the SOVA centre, which has produced several 
authoritative reports on the phenomenon including the work of Kozhevnikova 
(2008) and Kozhevnikova and Verkhovskii (2005).  Solovei has noted that this 
intolerance is not restricted to the fringes of society but is in fact incorporated in 
mainstream discourse and is uniformly present across the political spectrum 
(2008: 67).  The reasons for the rise in xenophobia are complicated and a 
complete analysis of the phenomenon is beyond the scope of this study.  It has 
been argued (see ibid: 56-70) that this discrimination is not a general enmity 
towards all minorities but is instead directed towards certain particular groups 







groups of militant nationalists, this discrimination can be directed at a large 
variety of minority groups including Russians who are deemed to have 
unacceptable political views or lifestyles although individuals from the 
Caucauses are still the primary target (see Alperovich and Yudina 2013: 5-12).  
Attacks on minority groups such as those witnessed in Kondopoga are the work 
of a comparatively small minority of violent radical groups and individuals and it 
must be noted that ‘extremist’ groups are banned under Russian law and that the 
authorities do make some effort to proscribe and prosecute such formations.  
Solovei has argued that the rise in intolerance towards certain groups is an 
‘ethnic mobilisation’ from below that reacts against the internally-colonising, 
patronising discourse of the political elite which belittles and undervalues 
manifestations of ‘Russian’ ethnic identity (2008: 70-73).  Other commentators 
have, however, argued that the Russian state itself has fostered such intolerance 
by promoting an ‘imperial’ view of Russian identity which both rejects the 
western example and promotes Russian exceptionalism whilst at the same time 
disregards ethnic minorities.  Condee (2012: 37-50) views this process as the 
‘imperial’ state muting civil society and abrogating to itself the creation of a 
Russian identity.   
The Kondopoga affair was not the first indication of ethnic tensions or 
intolerance within the Republic of Karelia, even if it appeared to take the 
authorities by surprise.  An examination of the manner in which prior 
manifestations of inter-ethnic tension or hatred within the Republic of Karelia 
had been covered by the local press shall be made below.  It is sufficient to note 
here that sporadic instances of criminal activity directed toward minority groups 
had been recorded in the area prior to 2005.  Indeed in 2003 a smaller scale 
altercation between what Karel’skaya Guberniya described as "десантниками" 
и торгующими” (K.G.11 20.08.2003) had already taken place within 
Kondopoga itself.  It is clear therefore that the Kondopoga affair did not arise 
spontaneously or indeed necessarily without warning but was the product of 
longstanding tensions between differing groups within the town.  As shall be 
further explored below it is also clear this phenomenon was not restricted to 
Kondopoga itself.  Nevertheless the scale and notoriety which the Kondopoga 







and across Russia more broadly.  It is not possible to discuss here the broad 
impliclations for Russian society as a whole but cognisance must be made of the 
fact the incident was widely seen, as Kozhenikova states, as “an obvious and 
probably the biggest victory won by right-wing radicals, in particular by the 
Movement against Illegal Immigration (DPNI), not only in the current year, but 
over the last few years (2006)”.  Relitavely little scholarly attention has been 
directed towards the question of what the Kondopoga affair tells us about civil 
society, identity and ethnic tension within Karelia itself; most analyses have 
concentrated on wider questions of the situation across the Russian Federation as 
a whole.  As discussed below the incident did force the local government to 
concentrate more attention on such issues.  In immediate political terms, as 
illustrated in the local media coverage of the event analysed below, the fallout of 
the incident caused increased tensions between federal authorities and their 
Karelian counterparts.  Indeed the perceived poor showing of the local 
government may have contributed to the decline in influence and prestige of the 
local head of government, Katanandov, whose position was questioned by non 
other than president Putin.  
Katanandov was not immediately dismissed, however his apparent 
power had diminised considerably and he was eventually replaced in 2010 by 
Andrei Nelidov who held the post for a mere two years before resigning to be 
replaced by Aleksandr Khudlainen who currently holds the position.  
Katanandov and Nelidov were both Russians by ethnicity; whilst Katanandov 
was born in Petrozavodsk Nelidov was brought in from Leningradskaya Oblast’ 
prior to his appointment and had few previous connections to the Republic of 
Karelia.  Khudilainen is an Ingrian Finn from Tver’skaya Oblast’ and is thus the 
first Finno-Ugric head of the region since Stepanov was ousted in 1998.  Until 
his appointment he also had, however, spent his entire career within the confines 
of Leningradskaya Oblast’ and had no direct connections with the Republic of 
Karelia.  As of yet the appointment of a Finno-Ugur as head of the Republic of 
Karelia seems to have had no real influence on questions of minority 









1.2 The Contemporary Karelian Political System 
 
 
 That Karelian politics is generally in ideological terms indistinguishable 
from Russian politics would seem to be proven by the persistent victories of the 
ruling party in Karelian and Federal elections.  The Karelian political systems is, 
however, at least somewhat more pluralistic than the majority of regional 
political systems within the modern Russian Federation.  At the last elections to 
the Legislative Assembly of the Republic of Karelia in 2011 candidates for 
Edinaya Rossiya, the party most associated with Vladimir Putin, took 19 out of 
the 50 seats available.  This makes Karelia, alongside Amur Oblast’ and the 
Federal city of St Petersburg one of only three Russian regions in which Edinaya 
Rossiya does not command an outright majority in the local legislature.  The 
Republic of Karelia is also one of only three areas in which the liberal opposition 
party Yabloko has any representation at all, with three four deputies being 
elected to sit in Petrozavodsk.  Yabloko, the left-leaning Spravadlivaya Rossiya 
(12 deputies), the Communist Party (8) and the right-wing Liberal Democratic 
Party (5) alongside two independents can in principle combine to form a 
collation government and at times they have indeed united in various 
combinations to pass or block legislation.  Although the appointed Head of the 
Republic actually wields most of the executive clout of the local administration 
this above average level of political plurality does indicate that the political 
culture of the Republic of the Karelia is more arguably more open and 
transparent than that of the typical autonomous area of the Russian Federation.  
This is important as it indicates that Karelian society may hypothetically be more 
accepting of identities and historical narratives which potentially challenge or 
oppose the orthodoxies promoted by the central     
It has been noted however that nationalist movements do exist in Karelia 
and hence there must be consciousness of nationalist ideology amongst Karelian 
society, amongst Karelians, Finns, Veps and Russians.  These never seem to 
have enjoyed majority support.  It has been noted above that the majority of the 
KASSR voted against the dissolution of the USSR, and studies by Klementyev 







positive.  Interestingly however recent studies have shown that amongst all these 
groups support for separatism is fairly low but not insignificant.  Louk 
Hagendoorn et al (2008: 364) discovered support for separatism was not as high 
in Karelia as elsewhere, but that the Russian population of Karelia was much 
more sympathetic towards separatist ideas here than in other autonomous 
regions.  Around 50% of Karelians expressed support for such ideas together 
with 45% of Russians interviewed.  Russians in Karelia also had a more positive 
view of the titular minority and perceived less competition from them than in 
other such republics.  It must be recalled however that the study was conducted 
in urban areas only and the sample size perhaps not sufficient to determine how 
typical such views are.  Furthermore although around half of ethnic Karelians 
may support separatist ideas an absolute majority of the population would not 
appear to do so.  It would also appear that this support is not translated into 
political capital for the exploitation of nationalist groups.  The Karelian Congress 
headed by A. Grigoriev which at one time proposed Karelian autonomy within 
Finland is not now above offering its support to Putin’s administration.  The 
main activity of the Karelian Congress now appears to be the defence and 
promotion of Karelian culture; any political ambitions appear to have been 
shelved for now.  Klement’ev’s study (2002: 245) also demonstrated that 56.7% 
of Karelians viewed Karelia as their ‘motherland’, however 30%, 58.2% and 
42.9% of Karelians, Russians and Finns respectively named Russia instead.  
Clearly there is some ambiguity in contemporary society in the Republic of 
Karelia as to what the ultimate political future of the area should be; however 
there seems little appetite for any immediate or dramatic change.  It is important 
to note however that both of the above studies show that there is at least a low 
level of consciousness of alternate identities to Russian or the resources upon 













1.3 Institutional and Legal Factors 
 
 
Karelia as an autonomous region is not administered in entirely the 
same manner as the remainder of the Russian Federation and there are several 
important legal and institutional differences.  Firstly Karelia possesses a 
constitution of its own, which guarantees certain rights for its citizens and, more 
importantly, powers for the administration which most subjects of the Russian 
Federation do not enjoy.  Most importantly the constitution affirms that the 
Republic of Karelia is a state in itself, the borders of which cannot be amended 
without the consent of the Republic and its citizens, and it is stated that the 
republic is distinguished first of all by the historical and contemporary presence 
of the Karelian people (Article 1).  Article 3 however also affirms that the state is 
thoroughly democratic and must “служат всему обществу, а не какой-либо его 
части”.  Importantly Article 11 of the constitution recognizes Russian as the sole 
official language of the republic.  This article allows the Republic of Karelia to 
choose a different or additional official language, subject to this move being 
approved in a referendum by the population.  This same article also enshrines the 
right of peoples “проживающим на ее территории” to secure the status of their 
language and create opportunities for its development and study.  Thus the 
indigenous populations of Karelians, Finns and Veps, and potentially other 
minority groups given the ambiguous nature of the text, do possess a legal right 
to official aid in the preservation of their languages.  What these groups do not 
possess, however, is the right to use their languages as official languages.  Hence 
the actual constitutional support for such languages is rather poorly defined and 
does not essentially extend beyond vague promises of rights and guarantees.  
Significantly any further change to the law on languages would have to be 
approved by a majority of the population, which would make the addition of a 
further official language seem unlikely at this time in a society which is 
overwhelmingly Russian-speaking.  There are additional guarantees in Article 21 
which promise measures will be taken to ensure the “возрождениe, сохранениe 
и свободноe развитиe карелов, вепсов и финнов” resident within the area.  







must be admitted that not only do these populations have the right to demand 
official support for their communities but that the Karelian state has explicitly set 
itself the task of providing this support and achieving some sort of ‘revival’ 
amongst the indigenous population.  These observations may be tempered by the 
fact that all nationalities residing in Karelia are meant to receive equal treatment, 
a contradiction the Karelian constitution does not seek to address, and also the 
explicitly stated fact in the Karelian constitution that the constitution of the 
Russian Federation is of equal validity and indeed that Karelia possesses 
autonomy only insofar as local laws and rights are compatible with their federal 
counterparts.  It will be noted, for example, that direct elections to the post of 
governor were a constitutional right in Karelia, but that the constitution was 
overruled by federal law and was therefore amended. 
Although the constitution does not specify which languages in particular 
are to receive state support other than Russian, a law of March 2004 does 
guarantee the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish languages a special status.  This law 
provides some legal, financial and social support for these languages however it 
must be stated once again that it does not go so far as to declare them official 
languages, which could not be done without a referendum.  Two previous 
attempts at passing a law that would declare Karelian an official or state 
language did not achieve a sufficient level of support.  The Karelian state 
commits itself to a number of provisions designed to offer support to these 
languages below the level of complete official sanction however.  Firstly these 
languages, and it must be noted no one of these languages has a right to a larger 
amount of support than any another, are to enjoy a ‘widening and strengthening’ 
of their social and cultural functions, although it is not specified what this shall 
entail.  Support for mass media in these languages is explicitly promised, 
however, as is the organization of a system of study for the languages in 
educational establishments.  To this end support is promised for the study of the 
languages and the creation of educational literature, textbooks, children’s 
literature and dictionaries to facilitate this.  In the case of Karelian particularly 
this is an important step given the current paucity of such material and indeed its 
complete non-existence in Soviet times.  Specialists are also to be developed in 







languages already extant in the spheres of culture and media, are to be supported.  
Importantly funds are to be provided for all these measures from republican 
budgets.  Limitations are however observed in the uses of these languages.  
Individuals are guaranteed the ‘free choice’ of language in education and the 
bringing up of children (a constitutional right in any case), however the choice of 
language of instruction in any educational establishment is determined by that 
establishment’s assessments of the ‘needs and interests’ of the local population, 
hence it is not necessarily possible for parents to demand and receive education 
in any of the minority languages in any given school.  Official acts and orders 
may or may not be printed in these languages depending on the choice of the 
institution issuing the information, and then only in publications which are 
already printed in such languages.  Also the electoral commission may print any 
ballot paper in these languages, but only if it chooses to do so and in areas where 
a linguistic minority is ‘densely-settled’.  Local authorities and cultural, artistic 
or educational organizations are permitted to use these languages but only in 
addition; in all of the above cases Karelian, Finnish or Vepsian cannot be the 
only language used; Russian must be utilized alongside the chosen language.  
Furthermore the use of these languages is optional; there is no question of there 
being an obligation on the part of such bodies to do so.  Road signs for example 
can be in Karelian or Vepsian but only alongside Russian; furthermore the 
orthography in such signs must be in accordance with federal regulations, 
meaning that it must be rendered in the Cyrillic alphabet. It may be said therefore 
that whilst Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish do enjoy a special status in the 
Republic of Karelia, they are currently very far from the status of official 
languages.               
The Karelian government is divided into 11 ministries as well as a 
certain number of committees and administrations.  These include the Committee 
for Questions of Nationality Politics and Links to Religious Societies which is 
the main administrative strategy for fulfilling these constitutional and legal 
obligations.  This committee was briefly elevated to the status of a ministry in 
November 2006 as part of the official response to the Kondopoga affair, but was 
re-designated a committee in 2010.  It is a direct descendent of the Committee 







December 1991 and functioned until 1994 when it was reorganized along very 
similar lines as the Committee for Nationality Politics, the changes being 
seemingly mostly cosmetic.  Similar small changes to the title of the committee 
were made in 1997, 1998 and 2002, and the number of members was expanded 
gradually from 7 to 21.  With these resources it is responsible in accordance with 
Order 34 of the 24
th
 of May 2008 for the coordination of all government activity 
in the sphere of nationality politics, religious affairs, and the relations between 
‘fellow-countrymen and necessary immigrants’ and the adaptation of immigrants 
to Karelian society.  As far as its activities relate to the indigenous peoples of 
Karelia (be these Karelians, Finns, Veps or Russians) it is tasked with protecting 
the rights of ‘indigenous minority peoples’ and ‘peoples traditionally resident in 
our territory’, their way of life, culture, language, the study of these languages 
and ‘other aspects of national culture’, traditional industries and environment and 
support for organizations of such groups and their initiatives.  It is also tasked 
with preventing any inter-ethnic conflict between these or any other groups.  
 
 




The latest data available gives the total population of the Republic of 
Karelia as 643,548 individuals (all figures unless stated from the 2010 Russian 
Census).  The population of the republic has been steadily declining, in line with 
much of the Russian Federation, since the collapse of the Soviet Union.  
Interestingly this decline did not affect all ethnic groups.  According to data from 
1997 since 1989 to that date the Russian population had declined from 582,000 
to 572,000, with the number of Belorussians also declining from 56,000 to 
52,000 and Ukrainians from 28,000 to 24,000.  This may indicate increased 
mortality but also perhaps emigration from Karelia to other areas.  Surprisingly 
the number of Karelians actually increased in this period from 78,000 to 90,000, 
with the number of Finns moving from 18,000 up to 22,000.  Only the Vepsian 







for this numerical and proportional increase; it may be that Karelians and Finns 
were more comfortable with identifying themselves as such in censuses after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, or possibly Karelians and Finns moved to the 
Republic of Karelia from other parts of the former USSR, although there does 
not seem to be direct evidence of this.  The figures, as mentioned below, might 
not be entirely reliable however.  One factor which may explain the rise in Finns 
would be the possibility of emigration to Finland.  In 1990 the Finnish 
government had offered the possibility to Finns in the USSR of emigrating to 
Finland as ‘remigrants’, which may have tempted some people of Finnish 
descent in Karelia to try and avail themselves of this opportunity (see Virtanen 
1996).  The latest figures which give a breakdown of the total population into its 
national components is the 2010 census; in this survey 507,654 individuals 
claimed to be Russian, 78.8% of the total, of whom almost all (507,540) could 
speak Russian.  Karelians made up the second largest ethnic group with 45,570 
individuals registering themselves as Karelian, a large drop from the previous 
census in 2002 when 65,651 individuals were recorded, which again would 
appear to be a significant decrease if the figures for 1997 and 2002 are accurate.  
This would indicate a mere 7% of the population is now Karelian.  Almost all 
Karelians (45,529) claimed to be proficient in Russian.  The next largest ethnic 
groups are the Belorussians and Ukrainians who muster 23,345 (3.6%) and 
12,677 (1.99%) individuals respectively.  Finns comprise only 1.33% of the total 
(8,577), including 152 Ingrian Finns, and Vepsians were a mere 0.5% of the total 
(3,423).  There are over 100 different nationalities represented in total however 
the remainder are present in generally insignificant numbers, the largest other 
group being 1,888 Tatars, whilst there are also over 1,000 Azeris, Armenians, 
Poles, and Gypsies as well as 25,880 individuals who did not indicate their ethnic 
origin, an inexplicably large increase from the 4,886 who declined to do so in the 
last census.  If the 1997 and 2002 figures are accurate therefore we have a large 
numerical drop in the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish populations, although it 
must be noted a large drop in the Russian population as well.  Certainly these 
trends would seem consistent with the general demographic decline in the 
Russian Federation; it also seems likely however that at least many Finns have 







there has also been a more general internal emigration to other parts of the 
Russian Federation.  Across the entire Russian Federation there are 60, 815 
Karelians in total, again a large decline from the 93,344 recorded eight years 
previously; over two-thirds of all Karelians are resident in the Republic of 
Karelia.  Just under half of the total population of Finns (20,267) are also 
resident in the republic, together with more than half of all Veps (there are 5,936 
in total).   
In the Russian Federation as a whole 25,605 individuals claim to speak 
Karelian (a decline of around 50% since the last census), 38,873 to speak Finnish 
and 3,613 to speak Vepsian.  In the Republic of Karelia itself there are now 
19,100 individuals who claim to be able to speak Karelian: 16,876 Karelians 
claimed proficiency in the language, or only 37% of the total Karelian 
population.  There are also 1,764 Russian speakers of Karelian (0.34%) 
indicating very few ethnic Russians in Karelia have any proficiency in the 
Karelian language, whilst 163 Finns (1.9%) also claim to speak the language 
together with 33 Veps (0.97%).  Altogether only 2.97% of the total population in 
the Republic of Karelia speak Karelian.  Finnish fares as badly as Karelian with 
only 14,630 speakers registered in the republic, of whom 2,901 are ethnic Finns.  
This means fewer Finns than Karelians (33%) are proficient in their own 
language.  Russians tend to be better able to communicate in Finnish, with 6,013 
speaking the language; however this is still just over one percent (1.18%) of the 
Russian population.  Karelians are actually reasonably proficient in Finnish, with 
5,087 being able to speak the language (11%). Altogether 2.27% of the 
population of the area can speak Finnish.  Of the 1,179 speakers of Veps almost 
all are Veps themselves (919), the remainder being mostly Russians (213), 
Karelians (25) and Finns (11).  A mere 0.18% of the population of the Republic 
of Karelia speaks this language.  Altogether it is certain that far less than 10% of 
the population of the Republic of Karelia is able to speak any of the languages 
which are to be officially protected and promoted.   
Karelians are not uniformly distributed across the Republic of Karelia: 
there are certain areas of the republic recognised as more ‘Karelian’ than others.  
A large group of Karelians (13,527 according to the 2000 census) lives in 







In the appropriately titled Kalevalskii National District there are 3,820 Karelians 
however this is 35.9% of the total population, and Pryazhinskii Raion boasts a 
similar (36.8%) percentage of Karelians.  The main bastion of the Karelian 
population is Olonetskii District and the town of Olonets itself.  Olonetskii 
District is the only area in the Republic of Karelia where Karelians are actually 
the majority group.  There are 16,402 Karelians in the area which is 60.7% of the 
population, as opposed to only 8,748 Russians.  In contrast other areas have 
distinctly low populations of Karelians; in Kem’skii Raion the proportion of 
Karelians is a mere 5.8%, and in Pudozhskii Raion it is just 0.9%.    
The implications of the decline in Karelian and other minority language 
usage for questions of ethnic and national identity shall be explored in depth 
below.  It should be noted here that the above figures demonstrate the general 
decline in the self-identification as Karelian has been mirrored by a general 
decline in the usage of Karelian as a language.  It is also important to note the 
dominance, in statistical terms at least, of the Russian language and also self-
identification as Russian within the contemporary Republic of Karelia.  Clearly 
the complicated historical background of the area as sketched out above, 
including the multitude of historical attempts to manipulate ideas of Karelian 
identity as closer to or more distant from Russian and Finnish identities, provides 
a rich background for this type of study.  The contemporary Karelian situation of 
relatively dynamic demographic change, insofar as Karelian identity would 
appear to be rapidly declining, coupled with the contentious nature of this 
identity in historical terms should produce interesting results if the hypothesis of 
the centrality and utility of historical narration in the production of national 














































Chapter Two: Theoretical Considerations 
 
2.1 Introductory Remarks 
 
Before embarking on an examination of the potential usage of historical 
narratives in the production of national identities in the Republic of Karelia it is 
necessary to clarify the theoretical basis of this study.  Evidently any study which 
seeks to address the question of how a particular identity is created must first 
undertake to understand how identity in general is produced.  As it is the 
contention of this analysis that this is a social, discursive phenomenon a survey 
of the scholarly literature which supports such a position must be carried out 
together with an acknowledgement of the criticism of such theories.  The chapter 
below will attempt to demonstrate the relevance and validity of such a theoretical 
framework to the questions raised by this study.  To this end it is of particular 
importance that the phenomena of the nation and national identity be examined 
together with the scholarly literature on these subjects.  Attention must aslo be 
directed to theories which attempt to describe how national identity is 
constructed, in particular those theories which advocate it is constructed 
discursively and upon which the main analysis undertaken here shall be based.   
The relevant factors determining the production of national identity are 
numerous and, indeed, by no means inherently limited to any particular set of 
variables.  Nor do these factors act in isolation; rather it is their interaction which 
produces and reproduces identity.  Nevertheless it is possible to identify certain 
strategies which are commonly employed to perform national identity.  No study 
could exhaustively document these strategies nor could any study conclusively 
identify a definitive order of importance by which these strategies could be 
ranked.  It is my contention that the production of national identity is a process 
unique to each nationality or putative nation in question; it would be futile to 
attempt to isolate and explain national identity production per se without 
reference to concrete processes, at least in anything beyond very general terms.  
Despite this it is possible to examine common strategies employed in the 







agendas.  Simply put this study shall not seek to explain why national identity is 
created but how individuals and groups seek to perform and propagate their own 
conceptions of these identities.       
Some terminological clarification is perhaps in order.  There is in fact 
some debate, as noted by Ivanic (1998: 10-11), as to the use of the term ’identity’ 
itself to refer to the problem of ‘people’s sense of who they are’.  Indeed in this 
analysis several differing terms will be used to try and conceptualise the various 
elements which it shall be argued constitute any given identity.  An explanation 
of these terms and how they are intended to relate to the overall concept of 
identity or an identity shall be provided which, it is hoped, shall provide 
something of a coherent overall scheme.  Given the purpose of the analysis 
however is both to highlight the social construction of identity and gain a sense 
of how this leads to the particular phenomenon of ’national identity’ it would 
seem perverse to utilise another term for identity in general such as the ’self’, 





i)  Identity and the Individual 
 
 
 To begin an examination of the concept of national identity it is necessary to 
first investigate the concept of identity itself.  In purely formal terms and in terms 
of logic identity is a relational term asserting a sameness or equality; however 
identity in practice is somewhat more difficult to explain.  Clearly whilst our 
concept of identity can relate to a quality of sameness in an object it must also 
encompass more subtle and dynamic nuances to enable us to apply it 
successfully in the real world.  A useful starting point for this investigation is the 
theory of identity advanced by Paul Ricoeur (1985, 1992).  This theory 
articulates the existence of two related types of identity, the existence of which 
aids the mind to relate to the outside world.  The first of these types of identity is 







three different elements.  Firstly numerical identity, or two occurrences of a thing 
designated by an invariable noun, is expressed by this type of identity.  Idem 
identity allows the re-identification of the same thing, or as it may be expressed 
the same thing, n times.  This is linked to the second element of this type of 
identity, namely the idea of qualitative identity, which Ricoeur defines as the 
’operation of substitution without semantic loss’.  This is essentially the criterion 
of extreme resemblance; Ricoeur gives the example of individuals wearing the 
’same’ clothes, which would be interchangeable without it being possible to 
discern difference.  Evidently, as Ricoeur acknowledges, with the increase in 
temporal distance between a recollection of the past and present reality, or indeed 
any sustained break in perception a problem may arise whereby an object or 
individual is recognised despite having been subject to perceptible change.  In 
such instances the third element of Idem identity is utilised, namely the element 
of uninterrupted continuity whereby despite dissemblance a thing can be 
recognised as the same or rather re-recognised.  This conception of a kind of 
essential immutability, a structure, undermines and removes the potential threat 
to any identity that the reality of temporal change poses.  In terms of the 
individual this can described as that part of identity Motyl describes as “a 
persisting quality or dimension of me, as I am, and not as I am defined by others 
or as I appear to others in different contexts” (2010: 69).  Evidently such a 
consciousness of continuity must be present to allow the construction of a 
coherent and stable idea of personal identity.  
 Identity, in Ricoeur’s view, does not however merely consist of the 
components of Idem identity detailed above.  He also develops a conception of 
another kind of identity which he terms Ipse identity.  Ipse identity is identified 
as ‘Selfhood’ by Ricoeur, which is similar to the 'Ego' of Goffman (1963: 106).  
Ipse identity is rather more difficult to define in exact terms and can be 
understood as 'uniqueness', as it is for example by Martin (1995: 5-10), meaning 
singularity.  Wodak et al. (2009:11-12) have cautiously noted the similarity to 
Goffman's (1963: 56) conception of ego identity where that identity is the 
individual's subjective feeling of their situation and uniqueness.  This selfhood or 
ego would allow the ability to direct behaviour in accordance with perceived 







deterministic view of identity.  Essentially these concepts, in a basic sense, could 
be seen as equivalent to a sense of ‘consciousness’ of oneself as a discrete 
individual with the capacity to direct behaviour towards a particular end.  It 
would perhaps be unwise to attempt to push this conception any further than this 
basic consciousness of the self, or to assert a sense of individual identity arises 
from this faculty in isolation.    As shall be discussed below it cannot be 
conjectured that consciousness operates independently of the process of social 
interaction, as a result of the exchange of ideological signs.  Furthermore it 
would not be helpful to extend the concept of ‘Selfhood’ or Ipse identity beyond 
the individual.  It would seem implausible for any group, and certainly 
impossible for an abstract entity such as the ‘nation’ to have any concept of 
selfhood.  Although such a collective ‘self’ is evidently often evoked in 
nationalist discourse and indeed the idea of such a national ‘soul’ is at the heart 
of certain theories of the nation (e.g. that of Ernest Renan, see Renan 1996 
[1882]), there does not seem to be any possibility of such consciousness in any 
meaningful scientific sense. 
 Ricoeur views Ipse and Idem identity as operating in a dialectical 
relationship with each other, with 'narrative identity' operating as a conduit 
between the two, a personage, or basically the identity of a character.  This 
identity or basically narrative has to be able to integrate “what seems to be its 
contrary in the domain of sameness-identity, namely diversity, variability, 
discontinuity and instability” (1992: 40).  This scheme allows for the imagined or 
perceived constancy of an individual to be squared with the unexpected 
variables, contradictions and changes which threaten this temporal unity, thus 
allowing a coherent identity.  This allows an individual to communicate their 
identity to others and give meaning to acts which would otherwise be potentially 
meaningless, unless set against this narrative.  An important aspect here is that 
this allows the possibility of variations or revisions to the narrative being made to 
allow the integration of dissonance and disparity introduced by changes to the 
Idem identity of the self or indeed others and how these impact on the interior 
Ipse identity without inducing a crisis.  It shall be argued, however, that this 
ability to reconstruct the self through reconstruction of the personage is not 







powerful cognitive resource is embedded in a system of societal norms and also 
cognitive structures which somewhat curtail the ability of the individual to 
construct their identity.  As shall be seen the more or less objective perceptions 
which could be seen as constituting the Idem identity are structured according to 
a set of dispositions which are themselves structured by such perceptions.  Thus 
the individual, although given the capacity to develop their sense of self, does not 
have unlimited capacity to develop their personage.  Another part of the 
construction of identity which must now be raised here is that the construction of 
identity is not something which happens in some kind of egocentric vacuum.  
Humans are a social species, and hence a great deal if not in fact all of the 
cognitive processes that go towards the constitution of the identity of any 
individual must necessarily take into account society, or put another way the 
identity of an individual is constituted as much socially as it is through individual 
caprice.  The personage Ricoeur identifies is constructed for and by others rather 
than being the product of some kind of closed mental process. 
A useful theoretical conception which, I shall argue, may be closely 
related to the ideas advanced above is the idea of the habitus as advanced by 
Pierre Bourdieu.  According to Bourdieu the habitus is the set of dispositions 
which incline any agent to act in a particular way.  Not only that, however, as it 
is not only the generative principle of objectively classifiable judgements but the 
system of classification of such practices.  As Bourdieu notes it is “in the 
relationship between the two capacities which define the habitus, the capacity to 
produce classifiable practices and works, and the capacity to differentiate and 
appreciate these practices and products that the represented social world is 
constructed” (1989: 170).  The habitus is conceived of as a structured and 
structuring structure; the principle whereby social reality is divided into what 
may be termed logical classes, or identities, which constitute the social world, is 
made possible by the internalisation of the division of the world into such 
classes.  As Bourdieu advances “each class condition is defined, simultaneously, 
by its intrinsic properties and by the relational properties which it derives from 
its position in the system of class conditions, which is also a system of 
difference, differential positions, i.e. by everything which distinguishes it from 







defined and asserted through difference” (1989: 172).  With this in mind it is 
then clear that the structure of social conditions as it can be apprehended within 
the perception of a subject is thus an intrinsic aspect of the habitus occupying 
any particular position in that structure.  The habitus thus recognises differences 
between given conditions and understands these through the prism of the 
differences between the products of any other habitus according to the principles 
of differentiation which are the product of such differences and thus are 
perceived as objective and natural.  It is through this internalisation of the 
structure of social space, producing this classificatory system, that the individual 
perceives the world and classifies themselves and others within it.  This should 
not however be taken to mean that the subject is bound by this habitus to act in a 
predetermined, mechanistic way, although this may also in fact be the case is 
some circumstances; this theory is above all reliant on a cognitive approach to 
the world which allows the individual the possibility of attempting to manipulate 
social reality as shall be discussed.      
The concept of the habitus could be compared to the Ipse identity, 
conscious of the narrative identity and attempting to act in accordance with it, or 
occasionally choosing or having to accept an action, impression or experience 
that must then be accommodated with the narrative identity and thus alters the 
habitus insofar as it perhaps alters the dispositions of the individual to a greater 
or lesser extent.  This would allow us to accept the idea of the habitus 
determining the actions of an individual but also allowing a place for individual 
action to alter these dispositions and thus possible future actions.  Here we are 
already venturing towards the social aspect of identity production; noting the 
dialectical relationship between the production of identity, the individual and 
society.    
In terms of the dispositions of the individual towards the adoption, 
production and negotiation of any particular identity it is worth further 
examining the dispositions of the individual and the way the effect this process.  
We can readily compare the idea of the habitus with the ideas of van Dijk on the 
cognitive basis of identity production.  Van Dijk advances the idea of the ‘K-
device’, a set of knowledge shared by members of a particular community.  This 







notably education, is conceived as “general world knowledge shared by the 
epistemic communities of which the language user is a member” (2010: 613).  
This world knowledge does not need to be construed as mechanically imbibed 
but can be critically reflected upon; it will however help constitute the 
dispositions of the subject.  Such a set of knowledge constitutes a set of symbolic 
resources at the subject’s disposal for the interpretation of the outside world. The 
presence of such knowledge influences the evaluation of the outside world by the 
subject; hence their semantic understanding of discourse will include both the 
explicit semantic meaning of the given text but also a range of referential 
meanings.  This leads to what van Dijk calls the phenomenon of semantic 
comprehension; the individual relates to their discursive surroundings not merely 
on the basis of what is explicit in any given interaction but also with reference to 
a range of nuances both speaker and listener are assumed to share.  Furthermore 
in certain circumstances, especially amongst individuals from differing 
communities, the nuances attached to a certain word, or to rephrase, the 
ideological content of a particular sign, shall vary according to the dispositions of 
the habitus or the collective knowledge they possess; that is to say the individual 
shall evaluate and respond to a stimulus according to their particular social 
position and background. 
A further refinement of this model of individual identity production 
might be found in the optical model proposed by Kaufmann (2008).  This model 
envisages the production of identity to be akin to the production of an image on 
the retina.  The process involves an initial population or territorial referent 
passing through a series of interpretive lenses to focus on a series of ‘facts’.  
Some form of territorial or population referent would appear necessary in the 
especial case of national identity given this must be related to a putative ‘nation’; 
in a Western context where the conception of a ‘nation state’ is dominant this 
idea seems particularly useful but it should also be possible to apply this idea to 
the Karelian context.  It will be argued below that the idea of nationality has 
somewhat different connotations within societies that have developed from the 
Russian and Soviet intellectual traditions but both understandings of the concept 
do attempt to deliminate national groups in territorial terms and with reference to 







‘nation’ for the subject concerned.  This model is quite attractive as an attempt to 
describe the range of factors which combine to produce what appears to be, on 
face-value, a quite straightforward concept such as national identity.  The model 
is also quite useful as it presupposes, as Kaufmann contends (2008: 452) that the 
initial referents are based on apparently objective facts such as a common 
language, territory or shared ‘national history’.  This is an important point to note 
as whilst some analyses, as discussed below, would contend that national identity 
is entirely constructed and synthetic this would be to overstate the ability of the 
individual or any institution, including the state, to manipulate the social world.  
Clearly the ‘image’ of the nation may be heavily distorted after filtering through 
the various lenses of ideology and interests an individual may possess but no 
such identity can be accepted as potentially valid without reference to concrete 
facts.  In terms of national identity any identity produced would normally seek to 
correspond to certain definite historical, geographical or linguistic facts.  These 
facts are of course subject to the same dialectical pressures as the individual (in 
terms of differing historical interpretations, borders and language shifts) but will 
tend to appear at any given moment as objectively true.  Symbolic resources, that 
is to say the set of knowledge or dispositions ingrained in the subject, are also 
constantly being renegotiated and refracted by these processes.  Indeed the 
subject may actively attempt to reinterpret such resources to advance an alternate 
plan of their national identity.  Whilst the freedom of the subject to do so is in a 
certain sense infinite, however, the reception of such attempts will be bounded 
by the same set of symbolic resources at the disposal of the subject’s audience.  
That is to say we possess a certain ‘identity repertoire’ as Motyl describes it, 
“identity is thus situational, but rooted in certain intrinsic characteristics that are 
not situational” (2010: 70).  We must here place the caveat however that the 
characteristics which are not situational are not immutable in the sense that their 
reception may change, thus the status of being, for example, an English-speaker 
or born in New Delhi are non-situational characteristics of an individual, but the 
symbolic values associated with either may be subject to change or may be 
renegotiated by the individual within a certain likely range of possibilities. 
The optical model with its multiple layers of refraction of any concept is 







producing a given identity.  The refraction of the referent through layers of both 
symbolic resources and ideologies underscores the fact that national identity in 
any individual is not merely the result of one key process.  The prevailing 
allocation of nationalisms into either the ‘ethnic’ or ‘civic’ categories is not 
readily applicable to real individuals.  The model Kaufmann proposes avoids the 
temptation to use such categorisations.  As shall be discussed further below such 
a categorisation is not necessarily helpful when dealing with discrete 
manifestations of particular national identities.  Despite this caveat it is also 
worthwhile recalling that: 
 
“Even if all the interpretive frameworks could be eliminated, identity 
cannot function without our inbuilt cognitive machinery which reduces the 
infinite complexity of our sense-impressions down to a manageable focus.  For 
this reason no more than a handful – perhaps as few as two or three – 
genealogical-historical components can remain central to one’s national 
identity.” (Kaufmann 2008: 451) 
 
We should like to interpret this as the recognition of the fact that whilst a 
multitude of ideological and social factors combine to produce any given 
individual’s identity an individual can only focus consciously on a number of 
these.  Evidently more broadly within a putative group or state more such 
ideological and social factors are at work, producing a broad range of potential 
identities which any individual can subscribe to or reject as they accord with 
their own dispositions and beliefs.  A state in particular may promote certain 
‘facts’ and attempt to create an ideological representation of the ‘nation’ which 
can be particularly influential given its propagation through education and the 
banal nationalism of quotidian administration as discussed further below; whilst 
this is especially effective given the role of education in forming the initial 
dispositions or habitus of the individual and constitutes an attempted hegemony 
heterodoxies nevertheless can be and are posited by individuals and oppositional 
groups as the analysis of Karelian identities will show.  Thus whilst the factors 
themselves and the subject’s perception of these factors is constantly altered in a 







ideological or symbolic resources upon which to base their identity.  These 
resources may readily change or be reinterpreted, but they provide a semi-stable 
basis, a form of Idem identity, for that individual to narrate their identity. 
The purpose of the above is to indicate the complex dialectical process of 
individual identity formation.  The complexity of social identity formation is 
quite apparent but if we are to successfully apply our principles to this field we 
must recall that: 
 
“If man is made the measure of all things, and if with the aid of that 
assumption all transcendence is to be eliminated without man himself being 
measured against this criterion, without applying the same standard to himself or 
– more exactly – without making man himself dialectical, then man himself is 
made into an absolute and simply puts himself into the place of these 
transcendental forces he was supposed to explain, dissolve and systematically 
replace” (Bourdieu 1990: 187). 
      
 
ii)  Identity, the Individual and Society 
 
 
To begin an examination of the relationship between identity production, the 
individual and society a useful starting point is an examination of the relationship 
between individual consciousness and social interaction.  A key component of 
this relationship, it can be argued, is linguistic.  It is of particular importance to 
establish the relevance of this concept as the analysis to be undertaken depends 
upon an examination of an corpus of data derived from press and interview 
material.  Language use is not merely communicative, as by no means all or even 
perhaps the greater part of the meaning of any statement is its propositional 
content.  If we begin our analysis from the starting point of Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s (see Saussure 2011 [1916]) contention that language is a system of 
signifiers and signified which is ultimately arbitrary then, as Joseph (2004: 48) 
notes identities are 'conventional labels for culturally conventionalised 







understand the relationship between language and the production of society we 
must refer to the work of the Bakhtin Circle (see Todorov 1984 for a discussion 
of whether these ideas are attributable to Bakhtin himself or other members of 
the group). As Voloshinov (1973 [1929]) has pointed out to merely follow a 
Saussurian account would give rise to a system in which reality was not 
reflected, i.e. no account would be made of how these categories and labels were 
produced but merely the “relationship of sign to sign in a closed system'”(ibid: 
52).  As Voloshinov argues reality is refracted in the sign and therefore language 
itself becomes a medium for the expression of social differences.  Reality is not 
reflected mechanically in the sign but rather the sign itself, the utterance or text 
in question, becomes the nexus of the struggle for control over the social reality.   
 
“Every sign, as we know, is a construct between socially organised 
persons in the process of their interaction. Therefore the forms of signs are 
conditioned above all by the social organisation of the participants involved and 
also by the immediate condition of their interaction.  When these forms change, 
so does the sign.” (ibid: 21). 
   
Rather than following an idealist pattern of locating ideology merely in 
consciousness Voloshinov argues consciousness arises in the material 
embodiment of signs.  Such signs emerge only in the process of interaction, thus 
consciousness is consciousness only when filled with semiotic content through 
social interaction.  Therefore we see that individual consciousness is in fact a 
social-ideological fact.  Language use is consequently inherently political in the 
most basic sense of the word.  Evidently in the scheme advanced by Voloshinov 
the struggle over social reality that is conceptualised as being refracted and 
shaped through this mechanism is the Marxist class struggle of the bourgeoisie 
and proletariat, however if this view of language’s constitutive social function is 
adopted it becomes clear that it can and must be applied to the construction of 
any society in general and the position of the individual within it.  As Voloshinov 
and Bakhtin (1981, 1994) argue language is also dialogic, with any utterance 
being formulated with a particular audience in mind; as van Dijk has also 







speaker (van Dijk 2010: 683).  The utterance is dialogic even with regards to the 
internal monologue which seeks to help the self position itself in the social 
world.  In fact this concept can be related to the concept of narrative identity, 
with internal utterances offered up for the acceptance or rejection of the Ipse 
identity, for incorporation into the narrative identity and in fact to facilitate its 
operation.  The narrative identity is in fact this internal dialogue or dialectic in 
operation, the dialogue of the ‘self’ with itself which integrates or rejects aspects 
of the perceived social reality into its conception of itself.  This dialectic leads to 
the phenomenon of heteroglossia, or the constant presence of differing manners 
of speaking or discourses which are perpetually reacting to one another and 
indeed are generated explicitly for this interaction.  Language then is not merely 
an independent faculty which allows for the expression of social reality but the 
key component in the constitution of social reality.  This is a point developed at 
great length by many academics since Bakhtin and Voloshinov’s ideas were first 
advanced within the USSR, and it may very well be argued that much later 
theorising is either heavily indebted to or in fact somewhat derivative of these 
ideas; although many of these ideas were developed apparently independently by 
Western scholars at a later date. 
This view of the nature of language would accord with the ideas of 
Bourdieu who does not envisage the habitus as a passive agent, rather as an agent 
engaging in the exchange of symbolic power with other agents.  Relations 
between habitus and various fields are the site of struggle for capital of various 
forms, such as symbolic capital, creating various markets and providing a link 
between actions and interests; these are not narrowly economic in the ordinary 
sense.  Linguistic utterances produced in various contexts are valued at varying 
rates, thus speakers can produce and possess varied amounts of linguistic capital, 
this results in a variety of expressions from speakers depending on their relative 
positions in this market and their access to various sorts of capital.  To operate 
successfully (with the acceptance of other members of a group or to be 
recognised as contributing to a certain discourse) a speaker must be aware of 
what is or is not permissible in any discourse.  The standardised ‘official’ or 
‘technical’ language and competence in this language permits individuals to 







groups or making an acceptable contribution to any discourse.  The lack of a 
certain sort of linguistic capital denies dominated individuals (or ‘non-experts’, 
the ‘unqualified’ etc.) from access to certain groups and restricts their ability to 
contribute to a discourse or in fact renders them silent.  
Thus as Voloshinov opines language is the medium for the expression of 
social difference (or one of the mediums) and cannot be seen as anything other 
than political in a very basic sense.  Also it must be noted that utterances are 
always produced with their reception in mind, thus identity reception is at least 
as important as identity production, and indeed is inseparable from it.  It is of 
course possible for any individual to wilfully assert any identity as much as it 
possible for any individual to attempt to undercut the established markets of 
linguistic and cultural capital with a non-standard contribution, however if their 
contribution is rejected as not measuring up to the accepted forms and norms it 
shall be rejected, and in much the same manner an identity asserted must also be 
assessed by society in accordance with the accepted norms.  Hence whilst any 
individual actor has theoretically unlimited freedom to construct an identity, 
identity is also constituted socially and thus the individual will always be 
perceived in accordance with the dispositions of those around them and accorded 
a place in the perceived position in the network of social structures and 
hierarchies which are based on the struggle for cultural capital and its 
distribution. 
 Further to the above it then becomes necessary to examine the manner in 
which the properties of the habitus and the struggle for cultural capital create and 
dissolve group identities.  This process can be viewed as being accomplished 
through Rites of Institution and Authorised Language; unlike Austin (1975), 
Bourdieu does not contend that the substance of speech is key to efficacy of 
speech.  Language represents authority, and symbolises it in discourses of 
authority.  It must be recognised that the ‘symbolic efficacy of words [is] 
exercised only in so far as person subjected to it recognises the person who 
exercises it as authorised to do so’ (1991: 116).  The creation of institutions and 
thus divisions in society is accomplished through the creation of arbitrary limits 
and their inculcation in society, as they can only exist if socially valid.  In any 







be termed Orthodoxy (Doxa) and Heretical Discourse.  The Doxa or orthodox 
may be conceived as the current principles of group construction, that is to say 
the current set of dispositions within the habitus which regard a certain subject 
position as valid and another as invalid.  These accepted dispositions, or accepted 
structures, allow the habitus to treat as legitimate any claim to a particular 
identity.  As has been seen above it is the natural tendency of the habitus to seek 
to classify the social world and indeed be classified by it, but the principles by 
which this operation is affected are objectively open to alteration.  It is possible 
for a new system of classification to be proposed, or alterations proposed to an 
existing schema, which if accepted then becomes a new orthodoxy.  At first this 
newly proposed classification or schema is put forward as a ‘Heretical’ 
discourse, and its efficacy depends directly on the linguistic resources available 
to the subject, which is to say the amount of linguistic capital they possess.  As 
Bourdieu proposes ‘every group is the site of a struggle to impose a legitimate 
principle of group construction‘  and therefore there is a constant struggle in 
discourse between the dominant who wish to conserve orthodoxy and those who 
wish to create a new social identity.  This struggle is almost always and most 
effectively carried out through discourse, linguistically, through the use of 
cultural capital as stated above.  The manner through which the struggle is 
advanced is the exploitation of symbolic power:     
 
‘Symbolic power - as a power of constituting the given through 
utterances, of making people see and believe, of confirming or transforming the 
vision of the world and, thereby, action on the world and the world itself, an 
almost magical power which enables one to obtain the equivalent if what is 
obtained through force (whether physical or economic), by virtue of the specific 
effect of mobilisation - is a power that can be exercised only if it is recognised, 
that is misrecognised as arbitrary (ibid: 170)’. 
 
Thus symbolic power results from belief in legitimacy of the words 
uttered, but this cannot be produced merely by the utterance itself.  The entire 
structure of social reality as perceived by the habitus which receives the 







will then possess a greater or lesser degree of ‘objective truth’ as it conforms to 
the structures of the social reality perceived by the habitus and is incorporated 
into these structures.  The symbolic power exercised by the speaker is also 
directly relevant to the position they occupy within the recognised hierarchies 
which the habitus uses to construct the social reality and by which it has been 
constructed.  Thus it becomes perfectly clear why, for example, the utterance of a 
‘thief-in-law’, for example, must and would be assessed and valued at varying 
rates by a judge, member of the public or another such criminal.  In one instance 
the utterance may be despised or ignored, or indeed in the other if uttered in 
criminal argot simply not understood, whereas for the final category it may be 
given, depending on the position of the individual criminal within the relevant 
hierarchy, respect and authority.  The utterance, furthermore, would have clearly 
differing levels of effect given particular situation in which it was made, for 
example within a court or prison cell, providing a large measure of its potential 
symbolic power before the propositional content is even considered.  Thus any 
utterance must be considered within the full context of its creation if its potential 
and actual symbolic power and thus its potency for the alteration or consolidation 
of the social world can be assessed.  As Bourdieu puts it “a language is worth 
what those who speak it are worth, so too, at the level of interactions between 
individuals, speech always owes a major part of its value to the value of the 
person who utters it” (1977: 652).    
This scheme of symbolic power accords very well with our model of the 
production of individual identity detailed above.  We can now propose a coherent 
scheme of identity production where various identities are proposed and received 
according to the apparently objective dispositions of the habitus in conjunction 
with the communal knowledge and symbolic resources at our disposal.  Such 
identities are proposed and received in accordance with both these symbolic 
resources and our ability, our stock of symbolic power, to aid their reception.  
This scheme of identity production acknowledges both the potentialities and 
limitations of our freedom to proclaim any particular national identity.  It 
recognises both the manner in which social facts influence our identities and the 
manner in which we can interpret and shape social facts.  This method shall 







‘set the limits’ of what various forms of Karelian identity should be and the 
relation between this process and the broader social context of Karelian society.  
This method is, it is to be hoped, a demonstration of a conceptual system within 
which as Lukacs described: 
 
“The knowledge that social facts are not objects but relations between 
men is intensified to the point where facts are wholly dissolved into processes.  
But if their being appears as a becoming this should not be construed as an 
abstract universal flux sweeping past, it is no vacuous duree reelle but the 




 2.2 National Identity and the Nation 
 
 
i) What is the Nation? 
 
  
 Before considering questions of how national identities are constructed 
within the Republic of Karelia it is necessary to consider what is meant by the 
terms ‘nationality’ or ‘nation’ themselves.  As has been stated above this analysis 
presupposes that nations and therefore national identity are discursively 
constructed.  That is not to contend, as we have noted, that nations and national 
identities do not appear to have a certain objective reality.  We have already 
argued that the ability to produce any particular national identity is limited to a 
certain extent, and limited by what appear to be objective factors.  Nations and 
nationalisms are constrained by their ability to appeal to referents such an 
apparent shared language, history, culture or geography.  As a consequence of 
this much thinking on the nation has traditionally accepted that either nations 
must be a kind of natural fact or that nationalism must be a definite and perhaps 
inevitable process.  Despite this academic study of the nation has yet to 







accepted, and has significantly failed in determining a point from which we are 
able to actually speak of ‘nations’ historically.  It is my contention that such a 
definition is intrinsically impossible, nor can a firm date ever be placed on the 
genesis of the ‘nation’ historically.  Despite this nations are recognisably part of 
our modern world; despite my insistence on the constructed nature of the identity 
I would not deny that I myself consider myself to possess a national identity and 
to live in what would be termed by most people, including myself, a nation, if 
not a nation-state.  The idea of the nation itself and its construction is therefore 
worth considering. 
 Much debate has traditionally centred around two differing conceptions 
of how nations are formed, the civic or political nation and the ethnic or cultural 
nation.  The Romantic notion of the nation advanced in the eighteenth century by 
the likes of Fichte (see Fichte 1968) which determined nations to have ‘natural’ 
boundaries exemplifies a common view of the ethnic or cultural nation.  Those 
arguing for a particular cultural nation emphasise a shared language or culture 
which is distinctive enough to merit the existence of a discrete ‘nationality’.  In 
terms of the civic nation a particularly key contribution was made by Ernst 
Renan who formulated the idea of the cultural and political ‘types’ of nation; the 
political nation (such as supposedly France) was formed by a voluntary union of 
people who decide to live together as a nation due to a desire to preserve a 
common past and share a common future (Renan 1996: 53-55).  Such a 
constitutionalist view of the nation relies heavily on the idea of the state acting as 
a unifying factor by combining together different individuals on the basis of their 
shared belief in certain political principles.  Renan’s model uses similar 
terminology to the earlier Romantic conception of a nation by appealing to a 
shared ‘soul’ or ‘spirit’, but as Joseph (2004: 112-3) contends by locating such a 
soul within the shared memories of the community involved he passes beyond 
Romantic conceptions towards a view of the nation as a mental construct or act 
of consciousness.   Such a model has been favoured by Kohn (1944:12-16) 
amongst others as explaining the constitution of certain nations which may not 
necessarily coincide with linguistic or cultural boundaries. 
 Both the conception of a nation as constituted by an act or continuing 







be readily criticised for a variety of reasons.  The concept of a nation as defined 
by political will readily conflates nationality with citizenship; it is clear from our 
own experience that nations apparently formed on the basis of a shared set of 
political values, such as say the United States, also display the characteristics of 
nations supposedly formed by ‘natural boundaries’.  The idea there are natural 
principles of division is also flawed on the basis that we can clearly also 
determine that such natural principles (i.e. language, culture etc.) do not always 
give rise to nations.  There are communities who possess, say, a shared language 
but are clearly not considered to be part of the same nation just as there are 
communities who possess these characteristics but which are not considered to 
be nations at all.  Furthermore state boundaries are not the same as linguistic 
boundaries and the linguistic unity of a nation can be the result of deliberate or 
chance intervention by a range of factors.  Hobsbawm has also noted (1990: 6) 
that there are nations which would be recognised as such by the majority of 
observers which do not apparently meet any of the criteria proposed by either 
theory.  All of these considerations highlight the dynamic nature of nation-
formation and recognition; the principles by which any given nation is defined or 
defines itself can vary immensely and can be subject to change.  Indeed as Hroch 
(1996: 79) has pointed out some factors may be of vital importance in a 
particular nation-building process and almost irrelevant in others.  The manner in 
which the French or Russian nation might be conceptualised, for example, is 
inevitably dependent on the period concerned and the subject involved in the 
conceptualising. 
 This is not to argue that the nation is entirely contingent.  As has been 
discussed above the ability of any individual to claim any particular identity or to 
propose or alter the dynamics of group construction is not entirely limitless.  
Kedourie’s (1993) argument that nationalism and the nation is an entirely 
contingent phenomenon is clearly unsustainable.  Gellner is clearly correct when 
he proposes that nationalism is “neither contingent nor accidental” but “the 
necessary consequence or correlate of certain social conditions”, he is also 
correct when he notes that it is “not the destiny of all men” (1997: 10-11).  The 
rise of the nation as a principle of group construction must be sought in the 







had become a recognised principle of group construction it would inevitably 
appear to be a natural fact of human existence; this is clearly incorrect, however 
once it had become such a symbolic resource it would inevitably appear to have 
a ‘reality’ in the same manner of any other such resource.  As has been argued 
above to have efficacy it would have to rely on certain referents which appeared 
to have an objective social reality, thus the nation itself gains an objective social 
reality in the eye of the beholder.  As a consequence of this process the nation, 
socially constructed as it may well be in the final analysis, is the product of 
definite social processes and possesses an objective reality which belies its 
origins. 
 What a nation is precisely thus defies definition.  Ultimately a nation is a 
nation if a certain group claims it is and that claim is generally recognised.  This 
may seem a rather facetious answer to the question posed above but it is the only 
accurate answer.  Any attempt to formulate a universal template for the nation 
will ultimately founder on the difficulties of applying such a model to the real 
world.  Evidently however these templates are not entirely useless.  The nation 
may well be a socially constructed concept and thus ultimately subjective but the 
reifying effects of our contemplation of this concept affect our understanding of 
the world and change our actual interaction with it.  By seeking to understand the 
genesis and actuality of the nation and nationalisms through the prisms of such 
theorising we inevitably influence the manner in which we construct both these 
concepts and social reality.  To give a concrete example Light has demonstrated 
that “nationalism did not lead to the creation of nation-states in Central Asia; 
rather state narratives are one way to legitimise control over people within a 
bounded territory” (2011: 33).  This example demonstrates that once the idea of 
nations and nationalisms becomes current there is a certain reifying tendency to 
seek and create nations where none existed previously.  The resulting nation may 
well be contingent in the sense that another nation might very well have been 
created instead or none at all, but if accepted it will gain a certain actuality.  
It has been stated above that it is not my intention to explain why such 
‘imagined communities’ are created nor is it my intention to provide an answer 
to the question of when nations became a valid principle for the construction of 







to understand the aspects of the nation and national identity we shall examine.  In 
terms of the theoretical basis outlined above it shall be clear that the struggle to 
assert or deny any group identity is political in a basic sense and therefore has to 
do with the perceived interests of the individual concerned.  In this sense 
therefore clearly the assertion of a national identity must be seen to have certain 
perceived benefits.  It is my contention that the particular perceived benefits 
involved in any particular manifestation of national identity will be as unique as 
the circumstances associated.  Clearly differing groups at differing historical 
points in time shall have differing motivations in asserting one particular identity 
over another.  Many excellent analyses of various nationalisms have been 
produced, for example by Hroch, Smith (1985, 1987) and Hobsbawm (1983, 
1990) to name just a small selection demonstrating the particular socio-historical 
factors which gave rise to certain national movements.  It would however be a 
mistake in my view to extrapolate from these analyses and attempt to form a 
model of nationalism and nation building that would be valid for every instance 
and for all time.  In very basic terms it is clear that all nationalism are an 
articulation of perceived interests, insofar as the creation or maintenance of any 
particular group must correspond to perceived benefits to be received from the 
membership of this group.  It is also true that in the final analysis much of this 
benefit is material; a recent study has noted the particular material benefits 
sought from the EU by certain Czech politicians from maintaining one particular 
version of Czech historical identity (Gledwell 2011: 487).  It however would be a 
mistake to contend as Silverstein has proposed that we should only consider 
political and economic factors in the production of nationalism (Silverstein 2000: 
130-8). In the dialectical production of national identity the promotion of identity 
can become a means in and of itself, as Kaufmann notes: 
 
Individuals national identities when codified into collective 
representations can become ideologies – lenses influencing individuals’ 
subsequent interpretation of symbolic resources (2008: 468). 
 
The key point here is to remember that the identity produced by these 







dependent upon social, political and economic factors the production and 
promotion of national identity becomes a factor in the interpretation and 
production of social, political and economic factors, thus as Joseph notes  
 
This ‘we-ness’ and the national identities and imagined communities 
founded upon it are neither more or less real than ‘the dialectical workings of 
political processes’ or ‘political economic conflict’, because they are in fact an 
inseparable part of them (2004: 125). 
 
Nationalism or the nation may also provide certain other benefits, such as 
Cohen has suggested, by providing a mechanism for the individual to advance 
aspects of their own identity; a national identity may provide a shared space for 
the realisation and performance of personal identity (1994: 157-166). 
As for the question of when nations can be said to have come into being, 
it is generally held that the beginning of the age of nationalism was the start of 
the nineteenth century.  It would seem to inappropriate to attempt to apply the 
terminology of the nation prior to this as the idea of a nation can only be sensibly 
understood in its own terms; that is to say prior to the consciousness of the idea 
of the nation and attempts to use nationalism to create or dissolve such groups 
nations qua nations did not exist.  Different principles of group construction were 
used to comprehend and create different types of groups.  This may sound like 
sophistry, a kind of extreme philosophical relativism, but simply put a nation 
cannot sensibly have said to have existed prior to national consciousness.  Many 
of the historical, linguistic or territorial referents which would later be utilised in 
the creation of national consciousness undoubtedly would have existed, in some 
if not all cases; the point is that these referents were not combined with our 
contemporary ideological and symbolic notions of nationhood to produce 
national identity.  The beginning of this process is inevitably a distinct event in 













ii) Constructing the Nation 
 
 
The construction of the nation has been a subject of intense debate ever 
sincethe natural and organic existence of the nation was called into question.  It 
has been noted previously that the construction of groups involves certain 
individual psychological process, albeit processes intrinsically social in nature.  
Nevertheless the nation is a group which has an existence far beyond the limited 
social experience of any one individual.  It is in this sense, as Benedict Anderson 
famously termed it, ‘imagined community, as “the members of even the smallest 
nation will never know of most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear 
of them; yet in their minds each lives in the image of their communion” (1983: 
15).  It is therefore necessary to examine in greater depth how exactly such a 
community can be formed and maintained.  Clearly powerful symbolic resources 
must be mobilised in order to bring about the existence of the nation; thus begins 
the process of forming national myths through which to unite an otherwise 
disparate group of individuals with their own interests.  Anderson believes the 
fall of Latin as the sacred language and the advent of the printing press as key 
events in the transformation of local languages into national languages with 
enhanced symbolic power (1983: 40).  The creation of a marketplace for books 
in these languages created languages of power as certain dialects replaced 
outdated sacred languages as symbols of learning and status, thus opening the 
door for the process of nation-building, the written language thus creating 
nationalism (1983: 48 and 122).  The creation of a national language is certainly 
a very potent tool in creating nationalism and national consciousness; however 
Anderson goes too far in attempting to conflate the creation of such a language 
with the creation of the nation.  National languages, indeed the notion of a 
codified, pure form of any language are artificial; they are Kantian constructs 
which do not exist in reality any more than the ideal form of the nation exists in 
reality.  As surely as Voloshinov demonstrated that it was futile to attempt to 







any attempt to found the nation or nationalism on a conception of an idealised 
national language shall be found wanting.  As Hobsbawm has noted such 
languages “are in fact the opposite of what nationalist mythology supposes them 
to be” (1990: 51). A national language is itself a synthetic idealised form derived 
from actual spoken language, rather than the basis for spoken language itself.  
Despite this the symbolism of a national language, once created, can be an 
extremely powerful tool for the nationalist.  The idea of a common national 
language may serve to mobilise national sentiment regardless of the number and 
varieties of dialects actually spoken in a given nation.  In the context of the states 
of the former Soviet Union the idea of ‘national’ languages is of particular 
importance in the creation and reproduction of ‘national’ groups, as shall be 
discsussed further below. 
 If language is not the basis of the construction of national identity then 
what is?  An important part of the construction of national identity is in fact the 
rather more mundane repository of national symbolism termed ‘banal 
nationalism’ by Billig (1995).  This refers to the reinforcement of a particular 
nationalism by the presence of national symbolism in our everyday lives.  
Through the constant presence of national symbolism on stamps, banknotes and 
the like we are inculcated in the belief we are part of the community those 
symbols represent.  This mundane symbolism is an important aspect of the 
construction of the community of the nation.  By surrounding us with this sea of 
small symbolic references the state (ordinarily if not necessarily exclusively) 
attempts to predispose us to considering these references part of our own 
symbolic resources and thus a part of the community which shares these 
resources. 
   Such banal nationalism clearly cannot sustain or produce national 
identity by itself, however.  It may seek to help maintain a certain identity but 
clearly more effective methods of construction must be employed to persuade us 
to adopt one or other nationality.  After all, the dollar is a common currency of 
exchange across the world yet has hardly influenced individuals in Taipei or 
Nairobi to consider themselves Americans regardless of how often they handle a 
dollar bill; likewise most patriotic US citizens are not prepared to fight for their 







US state.  Clearly this banal symbolism, effective as it may be, must relate to 
certain more resonant symbolic resources which can mobilise national sentiment 
to such extremes.  An important aspect of this type of nationalism must be the 
employment of national myths.  As suggested by the Hobsbawm quote above 
such myths play a large role in the creation and maintenance of national identity.   
 
  
iii) Narrating National Identity 
 
 
The concept of narration as a key cognitive resource in the production 
and reproduction of individual identity has already been discussed.  
Nationalisms, that is to say the principles by which national groups are perceived 
and recognised, are not constant.  A further objection to theories which would 
seek to conclusively define this or that nationalism is that nationalisms are 
subject to the same dialectical forces outlined above.  As Na Thalang has noted 
in connection with certain Indonesian nationalist movements that: 
 
Not only can the ideological basis of nationalism transform over time, but 
also the form nationalism takes is not always a constant.  The use of the term 
ethnic nationalism should be no means imply that the term ethnic is biologically 
fixed or primordial (2009: 322). 
 
Nationalisms are constantly evolving in response to the changing 
development of the societies within which they are ensconced, much as they aid 
the changes within these societies.  Nevertheless one common feature of 
nationalism is that it attempts to view this development as a continuum.  Most 
nationalisms consider their nation to have a definite history which stretches back 
far beyond the advent of the particular political nationalism in question.  That is 
to say the narration of the nation plays an important part in the construction of 
any national identity.  By reference to a shared heritage nationalisms can appeal 
to a set of particular symbolic resources which in theory are unique to that 







a ‘national story’, a story of the realisation of the nation in question from a proto-
nation state to national self-consciousness and fulfilment.   
Various researchers have attempted to provide an analysis of this process 
which identifies key elements present in the narration of national identities.  One 
of the aims of this study has been to examine the relevance of these ideas to the 
production of national identities within the Republic of Karelia.   Stuart Hall 
(1996: 615) and Leszek Kolakowski (1995: 33-54) have both presented schemes 
which categorise national identity as characterised by five elements, although 
they disagree on the exact composition of these elements.  An outline of the 
elements is given below: 
 
Stuart Hall’s Five Elements 
 
1. Narrative of the nation 
2. Emphasis on origins, continuity, tradition and timelessness 
3. Invention of tradition 
4. Foundation myth or myth of origin 
5. The idea of a pure original people 
 
Leszek Kolakowski’s Five Elements 
 
1. National spirit or Volksgeist 
2. Historical memory 
3. Anticipation and future orientation 
4. The ‘national body’ 




Both agree that a foundational myth or nameable beginning (essentially 
the same thing) is one of these aspects present in the narration of any nationality.  
As I shall discuss further below I do not agree such a foundational myth is 







and identifiable sense.  The other aspects are similar in certain regards if not by 
any means identical.  To discuss each in turn it Hall’s idea of the narrative of the 
nation would appear to be a very useful formulation.  Such a narrative presented 
(not necessarily in anything other than fragmentary form) with inevitable 
regularity through media, literature, education and in almost all discourse 
relating to the nation provides a coherent and reassuring scheme for the 
individual.  By narrating the nation the individual and society provide the illusion 
that the nation is not created; by reaching back into history and mobilising 
certain symbolic resources the individual can provide a narrative which 
apparently proves the objective and almost eternal existence of the nation itself. 
Both Hall’s emphasis on tradition and timelessness, the idea of the 
invention of tradition (as per Hobsbawm) and Kolakowski’s ‘historical memory’ 
can be related to the ‘K-device’ of van Dijk discussed above.  These invented 
traditions and apparent shared memories are the collective store of symbolic 
resources and empirical ‘facts’ which enable disparate individuals, who may 
never have met, to claim a share of a collective narrative.  Through the medium 
of education in particular such a collective store of knowledge can be created in 
the community for ready access by those seeking to construct a national narrative 
that will be effective through its appeal to apparently shared memories.  This is 
similar to the concept of ‘collective memory’ advanced by Halbwachs (1980, 
1992), an interactive phenomenon which is a reconstruction of the image of the 
past in order to define a group’s identity in relation to other groups.  Halbwachs 
envisages this as a process deeply embedded in the sociocultural surroundings 
reconstructed in accordance with the ‘predominant thoughts of society’ (1997: 
40).  Collective memory is a useful concept in that it can be used to differentiate 
from formal history, as Wertsch and Roediger have noted (2008: 320-326), in 
that it tends to ignore ambiguity and heterodox interpretations of events for 
established narratives.  In terms of the narration of the nation such narratives can 
indeed almost be viewed as sacred, and the attempts to alter them, impinging as 
they may on the key facets of the constitution of a given group, regarded as 
sacrilegious.  Such an effect has been noted, for example, in the reactions 
towards the attempted reconfiguration of the narrative of the Red Army’s role in 







not abstract group memory but distributed as Tileaga (2009: 339-41) has 
contented by various cultural vehicles, such as textbooks, museums and 
commemorative rituals. 
In terms of collective memory it is useful to recall the fact that the act of 
remembering itself is the important aspect here.  Collective memory, knowledge 
or symbolic resources, whichever terminology is used, do not exist in the abstract 
but are subject to the same dialectical pressures as any other resources.  As signs 
they are constantly subject to refraction in the course of social interaction.  Ter 
‘communicative memory’ of Assmann (1995: 126-8) must be construed as being 
constantly refracted by the act of remembering itself; as Ollick and Robbins have 
suggested ‘collective memory’ must be viewed as a process rather than a ‘thing’ 
(2009:127) .  Furthermore these memories represent an orthodoxy, as Bourdieu 
might put it, or a hegemony to use Tileaga’s phrase (2009: 339) which is 
constantly being challenged by the heterodox or polemic.  If contributions to the 
discourse are threatening in terms of the established principles of nationalism, 
that is to say if they threaten the national narrative, then they face de-
legitimisation in the face of the established orthodoxy, as Vihalemm and 
Jakobson (2011; 478-80) have demonstrated with regards to the narration of 
Estonian history. 
Kolakowski’s conception of narration of the nation having an anticipatory 
aspect is also quite a key insight.  Evidently any individual who subscribes to a 
particular national identity must consider the future of that nation as well as its 
past.  Unlike Kolakowski we cannot personify the nation and adopt the view that 
the nation itself is concerned with its future (1995: 54), nor can we agree with 
him that the end of the nation cannot be conceptualised.  On the contrary the very 
concern that the nation may indeed be under threat of extinction is a key element 
of the narration of the nation for many smaller national groups.  Indeed this study 
shall demonstrate that the ‘death’ of the nation is a matter of central importance 
and real concern for many individuals in Karelia. 
No systematic analysis shall be made here of the remaining aspects of the 
narration of the nation identified by Kolakowski and Hall.  In fact it will be 
contended that to limit the potential number of such aspects would be fallacious 







may not for example deploy the idea of a Volksgeist or the idea of a pure original 
people or folk; the evidence for such phenomenon in the current study is 
inconclusive at best.  Certainly there are nations which would not seem to make 
use of such concepts; conversely it may be argued other strategies could be 
added to the above schemes.  The key reason for referencing the work of the 
above two authors is to highlight the role the narration of the nation plays in 
constructing national identity.  It would be erroneous to claim it was the only 
mechanism through which national identity was constructed and performed; 
clearly as stated above banal nationalism plays an important role amongst other 
factors.  Nevertheless the narration of national identity is a key conceptual device 
which allows individuals to reconcile their changing and contradictory everyday 
experience of the nation with their idealised conception of the nation as an 
unchanging, natural phenomenon. 
 
iv) National Identity and Multiple Identities 
 
It should be noted here that there is no reason to assume, as Mandler has 
noted, that national identity ‘trumps’ other forms of identity or indeed that “one 
national identity must trump others” (2006: 297).  The dynamic scheme of 
identity production outlined above provides room for any one individual to claim 
multiple identities or identifications at any one time, given the individual is 
presented with a range of potentialities, symbolic resources and referents upon 
which to base their own identity, albeit constrained by the ‘identity repertoire’ 
their particular position in society and the exact range of resources presented to 
them.  Any individual therefore may be in a position (and indeed depending on 
the changing of their social position) to profess several identities either 
consecutively or contemporaneously.  Evidently this ability is also constrained 
by the fact that identification with one group can imply a simultaneous exclusion 
from another group; to claim to be Jewish, for example, invariably implies a 
rejection of or non-inclusion in other religious groups.  Claims to hold one type 
of identity, by the nature of the principles of the construction of that group, may 
also exclude the possibility of successfully claiming another type of identity.  







membership of what would ordinarily be considered two separate national 
groups (i.e. a dual-citizen claiming to be both Canadian and Iranian).  These 
claims may not always be successful however there is no a priori reason why 
they cannot be.  Indeed certain national claims such as Swiss, German or British 
may in fact either by definition or in certain circumstances be considered to 
contain multiple, equally valid, claims to a particular national identity.  To a 
certain extent as Wodak et al. (2009: 16-17) claim such multiple identities can 
offer a certain corrective element to the intrinsically divisive nature of national 
identity production.  In the context of the Russian Federation, as in the USSR 
before it, the situation may be viewed as potentially quite complex.  It is 
perfectly possible to view the USSR and its successor state as a type of ‘civic’ 
nation containing the various minority nationalities (or ‘ethnic’ nations’) within 
its geographic and conceptual borders.  The implications of the conception of 
ethnic and civic nations shall be discussed further below but at this point it 
should be noted the idea of multiple identities is of importance in a Karelian 
context; Karelians could potentially view themselves as ethnically Karelian but 
part of a broader Russian civic nation.  It is also possible for Russians to 
conceptualise Russian identity as inclusive of groups such as the Karelians in a 
national if not an ethnic sense. 
National national identity has not always been the key principle by which 
humanity has divided itself and there is no evident reason why it should always 
continue to be a particularly important aspect of human existence.  It is difficult 
to conceive of a world without national identity given how reified the concept 
now is however there is no fundamental reason why it should not be dispensed 
with at some future date.  Certainly before the nation was conjured into being 
other forms of identity were self-evidently far more important to the individual 
and socially.  Even in the contemporary world certain nationalisms and nations 
are seen to be ‘weaker’ than others.  As a case in point the nation of Belarus is 
viewed by many commentators to possess a particularly feeble nationalism; 
Marples for example has noted the very weak position of the national language in 
Belarus and also the apparent lack of a unifying ‘national idea’ to the extent that 
the ruling elite have practically negated the idea of a Belarussian ‘nation’ (1999: 







intelligentsia has a very limited resonance amongst the Belarusian populace at 
large, suggesting that at present such a form of national identity does not or 
cannot fulfil the social roles expected of it and is thus not utilised (2006: 628-30).  
Perhaps Belarusian nationalism is simply not seen as a credible form of group 
construction; in the absence of strong symbolic resources around which to 
construct such a nationalism or indeed in the shadow of other national narratives 
with more credible or powerful resources it is relegated to the margins of society.  
Other forms of identity, be they national, transnational or other are evidently 
more resonant in that particular society. 
 The futility of attempting to define what a nation is per se is also evident 
if we try to demarcate where exactly national and regional identity differ.  Many 
of the hallmarks (territoriality, language and history to name but a few) of any 
putative national identity can be found in what we would term regional identity.  
The ‘jumping off point’ at which an identity ceases to be regional and becomes 
national are not conceptually clear.  As a result of this what one individual may 
term a national identity can appear to another to be just a regional identity 
depending on their particular set of symbolic resources and collective knowledge 
and the manner in which it is interpreted.  What is a deeply cherished national 
identity to one individual or group can be construed as a relatively trivial 
























 As the above view of identity has been taken the most suitable manner of 
approaching this issue would seem to be Critical Discourse Analysis or CDA.  
Discourse is here understood as social practice, which is to say everyday 
communication, assuming a dialectical relationship between discursive acts and 
the institutional and social environment in which they occur in the tradition 
outlined by Bakhtin and Voloshinov.  These discursive acts are socially 
constitutive in the manner outlined by Bourdieu, and hence the analysis of these 
acts allows the exposure of the power relations prevalent in a given group and 
thus the principles through which such groups are constructed.  In this work the 
general principles followed shall be those of the Vienna school of CDA or the 
Historical Method, particularly with regards to the emphasis placed on 
background of any utterance to the analysis of the text produced.  As has been 
explained above discourse is seen as socially constitutive, however as has also 
been noted it is not the sole factor in the constitution of any given social reality.  
To fully explain the role of discourse in the constitution of society a range of 
other factors must be acknowledged.   Clearly the constitution of the habitus 
takes into consideration as stated the whole range of learned experience that the 
subject is aware of, which shall take into account factors such as the material 
conditions of existence.  It also must be noted that there is a finite point beyond 
which pure linguistic analysis cannot go.  In terms of the current research for 
example it would not be possible to fully understand expressions relating to 
historical events and narratives, such as, for example, the particular resonance of 
‘фашист’ or ‘бело-финны’ by reference to linguistic analysis alone, it is the 
application of historical analysis which can unlock, as it were, the full discursive 
baggage of these terms and expose the actual semantic intent behind their 
utilisation.  Furthermore without cognisance of the particular ethnographic 
situation in the Republic of Karelia much of the discourse would be unable to be 
adequately explained from a discourse analysis standpoint alone.   The principle 







methodological and theoretical perspectives, in particular a combination of 
historical, social-political and linguistic approaches, and also utilising various 
methods of data collection to allow as detailed a picture as is possible of the 
subject studied shall be utilised here.  This method is seen as avoiding the 
potential pitfalls of the examination of any one of these aspects in isolation.  As 
has been argued above the particular cognitive processes through which identity 
is negotiated, that is to say the process of the production of discourses, their 
acceptance and rejection through the actions of the habitus is ultimately a 
complex process that requires the entire social reality to be considered, as it is 
this reality which dialectically constitutes itself in terms of the structures through 
which life is understood and ordered, and then reproduced or altered.   
 I will also note that although this school of CDA and indeed CDA in 
general proclaims an emancipatory and socially critical approach, this is not 
deemed appropriate in the current work at this time.  Certainly the examination 
of the way groups are created and dissolved shall serve to expose the ultimately 
arbitrary divisions imposed by the existence of these groups, however with 
certain exceptions in the current study it is not clear what emancipatory function 
this would serve.  Whilst the exposure of the creation of negative 'other' group 
images and the necessity of this for the perpetuation of certain political agendas 
could only be seen in a positive light (if this proves possible), it is not possible to 
find any one valid 'Karelian' identity nor indeed does one exist, and the possible 
'negative' assessment of any outcomes of these identities changing or 
disappearing are to entirely determined by the subjective views of the individual.  
The just comment of Fairclough must be acknowledged that no researcher is 
entirely neutral and hence it would be hypocritical and dishonest to assert that no 
preconceived ideas or prejudices were brought to a given piece of research 
(Fairclough 1989: 138-9).  It must also be advanced however that should 
research be carried out effectively the hidden or implicit political agendas in any 
piece of discourse should be exposable without recourse to an aggressively 
political research agenda.  As Voloshinov has pointed out language use and the 
very sign, that is to say language itself, is the site of struggle over social reality.  
Evidently CDA can uncover how language is used to advance any given agenda 







and contested nature of the most evocative words such ’democracy’, ’freedom’ 
and suchlike.  Also it would have to be noted that whilst the language of the 
dominant class is full of such manipulative strategies, the language of the 
opposition to the dominant class is by definition and of necessity as full of 
similar strategies, as Bourdieu’s analysis of orthodox and heretical discourse 
should illustrate.  Finally it might be contended that the position of an ideal 
neutral observer is not in any case possible, given all individuals are the products 
of the same process of conditioning which produces the individual habitus.  It is 
not therefore possible for any researcher to attain this idealised state of complete 
neutrality and objectivity.  Indeed as the stated aims of this research show it was 
partially undertaken as a response to the dearth of research, in the English 
language in particular, into aspects of identity production within the ethnic 
Karelian population.  
 Paul Chilton (2005: 19-53) has also criticised CDA on a number of 
accounts.  Firstly and perhaps most importantly is the issue of the relations 
between CDA and psychology and cognitive science, or the perceived lack of 
such relations.  There is a problem, as Chilton has identified, that to see discourse 
as constituting social reality can cause the apparent problem of discourse causing 
itself.  It has been argued thus far that there is a cognitive element to the 
production of discourse which eliminates this concern.  Language as used in 
social practice, and I would argue social practice in general, which could include 
non-verbal communication, is produced by the dialectical interaction of 
individuals and in fact the cognitive processes of the individual at any given 
time.  Thus language and communication, which must be produced in the human 
brain (as it would seem impossible to contend it was produced elsewhere) and 
therefore discourse has an important cognitive element, in fact it can only be 
taking place through cognition.  Chilton alleges CDA has been successful as a 
descriptive process whilst not being able to identify the cognitive processes at 
work which lead to certain types of behaviour and the production of certain 
discourses, which is to say CDA can explain what is going on but not why, or at 
least not completely.  There are a number of possible objections to this view.  
Firstly certain practitioners such as van Dijk certainly have been concerned with 







the conceptual apparatus of the habitus and its functioning provides a general 
scheme for how the mind conceptualises and ultimately constructs and is 
constructed by social reality.  This shows how learned experience interacts with 
current perception, or rather how current perception is squared cognitively with a 
framework of past experience which influences the way in which current events 
are perceived and is shaped by current events.  If we are allowed to integrate 
Ricoeur’s idea of Idem and Ipse identity and the personage we can see how the 
Ipse identity or habitus perhaps, can take past experience, or the ‘full life-history 
of existential experience’ if this is preferred and through the dialectical operation 
described arrive at a seemingly unitary, unproblematic personage.  As has been 
seen above with reference to van Dijk (2008, 2011) knowledge, and various 
assumptions and types of knowledge, are very important to the ability to function 
in a discursive environment.  This cognitive scheme, which is of necessity 
somewhat abstract and perhaps insufficiently detailed, is preferred to the 
alternatives proffered by Chilton as shall be discussed below.  Secondly as has 
been mentioned above CDA has not generally claimed, or at least not all 
practitioners have claimed, that such problems can be explained only though 
linguistic analysis alone.  To explain the issue of xenophobia or racism, the 
problem raised by Chilton, a linguistic analysis alone would not suffice to 
explain why the issue was happening, but a linguistic analysis coupled with a 
historical or ethnographic and social analysis would certainly be able to offer 
some ideas.  In fact it might be argued that this would be more successful than 
cognitive model offered which seems extremely problematic for a variety of 
reasons.     
 The notion of the social construction of society and identity has been 
criticised for the use of concepts and terminology which are not used by the 
subjects studied.  Specifically Motyl has argued that: 
 
 “Constructivism claims that agents construct reality in their language, but 
the assertion of this claim and the demonstration of this claim can only be 
effected by the use of constructivist language, which by definition is alien to the 
language of the agents concerned and could not possibly have figured in their 








 Criticisms of this nature are rather beguiling as it is inevitably true that in 
our quotidian existence we do not use the terminology of social constructivism to 
conceptualise and understand our behaviour.  Beyond that self-evident 
observation however to object to the idea of social constructivism in such terms 
is to an extent merely sophistry.  The fact that we do not use the terminology of 
economic theory to conceptualise and understand our everyday behaviour in 
terms of our economic interaction does not lessen the value of economics.  As 
has been argued above to rigidly separate theory and practice does not lead to an 
understanding of the totality of the problem, which is the only method through 
which to understand any element of the totality.  The fact that subjects are not in 
the habit of referring to symbolic resources, the habitus or the like is no 
indication that these are not useful conceptual devices for the researcher.  
 A more relevant criticism of CDA may be made on methodological 
grounds.  Certain commentators, for example Widdowson (1995, 1996) have 
argued that due to the nature of CDA it may be overly subjective as the selection 
of texts, and therefore ultimately the result of the analysis will depend on the 
researcher.  This is an issue which will have to be addressed individually by each 
researcher.  To a certain extent the problem is unavoidable insofar as no selection 
of texts can be considered entirely objective.  No analysis can cover the entirety 
of texts potentially relevant to any an issue as vast as that of one of national 
identity which by definition encompasses literally thousands of individuals all 
producing and reproducing that identity.  The issue of a potentially small and 
perhaps unrepresentative sample is also raised by Fowler (1996: 9-10) as a 
limitation to the effectiveness of CDA in this area.  There are a number of ways 
in which such problems can be minimised if not entirely eliminated.  Should a 
plurality of sources be obtained the potential problem of bias should be 
minimised to an acceptable level.  Hopefully any researcher would attempt and 
be in a position to acquire a variety of texts from differing sources, and cross 
reference these sources to acquire as objective an impression of the field as 
possible.  In this regard the principle of triangulation should also serve to 
minimise the distorting effect a reliance on one method alone might induce.  







the production of national identity the number of potential sources that could be 
referenced is evidently gigantic, we must appeal to our notion of cultural and 
symbolic capital advanced above.  By seeking contributions from those most 
influential in terms of negotiating the production and reproduction of national 
identities we should gain the most value possible from even a relatively limited 
sample.  As not all contributions shall be valued at equal rates the focus of the 
researcher is best aimed at analysing those key contributions made by those with 
the greatest access to symbolic capital.  In this instance that would appear to 
indicate an approach which combined media discourse with the views of those 
individuals occupying the most influential roles in society.  A certain balance and 
indication of the efficacy of their contributions can be achieved by the inclusion 
of contributions from those less well placed to influence and shape debate.  In 
such a manner although a complete picture will not be obtained (and indeed it is 
in the nature of the production of national identity perhaps impossible to obtain 
such a picture) a fairly accurate and revelatory analysis is possible. 
 
 
 2.4  Methodological Considerations 
 
 
 As stated previously this study shall broadly follow the methodological 
outlines drawn up by the Vienna school of Critical Discourse Analysis.  In 
particular it shall follow the methods outlined in Wodak et al. 1990, 1994 and 
2009.  In this regard it shall utilise three layers of analysis, namely: 
 
   1.Content 
   2.Strategies 
















The content of the study relates to the thematic concerns of this particular 
piece of research.  Specifically this involves the discursive construction of 
varying Karelian identities.  The first and major aspect of this theme is the 
narration of Karelian history as a basis for the construction of a putative Karelian 
national identity.  It was the intention of this study to apply the conceptual 
framework of the narration of the nation to the contemporary state of Karelian 
national identity to judge its efficacy and relevance.  As such the study was 
involved with attempting to identify narratives of the Karelian nation in the 
source material.  No presumptions were made as to the relevance of this concept 
in terms of the contemporary state of Karelian national identity; rather the 
intention was to test its relevance. 
A further thematic concern of this research was to demonstrate the 
dynamics of the construction of the historical discursive ‘space’ in Karelia.  This 
research was intended to delineate the various tendencies within the narration of 
the history of Karelia and the Karelian people and to relate these to the varying 
narratives of the nation (not necessarily narratives of the Karelian nation) current 
within the Republic of Karelia.  This was intended to demonstrate the variety of 
competing potential identities and narratives of the nation at work in the area 
today.  Through the narration of either difference, exclusion and separateness or 
a shared historical legacy and inclusion differing conceptions of ‘Karelian-ness’ 
can be constructed.  Such narratives utilise various historical myths, 
interpretations and symbols. 
Another thematic aspect closely related to the above is the construction of 
either Russians or Karelians (and indeed Finns) as either victims or perpetrators 
of various alleged historical wrongs.  This is closely connected to the spatial 
narration of Karelia, and the highly important symbolic role of the border.   
Another related consideration is the temporal narration of Karelia and the 
construction of differing Karelian presents and most importantly futures.  This 







Karelian identity and language, and future social and political goals related to 
these topics. 
Finally the narration of the nation is compared to other relevant sources 
of national identity in terms of value and importance.  From this analysis the 
discursive construction of Karelian identity and the manner in which history is 
utilised to narrate the nation, and the manner in which it interacts with other 






The interpretation of strategy used here relates directly to the conception 
of the habitus outlined above.  Strategies are envisaged as not directly voluntary 
in the sense of the subject having unlimited action, but neither are they to be 
envisaged as entirely mechanistic.  The strategies referred to are part of the 
relation between the habitus and the social milieu in which it is located; hence 
the employment of such strategies is conditioned by the milieu and also by the 
habitus involved; thus strategies are employed without necessarily a large degree 
of calculation but in response to certain stimuli.  The employment of such 
strategies is therefore an action which is at best semi-conscious, entailing as it 
must a great deal of symbolic ‘baggage’ only half acknowledged by the subject 
involved.  Here strategies are defined as ‘actions orientated towards goals’ 
(Bourdieu 1993: 90).  These actions may be more or less automatic and 
conscious depending on context.  Strategies are the intent behind the utterance, 
that is to say by analysing a discursive act we may determine certain strategies 
which attempt, more or less consciously, to configure the understanding of a 
sign, to influence its reception in the listener and thus influence their 
understanding of its semiotic content and therefore the world. 
 There are several different types of discursive strategies of particular 
relevance to this study.  Constructive strategies, which seek to promote a certain 
definition of national identity through unification, cohesion, inclusion and 







to differentiate various putative groups as well as to establish unity between 
separate but apparently related groups.  One of the most prevalent strategies, and 
indeed one that could be termed almost an official strategy, was that of 
perpetuation which narrated a history of positively evaluated political and social 
continuity between Russians and Karelians, for example.  This is also related to 
the strategy of unification as expressed through the construction of shared 
heritage and character.  The supposedly model character of aspects of Karelian 
society could also be invoked as a strategy of singularisation which emphasises 
the unique or exemplary character of certain aspects of Karelian history and 
culture.  Related strategies were those of relativisation and justification which 
assign the blame for perceived historical mistakes or abuses to various parties 
whilst declaiming, downplaying or minimalizing the apparent responsibility of 
another group.  This is also closely associated with the use of strategies of 
avoidance which refrain from assigning such responsibility to a particular group.   
 Not all the strategies discovered were of this constructive type; the use of 
constructive strategies was generally associated with the promotion of the status 
quo or identities which might be considered to be part of an established 
orthodoxy.  For the production and promotion of less orthodox or potentially 
heretical identities transformative or destructive strategies were more generally 
employed.  Such macro-strategies could also use the strategies of assigning 
responsibility as described above, but could also emphasise discontinuity, 
discreditation or negative presentation of the other group or even in certain 
circumstances that of the purported ‘we’ group.  Perceived existing narratives 
could be questioned or declared invalid or indeed inverted to recast the ‘victim’ 
and ‘aggressor’ paradigms established elsewhere.  The use of ideas of continuity 
could also be invoked in strategies of either legitimisation or de-legitimisation. In 
assessing the current state of Karelian identity a negative strategy of presentation 
as a ‘disaster’ or ‘finality’ which evoke an image of the identity or its 
components as ‘dead’ or ‘dying’ was occasionally invoked.  Heteronomisation 
was also an important strategy in the presentation of Karelian identities as shall 
be discussed below; this strategy emphasises the lack of free will or possibility of 
free action associated with a particular event or phenomenon.   







studied was sizeable and for reasons of space not every one can be analysed in 
detail here.  All such strategies however could be classified into one of the three 
main groups described above: constructive, transformative or destructive.  One 
minor strategy may be employed to assist any one of these three macro-
strategies; for example the strategy of continuity may be used in a constructive or 
a destructive strategy to posit differing conceptions of Karelian identity.  Most of 
these strategies are relatively straightforward, however should a more than 
usually complicated example by encountered in the course of this study it shall 
be further examined in the analysis.   
 
 
 iii) Means of Realisation 
 
 In discussing strategies the focus has been on the more or less automatic 
or semi-conscious ‘schemes of argumentation’, to use Wodak et al’s term (2009: 
34), which are used by subjects towards the realisation of particular ends.  
‘Means of realisation’ in this context simply refers to the lexical and syntactic 
devices which are utilised within the text to fulfil the strategy involved; that is to 
say they consist of those discursive tools which create or de-legitimate 
conceptions of national identity.  There are innumerable such tools in the data 
collected for this study and as such no systematic overview of each and every 
one can be provided; furthermore such means of realisation can be used perfectly 
easily for any chosen strategy and to support or criticise almost any given 
national identity.  The manner in which each particular means of realisation is 
utilised will be analysed with reference to the concrete example, that is to say the 
text under analysis, in each individual case.  The purpose of this study is not to 
demonstrate exactly how, in linguistic terms, a given lexical device contributes to 
the realisation of a given strategy but to analyse the production of such strategies 
and the manner in which the realise various national identities in a particular 
context.  Some general comments on certain issues are necessary at this juncture, 
however.  In this study what Wodak et al. term the “phenomenon of vagueness” 
(2009: 35) is of especial interest and importance; this relates to the use of 







uncertainty and ambiguity in the texts in question.  The manner in which ‘us’ and 
‘them’ groups are created in the discourse is also of key importance (see ibid: 36-
47 and van Leeuwen 1996 for further discussion of this phenomenon) as is the 
synecdochial substitution of referents to expand or contract the boundaries of a 
putative social group.  As stated above the manner in which such tools are 
implemented shall be demonstrated and analysed in further detail throughout the 
analysis of the data itself. 
 
 
iv) Mass Media , Cultural Capital and the Karelian Press 
 
It has already been noted that symbolic power and cultural capital are 
utilised in order to aid in the construction of the nation by individuals and 
groups.   Furthermore the concept of the narration of the national ‘story’ has also 
been identified as one of the key manners in which conceptions of national 
identity are advanced and perpetuated.  Clearly, however, as Bourdieu’s ideas of 
symbolic power and cultural capital suggest the contributions various actors 
make to this process are assessed at varying rates.  The position of the mass 
media in industrialised societies places it in an exceedingly favourable position 
with regards to the reception and influence of their contributions in shaping the 
social world.  Such influence is furthermore cumulative, as Fairclough has 
pointed out (2001: 45), as the repetition of themes of discourse in media outlets 
aids its efficacy in reproducing the intended discourse.  Indeed Anderson (1983: 
87) has proposed that the growth of the ‘national’ press following the industrial 
revolution was a major factor in the rise of the nation itself.  Certainly the 
influence of the mass media in shaping discourse has been widely studied and 
acknowledged, for example by Bell and Garet (1998), Fowler (1991), Fairclough 
(1995).  It is important to note the notion of heteroglossia as advanced by 
Bakhtin (1981 [1934]) when examining the role of the press.  The utterances of 
any speaker are layered with information and ideas assimilated from previous 
utterances. Within any dialogue speakers choose or reject parts of the proffered 
discourse and go on to incorporate it within their own.   In media discourse there 







interlocutor.  Furthermore media discourse often undertakes to inform and 
educate; the producer of the text can, but not always, assume the role of an 
authority on a particular subject.  In such text production the speaker still enters 
into the dialogic task of convincing their imagined reader or viewer of the 
semantic content of their utterance with the various linguistic strategies available 
to them; in this manner of text production however the producer may appear to 
have a perceived power or right to have such utterances accepted almost 
unquestioningly.  Such authoritative discourse may include that of the mass 
media.  As Li has suggested therefore: 
media representations understood in this way, are reconceptualisations of 
observable linguistic markers according to the specific intentions of those 
involved in the process of media production (2009: 92). 
 
It is therefore important to consider media discourse not merely with the 
semiotic content of the utterance in mind, but with the intent of the producer and 
the manner in which it relates to previously expressed utterances and information 
that is considered ‘common knowledge’; the imagined ‘K-device’ or ‘habitus’ of 
the intended interlocutor.  Heteroglossia is therefore a key consideration when 
examining mass media discourse.  The relationship between media discourse and 
consumer is also as has been noted above a relationship between an actual 
producer and an imagined reader.  As Lindgren has noted: 
The relation between the press and the public is characterized by the 
action of information. In contemporary societies we are dependent upon 
mediated texts, which means that face-to-face interaction between ‘sender’ and 
‘receiver’ is often precluded. This leaves the institutions or individuals who can 
control or influence processes of mediation with a considerable amount of 
power. The relationship between the media and their informants – and that 
between informants and readers – are similarly structured. In broad terms, we 








This act of informing is key to understanding the potential for media 
discourse to aid in the construction of narratives of national identity.  In terms of 
the construction of such narratives in Karelia the media by choosing and filtering 
its informants and the information they provide can strongly influence the 
perceptions of its readers as to the validity of competing claims to national 
identity.  As this is what Fairclough would term a ‘knower-initiated” (2003: 108) 
exchange of knowledge, with the media assuming a position of authority, it can 
issue ‘statements of facts’ which can evaluate and determine the acceptable 
bounds of a putative identity or historical narrative.  It should be noted, however, 
that media discourse does not create such narratives in a vacuum; these are 
narratives produced and reproduced within the society in question.  The 
continued prevalence of one or other particular narrative in any corpus of data 
derived from the mass media is often attributable to the objective conditions 
under which it was produced.  That is to say that the standardisation of the 
individual described by Horkheimer and Adorno (2002) by substituting a 
stereotyped, universalised image is a consequence of the nature of the modern 
mass media; the dominance of the elite and their control of the mass media 
industry tend to promote the reproduction of similar standardised narratives in 
media discourse.  As Molina has also described: 
 Another problem which text contents face in the media, particularly in 
television, is the prevalence of the discourse genre. Through its permits and 
prohibitions (which are not only linguistic), a type of language that causes 
discourse genres to have primacy over contents has been positively established 
(2009: 186). 
As a consequence of this standardisation and consolidation of genre the 
actual content of the discourse can become repetitive and standardised.  There is 
a tendency, therefore, for existing narratives to be reproduced through the use of 
conventionalised language by producers of discourse in the media.  By relatively 
uncritical adherence to the rules of a perceived discursive genre, for example 
newspaper journalism, the prevailing narratives of identity can be reproduced in 







context in which the text is produced when examining the role it may place in the 
production or reproduction of a given narrative. 
Given the ability of the press to influence the narration of the nation a 
study of this issue in a Karelian context is a rewarding way in which to approach 
the question of how the process of the construction of national identity is being 
undertaken in the area.  In the next chapter I shall therefore examine the manner 
in which the Russian-language press treats topics relating to the history of the 
Republic and the various peoples of Karelia to determine in what manner they 
may impact upon the development of national identity.  By advancing various 
notions of Karelian history such articles shall reinforce, develop or undermine 
competing narratives of Karelian history and hence Karelian identity.  There are 
some particular concerns to address however with the Karelian press before 
considering the topic in detail.  Firstly it must be noted that the Karelian press 
exists side by side and in competition with the Russian press.  Anderson’s notion 
of the national press operating to create national identity has already been found 
problematic in states with potentially competing national identities.  This issue 
has been examined for example in the context of the United Kingdom, 
specifically from a Scottish perspective by Higgins (2004), Law (2001) and 
Rosie et al. (2004, 2006).  In these studies it is contended that Scottish and 
British identities are influenced by both a ‘national’ British press and a 
competing ‘national’ Scottish press.  There are similar issues in Karelia insofar 
as the Karelian press is a regional affair which exists alongside larger ‘national’ 
Russian media outlets.  The Karelian press cannot therefore been seen in 
isolation but reflects the discourse on identity and nationalism available in its 
Russian counterparts.  Its reception by the reader is also influenced by their 
exposure to and awareness of the discursive products of the national media.  To a 
lesser extent there is also a degree of influence from the Finnish media within the 
Karelian press itself; it is not uncommon for articles in major Finnish newspapers 
to be quoted by their Karelian counterparts.  Quite clearly therefore Karelian 
media outlets cannot solely act to construct national identity in isolation from 
their Russian counterparts.  Nevertheless as publications dealing specifically 







source, in the construction of a Karelian identity.  It should also be noted that in 
general terms ‘local’ newspapers are slightly more popular than national 
publications in Russia, with 27% of Russians regularly and 40% occasionally 
reading a local paper as opposed to 18% and 38% reading the national press 
(Oates & McCormack 2010: 128).  National television networks are however 
much more popular than the printed press, and internet-based media is also 
increasingly influential and popular.     Circulation figures for the Karelian press 
are not readily obtainable, nor is it possible to determine the circulation of 
‘national’ publications with the Republic of Karelia. There are a number of 
‘Karelian’ publications, i.e. those produced with Karelia and targeted at a local 
audience.  The majority of these are ‘local’ papers published in and dealing with 
the affairs of one particular municipality or region.  As has already been stated 
there are a number of ‘republican’ papers which purport to cover the Republic of 
Karelia as a whole.  For the purpose of this analysis two of these papers have 
been examined.  Although there are a number of publications in the Karelian, 
Vepsian and Finnish languages publications in the Russian language have been 
preferred, both for ease of analysis and availability to the researcher but also due 
to the low circulation numbers of the papers in the Finno-Ugric languages.  It is 
also the case that the Russian-language press is available to all the inhabitants of 
the Republic of Karelia, and therefore can influence the production and 
reproduction of historical narratives and national identity amongst the broadest 
possible sphere, whilst by its very nature the Finno-Ugric press can do this only 
amongst those who speak one of the minority languages.   
 
v) The Interview Material 
 
As has been noted above discourse is dialogic in nature; the mass media 
is but one side of the dialogue.  To ascertain the reception of the orthodoxies and 
putative national identities found within the initial part of this study it was felt 
prudent to compare these results with a second set of data.  Consequently it was 







of Karelia in order to provide a further set of data for analysis.  As this was 
conducted after the compilation and initial analysis of the mass media corpus the 
questions asked in the interviews could be directed towards the exploration of 
certain key areas of interest which had previously been identified.  There was 
also the distinct advantage that the interviews could be tailored towards the 
object of this study in general, hence providing a large amount of specific data on 
the topic in hand.   
The methodological technique utilised in this study was that of the semi-
structured interview.  As Miniciello et al. (1990: 164) note interviews may be 
formally structured with a particular list and categories of expected questions and 
answers or unstructured, in which the dialogue and interaction between 
interlocutors provides the data to be analysed.  Between these two extremes a 
researcher may choose to use a list of questions as an aid to help form the 
structure of the interview in order to attain the require results (see Briggs 1986, 
Minichiello et al, 1990, Wengraff 2001).    Rather than devise a set of fixed 
questions in the manner of a survey or interrogation the use of a semi-structured 
interview format, wherein the subject had the maximum possible ability to offer 
narrations of the topic under consideration was considered ideal for the purposes 
of this study.  Using a general set of questions to broach a range of topics of 
interest and then utilising supplementary questions to develop points of interest 
would test the assumptions developed from the analysis of the mass media 
material.  By pursuing a semi-structured interview format this material could 
both be tested and other aspects of the narration of national identity which had 
not occurred in the previous data or had not been considered by the researcher 
could be explored.  As a relatively flexible dialogue such types of interviews, as 
Patton (2002: 343) has noted, allow the researcher to react to situational changes 
and also take account of the fact that as an individual dialogue the discourse 
produced is by definition individual.  Considerations of power and constraint 
within interviews conducted for research purposes are as valid as they are in any 
discursive field, as Briggs has indicated the interview also provides an alternate 
arena for the negotiation and expression of alternate discourses.  As Patton also 







manipulating the conversation in order to achieve a desired set of responses 
(2002: 343).  Conversely the researcher must attempt to maintain a degree of 
control over the process to stop the interviewee from directing the dialogue in an 
unproductive, irrelevant direction; the researcher must maintain awareness of the 
purpose of the interview and steer the conversation in that direction as required 
(Fife 2005, Patton 2002). 
The questions utilised as a framework for these interviews are listed 
below: 
1. В этом году отметают 90-я годовщина основании Республики 
Карелии, что эта годовщина означает для Вас? 
    
 
2. Расскажите короткую историю Карелии с древности до наших 
дней. 
 
3.(a) Какие разницы, если таковые вообще есть, Вы думаете, есть 
между историей Карелии и другими частями России? 
 
(b) Посьле вашего ответа на предыдущий вопрос, какие факторы 
способствовали формированию таких разниц. 
 
4. История Республики Карелии, важная для Вас или нет? 
 
5. Должны ли история Карелии влиять на ее будущее развитие? Если 
да, то в каком образе? 
 
6.Какие по-вашему самие важние аспекты истории Карелии? 
 
7. Какая роль, по-вашему, играет эпос Калевала в истории Карелии? 
Калевала - важная для вас лично? 
 








   
9. До 1917 главный язык в Карелии был Карельский, зачем, по-
вашемуб люды перестали говорить на Карельском?  Как вы 
оцениваете этот процесс? 
 
10. Карельское правительство считает Карельский, Вепский и 
Финский языки коренние языки Республики Карелии, вы считаете 
что это правилно?  
 
11.Какая роль играли конфликтов 40-ых годов в истории Карелии?  
Как эти конфликты влияют на современную Карелую? 
 
13. Карельское правительство считает Карельский, Вепский и 
Финский народы коренние народы Карелии.   Вы считаете что это 





As has been noted the interview process was semi-structured hence 
multiple additional questions were asked depending on the responses made to the 
initial questions; should a prior answer have sufficiently answered one of the 
questions it was not led unnecessarily.  The questions listed above were selected 
after the compilation of the corpus of media data and its analysis and were hence 
selected to investigate trends identified in this material.  They were also 
formulated to provoke, as far as possible, narration of historical periods and 
themes rather than straightforward affirmation or negation of a point.  It was also 
hoped they would be perceived as neutral and would not induce the participant a 
particular narrative.  In general participants were allowed as much lassitude to 
interpret the question as they desired, leading to some interesting findings.  







disregarded the main line of questioning and therefore this interview has been 
discarded from the corpus of data and shall not be analysed.          
It has been argued above that the social position of the interlocutors in 
any given discourse influences both discourse production and reception; at the 
same time as such discourse contributes to the creation and reproduction of such 
social relation between the participants.  It is therefore worth considering the 
particular position occupied by the researcher in this set of interviews.  There is 
in fact some basis for proposing that the particular social position of the 
researcher in question may have been of some assistance in obtaining a more 
complete set of data than might otherwise have been possible.  The construction 
of potential ‘we’ or ‘other’ groups within Karelia has been noted in the 
discussion of mass media discourse.  It was perhaps advantageous for the 
purpose of this study that the interviewer in question was not a potential member 
of any of these potentially competing ‘we’ groups.  As the interviewer was 
neither Karelian, Russian nor Finnish, or indeed from anywhere in the immediate 
geographical vicinity of Karelia, participants may have felt more able to openly 
discuss their opinions without fear of potentially offending their interlocutor.  
Furthermore being a complete ‘outsider’ in this sense participants to some extent 
may have felt obliged to include more exposition of their opinions in order that 
these would be understood by someone potentially less well informed than they 
would generally expect about certain issues.  This very quality of exposition is 
especially useful when addressing questions related to the development of 
differing narratives.  As Burgess (1984: 12) has proposed if the interviewer 
positions his or herself as simultaneously not only less well-informed than the 
interviewee but also willing and interested to learn the process will be more 
productive.  In this instance the interviewer was introduced as a foreign student 
conducting research, hence participants may have included further detail than 
they may otherwise have felt required if discussing such issues with a resident of 
the area.  As a caveat to the above however, it should also be noted that some 
participants treated the interviewer more as a researcher or specialist who would 







perhaps even more so than the participant themselves.  This can be demonstrated 
by such comments as: 
Знаешь к моему стыду много не расскажу, но и думаю что ты уже 
знаешь и можешь найти уже. (A8) 
   Although this may have led to a certain reticence in discussing the topic 
participants were assured, if necessary, that the interview was designed more to 
gauge their own opinions and views than as an exam of their historical 
knowledge.   
    It is also perhaps worth remarking that many participants were extremely 
keen to put forward their views and appreciative of the fact that a foreign 
researcher was interested in issues surrounding the minority groups of the 
Republic of Karelia in general.  Although it has already been noted above that 
despite the fact that in general Critical Discourse Analysis proclaims an 
emancipatory approach this has not been invoked with this particular study the 
social position of the researcher is open to varying interpretations by individual 
subjects; it was found during the course of the fieldwork undertaken for this 
study that the position of the researcher as a self-identified Scot was interpreted 
positively by some participants.  It would appear that as a representative of 
another ‘small nation’, moreover a small nation united with a larger, more 
dominant neighbour, certain participants constructed the interviewer as a 
particularly sympathetic interlocutor, which may have had some impact on the 
responses given.   
The issue of the size of any given corpus of data and the potentially 
limited value of analysing a small, restricted set of data has already been noted.  
Conducting semi-structured interviews, which by definition may last an 
indeterminate length of time and in practice would tend towards being lengthier 
than a formal questionnaire style process, also limited the total number of 
interviews undertaken.  There were also time constraints and organisational 
difficulties which acted towards restricting the number of interviews in total.  
Despite these issues 24 interviews are analysed here which should provide an 







contributions of some participants in any given discourse will be valued at a 
greater rate than others; some individuals are in a more advantageous position to 
manipulate the field of group construction than others as Bourdieu would have it.  
In this respect the relatively small sample is more than adequately compensated 
for by the nature of many of those who participated.  The fieldwork was 
conducted in accordance with the Research Ethics Framework of the College of 
Humanities and Social Science of the University of Edinburgh and Code of 
Practice for Research; the majority of subjects interviewed were ordinary 
Karelians or Russians who were not involved in political activities and hence to 
safeguard their anonymity they have been assigned random alphanumeric 
designations such as A1, B3, D6 etc.,  A number of participants are worth 
identifying individually due to the potentially key roles they play or then played 
in the production of Karelian national identity.  These individuals were 
interviewed as representatives of their organisations and hence are identified.  In 
particular this includes: participant D13, or Anatolii Grigoriev, head of the 
Karelian Congress; participant A1, or Natalia Sinitskaya, editor of the Karelian-
lanugauge paper Oma Mua, participant A2, or Natalia Antonova, then head of 
the Karelian youth organisation Nuori Karjala and currently a member of its 
board; D3, or Zinaida Strogal’shchikova, member of the Karelian branch of the 
Russian Academy of Science and prominent commentator on issues surrounding 
the Vepsian population in particular.  In the case of Grigoriev and Antonova in 
particular this offers the added advantage of being able to cross-reference their 
contributions in the interviews with articles which quote them either indirectly or 
directly in the mass media.  This offers a direct examination of an element of 
intertextuality between the narratives of Karelian history provided in the 
interviews and their contributions to the media discourse in which these 
narratives may only be partially revealed or inferred.  All the participants were 
advised of the nature of the study and consented to the recording of the interview 
for research purposes.   
Quite aside from the participants named above several of those 
interviewed are or were at the time of the interviews in potentially influential 







journalists participated in the process, participants A1, B1, C1, D10 and D11, 
with the first four listed working in the Karelian and Vepsian language press or 
television and D11 in the Russian-language media.  Participants A5 and A8 
worked at the National Theatre of the Republic of Karelia and participant A6 is 
an artist and theatrical director.  Three participants including Strogal’shchikova 
were lecturers or researchers at either the Karelian branch of the Russian 
Academy of Sciences or the Petrozavodsk State Pedagogical University (A3, D3 
and D16).  Clearly therefore many of those interviewed would be regarded as 
belonging to the local ‘intelligentsia’ of the Republic of Karelia and in particular 
its ethnic Karelian component.  As has been discussed above access to cultural 
capital and the perceived ‘symbolic power’ of any utterance is dependent on the 
position any individual holds within the social hierarchy.  Consequently these 
individuals in influential and prestigious positions within Karelian society 
possess a greater ability to potentially mould the discourse on Karelian identities 
than their counterparts in other positions.  Evidently in terms of the interview 
process itself this process is not ongoing in the sense that their responses are 
delivered to a foreign researcher not Karelian society; the interview process does 
however sample the historical narratives they produce and presumably help 
disseminate through their activities in education, journalism or other cultural 
activities.  The participation in particular of many of those working in Karelian 
and Finnish language media may also help provide some balance to the data 
derived from its Russian-language equivalents.  
The number of participants surveyed may be regarded as relatively small 
and thus a potential weakness of this study however it is argued that the 
influential position of most of those interviewed within the Karelian 
intelligentsia at least partially compensates for this issue.  It should also be noted 
that the relatively long duration of each individual interview, the majority of 
which lasted more than forty minutes and in several cases over an hour, made the 
collection and analysis of further data problematic.  As the researcher involved 
had no significant connections to the Republic of Karelia prior to conducting the 
fieldwork required for this study the assistance of the Karelian department of 







of Sciences was invaluable in identifying and contacting the initial participants of 
the interview process.  From the outset interviews with self-identified Karelians 
were prioritised over interviews with self-identified Russians due to the relative, 
as shall be seen, paucity of material available in the Russian-language press 
produced by Karelians.  Further information on the demographic composition of 
the interview material shall be provided below.  A smaller number of interviews 
with Russians were conducted however partially in order to ascertain how 
resonant the prevailing narratives of history and identity discovered during the 
analysis of the media material were within Russian society itself in the Republic 
of Karelia.  Although the relatively small sample size perhaps cannot provide any 
definite conclusions to this question together with the data derived from the 
Karelian participants it can offer some indications in this direction.  It had been 
intended to include as many Vepsian participants in the process as possible 
however it did not prove feasible at the time to include any significant number at 
all and the only Vepsian participant in this study is Strogal’shchikova as noted 
above; despite her very influential position in the relatively tiny Vepsian 
population it is unfortunately not therefore possible to draw any broad 
conclusions solely from the interview data on the views of the Vepsian 
population.    
As the potential relative importance of the local intellectual ‘elite’ in the 
production and reproduction of putative national identities has been outlined 
above it was felt important to include as many representatives of this group in the 
interview process as possible.  To this end attempts were made to secure 
interviews with representatives of the press, television and radio media, 
academic class and the local administration.  The process of identifying, 
approaching and interviewing such individuals extended and complicated the 
process itself and hence limited the absolute number of those interviewed.  It 
should also be noted constraints of time and budget were also a limiting factor.  
Most of the interviews were conducted within Petrozavodsk for similar reasons, 
however with the assistance of the local Karelian society and the local library it 
was possible to undertake a small number of interviews in Olonets.  Whilst as 







was also determined useful to include a number of participants in relatively less 
influential positions to determine if there were substantial and significant 
differences between the narratives of this elite group and broader Karelian 
society.  Once again due to the relatively small sample size involved in this study 
it is not perhaps possible to reach a definitive conclusion on this question 
however it is possible to draw some interesting inferences which may point the 









































Chapter Three: Constructing the History of ‘Karelia’: Territories, 








































 This chapter shall examine the manner in which historical narratives are 
constructed within a section of the mass media of the Republic of Karelia and 
how these narratives are then exploited to produce and reproduce conceptions of 
‘Karelian’ identities.  The usage of potential historical referents associated with 
putative Karelian identities such as religion, various conflicts and the Karelian 
language have been identified and the manner in which such referents are utilised 
to produce historical narratives in the mass media is examined.  This process has 
also revealed the predominant discursive strategies utilised to create conceptions 
of identity in the corpus of data.  The manner in which groups are created and 
dissolved discursively in the media through the opposition of putative ‘we’ 
groups and the image of the ‘other’ shall be examined; this is related to the 
construction of an ‘imagined reader’ of the Karelian press which excludes certain 
groups and focuses on a ‘we’ group of ethnic Russians.  It shall be argued that 
this includes the continuation of a Soviet-era form of discourse in which the 
Karelians and other Finno-Ugurs are represented as the ‘younger brother’ of the 
Russian majority.  The analysis shall then focus on representations of Karelian 
space and the presentation of Karelia as a ‘national territory’ of the various 
groups resident in the area, both Karelian and Finnish or Russian.  This includes 
the examination of the construction of strategies of continuation and colonisation 
which seek to exclude or justify the claims of differing groups to Karelia as their 
‘indigenous’ territory.  It shall also examine the contentious issue of those 
territories annexed to the former USSR from Finland in 1940.  Narratives which 
seek to exclude or diminish the Finno-Ugric character of ‘Karelia’ shall also be 
examined alongside their necessary collolary: the incorporation of Karelia within 
an almost exclusive Russian cultural sphere and thus identity.  This shall also be 
related to the construction of Karelia as a ‘model’ Russian-Orthodox territory 
and the implications of this for ideas both of the Russian character of the region 
and ethnic Karelian identity itself.  It shall be argued that this process and the 
discursive strategies employed posit a ‘Karelian’ identity that is heavily 
associated with Russian identity itself.  The narration of the process which has 







shall also be examined with its important implications for Karelian identity; it 
shall be argued that as language is a key component of Karelian identity the 
narration of this process is of utmost importance in understanding the 
representation of modern Karelian identity.  The role of the various conflicts in 
Karelian history shall then be examined to unearth the manner in which their 
narration is employed, much like that of Karelian Orthodoxy, to position 
Karelian identity closer to Russian influence and to exclude or diminish Finnish 
influence.  Finally an examination of the recent growth in discourses of 
intolerance and ethnic discord shall be examined in the light of the Kondopoga 
Affair and the implications of this event shall be considered for ideas of 
‘Karelian’ identities.        
 
 
3.1 Karel’skaya Guberniya and Kareliya 
 
 
The first paper chosen for analysis is the independent commercial paper 
Karel’skaya Guberniya, which is printed and published in Petrozavodsk.  The 
paper prints news from within the Republic of Karelia alongside articles on a 
variety of social and ‘lifestyle’ issues and local politics.  Karel’skaya Guberniya 
has often taken a distinctly critical stance towards both the republican 
administration and the central government, and offers an outlet for opposition 
political groups such as Yabloko and other political parties generally considered 
hostile towards the governing elite which do not often receive much media 
attention in the mainstream, government-owned press.  In fact it often claims 
(see for example “Кому выгодно закрыть "Губернiю?” KG 13 27.03.2002) that 
the paper is subject to a certain amount of hostility from the authorities or their 
supporters.  The paper is published weekly and therefore averages around 51 
issues a year.  To obtain a potentially contrasting view the second paper chosen 
for analysis is the paper of the republican government, Kareliya.  This 
publication plays an analogous role with the Republic of Karelia to that of the 
Rossiiskaya Gazeta on a national level; published by the local government its 







authorities: i.e. it functions as a newspaper of record.  Much like its national 
counterpart however it also publishes news articles on a variety of topics, usually 
but not exclusively concerning the activities of various local officials and 
initiatives.  As shall be discussed further below it would appear that its non-
commercial, official nature can in fact occasionally offer the opportunity for 
minority groups to find column space that may not otherwise have been 
available.  Kareliya is published on average three times a week; however 
midweek editions are often limited in size to just a few pages consisting for the 
most part of official announcements.  Both papers are also available in a web 
version, Karel’skaya Guberniya from its own website and Kareliya via the 
website of the republican government.  These two publications were chosen for 
analysis to examine the potential differences in the treatment of historical 
narratives and minority issues in general between ‘official’ and ‘unofficial’ 
publications.  Given Kareliya’s close association with the local administration it 
was posited it would propagate officially sanctioned narratives of Karelian 
history and identity.  In contrast it was expected Karel’skaya Guberniya would 
offer an outlet for more heterodox views which might not be permissible within 
the state-controlled press.  As discussed below the actual situation in the Karelian 
press is somewhat more nuanced, as the official nature of Kareliya has the 
perhaps somewhat counter-intuitive effect of providing minority groups with at 
least a limited platform for the expression of their views; this opportunity is less 
readily available in the commercial Karel’skaya Guberniya which is almost 
exclusively the preserve of the ethic Russian majority.  Actual readership figures 
from the Karelian and Russian populations for these papers are not readily 
available so it is not possible to determine if there is any significant disparity 
between either group in terms of their exposure to either paper.  Unfortunately 
there are no figures available on relative levels of income, education or 
urbanisation between Karelians and Russians within the Republic of Karelia 
which would suggest any especial difference in the likely exposure of either 
group to newspaper discourse or their potential preference in terms of paper 
selection; it is to be expected that at least some Karelians read the Karelian-
language press but given the infrequency of publication and circulation of such 







is not likely they entirely ignore the local Russian-language press.  It should also 
be noted that whilst, as noted below, Karelians often appear to construct an 
image of their identity which closely associates it with ideas of ‘the village’ they 
are actually a relatively urbanised group; around a fifth of all Karelians actually 
live in Petrozavodsk itself, alongside around half of Vepsians.  Kovaleva gives 
the percentage of Karelians resident in urban areas in 2009 as 76.4% (2010: 31), 
suggesting that the overwhelming majority of Karelians are urban dwellers, 
although she suggests the proportion of Vepsians resident in towns is much 
lower.   
The corpus of data for analysis has been derived from issues of both 
papers printed between 2000 and 2012.  The chronological boundaries selected 
for this study are somewhat arbitrary in nature; a twelve year sample was 
selected as the maximum practicable amount of data which could be analysed in 
the time available.  The data thus selected however covered an interesting period 
within which, as noted above, many studies have identified a centralisation of the 
Russian state and dynamic changes within narratives of Russian and broader 
post-Soviet identities.    The sample also emcompasses the time period of the 
interview process and hence the two sets of data are contemporaneous in that 
sense.  The analysis which has been undertaken is qualitative rather than 
quantative in nature.  That is to say that each individual issue of the paper has 
been examined for relevant material rather than searching the corpus to 
determine the prevalence of certain keywords or particular expressions.  The 
primary reason for adopting this approach was determined by the nature of the 
topic under investigation.  As any article, even those on seemingly unrelated 
subjects, might contain certain traces of a particular historical narrative close 
examination of each text would aid in the recovery of such data.  An approach 
which listed the frequency of certain key phrases would not aid in the 
understanding of how these were employed; the term фашисты, could, 
depending on the broader context within which it was situated, be nuanced in 
such a way as to contribute to reproducing or undermine a particular historical 
narrative.  There is also a minor terminological issue to consider insofar as the 







and also any topic or object associated with Karelia as an area; it would therefore 
potentially be misleading to think any topic described in this manner had 
anything to do with Karelians as an ethnic group or nationality without carefully 
considering the broader context in which it was used.       
As Pietikainen (2003: 604-5) has discussed in the context of the Sami 
minority in Finland access to mass media coverage is crucial to minority groups 
seeking to be heard in the larger community; it is also, conversely, much more 
difficult for such groups to obtain such coverage.  Indeed, one of the most 
important aspects of the issue is that such groups are rarely direct contributors to 
such discourse or even indirectly quoted.  In the Karelian context, Karelians 
themselves are most often the subjects of discourse not direct participants within 
it.  The special form of media discourse means that it is produced with an 
imagined recipient in mind, an imagined reader.  It shall be argued that the 
imagined reader in both the case of Karel’skaya Guberniya and Kareliya is 
Russian not merely linguistically but by perceived nationality.  In the case of 
Karel’skaya Guberniya the Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish minorities are 
constructed as the ‘other’ by not merely by the method by which they are 
referred but also by the complete lack of any direct contribution by the minorities 
themselves.  In all articles dealing with issues relating either to the history of the 
Republic of Karelia or with the affairs of the minorities in general they are only 
ever quoted indirectly, and that infrequently.  Almost no articles within the 
newspaper are explicitly written by a Karelian, Vepsian or Finn.  Whilst 
members of these minority groups may perhaps be on the journalistic staff of the 
paper in no article do they write as a Karelian or Finn; that is to say that there are 
practically no articles claiming to be written from the perspective of the minority 
in question.  This leads to a situation in which the views of the ‘other’, the 
minorities, are presented on their behalf, selectively and with attached 
commentary, by the dominant group.  Below are a number of excerpts from 
Karel’skaya Guberniya which illustrate the construction of the minority 
nationalities and the nationality of the imagined reader: 
A) Вепсская волость — это несколько деревень на юге Карелии. 







здесь течет мирно и неспешно. А управляет ею в меру сил и 
возможностей местный Совет из одиннадцати депутатов, в 
каждой деревне — по управляющему. Центр волости — деревня 
Шелтозеро, где в здании школы размещается волостная 
администрация. На другой стороне деревни стоит покосившееся 
здание музея вепсской культуры. Это, пожалуй, единственное 
напоминание о том, что ты находишься на вепсской земле. 
Правда, в последние годы туристы проявляют интерес и к 
местному вепсскому хору. Финнов да москвичей сюда 
автобусами возят: от Петрозаводска всего 80 километров. В 
музей сходили, хор послушали — и обратно. А в остальном все 
здесь как и везде: дороги чистят редко и не все, домишки 
одинаково неухоженные (KG4 23.01.2002). 
B) Карелы за "русский 
 
    Малые народы опасаются конфликта 
 
Возмущение финно-угров вызвало сокращение количества 
русскоязычных радиопередач в эфире "Радио Карелия".  
“Из эфира в неделю должно исчезнуть 350 минут: такова 
директива московского руководства, и связана она с 
убыточностью карельской радиостанции. Передачи на 
национальных языках трогать не стали: пожертвовали 
русскоязычными. Что не осталось радиослушателями 
незамеченным, но больше всего взволновали перемены 
непосредственно носителей национальных языков. Да так, что 
написали письмо Катанандову и в прочие высокие инстанции.  
– Многие карелы, особенно молодые, не знают своего родного 
языка. Поэтому они слушают передачи на русском языке, – считает 
лидер общественного объединения "Карельский конгресс" Анатолий 








По мнению Анатолия Григорьева, урезание нарушает 
конституционные права, а также наносит вред "моральной 
атмосфере в республике" и может привести даже к национальной 
распре, поскольку ограничивает русскоязычное население в 
информации. Всего в Карелии проживают 10% карелов и всего 0,8 % 
вепсов. Согласно же госпрограмме, принятой в Карелии, до 2010 
года на поддержку национальных языков предусмотрено выделить 
больше 22 миллионов рублей. А теперь, похоже, и на поддержку 
русского придется подкинуть. Не допустить, так сказать, гонения на 
карелов (KG52 24.12.2008). 
 
C) "Карельская Губернiя" попробовала выяснить, для чего нужно 
петь на языках, которые почти никто не знает 
 
На финно-угорском фестивале Ropivo вокальная группа Anna Tulla 
представила первый диск собственных песен на вепсском, 
карельском и финском языках. Музыканты не пытались создать 
нечто псевдофольклорное. Наоборот, композиции нарочито 
современные, насыщенные электронным дискотечным звучанием. 
 
Главный вопрос, который возникает у людей, не имеющих 
отношения к проекту, – зачем? Кому нужна попса на языке, который 
почти никто не знает? 
 
– Если мы этим занимаемся, значит, это нужно. Хотя бы нам. У нас 
не было цели сделать популярную группу и продать диск, – 
рассказывает Наталья Антонова, директор общественной 
организации "Молодая Карелия". – Мы рассчитывали на резонанс в 
финно-угорском сообществе. Пусть молодежь поймет, что можно 
сочинять современную музыку и на других языках. 
По словам Натальи, молодежь уже начала это понимать, судя по тем 
отзывам, которые слышат в "Молодой Карелии". Чего стоит один 







провести летом этнодискотеку. Однако, по большому счету, 
аудитория, которая услышит музыку Anna Tulla, довольно 
ограничена. Это 200 человек организации "Молодая Карелия", а 
также студенты "финского" факультета ПетрГУ и учащиеся финно-
угорской школы. Поэтому диск, созданный на деньги гранта, 
выпущен тиражом всего в 500 экземпляров (KG4 21.01.2009).” 
 
In example A the author of the article clearly feels the need to inform his 
reader at the very start of the piece of a few basic facts about the Vepsian 
National Volost’ that was then in existence; the inference that can therefore be 
drawn is that he or she believes the reader will be unaware of these facts.  Clearly 
the Vepsians themselves, who would presumably not need reminding of such 
basic information, are not the intended recipients of this discourse.  In fact the 
imagined reader is constructed as a (presumably Russian) ordinary citizen of the 
Republic of Karelia; the actual apparent national pretensions of the Veps aside 
life in the area is как и везде, and apart from the museum, we are told, nothing 
would remind you that this was supposed to be a Vepsian area.  In fact we are 
informed that the museum itself is a place to where ‘Finns and Muscovites’ are 
bussed in and out to see displays of Vepsian culture.  Here we see a strategy of 
trivialisation or minimisation in which the Vepsian claim to a ‘real’ or ‘genuine’ 
culture is downplayed.  As will be seen below aside from suggesting the author 
views his imagined interlocutor as disinterested in and somewhat ignorant of 
Vepsian issues.  There are also other implications for the construction of national 
identities which will be further examined below. 
Examples B and C illustrate how Karelians are talked about in 
Karel’skaya Guberniya rather than to.  In example C the reader is informed of 
the small numbers of Veps and Karelians actually resident in the modern 
Republic of Karelia; again it is unlikely a Karelian or Vepsian reader would need 
to be reminded of basic facts about their national group.  The small numbers of 
the minorities are introduced using the adverb ‘всего’ or ‘altogether’, which 
highlights their position as an absolute minority and serves to further diminish 







minority group.  Their minority status is recalled in a discussion on the 
withdrawal of support for Russian-language programmes on Radio Karelia; the 
inference clearly is that the minority group are being favoured over the majority 
‘we’ group.  Interestingly the use of пожертвовали русскоязычными can be 
interpreted by the reader in two ways, either as the victimisation of Russian-
language programming or the victimisation of Russian-speakers. The author 
treats the ‘problem’ under discussion somewhat light-heartedly; the closing 
comment inferring that the issue is not worth persecuting Karelians over is 
clearly intended as a joke.  In framing the discussion of the problem in this 
manner, however, the author again appears to construct his imagined interlocutor 
as Russian or at least as non-Karelian; the Karelians are the subject of referential 
dissimilation by description as ‘speakers of the national languages’ and ‘Finno-
Ugurs’.  No other group is explicitly named in opposition to this group; the 
author appears to assume his or her reader does not fall under one of these 
designations.  It should be noted however that although not directly contributing 
to the discourse Karelians are, as on this occasion, allowed to make indirect 
contributions as the quotation by the journalist of Anatolii Grigoriev 
demonstrates. 
Example C also illustrates the points made above.  Natalya Antonova is 
again allowed to contribute indirectly by the paper here through quotation, and 
indeed the article goes on to quote two more Karelians on the topic of Karelian 
music.  In speaking to the journalist however, and by extension the readers of the 
newspaper, Antonova appears as a spokesperson for the Karelians talking about a 
non-inclusive ‘we’ group of Karelians.  This is partially a result of the manner in 
which her comments are presented by the journalist, and presumably the manner 
in which the journalist elicited the comments in the first instance.  The journalist 
clearly constructs the Karelians as an ‘other’; the article itself begins by claiming 
it will attempt to answer a problem: для чего нужно петь на языках, которые 
почти никто не знает.  Indeed this question is repeated on a number of 







Главный вопрос, который возникает у людей, не имеющих 
отношения к проекту, – зачем? Кому нужна попса на языке, который почти 
никто не знает? 
The idea that ‘almost nobody’ speaks Karelian is repeated twice at the 
very beginning of the article; once again the newspaper is constructing a picture 
of modern society in the Republic of Karelia in which the usage of Karelian is 
unusual and ethnic Karelian identity is somewhat marginalised.  The question of 
‘why’, or as it might be better translated in English in this context ‘why bother’, 
is assumed to be the main reaction of людей, не имеющих отношения к 
проекту, which as the author knows will be almost all his or her readership.  The 
journalist then details the small audience such music has by listing the small 
numbers of those involved in its production; once again by detailing their small 
numbers the relevance of Karelian identity is questioned.  The author 
furthermore declines to use the Karelian ‘Nuori Karjala’ as the name of the 
organisation throughout, choosing to use the Russian equivalent of ‘Молодая 
Карелия’.   Presumably ‘Anna Tulla’ and ‘Ropivo’ were retained as the author 
could not find a Russian equivalent.  In this context the ‘we’ group constructed 
by Antonova in reply is both through her lexical choice and the manner in which 
it is presented non-inclusive of the reader.  In defending her project she claims: 
  Если мы этим занимаемся, значит, это нужно. Хотя бы нам. 
Her defensive reply of “xотя бы нам” appears in its presentation in the 
article to refer only to those involved in creating the project or to those involved 
with Karelian organisations in general.  She also makes no attempt to justify the 
importance of the project in terms of the broader Russian-speaking society; she is 
interested in what Finno-Ugric society makes of the project, rather than 
attempting to provide an answer which will satisfy the journalist.    
In summation therefore we can clearly glimpse from the above examples 
the manner in which the imagined reader of Karel’skaya Guberniya appears to 
be constructed as an ethnic Russian.  The validity of Karelian or Finno-Ugric 
culture and consequently identity is often questioned by its presentation in the 







presentation as a minority, ‘special-interest’ phenomenon.  The imagined reader 
is conceived of as being relatively uninterested in Karelian or Vepsian affairs and 
relatively poorly informed about them.  The use of synecdochial anthroponyms 
(i.e. ‘the Karelians’, ‘the Finns’ etc.) and other such referential dissimilation such 
as that described in example C is routine within the publication when the 
minority groups are under discussion.  In this manner the generally unstated ‘we’ 
group of Russians is disassociated from the explicitly referenced Karelians and 
others.  Basic information and ‘reminders’ to the reader of the presence of the 
minority groups frequently preface any discussion of their affairs in a manner 
which presupposes ignorance of and lack of interest in such matters on the part 
of the reading public.  The situation must not be overstated, however; Karelians 
and Vepsians are far from being negatively portrayed in the paper.  Indeed they 
are at least indirectly quoted by the publication, giving them some limited ability 
to influence the manner in which they are presented to the reader.  The general 
tendency, however, is towards marginalisation.  Karel’skaya Guberniya is a 
Russian ‘editorial voice’ speaking to a Russian imagined reader.  This discourse 
is strikingly reminiscent of the Soviet-era discourse which represented the 
various minority groups of the USSR as the ‘younger brother’ of the Russian 
majority.  This phenomenon will be examined further below and potential 
reasons for its persistence in the Karelian context examined.  
 
The situation in Kareliya is somewhat different as not only is there 
indirect quotation of the minority groups but individuals from these groups have 
contributed articles which are explicitly written as expressions of their views as 
Karelians, Vepsians and Finns.  Although such articles are relatively infrequent 
this does provide an outlet for these groups to contribute to the discourse in 
question expressly as representatives of the minorities of the Republic of Karelia 
rather than their views being presented by the dominant group.  The paper also 
regularly reports the proceedings of such events as the Congress of Karelians 
reproducing in some instances addresses made at such events by Karelians to a 
Karelian audience.  In such articles in particular, especially those concerned with 







addressing their fellow-Karelians.  In the main however despite being allowed to 
address the imagined reader directly in Kareliya it would appear that the 
Karelian contributors often appear to conceptualise their addressee as Russian by 
nationality.  This may be due to a number of factors.  Firstly it may simply be 
due to their own perceived status as a minority; i.e. that the Karelians in question 
construct their own identity in opposition to a perceived Russian identity and 
thus are comfortable constructing themselves as an ‘other’ in the Russian-
language press.  It may also be, in a related manner, due to the fact they consider 
the Karelian-language press to be ‘their’ press and hence again construct the 
Russian-language press as being the preserve of the ‘other’ group of Russians.  
The construction of an imagined other has been identified by Bhabha (1990) and 
Hall (1996a) as an essential component of identity construction itself; the 
Karelians appear to construct an image of their identity at least partially in 
opposition to that of the dominant Russian group.  Given the dialogic nature of 
the utterance they may consider the imagined reader shall construct them as an 
‘other’ also.  Perhaps more likely it is a combination of all three factors.   It must 
be stated, however, that the preponderance of articles talk about Karelians rather 
than giving them an actual direct voice in the discourse. 
 
L) “Карелы обижены на депутатов 
 
Встреча представителей национальных объединений с 
парламентариями, состоявшаяся в день открытых дверей в 
Законодательном Собрании, выявила рост недовольства со стороны карел. 
 
Обострение напряженности в отношениях представителей 
объединений карел с депутатами Законодательного Собрания вызвано, 
напомним, позицией народных избранников по вопросу о статусе 
карельского языка. При принятии новой редакции Конституции Карелии 
они отказались присвоить ему статус государственного, что вызвало бурю 
негодования со стороны карельских национальных организаций. Удар был 
тем более болезнен, что карелы не ожидали такого исхода событий. Об 







национальной политике Татьяна Клеерова на встрече с парламентариями в 
день открытых дверей в Законодательном Собрании. По ее мнению, 
готовность общества к принятию положительного решения была очень 
велика. "Мы были уверены в успехе", - говорит Татьяна Клеерова. После 
третьего чтения законопроекта карелы праздновали победу, уверенные, что 
на этой стадии повернуть вспять уже нельзя. Но депутаты рассудили иначе. 
Во время четвертого чтения статья о статусе карельского языка была изъята 
из текста Конституции.  
Более того, народные избранники сделали еще и "контрольный 
выстрел" в виде пункта о том, что вопрос о статусе должен решаться только 
на основании решения республиканского референдума. Эта оговорка 
окончательно похоронила надежды карел. Большинству населения Карелии 
судьба карельского языка безразлична, поэтому исход референдума 
предрешен. (K 49 04.05.2001).” 
 
M) “Однако вероятность того, что депутаты передумают и пойдут 
навстречу карельским национальным организациям, сомнительна. Это 
выяснилось в ходе разговора. Нелицеприятные эпитеты, которыми гости 
сразу же начали награждать депутатов, не могли не вызвать раздражения у 
народных избранников. Их обвинили в "нечистоплотных методах работы", 
заподозрили в том, что они "чего-то боятся" и вообще "увлечены не совсем 
добрыми намерениями". Председателю Палаты Республики Владимиру 
Шильникову неоднократно пришлось призывать выступавших к 
корректности, а те в ответ заявили, что депутаты на страницах прессы 
позволяют себе и не такое в отношении национальных организаций. 
Атмосфера постепенно накалялась и, наконец, взорвалась, когда слово взял 
лидер карельской организации ЛДПР Михаил Максимов, который является 
одним из главных инициаторов отклонения поправки о статусе карельского 
языка. Он обвинил карел в том, что они не знают своей истории, а именно 
того, что их предки, как утверждает М. Максимов, появились в Карелии 
всего 350 лет назад, а значит, карелы не имеют права называться 
"титульной" нацией со всеми вытекающими для статуса карельского языка 







не было предела. Владимиру Шильникову пришлось утихомиривать, 
кричавших со всех сторон гостей, словами: "Вы в парламенте, а здесь 
каждый имеет право говорить то, что хочет (K 49 04.05.2001)". 
 
N)  “ ЗЕМЛЯ КАРЕЛЬСКАЯ. Специальный выпуск 
Государственного комитета Республики Карелия по национальной 
полититке  
ОТВЕТСТВЕННАЯ ЗА ВЫПУСК НАТАЛЬЯ АНТОНОВА 
Предлагаем вашему вниманию доклад заместителя председателя 
Государственного комитета Республики Карелия по национальной 
политике Татьяны КЛЕЕРОВОЙ, прозвучавший на IV республиканском 
съезде карелов 23 июня 
И это очевидно: пока жив язык, жив народ, его самобытность, его 
душа. 
 
Все 10 лет, с I съезда в Олонце, мы последовательно добивались, 
чтобы отношение к карельскому языку было уважительнее не только со 
стороны внешнего окружения, но и в среде самого народа. Усилиями 
ученых, учителей, журналистов, художественной интеллигенции 
карельский язык стал возрождаться из полузабвения. (K 94 28.04.2001).” 
 
O) “Карелы, ходатайствуя о государственном статусе для своего 
языка, искали прежде всего моральной поддержки. Если бы господа 
оппоненты захотели вникнуть в суть проблемы, то поняли бы, что ни о 
каких "больших материальных затратах" речь не шла, поскольку 
предлагалось самое деликатное внедрение функций карельского языка в 
жизнь. Ни о каких "массах" переводчиков и о "насильственном изучении 
карельского языка" не было даже мысли, так как карелы все двуязычны, 
многие владеют тремя языками или многоязычны, поэтому в любой 
государственной структуре они в состоянии решать свои проблемы не на 







национальной розни и параллелей с Прибалтикой, то здесь полезно было 
бы познакомиться с историей, чтобы убедиться, что карельский народ 
всегда тяготел к России, веками являлся ее северным форпостом и в 
сложнейшие моменты своей истории выбирал именно ее. Высказывания же 
относительно "насилия меньшинства над большинством" вызывают 
улыбку. Неужели не очевидно, что карелы - сдержанный и деликатный 
народ?! Они не приняли тон дискуссии противников карельского языка и 
продолжают отвечать им в высшей степени интеллигентно, как, например, 
Е. Клементьев в статье "Получит ли карельский язык конституционную 
защиту?" (газета "Карелия" от 20 декабря 2000 г.), где свои суждения он 
строит вокруг двух вопросов: надо ли защищать языковые интересы 
русскоязычного населения в странах Балтии? и надо ли защищать языковые 
интересы народов России внутри нашей Федерации? (K16 10.02.2001).” 
 
In examples L and M which are taken from the same article the Karelians 
are clearly constructed as a distinct group from the actual author of the article 
and the imagined reader.  In fact two opposing groups are constructed, the 
‘Karelians’ and the ‘deputies’ (in this case of the Legislative Assembly of the 
Republic of Karelia; the deputies, however, are actively constructed as 
representing the majority of the populace of the Republic of Karelia whereas the 
Karelians are portrayed as a small minority.  Contributions are made directly in 
the article by Karelians, although only one is directly attributable to a named 
individual, the Tatyana Kleerova who gives voice to the Karelian’s expectations 
of success in achieving official recognition for their language.   Aside from this 
the only direct quotation of the Karelians in the piece is of their angry reaction to 
this recognition being denied such status.  In contrast to the Karelians, who are 
negatively portrayed as ‘crying from all sides’ in outrage at the decision and the 
rhetoric of the parliamentarians, the deputies are constructed in a somewhat more 
positive light.  Not only do they clearly represent the reader, being as the author 
would have us believe ‘народные избранники’ i.e. ‘chosen by the people’ in 
general, they are allowed to make far lengthier contributions to the discourse and 
these contributions are more often attributed to a specific individual.  They are 







the problem before arriving at a final, incontrovertible judgement.  Their 
intention to use a "контрольный выстрел" depicts them as metaphorically 
‘killing off’ the idea of the use of Karelian as an official language; critically this 
is not presented by the author in a negative light.   The fact they are quoted more 
often is not merely due to the fact they are deputies of the legislative assembly; 
the Karelians present were representatives of various organisations and could 
presumably have been quoted if the author had chosen to do so.  Furthermore the 
outrage of the Karelians is contrasted to the calm and democratic conduct of the 
deputies, who allow the minority to have their say, but insist on their right to 
authoritatively inform them of their own history.  The most telling aspect of the 
article, one which links the construction of the imagined reader directly to the 
objective context in which the article is produced is the statement that any 
referendum on the question of providing official status to Karelian will fail.  As 
the author reminds his reader, he or she is most likely indifferent to the fate of 
the language in any case and so the outcome of any referendum is predetermined.  
Example N is a speech delivered by the Tatyana Kleerova we 
encountered earlier to the 4th Congress of Karelians reproduced in Kareliya.  
The editorial responsibility for reproducing this speech in the paper falls to the 
Natalya Antonova we encountered above, who was at that time working for the 
Karelian State Committee for Affairs of National Politics, the organ of the 
Karelian government responsible for dealing with matters relating to the minority 
nationalities.  It is a relatively rare example of a text in the corpus studied which 
can be definitely attributed to a Karelian voice produced with a Karelian 
interlocutor in mind.  In her address, the opening remarks of which are 
reproduced in the last paragraph of this example, Kleerova uses an addressee-
inclusive form of ‘we’, conceptualising herself and those present as being the 
group of interested activists who have fought for the revitalisation of the 
Karelian language from the very first Congress of Karelians.  By being 
reproduced in the paper of course her address is removed from its immediate 
discursive context, the Congress of Karelians, and placed into another.  As a 
consequence the original text is ‘framed’ for its new audience by the editor, who 







Of course ordinarily the responsibility of a journalist for any article is assumed 
by the reader without question; we do not ordinarily find in Kareliya or other 
papers such an explicit assumption of responsibility by the journalist in question.  
This together with the manner in which Antonova introduces the piece with an 
invitation for attention may indicate a feeling of marginality or vulnerability on 
behalf of the Karelian contributor to their interlocutor; the attention of the reader 
is not assumed but requested.     
The marginalisation potentially perceived by the Karelian contributors in 
the mass media discourse is perhaps best illustrated by example O.  In this 
excerpt the Karelian contributor feels the need to refute various objections she 
clearly feels will be raised against the adoption of Karelian as an official 
language by the majority (i.e. Russian) population.  The imagined reader is 
reassured that the Karelians are not seeking unfair advantages over the remainder 
of the populace, nor are they going to demand increased rights in an undignified 
or aggressive manner.  Most tellingly perhaps the reader is assured that there is 
no ‘danger’ inherent in granting Karelians more language rights; the author is at 
pains to assuage their worries by informing the Russian reader that the Karelians 
have always been loyal to their Russian allies.  A strategy of trivialisation is 
employed which undermines this concern by using the polite/impolite paradigm 
to represent its supposed absurdity.  Apparent concerns amongst the Russian 
population, which the author clearly feels constrained to address, of a ‘Baltic’ 
scenario are dismissed as unfounded.  At the same time she appeals to her reader 
to be as sympathetic to the plight of the Karelians as to that of the Russians in the 
Baltic states; clearly, therefore, the interlocutor she is trying to convince must be 
a Russian suspicious of the motives of the Karelians in demanding more 













3.2 Constructing the History of a ‘Karelia’, or Who is Who on this Land? 
 
 
 As has been discussed above upon establishment the Karelian Workers’ 
Commune included various areas which did not at the time have a majority 
Karelian population and its later expansion into the KASSR increased the extent 
of the republic at the expense of its national composition.  The Finno-Soviet 
conflicts of 1940-44 also altered the boundaries and the ethnic composition of 
the KASSR.  It is evident therefore from a strictly scientific point of view it 
would be problematic to say the least to conflate the idea of ‘Karelia’ as the 
national and ancestral homeland of the Karelian people with the modern 
Republic of Karelia.  Indeed the narration of the history of the Republic of 
Karelia in the corpus of data studied highlights this issue.  Various national 
groups can and do claim to be ‘indigenous’ inhabitants of the territories now part 
of the Republic.  This allows these putative national groups to claim a share in 
some form of genuine ‘Karelianess’ from their long-standing or indeed apparent 
immemorial residence within the boundaries of what is understood to be in 
contemporary terms Karelia.  Denying the claims of any group to the status of 
indigenous or at least long-standing residence also delegitimises their claims to a 
share in this constructed ‘Karelianess’; this can also therefore exclude the group 
from consideration as legitimate current or future residents of Karelia in some 
narratives. 
 
i) Karelia as the Karelian homeland 
 
As the titular nationality Karelians are legally considered to be the indigenous 
inhabitants of the Republic of Karelia; this idea is also therefore one prevalent in 
narratives of national identity connected to the area.  The Republic of Karelia or 
at least certain areas of it can be claimed as the native or ‘родной’ territory of the 
Karelian people, a status which can be invoked not merely to aid the construction 
of a proposed Karelian identity but also to claim rights and privileges for the 
Karelian people and language as a whole.  The narration of the idea of Karelia as 







structure of the Republic of Karelia itself.  A number of discursive strategies 
appear to be employed to convey this narrative of Karelian history, including 
emphasising the continuity of Karelian occupation of the area and the idea of the 
Republic of Karelia as the birthplace or incubator of Karelian culture.  As a 
consequence of the rather arbitrary, in historical terms, nature in which the 
current autonomous area came into being there remains a tendency for such 
narratives to become somewhat localised.  This may also be a consequence of the 
current status of the Karelian minority, who tend to be clustered in a number of 
locations rather than dispersed across the republic.  This tendency towards 
localising the historical narrative, tying the historical narrative of the supposed 
‘Karelian nation’ to certain locales, can perhaps also act to marginalise the 
narrative by denying it the possibility of referring to the Republic of Karelia as a 
whole; this allows space in the discursive arena for other competing historical 
narratives.   
  
In terms of narrating Karelia as the homeland of the Karelians an 
important strategy employed is a constructive strategy which emphasises the 
continuity of Karelian occupation and residence of the area.  The antiquity of 
Karelian residence in the general area of what would become the modern 
Republic of Karelia is emphasised in the example below: 
  
Наука сегодня, к сожалению, не обладает абсолютно точными 
данными, когда племя древней корелы начало самостоятельное развитие, 
но достоверно известно, что в первой половине I тысячелетия н. э. древняя 
корела уже существовала. Первые ее поселения располагались на 
побережье Ладожского озера, в частности на Карельском перешейке, и 
отсюда она начала двигаться в разных направлениях. Миграция древней 
корелы завершилась в ХII веке, тогда она достигла побережья Белого моря. 
(K 94 28.08.2001) 
 
This continuity of Karelian history in the area is extremely important to 








 Факты говорят об одном: мы - птенцы общего родного гнезда, 
испытавшие на себе, как и носители любого другого языка, влияние 
времени. И это естественный процесс. Основа языка у нас одна, но 
"наслоения" могут быть разными (ibid). 
 
The common origins that the Karelian people share, in the author’s view, 
play a vital role in uniting them as a group.  Despite the differences which are 
apparently evident in modern dialects of the Karelian language the basis of the 
language remains, in the author’s view, unchanged.  Importantly the experience 
of the Karelians is far from unique; it is the same as that gone through by any 
other (linguistic) group.  This of course helps legitimise Karelian identity as valid 
by demonstrating that it has undergone processes which are common to other 
identities the reader will already consider to be valid.  It also allows her to claim 
the unity of the Karelian nation despite its current fragmented state in 
geographical and linguistic terms, which is important as shall be seen below. 
The idea of Karelia being the Karelian homeland is quite common amongst 
Karelian contributors to the mass media discourse.  Karelia can fulfil this role not 
merely for the Karelian language, although this is often seen as the most 
important aspect of the question by Karelian contributors, but also in terms of 
culture in general.  By ‘giving the world’ the Kalevala, for example, as is often 
claimed in the data studied, the area also serves to incubate and develop Karelian 
identity.  The narration of the Republic of Karelia as the ‘birthplace’ of Karelian 
identity is exemplified by the example below: 
 Калевальцы гордятся не только тем, что их родная земля дала миру 
знаменитый карело-финский эпос, но и тем, что здесь, на берегах озера 
Куйто, выросли и впитали в себя вековые традиции языка, литературы, 
культуры нации многие народные писатели и поэты, цвет карельской 
литературы.. (K 117 21.20.2003) 
 
The родная земля in question is Kalevala, formerly Ukhta, one of the 
areas of the current Republic of Karelia with the greatest proportion of Karelians 







epos Kalevala itself, an expression which of course places the creation of the 
work firmly within a Karelian context and excludes the influence of Finland, but 
also with the nurturing on centuries of linguistic and literary tradition writers 
who are the ‘flower’ of  Karelian literature.  A similar tendency to associate the 
idea of the area as the ‘motherland’ of Karelian literature is seen in the example 
given below: 
 
Здесь Родины моей начало: 
В Олонце прошел заключительный этап IX Республиканского 
фестиваля карельской литературы имени Владимира Брендоева Tдs [sic] 
synnynrannan minun algu (Здесь Родины моей начало) (K107 26.11.2009). 
 
 Again Karelia is described as the birthplace of Karelian literature, as the 
article goes on to describe the manner in which several famed Karelian authors 
will be commemorated in Olonets; by associating these writers with the town in a 
festival entitled ‘my motherland began here’ the organisers are clearly 
proclaiming the area as the ‘motherland’ of Karelian literature and therefore 
Karelian identity itself.  Both the above excerpts are again very reminiscent of 
Soviet-era discourse on the national question.  The framing of the nation and the 
language chosen to conduct this process are very redolent of Soviet texts on this 
theme; it would appear that this traditional manner of constructing an image of 
the ‘Karelian-ness’ of the area in question has been retained, almost entirely 
unaltered, in the journalistic discourse of the Republic of Karelia.  Here we see 
an important continuity in the treatment of the Karelian minority by the Russian-
language press.  It may be the case that this rather patronising Soviet approach 
has been maintained as the Russian dominanted press has not perceived any 
particular change in the social relations between Karelians and Russians since the 
fall of the Soviet state; the Karelians are still represented using the same 
formulaic appeals to ancient culture, traditions and literature employed in the 
Soviet era.  This tends towards an ethnographic construction of ‘Karelian’ 
identity in which it is produced through reference to such ancient traditions 







relic.  As has been seen above this tendency appears to be quite stable; this top-
down construction of ‘Karelian’ identity as rooted in folkloric practices by the 
Russian-language press does not seem to be on the wane throughout the period of 
data analysed.   
ii) Local and National Identity: From the Village to the 
Nation 
 
 Expressions of Karelian identity are often linked to specific localities 
with the modern Republic of Karelia; simply put, some areas seem to be 
considered ‘more Karelian’ than others.  The town of Kalevala, formerly Ukhta, 
and its surrounding district is one part of the Republic of Karelia in particular 
which is often depicted as being particularly ‘Karelian’.  
  Калевальский район — родина всемирно известного эпоса 
"Калевала". Именно в деревнях и селах Калевальского района была собрана 
и систематизирована большая часть рун эпоса. В настоящее время 
некоторые из деревень находятся под охраной Юнеско. Для любого карела 
Калевала — это земля обетованная, святое место... Калевальский район 
надо не ликвидировать, а возрождать в совершенно новом качестве — как 
культурно-исторический, рунопевческий, туристический центр, способный 
в будущем привлекать в республику тысячи туристов и инвестиции...(KG14 
31.03.2005). 
 Once again in the example above we have an area of the modern 
Republic of Karelia described as being the ‘birthplace’ of the Kalevala, in this 
instance Kalevalskii District.  This excerpt from Karel’skaya Guberniya is 
derived from a letter sent to the newspaper by the residents of the district 
protesting about its putative liquidation into a larger area which would dilute the 
percentage of Karelians in this ‘national district’.  Given this context it is 
important for the letter-writers to attempt to convince their addressee, the 
editorial staff of the paper and also the newspaper reader, of the innate ‘Karelian’ 
nature of the area.  This is attempted once again by constructing the district as 







Kalevala, was derived.  The implication is that it would be, or at least should be, 
unthinkable to dissolve what little national autonomy Kalevalskii District now 
has in the light of its past as incubator of Karelian identity.  Indeed the area is 
sanctified as земля обетованная, святое место to любого карела; such use of 
ecclesiastical language is intended to legitimise this viewpoint to the imagined 
reader.   
 This use of the idea of Kalevala the town as the birthplace of the 
Kalevala itself, and hence ‘sacred ground’ for the Karelian people is also 
employed in the examples below, which are taken from one of the very few 
articles in Karel’skaya Guberniya written explicitly by an ethnic Karelian 
journalist: 
 Известный калевальский журналист Андрей Туоми прислал в 
"Карельскую Губернiю" свои размышления о том, как власти привели к 
гибели район, и о том, чем чревата для всех жителей республики такая 
политика правительства. 
Калевала: между гетто и резервацией  
О нас, жителях многострадального национального района, говорят, 
как об узниках гетто. Тех — туда, этих — сюда. Похоже, в правительстве 
Карелии плохо знают историю республики. А жаль. Новым карельским 
демократам надо бы помнить, что демократия на нашей северной земле 
зарождалась как раз в Ухтинской республике. И даже медведь на гербе 
республики заимствован из ухтинского герба. Надо бы поуважительнее 
относиться к той святой для карелов земле, что дала миру эпос, 
национальную литературу, культуру и традиции. 
И последнее. Родина "Калевалы" переживала и худшие времена. И 
не только в новой истории. Даже в эпосе мы находим строки, 
повествующие о трудных днях: 
Не восходит больше солнце, 







Ни над Вяйнёлы домами, 
Ни над полем Калевалы. 
Охватил мороз посевы, 
На стада болезнь напала, 
Птицы все затосковали, 
Люди чувствовали скуку 
Без сиянья солнца в небе 
И без лунного сиянья.  
Руна 49 (KG12 17.03.2005). 
In his article Andrei Tuomi once again uses the idea of Kalevala as the 
birthplace of the Kalevala, and goes so far as to actually quote from it; this is an 
attempt at a negotiation of history in which the area is constructed as the 
birthplace of Karelian identity itself.  Indeed the work is invoked not merely to 
remind the reader of its origins but also to establish the idea of the continuity and 
resilience of Karelian residence and identity in the area.  Once again the area is 
described in terms of being ‘sacred’, the origin of the epos and by extension 
Karelian culture and tradition.  The birthplace of the epic, we are informed, has 
seen worse days, and this is then apparently demonstrated through quotation 
from the piece itself.  The negative portrayal of contemporary Kalevala as a 
‘ghetto’ for the Karelians is contrasted to the role the town placed in forming the 
Ukhtinskaya Respublika, as the author describes it the first attempt at ‘Karelian’ 
democracy; by drawing a comparison between that period in history and the 
contemporary situation Tuomi clearly intends to send the authorities a warning.  
This construction of the topos of the ‘ghettoisation’ of the Karelians also seems 
to be deliberately intended to contrast with the formulaic presentation of Karelian 
identity employed by the Russian-language media; here the influence of the ‘big 
brother’, or ethnic Russians, on this ancient Karelian culture is explicitly its 







of Karelian culture through a strategy of continuation to produce an image of 
Karelian identity he also subverts the mainstream narrative by rejecting the 
supposed benign interest and influence of the Russian majority and inverting it 
into a negative, restrictive force.  By recalling the formation of the Ukhtinskaya 
Respublika, which was an expressly ethnic Karelian attempt at autonomy he 
recalls a narrative of history where Karelians themselves attempted to solve their 
political problems.  The local authorities clearly надо бы помнить this fact, in 
the author’s view, and pay more attention to the problems of the area.  This 
creates a topos of the Karelians as the ‘original’ democrats within the region; the 
traditions of democracy and ‘correct’ political development are attributed 
implicitly to the Karelians and not any other group.  This idea is then used in a 
strategy of discontinuation and dissimilation which does not recognise the 
modern Republic of Karelia as the real inheritor of these traditions of democracy 
which the Karelians themselves have preserved.   
Kalevala is one of the towns generally seen as most ‘Karelian’ in the 
narratives of identity and history which were discovered within the newspaper 
discourse, however this opinion was not universal.  Occasionally the area is 
constructed as not being genuinely ‘Karelian’, as in the example below from an 
interview with Nina Serebryakova, a Russian filmmaker from Saint-Petersburg 
making a documentary on the Finno-Ugric peoples of Karelia: 
Мы были в Калевале, которая, к сожалению, произвела на нас 
печальное впечатление, потому что, как мне показалось, там очень мало 
карельской души осталось, хотя это центр национального района Карелии. 
  - Там, наверное, преобладает финская душа: 
    - Финская душа преобладает в значительной мере. Но ведь она 
присутствует во всей Беломорской Карелии. (K 136 05.12.2006) 
 
Here the ‘Karelian-ness’, literally the ‘Karelian Soul’ of Kalevala is 
minimised by the interviewee, who interestingly in the same article notes that to 








Конечно, Петрозаводск - это смешанное население, но, когда мы 
оказывались в деревнях, например, в Шокше, Шелтозере, Рыбреке, Другой 
Реке, перед нами было уже совсем другое. Там чаще встречали вепсов и 
карелов. Мы решили расширить финно-угорскую тематику и сделать 
фильм о карелах. Поэтому мы приехали сюда, в Олонецкий район (ibid). 
 
This interview is interesting as both the interviewee, an outsider with 
presumably no pertinent qualifications for deciding which district is more 
‘Karelian’ other than her own impressions and presuppositions as to what 
‘Karelian-ness’ may be is allowed, unchallenged by the local journalist, to 
determine the Olonets District the true centre of modern Karelian culture.  
Kalevala, as stated, may be the centre of the National District but lacks ‘Karelian 
Soul’ in the opinion of the Russian filmmaker.  The interviewer does not 
challenge her on this, despite in other instances interpolating in brackets further 
exposition when he deems it necessary; for example when she lists the places 
where Veps live he adds his own experience of meeting some from Irkutsk 
Oblast: 
 
Если говорить о вепсах, то этот народ волею судеб оказался 
разделенным на три административных региона. Это Ленинградская, 
Вологодская области и Карелия. Волею судеб и нас занесло сюда, в 
Прионежье, к шелтозерским вепсам. (Кстати, вепсы живут и в Иркутской 
области. С ними я познакомился на международном конгрессе финно-
угорских писателей. Уехали они туда еще во времена Столыпинской 
реформы. - В.В.) (ibid). 
 
Furthermore, rather than questioning her assertion he suggests to her that 
Kalevala and indeed the entirety of White Sea Karelia is actually more Finnish 
than Karelian, a suggestion with which she concurs.  It might be suggested, 
therefore, that even within Karelia there are those who see the Northern 
Karelians as being too closely influenced by Finnish culture to qualify as 







As seen above Olonets is also often incorporated in various narratives on 
Karelian identity as an ancient stronghold of Karelian identity, both cultural and 
linguistic and therefore potentially national as well.  The role of Olonets is 
somewhat more nuanced, however, as it is also used to link Karelia and therefore 
Karelians to the Russian state in certain narratives.  In 2008 an exhibition in 
Petrozavodsk examined the history of Olonets:   
 
Федеральное учреждение культуры музей-заповедник <Кижи> в 
партнерстве с Олонецким национальным музеем представляет жителям и 
гостям города Петрозаводска выставку <Олонец - посад старинный>, 
повествующую об истории старинного города и особенностях 
традиционной культуры его жителей - карелов-ливвиков. (K 62 10.06.2008) 
 
Olonets is clearly in this article constructed as an ancient town with a rich 
and valuable history, a town moreover inhabited by Karelians and a history at 
least partially belonging to these Karelians: 
 
На выставке представлены разделы, рассказывающие о 
Рождественском Олонецком погосте, о рождении города Олонца и 
строительстве крепости, о материальной культуре олонецких карелов (ibid). 
 
The history of Olonets is not merely the history of the Karelians 
themselves, however: 
 
Олонец - старейший город Карелии, письменным свидетельствам о 
котором уже более восьми веков. Возникнув как форпост Российского 
государства на его северо-западных рубежах и получив 360 лет назад 
статус города, Олонец в свое время дал название одной из крупнейших 
губерний России и был ее административным, экономическим, торговым 
центром более ста лет. 
Сегодня Олонец имеет статус исторического города, а Олонецкий 









Although Olonets and its District are viewed in this historical narrative as 
a centre of Karelian culture, a historical centre of the Karelian people, it is also 
strongly linked to the historical narrative of Karelia as the ‘форпост’ of the 
Russian state.  Olonets ‘arises’ or ‘springs up’ as the outpost of the Russian state; 
the actual agency in the sentence is undetermined, it being unclear as to whether 
the Karelians themselves founded the town or if in fact the Russian state took 
action to create the fortress.  The town instead ‘arises’ almost organically in the 
desired position to be an outpost for the Russian state, and equally organically 
‘obtains’ the status of a town without reference as to who was granting such 
status.   The idea of Olonets as having been created as a stronghold of the 
Russian state and safeguarding Russia against foreign attacks is also 
demonstrated in the example below: 
 
1649 По указу царя Алексея Михайловича под руководством 
воеводы окольничего князя Федора Волконского и воеводы Степана 
Елагина строится Олонецкая крепость - ключевой форпост России на ее 
северо-западных рубежах (K 15 08.02.2001). 
 
Once again the term ‘форпост’ is employed to denote the relation of 
Olonets, and by extension Karelia, to the remainder of Russia.  This 
representation of Olonets as a bulwark against foreign invasion incorporates the 
town into the body of the Russian state.  It also minimises or indeed entirely 
removes its potential to act as independent centre of a specifically Karelian 
history; its existence is always tied to that of Russia itself. 
 
The continuity of Karelian residence in the modern Republic of Karelia 
can also be invoked alongside the absence of other nationalities; Karelia or at 
least areas of it can be constructed as having been exclusively Karelian.  The 
example below is another article from Kareliya by Anatolii Grigoriev about his 








 Ламбисельга - маленькая деревня в южной Карелии. Зимой там 
проживают всего три семьи - все карелы. 
До революции в Ламбисельге практически не было русских. 
Приезжали сборщики налогов и других повинностей. Во время рекрутских 
наборов карелы общались с русскими (K71 03.07.2008). 
 
Here Grigoriev clearly constructs his native village as being historically 
settled by Karelians alone to the almost total exclusion of Russians.  Although 
apparently in sporadic contact with Russia at times through the visits of various 
officials the impression given by the author is of a territory relatively 
uninfluenced by Russian culture.  In contrast to this lack of Russian influence 
Grigoriev continues his article by detailing the greater influence of Finland on 
the daily lives of the local Karelians:  
 
До 1939 года граница Финляндии от Ламбисельги была всего в 12 
километрах, и многие деревенские до революции ходили в Финляндию: кто 
на заработки, кто по другим делам. Да и из Финляндии приходили люди, 
коробейники, например. Близость Финляндии сыграла в судьбах некоторых 
ламбисельжцев роковую роль. И в Гражданскую войну некоторые ушли в 
Финляндию, и перед Второй мировой (ibid). 
 
Grigoriev clearly constructs an image of Lambisel’ga as having been 
more closely connected to and influenced by Finland rather than Russia.  Whilst 
the Karelians of Lambisel’ga have only occasional contact with the Russian 
authorities they are in much more regular contact with the Finns who are only a 
short distance away over the border.   Although the border has now been pushed 
back from the village along with the influence of the Finns Grigoriev still 
manages to convey the impression that the historically Karelian village remains 
that today by noting that the only inhabitants of the modern village to remain 
there through the winter are three Karelian families; thus Lambisel’ga is 
portrayed as having been and remaining at heart an exclusively Karelian 
territory.  In contrast therefore, to the historical narrative which ties Karelia to 







province of Karelians exclusively, or at the very least do so for certain areas of 
Karelia. 
 
As has been seen in the examples above the process of establishing the 
‘Karelian-ness’ of an area is often done at a very localised level: Kalevala, 
Olonets, or the village of Lambisel’ga.  There is a possibility therefore that 
Karelian identity itself can be associated with these localities rather than the 
Republic of Karelia as a whole.  Indeed the example on the town of Kalevala 
demonstrates that on occasion the ‘Karelian’ nature of a locality can be 
diminished.  We will examine below further, competing narratives of Karelian 
history in which the ‘Karelian-ness’ of some or all of the modern Republic of 
Karelia can be denied entirely.  There are however attempts made in the 
discourse to claim the whole of the modern Republic, or at least the greater part 
of it, as a Karelian homeland.  Almost as a reaction to the fragmentation and 
localisation of Karelian identity there are contributions made to the discourse 
which seek to unite these scattered threads into a common sense of Karelian 
identity: 
 
Союз карельского народа объединяет людей с едиными этническими 
корнями, желанием общения на родном карельском языке, ведь для многих 
это - потребность проявить свое мироощущение, национальное 
самосознание. Поэтому возникли отделения союза в районах Карелии: 
Кеми, Калевале, Кестеньге, Пяозере, Пряже, Ведлозере, Коткозере, 
Крошнозере, Эссойле... Люди, живущие там, устраивают праздники и 
теплые встречи, пьют чай по-карельски, по газете учатся карельской 
письменности, поют, танцуют, мастерят. Они наверняка не знают обо всем, 
что творится в национальной жизни столицы республики. Цену своему 
материнскому языку они знают, поэтому с надеждой ждут хороших вестей 
отсюда, из Петрозаводска, - ведь это столица Карелии и карелов тоже (K50 
23.05.2002). 
 
 The localised nature of expressions of Karelian identity can be glimpsed 







attempting to preserve their ethnic identity in their own way.  The impression 
given, however, is that they are isolated not merely from Petrozavodsk but also 
each other; the author describes them using strategies of marginalisation and 
trivialisation.   Despite this the author wishes to have us believe there is a certain 
unity amongst them; they are all attempting to safeguard their national culture in 
the expectation of ‘good news’ from Petrozavodsk, which is after all, as the 
article informs us, the capital of Karelia and Karelians. 
 
 
iii) 1920: A Foundational Myth? 
 
From the examples above we have seen how the idea of the continuity of 
Karelian residence in the modern Republic of Karelia can be invoked to 
construct a narrative which depicts the area as the ‘homeland’ of the Karelian 
people.  As certain of the examples have also demonstrated this idea can be 
invoked for a definite political purpose.  Karelians can claim the status of being 
the indigenous inhabitants of the republic in order to claim certain political or 
linguistic rights as well as to foster their own and their community’s sense of 
national identity.   This idea of continuity can and is also employed to a degree to 
legitimise current political arrangements in the Republic of Karelia. 
 
 The creation of the Karelian Workers’ Commune in 1920 has recently 
been promoted by the government of the current Republic of Karelia as an 
important anniversary.  The anniversary of the foundation of the first 
autonomous area in for the Karelian people was celebrated by the authorities as 
an important landmark in the history of the area.  An example of this tendency 
can be viewed in the example below which was published in Kareliya in honour 
of the 85th anniversary: 
 
  Октябрьская революция 1917 года провозгласила лозунг 
самоопределения народов России. Формы решения национального вопроса 







статус. В конце марта 1920 года создается так называемая Ухтинская 
республика, принявшая решение о независимости Карелии. 
     
8 июня 1920 года ВЦИК (Всероссийский Центральный 
Исполнительный Комитет) принимает декрет об образовании в составе 
Советской республики Карельской автономной области, которую назвали 
Карельская трудовая коммуна (КТК). 
  
 В декрете, в частности, говорилось: "Образовать в населенных 
карелами местностях Олонецкой и Архангельской губерний, в порядке 
статьи 11 Конституции РСФСР, областное объединение Карельскую 
трудовую коммуну". Карельский народ, который на протяжении веков был 
разобщен, соединился в общих национальных границах. (K 60 07.06.2005) 
 
 The narrative of the foundation of an autonomous area for the Karelians 
constructed here is very interesting.  The revolution of 1917 is stated to have 
promoted the idea, literally in fact the slogan, of national self-determination for 
the peoples ‘of Russia’.  The form, it is claimed, which such self-determination 
could take was left up to the nation in question itself.  The Karelian ‘nation’ 
itself, therefore, is the agent which presumably then forms the ‘so-called’ 
Ukhtinskaya Respublika which then takes the decision to declare Karelia 
independent.  The agency in the sentence is generalised, however, and the lexical 
choice employed in the sentence casts some doubt on the validity of the 
Ukhtinskaya Respublika itself, which vaguely takes a decision sometime at the 
end of March 1920.  In contrast to the uncertainty constructed around the actions 
of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika the actions of the Central Committee of the 
CPSU are portrayed as clear and unambiguous; a decree is issued on an exact 
date which creates an actual vehicle for Karelian self-determination: the KTK.  
This is the step which unites, as the article would have us believe, the scattered 
Karelians for the first time within common political boundaries.  This act not 
only gave the Karelians self-determination in 1920 in this narrative, but also 
through the continuity of this self-determination as now expressed in the current 








 Одной из важнейших задач руководства республики является 
сохранение коренных малочисленных народов как уникальных 
самобытных этносов мирового сообщества. Принимаются конкретные 
меры по поддержке и развитию их языков и культуры. Во многих 
общеобразовательных школах дети охотно изучают карельский, вепсский и 
финский языки. Специалистов готовят Петрозаводский государственный 
университет, Карельский государственный педагогический университет, 
Петрозаводская государственная консерватория (ibid). 
 
 The modern Republic of Karelia, however, is also constructed as being 
more than just an autonomous area for the benefit of Karelians: 
 
 Государственное устройство Карелии отвечает современным 
требованиям, способствует экономическому, социальному, духовному и 
культурному возрождению северного региона России. Трудом, опытом и 
знаниями многих поколений обустраивается республика, укрепляется ее 
экономическое и финансовое положение. Край "Калевалы" стал общим 
домом для всех народов, живущих в этом прекрасном крае (ibid). 
 
 In this example the ancient traditions of the Karelian people are 
recognised and claimed by the regional authorities; this is after all as the author 
reminds us the land of the Kalevala.  Modern Karelia, however, is also a multi-
national ‘home’ for all those who live within its boundaries.  The Republic of 
Karelia and its predecessors are clearly constructed here as having been formed 
for the purpose of providing a homeland for the Karelian people and satisfying 
their wishes for self-determination.  This continuity legitimises the current 
authorities, who are still, apparently, acting to safeguard the future of the 
Karelian people whilst at the same time acknowledging that modern Karelia is 
not mono-cultural.  This narrative of the historical basis of the Republic of 
Karelia is therefore, in terms of identity, quite fluid and contradictory; the 
creation of the KTK is carried out for the Karelians but not necessarily by them, 







entirely different function.  The KTK, an explicitly Karelian formation, has 
become an общии дом for non-Karelians; this is a reversal of its apparent 
original function but is depicted as being in continuity with these initial aims.  
This excerpt is also very redolent of Soviet discourse on the nationalities 
question; it would appear that, within the pages of Kareliya in particular, this 
quite patronising approach to the construction of ‘Karelian’ identity has persisted 
to the present day.  It would seem likely that this has been facilitated, as the 
above excerpt demonstrates, by the construction of the modern constitutional 
settlement by the contemporary authorities as a direct continuation of that of 
1920, existing for much the same ideological purpose.  The continued existence 
of an autonomous area in Karelia, a source of great perceived benefit it would 
appear to the regional elite, is justified by the continued need of such a power 
structure to protect and nurture the Karelian minority; that it has apparently 
surpassed these aims to nurture the entire local populace is portrayed as a great 
achievement and assurance of future success and prosperity.  More prosaically it 
would appear that this Soviet-era discourse has been maintained as the regional 
elite see no lack of continuity in relations between the Russian majority and the 
Karelian minority from the end of the Soviet Union to the present day.      
 The date can also be selected for use by those with alternate viewpoints 
on Karelian history and narrated in a manner not so favourable to past and 
current authorities.  Anatolii Grigoriev, leader of the Karelian Congress, also 
uses the anniversary of the foundation of the KTK to narrate an alternate history 
of the period and draws sharply contrasting results from his review of this 
history: 
 
 А что мы собираемся отмечать 8 июня - День Республики Карелия? 
Если быть объективным, то на сегодняшний день 8 июня - это всего лишь 
день памяти тем карельским патриотам, которые в 1920 году создали 
Карельскую трудовую коммуну, а затем Карельскую республику. Наши 
предки-созидатели надеялись, что потомки сохранят и разовьют 
Карельскую республику, национальную самобытность карельского народа. 








     Известна позиция законодателей Карелии, которые накануне нового 
года отвергли законопроект Карельского конгресса о предоставлении 
небольшой квоты для коренных народов в парламенте. Подобные законы 
уже давно действуют в ряде зарубежных стран и некоторых субъектах 
Российской Федерации. Часть русскоязычных политиков поддержала 
законопроект, но этой поддержки оказалось недостаточно. 
 
В нынешней политической системе Карелии карелы, финны, вепсы 
не смогут сохранить себя как национальные общности. Получается, мы не 
нужны государству со своими самобытностью, языком, культурой, 
традициями. 
 
Результаты выборов говорят - государственная система Карелии 
пока не отвечает важнейшим интересам коренных народов. Эту систему 
надо изменить в рамках закона и Конституции России (K50 23.05.2002). 
 
 In sharp contrast to the ‘official’ history of the foundation of the KTK 
Grigoriev ascribes the creation of autonomy for the Karelians not to officials in 
Moscow but to ‘Karelian patriots’.  This narrative of the foundation of the KTK 
therefore gives no credit to the authorities for the establishment of self-
government for the Karelians in 1920, but describes it as being brought about by 
the Karelians themselves as an attempt to secure the future of their ethnic 
identity.  In contrast to the manner in which the local authorities attempt to 
legitimise their modern position by reference to their provision, past and present, 
of autonomy for Karelia Grigoriev portrays them as having subverted the legacy 
of the politicians of the 1920s.  Instead of supporting contemporary Karelians 
they are accused of disregarding them entirely, thus the original purpose of the 
KTK and hence the current Republic of Karelia is not being fulfilled, at least in 
Grigoriev’s view.  In contrast to the constructive strategies employed by the 
authorities Grigoriev uses deconstructive, dissimilative strategies to create an 








 The political history of Karelia or the Karelia before 1920 is not widely 
discussed in the corpus of data studied.  That is to say that the idea of any kind of 
Karelian political movement or any sort of independent, explicitly ethnically 
Karelian political formation before this date is extremely uncommon in the 
discourse.  Karelian autonomy, in the form of the KTK, generally seems to 
appear almost unheralded in 1920, and even then only in connection with 
international events.  Discussion of what actually took place in the confused 
period between 1917 and 1920 is almost entirely absent for the mass media of 
the Republic of Karelia.  One such example is given below: 
 
 А вот история про карелов и петицию английскому королю Георгу V 
– реальное историческое событие, о котором до последнего времени ничего 
не было известно. Петиция была составлена в январе 1919 года, после того 
как войска Антанты очистили Северную Карелию от большевиков, а сами 
карельские добровольцы под командованием британских офицеров 
вытеснили финские отряды с карельских территорий. Британия в то время 
была ведущей мировой державой, и в голодную зиму 1918-19 г. именно 
англичане кормили Северную Карелию. Поэтому за помощью карелы 
обратились именно к Британии. То есть речь шла не совсем о 
присоединении, а о получении статуса протектората в составе Британской 
империи. Вроде того, что был в то время у Палестины или Египта. Увы, 
Карелия оказалась Британии неинтересна.  
 
Эти факты стали известны благодаря историку Нику Барону, 
доценту Университета Ноттингема, который раскопал дневник британского 
офицера Филиппа Вудса. В его бумагах ученый нашел оригинал петиции 
карелов Георгу V. Он опубликовал этот дневник вместе с биографией 
Филиппа Вудса на английском языке в 2007 году. Карельский историк 
Алексей Голубев в 2008 году перевел книгу на русский язык, и она 
получила название «Король Карелии». Правда, пока так и не нашла своего 








In this example Karel’skaya Guberniya does, briefly, touch on some of 
the issues of the 1917-20 period.  It will be noted however that the paper is only 
aware of some of the facts of the period thanks to the work of Nick Baron, the 
British historian.  Indeed the paper notes that Baron’s actual work, although 
translated, has not been published in Russian.  The fact that the newspaper and, it 
presumes, its readers were unaware of the activities of the Karelian volunteer 
forces during the post-revolutionary period indicates that this is a historical 
narrative with little resonance in contemporary Karelian society.   
The formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika is not often referenced 
within the mass media discourse within the Republic of Karelia.  In fact the term 
is used only four times within Kareliya, for example, in the period studied, 
almost exclusively within the practically identical official announcements 
celebrating the foundation of the KTK.  The term is virtually never used in 
Karel’skaya Guberniya, with Tuomi’s article quoted above the only reference to 
it found whatsoever in that publication in the corpus studied.  In contrast the 
foundation of the KTK on the 8
th
 of June 1920 is an official holiday.  Certainly in 
official terms this appears to have been selected as a ‘foundation date’ for the 
current Republic of Karelia.  It is doubtful whether the date plays the role of a 
‘named beginning’ such as anticipated by Hall (1996), Kolakowski (1995) or 
Wodak et al. (2009).  It might be argued that this is not altogether unsurprising as 
it is debatable to what extent officially or otherwise the actual Republic of 
Karelia itself is considered to have an actual ‘nationality’ attached to it; certainly 
although there may well be conceptions of Karelian, Vepsian, Finnish and 
Russian ‘national’ identities current at some level with the republic the extent to 
which any of these mesh with the conception of the republic itself is debatable.  
The 1920 date has clearly however been chosen to express at least the political 
realisation of Karelian autonomy by the authorities.  It is as has been seen above 
commemorated as the beginning of the political history of the Karelian people at 
least in the official narrative.  Anatolii Grigoriev also appears to accept this idea 
at least insofar as the creation of the KTK is narrated by him as the start of 
Karelian attempts to decide their own future.  Tuomi’s article offers some 
indication that this may not be accepted at least in some quarters of Karelian 







a starting point for a Karelian political movement.  The main issue, as illustrated 
in the examples given above, is that there is a consciousness of a Karelian 
identity predating 1920 by hundreds or thousands of years.  Consequently it is 
difficult to accept the idea of 1920 as being viewed as anything more than the 
foundation of Karelian political autonomy.  The idea of other possible 
‘foundational myths’ for the Karelian people will be discussed further below. 
 
3.3 The Position of Vepsian History Within the Mass Media Discourse 
 
Narratives of Vepsian history in the Russian-language mass media 
discourse in the Republic of Karelia are notable for their almost complete 
absence.  This is not perhaps greatly surprising when the relatively small 
numbers of Vepsians within the area is considered.  If the Russian-language 
press do not consider their average imagined reader to be Karelian by ethnicity 
there is little doubt it is extremely unlikely they attempt to construct an imagined 
Vepsian interlocutor.  It is also the case that although Vespians are legally 
considered to be one of the indigenous nationalities of the Republic of Karelia 
and therefore there is a duty for Kareliya at least to report on their affairs their 
small numbers make it difficult for them to contribute much themselves to the 
discourse.  Nevertheless certain tendencies can be identified from those articles 
which do deal with the Vepsian population.  As previously stated the Vepsian 
population is generally considered to be indigenous to the Republic of Karelia, 
however in practice only the area which was previously the Vepsian National 
Volost’ is generally considered to be a Vepsian ‘national territory’.  In particular 
the village of Shyoltozero is considered to fulfil the function of a Vepsian 
‘homeland’ within the Republic due to the presence of the ethnographic museum 
of Vepsian culture established there by Rurikh Petrovich Lonin.  In general, 
however, the attitude towards Vepsian history and the Veps themselves on the 
part of the Russian majority as reflected through the mass media discourse would 
best be described as indifference.  Whilst some information is available to a 
Russian readership through Kareliya the Veps are hardly ever mentioned at all 
by Karel’skaya Guberniya and practically nothing is said about their history.  







nationalities whose history is being produced, reproduced or even deconstructed 
and denied in the discourse.  The Veps are generally conspicuous by their 
absence. 
It has been noted above that Karel’skaya Guberniya feels constrained to 
give basic information on the Vepsians to its readers when the discussion touches 
on issues relating to the now-defunct Vepsian National Volost’.  In Kareliya the 
situation is somewhat different as at least a low level of discussion on Vepsian 
issues is always on-going in the publication due to its official nature.  As one of 
the named ‘indigenous’ nationalities in the Republic of Karelia the Vepsians are 
often included in the discussion even if only in the formulaic constructions 
‘Karelians, Veps and Finns’ or ‘Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish’ which are often 
used officially when discussing issues related to these named minorities, as 
exemplified below: 
Конкурс направлен на повышение общественной значимости 
журналистских материалов на карельском, вепсском и финском языках, 
стимулирование творческого роста работников средств массовой 
информации, пишущих на карельском, вепсском и финском языках, 
содействие сохранению, развитию и использованию карельского, вепсского 
и финского языков в Республике Карелия, воспитание у молодого 
поколения интереса к историко-культурному наследию родного края, его 
прошлому и настоящему (K37 24.05.2012).” 
Совет, собравшийся в зале заседаний республиканского 
правительства 13 сентября, кроме итогов работы и планов на будущее 
основательно рассмотрел вопрос о совершенствовании подготовки кадров 
из числа карелов, вепсов и финнов для органов местного самоуправления 
Карелии (K100-101 21.09.2002). 
 
By constantly being associated in this group of indigenous minorities 
together with the Karelians and Finns there is at least an official attempt to 







Karelia.  This indigenous status however is also, in a similar fashion to the 
manner in which Karelian history is often related, closely linked to the village or 
local area.  Due to limited number of Vepsian villages within Karelia this results 
in the construction of a very limited ‘Vepsian homeland’ clustered around 
Shyoltozero in the Prionezhkii District: 
A) Праздник вепсского края 
 
6 лет назад день памяти святого Ионы Яшезерского, уроженца 
деревни Шокша, стал национальным праздником вепсского края. 
Депутаты волостного Совета, а затем и глава Прионежского района 
поддержали инициативу настоятеля Благовещенского Ионо-
Яшезерского монастыря игумена Досифея считать этот день 
национальным праздником (K110 05.10.2010.) 
 
B) На родине древнего народа 
 
22 сентября Глава Карелии Андрей Нелидов посетил село 
Шелтозеро Прионежского муниципального района. В этот день в 
старинном вепсском селе впервые проходила межрегиональная 
краеведческая конференция <Лонинские чтения>, посвященная 80-
летию легендарного собирателя вепсского фольклора Рюрика 
Петровича Лонина (K 106 25.09.2010). 
 
C) Путешествие в "Страну вепсов" 
 
В Карельском государственном краеведческом музее открылась 
выставка "Страна вепсов" 
 
В Петрозаводск выставка приехала из Финляндии, где она 
экспонировалась в рамках мероприятий Года вепсской культуры, 







вепсской культуры Республики Карелия. Подготовлена она на 
средства программы Евросоюза "Интеррег Карьяла". "Страна 
вепсов" представляет культурное наследие трех регионов, где 
проживает этот маленький финно-угорский народ, - Карелии, 
Ленинградской и Вологодской областей. Здесь предметы из 
собраний Шелтозерского и Карельского государственного 
краеведческого музеев, деревенских музеев Курбы, Винницы, 
Тимошино и частных коллекций села Пяжозеро (K122 22.10.2002). 
 
D) В селе Шелтозеро Прионежского района прошла очередная встреча 
в рамках реализации проекта Tervhen tulda vepsan male – «В гости к 
вепсам» (K98 29.12.2011). 
 
In the above examples the area around Shyoltozero and its surrounding 
villages are variously constructed as the centre of Vepsian culture, occasionally 
in a manner which would appear to restrict the application of the idea of Vepsian 
identity much beyond the immediate area.  The idea of an undefined ‘Vepsian 
territory’ is used in example A in discussing the history of a monastery near the 
village of Shoksha in the Prionezhskii District.  In examples B, C and D the visit 
of officials to Shyoltozero or the viewing in a museum setting of exhibits from 
the area are described in terms of a journey; the officials in example B are in 
(having presumably travelled from Petrozavodsk) the ‘Veps homeland’, whilst in 
example E similarly they are ‘visiting’ the Veps by travelling to Shyoltozero.  
Example C is a further indication of this tendency as visiting an exhibition in 
Petrozavodsk on Vepsian culture is constructed as a ‘journey’ into the Vepsian 
land by the organisers and the journalist who reproduces their text in the media.  
In this manner the ethnographic or tourist discourse in constantly incorporated 
into the discourse on identity when it refers to the Veps; in this fashion 
something akin to Orientalist or tourist discourse in invoked, a curious external 
view from outside which regards the Veps as particularly exotic.  This example 
also notes the broader context of the Vepsian territory; it is not exclusively 







The possibility of a larger historical homeland for the Veps is hinted at in 
one article in Kareliya.  The article is actually a letter from a student of history 
from neighbouring Arkangel’sk Oblast’ investigating the history of the former 
Andomskii Pogost of Tsarist Russia part of which is now incorporated into the 
Pudozhskii District of the modern Republic of Karelia.  The author presents his 
research as of potential interest to the reader due to it being part of the history of 
the modern region: 
Андомский погост - это не только крупное прионежское селение, но 
и центр древнего округа, располагавшегося на территориях севера 
Вытегорского и юга Пудожского районов, один из 17 заонежских погостов, 
часть истории Олонецкой губернии и исторической территории нынешней 
Карелии. Поэтому информация о его истории и культуре, как мне кажется, 
может быть интересной для жителей республики (K105 03.10.2002). 
Clearly the editorial staff of Kareliya were of the same opinion as the 
article together with the author’s introduction was duly published.  In his article 
the author offers a rare account of the antiquity and previous extent of Vepsian 
settlement in an area not now generally regarded to be part of the ‘Vepsian 
territory’ described above: 
Наиболее ранними сохранившимися письменными источниками по 
данной территории являются писцовые книги XVI в. При анализе писцовых 
книг Обонежской пятины 1563 и 1583 г. на территории Никольского 
Андомского погоста мною было выделено не менее пяти десятков имен-
прозвищ дворохозяев и названий деревень, которые этимологически 
восходят к прибалтийско-финским языкам, в частности к вепсскому. 
Выделенные названия и имена были мною этимологизированы с 
привлечением современного вепсского языка (ibid). 
By describing the place-name evidence available from medieval texts on 
the area the author can detail the extent of Vepsian settlement in the area.  The 
author in fact then goes on to list the place names in question and their derivation 
from Vepsian.  As such analysis would be beyond the average reader lacking a 







to demonstrate what are presumably previously unknown facts to the imagined 
interlocutor.  In this manner he is able to justify his concluding assertion that: 
“Широкое распространение вепсских имен, прозвищ, названий деревень 
наряду с ныне сохраняющимися особенностями местной культуры, языка, 
архитектуры говорит о большой доле старожильческого вепсского 
населения, проживавшего на территории земель Андомского погоста в 
XVI-XVII столетиях и сохранявшего на то время свой родной язык. Под 
влиянием межнациональных браков, с переходом на русский и утратой 
вепсского языка андомская часть прибалтийско-финского населения 
постепенно стала осознавать себя частью русского народа.” 
This article, however, from a specialist outwith modern Karelia, is a relatively 
isolated contribution to the discourse on history and identity found in the corpus 
of data sampled.  It does prove, however, that alternate understandings and 
narratives of Karelian history are present within the modern republic even if they 
are not widely-propagated.  It also hints at the existence of a narrative in which 
the inhabitants of the modern Republic of Karelia are still largely descended, at 
least in part, from Finno-Ugric roots, even if they have become almost fully 
russified.      
 
3.4 A Special Case: Ingrian Finns  
 
Although the status of Finns in general as indigenous to Karelia is 
disputed and often rejected in the narratives of Karelian identity prevalent in the 
Karelian press the status of the Ingrian subgroup of the Finnish nationality are 
generally accorded a special status.  Originally most of these Finns did not live 
within the territory of what is now the Republic of Karelia, but they could have 
been considered to reside within the broader boundaries of the much more ill-
defined area of ‘Karelia’ itself.  This group of Finns evolved from Finnish 
immigrants who arrived in the 17
th
 Century in Ingria, the area on the Karelian 
Isthmus between modern Estonia and Finland, and their assimilation with the 







O 1994).  During the 20
th
 century and in particular in the aftermath of the wars 
between Finland and the USSR these Ingrian Finns were deported from Ingria to 
other parts of the USSR and a significant number were resettled in Karelia.  Even 
within Karel’skaya Guberniya these Finns are given a special status.  The author 
of the article below, for example, does as in the case of the Vepsians feel 
constrained to provide his or her reader with a short history of the Ingrian Finns 
before discussing their modern plight.  Both the historical experience of the 
Ingrians and their current difficulties are presented in a sympathetic light, 
however: 
 
Финны-ингерманландцы проживали на территории Карельского 
перешейка с XVII века. Территория эта в разные периоды принадлежала то 
Российскому государству, то Швеции, то вновь России, и в итоге так 
получилось, что к XX веку ингерманландцы оказались в этих краях по обе 
стороны административной границы Финляндского княжества, которая 
после 1917 года стала границей Страны Советов. С конца 20-х годов по 
приказу Сталина тысячи ингерманландцев были подвергнуты выселению 
со своих земель, и следы этих людей теряются где-то в Сибири и Средней 
Азии. Во время Второй мировой войны, после того как территория 
Карельского перешейка была оккупирована немецкими войсками, многие 
ингерманландцы оказались в Финляндии. За несколько военных лет многие 
там прижились и уже начали забывать свое недавнее социалистическое 
прошлое. Но когда в 1944 году Финляндия и СССР подписали мирный 
договор, то одним из его условий стало принудительное возвращение 
ингерманландцев — советских граждан. Финны, как бы им ни было 
неприятно, вынуждены были выполнять условия договора: они сажали 
своих братьев по крови в поезда, которые потом прямым ходом шли в 
Сибирь. Те "инкери", кому повезло чуточку больше, оказались в Карелии 
(KG9 27.02.2002). 
 
In this article, one of the very few on the Ingrian Finns published in the 
paper, this particular group of Finns is accorded the status of being indigenous if 







Karelia, then at least in its general vicinity.  Furthermore their resettlement 
within Karelia is clearly narrated as having been involuntary, a result of their 
unfortunate political persecution during the 1940s.  It is not possible to deduce 
from this one article the general attitudes towards Ingrian Finns within the 
Republic of Karelia but it does hint at certain differences in the manner in which 
they are viewed in comparison with other groups of Finns.  These attitudes will 





3.5 Russians in Karelia: Indigenous or Immigrant? 
 
i) Karelia as a Centre of Russian Culture 
 
 The somewhat haphazard nature in which the boundaries of the Republic 
of Karelia were decided led to the inclusion of certain areas which were never 
inhabited by large numbers of Finno-Ugric people.  In particular the inclusion of 
the area around the town of Pudozh was at the time of its incorporation into the 
KASSR inhabited for the most part by ethnic Russians.  Evidently since 1917 the 
large scale Russification of the KASSR and the immigration of many Russians to 
the area has made Russians the dominant national group across almost all of the 
modern Republic of Karelia.  It is not therefore unusual to find attempts to 
present Russians as equally indigenous to certain areas of Karelia as the 
Karelians themselves, or even, in certain extreme examples, even more so.   
The area around the White Sea is often imagined as a centre of Russian culture 
from time immemorial; this process of mythologisation is well illustrated by the 
example below from an article entitled “Страна за Онегой”: 
 
Там, за Онегой, в Заонежье и Заволочье - за новгородскими 
волоками, по рассказам бродячих людей, светили чистой водой несметные 
озера, и путь туда был труден, - кони падали, ломали ноги, скользили от 







"новгородской пятиной", лежащей за краем обжитых земель, и была 
некогда Карелия - старинное Заонежье. Сейчас это название исчезло с 
наших карт. Оно сохранилось только за большим лесистым полуостровом, 
вдающимся с северо-запада в Онежское озеро. Полуостров этот населен 
потомками новгородцев. Они сохранили чистый новгородский язык, 
сохранили старые сказания, песни, былины. Пушкин советовал учиться 
русскому языку у московских просвирен. С полным основанием можно 
учиться подлинному русскому языку и у жителей Заонежья.” (K 106 
25.09.2003) 
 
 Here we have a clear attempt to construct an area, ‘Zaonezh’e’, which is 
explicitly not and never has been, according to the author, part of ‘Karelia’, 
despite clearly now being part of the modern Republic of Karelia.  Instead it is 
conceptualised as a centre of Russian culture, specifically that of Novgordian 
Rus, distant and isolated from outside influence.  The area is constructed as a 
place of myth and wonder, having been almost beyond the known world (за 
новгородскими волоками, по рассказам бродячих людей), almost magical, as 
светили чистой водой несметные озера suggests.  The article throughout uses 
archaic and folkloristic language to build an image of historical primacy and 
antiquity for the area, thus emphasising the continuity of Russian identity in 
these locales.  More importantly it is not only Russian rather than Karelian, but 
emphatically Russian, the epitome of Russianess; with the reader advised that he 
or she can learn ‘genuine’ Russian language from the locals.  The almost fairy-
tale-like quality of the area is further developed: 
   Старик помолчал и добавил: 
    - Монастыри были у нас знаменитые. Северные монастыри. Может, 
слыхали? На озерах. Трава под самые стены. Колокольный звон над водой. 
Церкви деревянные, таких церквей ни в одной стране нету. Сооружали те 
церкви мужички с аршином, да с отвесом, да с кружкой квасу. Так-то! А 








    Из этого короткого разговора со смолокуром стало ясно, как 
органичны и глубоки в этом краю истоки народной поэзии, народного 
зодчества (ibid). 
 Once again the area is constructed as a unique and valuable centre of 
national (presumably Russian) culture; a strategy of singularisation is employed 
which emphasises its model national character.  Much as Kalevala was claimed 
above as nurturing Karelian culture here we see another part of the Republic of 
Karelia provide the basis for the development of Russian culture; even a short 
conversation with an old tar-extractor, that is to say a relatively uneducated and 
unrefined individual, apparently provides the author with a clear picture of how 
national culture is deeply rooted in the area.  The author clearly uses a strategy of 
continuation, tracing a link from the ancient monasteries and culture of the area 
down through the old tar worker through himself and down to the reader, in 
attempt to show the continuity and therefore validity of Russian culture in the 
area.  Pudozh is also portrayed as an ancient Russian town in the article “Край 
Пудожский былинный” (K 123 04.11.2006).  By connecting Pudozh to the idea 
of Russian ‘bylina’ or epic folk poetry the antiquity of the area is established as 
well as its deep connection to traditional Russian culture in a similar example to 
that given above.   
 The idea of Karelia as a centre of Russian зодчества, or wooden 
architecture, mentioned already in the example above, is further developed in the 
extract below with reference to one of the main cultural icons of contemporary 
Karelia, the Kizhi museum: 
 Самый старый памятник — церковь Лазаря Муромского — 
построена в XIV веке и является самым древним из сохранившихся 
произведений деревянного зодчества в России. 
“Кижи" — это еще и центр Заонежья, сокровищницы древнерусской 








 One of the problematic issues surrounding the construction of the image 
of Kizhi as an exclusively Karelian, in ethnic terms, cultural shibboleth is the fact 
that it was created artificially as a site by the Soviet authorities.  Although the 
most famous church on and therefore image of Kizhi, the Church of the 
Transfiguration, is in its original location many of the others were moved to the 
island from other parts of the region.  In particular the Church of Lazarus 
mentioned in the above quote was relocated to Kizhi in the 1950s from the 
Pudozhskii District, an area we have already seen above constructed as part of an 
exclusively Russian cultural landscape.  The museum complex therefore 
represents not merely the local area or the culture of the Karelian minority, but 
can also be represented, as indeed it is by the employee of the museum quoted, as 
a representation of Russian culture.  Thus one of the most recognisable images of 
the modern Republic of Karelia, the Kizhi museum, can be incorporated into the 
narration of Russian history.  By attribution to an expert this opinion is given 
extra weight in the discourse.  Indeed not only is Kizhi portrayed as being a 
centre of Russian culture it is in fact we are informed the repository of the oldest 
example of Russian woodworking of its sort remaining in Russia; in this manner 
Kizhi itself and Karelia as a whole can be depicted as having been a centre of 
Russian culture for centuries.   
The examples above depict a particular narrative of Karelian history 
which constructs at the very least the ‘Zaonezh’e’, a vague, indeterminate area 
around the Onego, as having been and remaining one of the most ancient centres 
of Russian culture.  This area is depicted as having nurtured some of the greatest 
Russian folkloric and woodworking traditions in the same manner as White Sea 
Karelia and Kalevala or Olonets and its district are narrated by Karelian 
contributors as having given birth to Karelian culture or the Kalevala.  In this 
manner the Russian majority can claim to be at least as entitled to consider 
Karelia or, at a minimum, part of the modern Republic of Karelia as their 
homeland or part of their homeland.    
 The idea of Karelia as being a centre of Russian culture is also narrated in 







part of or somehow connected to the idea of a ‘Russian soul’.  Below is an 
example of the manner in which this idea is relayed: 
 Карелия, как и Русский Север в целом, — это край, полный 
неразгаданных тайн и удивительных загадок. Разгадать их — значит понять 
наше прошлое и настоящее. Величие и историческое бессмертие народа 
определяются духовной культурой, которую представители даже самых 
малочисленных этносов сумели сохранить и донести до своих потомков. 
Разве духовная культура древних народов, издавна проживавших на 
огромной территории современной Карелии, менее древняя, чем культура 
любого из западно-европейских народов? Разве карело-финский эпос 
"Калевала" менее поэтичен, чем скандинавская "Эдда", французская "Песнь 
о Роланде" или германские "Нибелунги"? 
В 1916 году Николай Константинович Рерих — выдающийся 
художник и мыслитель — прибывает в город Сердоболь, нынешний 
Сортавала. Это была уже не первая поездка Рериха в Финляндию и 
Карелию. Интерес Рериха к Северу был неотделим от его интереса к 
прошлому России, к ее истории. Он живо интересовался изучением 
древнего магического Знания, существование которого в стародавние 
времена связывалось с северными территориями.  
Северные старцы-богомольцы предсказывали: в треугольнике, 
отмеченном тремя храмами Преображения — Валаамским, Соловецким и 
Кижским, — начнется очищение России. Это место, где как бы сгущается 
благодать, становясь явной для чутких сердец. Здесь душа Русского Севера, 
средоточие его гармоний (KG3 12.01.2005).” 
The example above relates a history of Karelia which places it firmly 
within the cultural and supposedly spiritual boundaries of the ‘Russian North’ 
and hence Russia in general.  The Kalevala is invoked once again, described here 
as being a representation of ‘spiritual culture’ passed down to the present.  This 
‘Karelo-Finnish’ epos is however mentioned alongside a description of what the 
author deems to be the ancient history of Russia.  The trip of an artist in 1916 to 







described as part of his studies into the history of Russia; Sortavala is 
incorporated in this manner into the general area the author is trying to construct 
of the ‘Russian North’; it should be noted that in articles on the town the old 
Russian name of Сердоболь, which has a transparent, folkloristic derivation, 
‘heart-ache’ is referenced by the author. It is often depicted as the ‘original’ 
name of the town, emphasising its primacy in contrast to the obscure, foreign-
sounding Sortavala. By describing a pre-revolutionary Russian taking an interest 
in the supposedly Russian aspects of the area’s culture the author is clearly 
attempting to demonstrate that validity of current conceptions of this culture.  We 
are furthermore informed that, in terms of folklore at least, the ‘north’, 
presumably including what is now the Republic of Karelia, was incorporated into 
the intellectual world of centuries of Russians.  By stressing the antiquity of the 
idea of Karelia as the Russian North and comparing it to the ‘spiritual’ heritage 
Karelians derive from the Kalevala the article attempts to give the impression 
that Russian identity is of equally long standing in Karelia as that of the Finno-
Ugric peoples.   
This idea of Karelia as being part of Russian territory is further 
emphasised in the final paragraph.  The author lists three famous Orthodox 
Churches of the Transfiguration which apparently have a significant role to play 
in his or her rather esoteric view of the spiritual life of Russia.  It should be noted 
that whilst the port for the Solovetskii Islands is the town of Kem’ they are not 
actually themselves within the boundaries of the current Republic of Karelia 
unlike the islands of Kizhi and Valaam.  These three locations are identified by 
the author as the very ‘soul’ of the ‘Russian North’.  By referencing these three 
famous Orthodox sites the Russian character of Karelia can be established, at 
least in the opinion of the author.  This narration of Karelia as part of the Russian 
Orthodox world and hence part of the Russian world in general is examined in 









ii) Russians as Indigenous: Further Narratives of Karelia as Part of 
the Russian World. 
 
The idea of Karelia as being an area of Russian settlement of long 
standing, if not indeed from time immemorial, is developed in a similar manner 
to that of the indigenous status of Karelians.  Karelia is often constructed as 
having been an area in which Karelians and Russians lived together for centuries 
much as they do today.  In this manner the current situation in the Republic of 
Karelia where Russians are present across all of its territory alongside the Finno-
Ugric minorities is constructed as being merely a continuation of hundreds if not 
thousands of years of tradition: 
Известно, что народонаселение нашей северной республики никогда 
не было этнически однородным. Издревле просторы таежного края вместе с 
племенами финно-угров (карелов, финнов, вепсов) осваивали новгородские 
славяне, тоже по праву считающиеся коренными жителями Русского 
Севера. (K 28 19.03.2005) 
 В нашем древнем крае издавна рядом жили русские, карелы и вепсы. 
Жили в мире и согласии. Многое перенимали друг от друга, многому 
научились друг у друга. В русских говорах Карелии немало карельских 
включений, в южнокарельских диалектах карельского языка много 
русизмов (K128 17.11.2005). 
In both examples above the Russian people are described as having been 
resident in what is now the Republic of Karelia alongside the Karelians and other 
Finno-Ugric peoples from ancient times.  Both the temporal adverbs издревле 
and издавна give this sense of ‘time immemorial’; the authors cannot give an 
exact date for Russian settlement.  Indeed in the first example the use of 
известно at the start of the sentence seeks to appeal to an apparent pre-existing 
body of knowledge which would automatically recognise the ‘objective’ fact that 
the populace of the Republic of Karelia has always been multi-national.  By 
invoking this shared store of knowledge the Russian populace, in this example, 







immemorial alongside the Finno-Ugric peoples.  The second example attempts to 
assert the antiquity of Karelian and Russian contact by demonstrating that both 
languages have been strongly influenced by each other.  In both examples, 
particularly the second, there is no hint of any conflict whatsoever between the 
two ethnicities; in fact in the second example we are advised that they have 
always lived together в мире и согласии.  This narrative of history justifies the 
modern Russian presence in the Republic of Karelia by claiming that this has 
always been a feature of the area.  It also begins to demonstrate how the 
Karelians and Russians can also be depicted as to some extent sharing a common 
historical past which serves to unify them in the present.  By narrating this idea 
of Karelians and Russians having always lived ‘side by side’ it is possible to 
construct an idealised image of the past which the modern situation is meant to 
reflect.  By narrating the historical past in this manner the current situation where 
the Karelian minority is influenced by and under the political control of the 
Russian majority can be depicted as the norm; it is after all, in this narrative, 
merely a continuation of historical tradition.  Conversely this narrative can also 
be employed by Karelians.  The second of the examples above is written by a 
Karelian journalist describing the history of the Karelian-language paper Vienan 
Karjala.  Clearly by referencing the centuries of Karelian and Russian 
cooperation and mutual tolerance the Karelian speaker is hoping to persuade his 
Russian addressees of the need to continue this tradition and respect the rights of 
Karelians.  This historical narrative, using a strategy of continuation to depict the 
long standing peaceful relations of Karelians with Russians, can be used to 
appeal for maintenance of this supposed mutual understanding and acceptance.    
iii) Russians as the Coloniser 
 
  Although Russians are often narrated as having an equally long history 
as the Karelian minority within the Republic of Karelia there are occasionally 
alternate narratives which depict the Russians as having been immigrants or 
colonisers of at least some parts of Karelia.  This attitude has already been 
examined above from a Karelian perspective by Anatolii Grigoriev who narrated 







marked degree.  A similar narration of a history of Karelia which, until modern 
times, excludes the influence of Russians and portrays Karelia as having been 
almost exclusively ethnically and linguistically is also given by some Russian 
contributors to the discourse.   
 The importance of the narration of the history of the Karelian language 
for Karelians themselves shall be examined further below.  Karelians often 
narrate the history of pre-revolutionary Karelia as that of a ‘golden age’ for the 
Karelian language in which its use was almost universal amongst the Karelian 
population.  Russian contributors do not view this widespread usage of Karelian 
as inherently positive, but more as a historical curiosity.  This tendency is 
exemplified by a series of articles in Karel’skaya Guberniya on the history of 
pre-revolutionary Karelia entitled “сто лет тому назад”, which began in January 
of 2008 and ran increasingly intermittently until early 2009.  This series of 
articles were produced by the journalists involved perusing copies of the 
Olonetskie Gubernskie Vedomosti of the appropriate date and selecting passages 
which they assumed their readers would find of interest or amusement.  As a 
consequence much of what was reproduced was fairly trivial or irrelevant 
material to the purpose of this study, however some of the articles chosen for 
discussion and their presentation are revealing of both historical and 
contemporary attitudes.  The question of the Karelian language in 1908 
apparently revealed information the journalist and his addressee were unaware of 
or had not previously appreciated:  
A) Самая большая и серьезная статья, растянувшаяся на несколько 
первых номеров газеты, была посвящена школьному 
образованию. Написала ее учительница русского языка, 
подписавшаяся "А.С.", – она сетует на "нравственное положение 
учителя", которому приходится либо "бичевать", либо выпускать 
в жизнь неподготовленных к работе молодых людей. А учеников 
приводили в школу вот каких: "Они приходят в гимназию без 
умения говорить, часто выражают свои мысли отдельными 
словами, притом неправильно произнося их. Бывали случаи, что 







карельскому языку, или на вопрос учителя отвечают 
недоумевающим "Мида сана?" (Что ты говоришь?) Отказ в 
приеме, вследствие незнания русского языка, удивляет 
родителей: зачем же и школа, как не для того, чтобы учить? Не 
так давно на экзамене горько рыдали мать и дочь. Все педагоги 
сбежались их успокаивать, достигнуть чего было трудно, так как 
дочь еле-еле говорила по-русски, а мать вовсе не знала этого 
языка. Мать объясняла по-своему, что для них большая обида" 
(KG2 09.01.2008). 
 
B) В следующем номере – откровения еще одного учителя. Он 
рассуждает не о школе, а о том, как важно знать карельский язык 
всем, кто работает в Карелии. Автор рассказывает о том, как 24 
года назад он приехал в Карелию, в Святозеро, и обнаружил, что 
без знания карельского языка обходиться здесь трудно. 
Приводит примеры из жизни, удивляющие своей наивностью: 
"Когда, например, при уходе из школы новым ученикам нужно 
было втолковать, чтобы они помолились, учительница сказала 
несколько раз: помолись, перекрестись, — видит, что толку 
мало. И сейчас же сказала эти слова по-карельски. И дело 
наладилось". 
Далее – наблюдения в кабинете фельдшера. Просто комическая 
миниатюра: 
"Сижу я у фельдшера, он по-карельски не понимает. Приходит 
женщина. Что болит? Женщина молчит, потом, должно быть, 
догадалась и говорит: амбагат (зубы) пакотэта (болят). Я 
фельдшеру перевожу: зубы. Фельдшер спрашивает: который 
зуб? Молчание. Посмотрела на меня и говорит: дюурэд. Говорю 
ему: корни. Но переводчик, как я, постоянно ли у фельдшера?" 
Нет, ну как с индейцами! Вот она – колонизация "русских" 







было значительно меньше, чем карелов. О степени 
взаимопонимания тех и других можете судить сами (KG3 
16.01.2008). 
Both examples above detail examples of the use of Karelian rather than 
Russian as the everyday language of the majority of the inhabitants of pre-
revolutionary Karelia.  In example A the experiences of a Russian schoolmistress 
and her struggle to teach Karelian children are recounted; we are informed that 
her pupils almost without exception either spoke no Russian at all or very little, 
being instead monolingual Karelian speakers.  In fact the schools of the period 
are related as having attempted to exclude children due to their inability to speak 
Russian.  The teaching of Russian to these children is not negatively evaluated; 
in fact the Karelians themselves are depicted as wanting to learn Russian and 
being ashamed at not knowing the language.  It appears the opinions of the 
original schoolmistress, refracted as they are through the journalism of 1908 and 
2008, are still reported relatively unchallenged.  It is her assessment of the 
willingness of Karelians to learn Russian that is directly quoted by both papers.  
In the second example the original letter writers of 1908 are still quoted but now 
their comments are framed to a greater extent by the contemporary journalist’s 
presentation.  The modern journalist presents their contributions in a humorous, 
somewhat comic light; indeed he or she explicitly refers to one excerpt as a 
“комическая миниатюра.”  Despite their presentation as amusing anecdotes the 
quotations do serve to narrate a history of Karelia where, in the Tsarist period, 
only the educated classes appear to have spoken any Russian at all, whilst the 
masses of the population were ignorant of the language.  It constructs an image 
of Karelia which has very little Russian about it at all; Karelia appears as an 
almost ‘foreign’ land, with an alien (i.e. non-Russian) culture dominating 
everyday life.  Indeed in the second example this is clearly stated: 
Нет, ну как с индейцами! Вот она – колонизация "русских" земель во 
всей красе: каких-то сто лет назад русских в Карелии было значительно 







This statement explicitly undermines the idea of Karelia as a Russian 
territory, instead drawing an analogy with the American West.  Such an analogy 
conjures up images of ‘civilised’ Russians dealing with ‘savage’ or ‘barbarous’ 
Karelians in a similar manner the depiction of Russian professionals struggling 
with ignorant Karelian peasants.  Karelia is represented as a ‘colonial’ territory 
of the Russians, at least in the past; the author reminds us this was around a 
hundred years ago and that today the situation is different.  This narrative is 
reminiscent of the idea of Orientalism and the other as expressed by Said (1995). 
The comparison of Karelians to American Indians is made again in another 
article from the paper from 2003: 
Но затем карелов в некотором роде постигла судьба 
колонизированных индейцев. Чем больше земля осваивалась эмигрантами 
из средней России, тем шире развивался алкогольный бизнес и росла 
популярность алкоголя среди населения. Осенью 1897 года в 
Петрозаводске начинает действовать первый государственный винный 
склад, где изготовлялась водка. В 1913 году по уровню потребления 
Олонецкая губерния переместилась с последнего на 49-е место среди 74 
губерний. Карелы полюбили "огненную воду", как когда-то индейцы 
Северной Америки (KG10 05.03.2003). 
Here the depiction of the Russian ‘colonisers’ is not perhaps as positive, 
as they are portrayed as having brought the Karelians, constructed earlier in this 
article as being unused to the consumption of alcohol, into the habit of regular 
drinking.  The Karelians again are compared to American Indians, having 
similarly fallen in love with ‘fire water’.  Once again the depiction of the 
Karelians is somewhat patronising and perhaps even somewhat offensive; they 
are represented as a simple, unsophisticated people being tutored and exploited 
by Russian incomers.  Nevertheless the articles do narrate a history in which the 
Russian influence on and settlement in Karelia was minimal. Importantly in this 
instance this image of Karelia as being on the margins of or indeed not really part 
of a genuine Russian cultural sphere in the relatively recent past is constructed by 







feel they have as much right to consider themselves indigenous to Karelia as the 
Karelians themselves. 
iv) ‘Pan-Finnish’ Propaganda: A Historical Threat? 
 
In its examination of the history of Karelia in 1908-9 Karel’skaya Guberniya 
also touches upon the issue of the ‘Pan-Finnish’ agitation undertaken at that time 
by Finnish nationalists within Karelia.  The paper, through sampling the output 
of its historical counterpart naturally reproduces attitudes which are very hostile 
to this agitation and see it as a threat to the then Russian Empire.  The 
reproduction of these views places the Finns in a particular light and reproduces 
a historical enmity towards them and a historical concern over the loyalty of the 
Karelian population to their Russian masters.  In a modern context these texts 
further reinforce the narration of pre-revolutionary Karelia as an area lacking in 
Russian influence and offer up a history of a competing Finnish influence.    
A) В декабре 1907 года в Петрозаводске собрали 
чрезвычайное заседание в Земском собрании. Обсуждали 
важный вопрос: опасность панфинско-лютеранской 
пропаганды. Требовалось принять "самые энергичные 
меры": построить железную дорогу по Олонецкой 
Карелии, при непременном условии "проведения ее из 
сердца России – Москвы". На железную дорогу 
возлагались большие надежды, ведь именно она должна 
была посодействовать повышению культурного уровня в 
Олонецком крае. Правда, каким именно образом – 
непонятно (KG2 09.01.2008). 
 
 
B) Финская угроза  
 
Тема так называемой "панфинской пропаганды" в начале 
XX века для Олонецкой губернии была крайне актуальна. 







большинстве своем не знавшие русского, легче находили 
общий язык со своими единоплеменными сородичами из 
Финляндии, чем с русскими. О вредном влиянии финнов 
на карелов говорилось в свете необходимости изучения 
карелами русского языка, религиозного просвещения и 
даже строительства дорог.  
В одном из февральских номеров "ОГВ" читаем наконец, 
в чем именно заключалась "панфинская пропаганда". 
Автор заметки "Финская тревога" рассказывает о том, что 
пишет финляндская пресса: "Мы, финны, устраиваем 
здесь библиотеки, строим молитвенные дома и причтовые 
помещения, читаем газеты, имеем читальни и даже 
общество трезвости. Население сознает себя и свое племя 
и потихоньку распространяется к востоку". В самой 
Финляндии собирают деньги "в пользу русских карелов". 
Но кроме этого, утверждает автор, "финляндцы хотят 
переселять в Карелию финнов из западной и центральной 
Финляндии". Противостоять пропаганде намеревается 
недавно образованное "Карельское братство".  
Его цель – читаем в другой заметке – "сознательное 
усвоение православной веры" карелами. "Если мы 
пройдем теперь мимо них (карелов), то финны возьмут на 
себя роль самарянина и окажутся "ближними" карелам 
более, чем мы", – говорит архиепископ на открытии 
съезда. – "Братство имеет целью… показать, что Россия 
им мать, которая любит карелов как своих и никому не 
даст отторгнуть их от своей груди (KG07 13.02.2008).” 
C) Меня скоро можно будет обвинить в непатриотичных, 
профинляндских настроениях. Но я не нарочно. 
Действительно, в "ОГВ" 1908 года с постоянной 







братская Финляндия манит к себе русских карелов 
гораздо сильнее, чем Россия, которая не спешит искать с 
ними общий язык. В православных церквях карелы стоят, 
не понимая, о чем говорит батюшка, а школ не хватает. 
Отсюда и преступное соседство икон с трефовым королем 
и примитивное, губительное для лесов подсечное 
земледелие. Как будто не прошло тысячи лет со времен 
Киевской Руси. 
"Правда, на устройство школ понадобятся деньги, 
которыми не особенно богата наша государственная 
казна. Но ведь устраивает же наше министерство 
народного просвещения школы в Финляндии. А 
спрашивается, для чего? Финнов нам не обрусить, тем 
более их просвещать: они и без наших школ просвещены. 
Не лучше ли было эти деньги употребить на просвещение 
нашего родного темного уголка – Карелии?" 
Насчет финнов автор оказался прав – не обрусили мы их. 
Зато вот карелов русскому языку за годы советской 
власти научили. Да так, что повыбивали из их голов даже 
желание говорить по-карельски (KG27 02.07.2008).” 
In example A the historical viewpoint of the Russian authorities is 
reproduced by the contemporary Russian journalist without much modification; 
nevertheless its very reproduction narrates, in contemporary terms, an unusual 
history of Karelia.  Once again Karelians are depicted as being far from the 
influence of Russian culture; in both examples the construction of railways and 
roads is recommended to strengthen Karelia’s links with the ‘heart’ of Russia.  
Although in 1908 by using this lexical choice the authorities and journalists of 
the time hoped to, in a similar fashion to the modern examples detailed above, 
depict Olonets Karelia as part of Russia by incorporating it into the imagined 
body of which Moscow is the heart, the reproduction of this text in a modern 







between Karelia and Russia were significantly weaker than they are today, and 
highlights the competing influence of the Finns on the Karelian population.   
The links between the manner in which the Russian press of 1908 
narrated Russian and Karelian history and identity and the manner in which this 
is done today are quite striking again in example B.  Here the nefarious plans, in 
the opinion of the tsarist journalist, of the Finnish nationalists and the solutions 
offered by his contemporaries to this threat are again reproduced with little 
editorial comment by the modern journalist.  The depiction of Russia as the 
‘mother’ of the Karelians offered by the churchman of 1908 is strikingly similar 
to the manner in which the colonisation of the primitive Karelians by their 
Russian allies is represented by Karel’skaya Guberniya itself in the examples 
presented above; the Karelians are portrayed as a simple, guileless people under 
the tutelage and protection of the Russians.  This idea of the primitive nature of 
Karelian society is also reproduced in example C, in this case not only by the 
historical but also the modern journalist.  The journalist of 1908 talks of Karelia 
as a backward, unenlightened place; his modern counterpart agrees with this 
assessment not merely by quoting him but by comparing Karelia of the period to 
Kievan Rus.  Indeed as shall be seen elsewhere the idea of the Russians 
protecting the Karelians from threats from over the border is often related in 
various narratives of Karelian history.  It is also interesting to note that even in 
1908 the Karelian Russian-language press was intently following its Finnish 
counterpart in order to detect supposed ‘threats’ to Russia and Karelia. 
The tone is somewhat more ironical and sceptical in example C.  Here the 
contemporary journalist offers more comment on the text produced by his 1908 
counterpart and uses the reproduced text to make observations on the current 
state of the Republic of Karelia.  Example C is two excerpts from one article on 
the ‘Pan-Finnic’ threat.  In his introduction to the topic the author offers critical 
comment on the problem by opining that it was unsurprising that the Finns found 
it easier to deal with the Karelians than the Russians; they actually attempted to 
understand and educate them, unlike the Russian authorities.  The author 
humorously notes that this opinion may cause him to be accused of pro-Finnish 







in proffering such an opinion, but the presentation of the comment in this manner 
does indicate perhaps the consciousness of committing a minor heresy.  Any 
appreciation of Finnish influence over and above that of the Russian community 
in Karelia or on Karelians can be seen as mildly controversial, as shall be 
explored further below.    This example is also noteworthy as it confirms that the 
author in discussing this issue is talking from a Russian perspective to Russian 
interlocutors: he or she depicts the Russians as the ‘we’ group which fails to 
russify the Finns.  In both examples the success of Tsarist regime in actually 
dealing with the ‘problem’ of Russification is viewed with some scepticism; in 
fact it is explicitly stated that it was the Soviet period which thoroughly Russified 
the Karelians. 
In all of the above examples a history of the Karelian people is narrated 
in which their exposure to Russian influence is diminished if not denied 
altogether.  Karelia is constructed as a territory on the periphery of Tsarist 
Russia, subject to the competing influence of Finland.  In these narratives the 
Karelians are depicted as an unsophisticated, colonised people subject to the 
opposing influences of two more developed nations.  Karelia itself as a territory 
is depicted as almost a ‘new world’ for Russian settlers, inhabited by an 
underdeveloped set of natives.  The Russification of this native population is 
generally depicted in either neutral or positive terms; the labours of the 
schoolteachers of the period to teach the inhabitants Russian are often depicted 
as heroic struggles in these narratives and the teachers themselves lauded.  Only 
in example C was any negative assessment of this process detectable from a 
Russian contributor in the entire corpus of data; even then it must be noted that 
the idea of the Soviets having повыбивали из их голов даже желание говорить 
по-карельскии is probably intended to be somewhat humorous.  It must be noted 
that these narratives are produced by Russian journalists for a predominantly if 
not exclusively Russian audience.  Although it is not possible to extrapolate from 
one set of articles the idea that these narratives of Karelian history are 
widespread amongst the Russian population of the Republic of Karelia it is clear 
that they do have some currency.  They also point to the narration of the image of 







the Finns are conceived of as a threat to the unity of the Karelian and Russian 
peoples, even if the modern journalists occasionally take a somewhat sceptical 





3.6 A Town Without a Past? Disputed Territories and Forbidden 
Histories 
 
 One particular part of the modern Republic of Karelia has a particularly 
problematic past and the differing manners in which this is narrated can cause 
significant controversy.  The loss of the territories annexed by the USSR from 
Finland in 1940 and again in 1944, in particular the town of Sortavala in the 
context of the Republic of Karelia, is still the subject of some resentment in 
contemporary Finnish society.  Before 1991 the topic of the history of these 
towns was off-limits for discussion within the USSR; it is now possible for this 
subject to be openly discussed and evaluated.  Consequently attempts are now 
made to narrate the history of these areas for the purpose of either legitimising or 
delegitimising their current political status.   
 The absence of a historical narrative for the areas annexed to the KFSSR 
in 1940/44 is sometimes perpetuated in the modern discourse.  In a similar 
fashion to the manner in which the topic was dealt with in the Soviet era some 
contemporary contributors choose to limit the ‘history’ of such areas to the post-
Soviet period: 
Название Питкяранта в переводе с финского языка означает 
буквально "длинный берег". Городом Питкяранта официально стала в 1940 
году, хотя по словам Онеги Федоровны Власовой, председателя городского 
совета города в 1965-1985 годах, после войны здесь уцелело всего пять 
зданий. Долгое время люди ютились в бараках, а первые благоустроенные 







Although in the example above a Finnish derivation for the name 
Pitkyaranta is provided the town apparently has no history at all before 1940 
when the town is described as having been officially founded.  No comment 
whatsoever is made by the author about the fact that the area around Pitkyaranta 
was part of Finland prior to 1940.  In fact we are advised on the authority of a 
former chairperson of the town council that there was practically nothing there at 
all until the 1960s; in this narrative the town of Pitkyaranta is built from scratch 
and therefore the rightful property of its current inhabitants.  The Soviet period 
of comfort, as established by the благоустроенные жилые дома, is contrasted to 
the barbaric lack of development of the Finnish period. 
This strategy of omission, which simply ignores the Finnish past of the 
areas annexed in 1940 or any of the history of the area at all before that date, is 
seemingly becoming much less frequently employed since the fall of the USSR.  
In fact several articles reference the fact that the history of these areas is now 
open for discussion and debate: 
 
Недавняя, не говоря уже о глубинной, история Северного 
Приладожья и Карельского перешейка в силу причин чисто политических 
(до 1940 года эта территория входила в состав Финляндии), пожалуй, самое 
большое и самое белое пятно в истории всего Русского Севера. 
Краеведческое движение, появившееся здесь в начале 60-х годов теперь 
уже прошлого ХХ века, постепенно, со срывами, но начало заполнять эту 
брешь фактами, что и по-человечески необходимо ("На какой же земле я 
живу?"), и исторически оправданно (с ХIII века до 1918 года, со столетним 
шведским перерывом в ХVII-ХVIII веках эта территория была 
естественной частью Руси - Московии - России) (K96 01.09.2001).” 
The above example acknowledges that in the relatively recent it was 
almost forbidden to discuss the history of those areas annexed to the KFSSR in 
1940.  Clearly this tendency appears to be disappearing and the problem of the 
history of the area is now being freely debated.  The opening up of the topic is 







ownership of the area but to justify its inclusion in a solely Russian sphere.  It is 
through the renewed study of the history of the area, the author claims, that it is 
possible to justify the inclusion of the area within a Russian state.  The Finnish 
claim to the territory is mentioned only in passing and in parentheses, whilst the 
history of the area is included in that of the ‘Russian North’; the absence of 
discussion of its history is depicted not as the absence of a ‘Finnish’ history but 
as a gap in Russian history.  The author then claims that despite a number of 
intervals the area was an integral part of Russia from the 13
th 
Century through to 
1918; in this manner the current inclusion of the territory in Russia is depicted as 
being wholly justified. 
 The manner in which newspapers in the then Olonets Guberniya were 
aware of and responded to texts published in the Finnish press has already been 
observed above.  It is therefore unsurprising that their modern equivalents in the 
Republic of Karelia and Finland are similarly engaged in the selection and 
reproduction of texts across the border and the consequent reproduction and 
refutation of narratives of Karelian history and identity.  Any perceived assertion 
in the Finnish media or society in general that runs counter to the accepted 
narratives of Karelian, Soviet and Russian history is vigorously countered by the 
Russian-language press in the Republic of Karelia. The issue which is most often 
the subject of this international intertextuality is that of the territories ceded to 
the USSR in 1940.  The demands of certain sectors of Finnish society for the 
restoration, as they would term it, of these areas are seen as unwarranted 
provocation by the Russian media.  The inclusion of these territories within the 
Russian Federation is seen as justified either by the victory over the forces of 
fascism gained in the Great Patriotic War, or by the narration of a history of 
these areas which places them firmly in the historical boundaries of Russia.  As 
has been seen from the example above it is possible to narrate a history of 
Sortavala and the other areas in question which excludes all but the most 
minimal Finnish influence.  Demands for the return of ‘Karelia’, as they are 
generally portrayed, are often interpreted as meaning the ceding of all of the 







the term ‘Karelia’ causes confusion within the discourse.  The examples below 
illustrate certain aspects of the discussion on this matter:  
A) Финские реваншисты требуют от России и "утраченные 
территории", и деньги на их восстановление  
Недавнее издание в Финляндии книги Вейкко Сакси "Возвращение 
Карелии" ("Karjalan palautus") раскручивает очередной виток 
общественной дискуссии о добровольном возврате Россией тех 
земель, которые отошли к СССР по итогам Зимней советско-
финской войны 1939-1940 годов и последовавшей затем Великой 
Отечественной. Прежде всего речь идет о части Карельского 
перешейка и Северном Приладожье, входящем сейчас в состав 
российской Республики Карелия. Потому эта тема и поднимается 
под кодовым названием "Карельский вопрос". 
Спонсором издания выступила известная общественная организация 
"Про Карелия" ("Pro Karelia"), настойчиво придерживающаяся 
реваншистских позиций. Теперь ее идеологи требуют возврата уже 
не только "утраченных территорий", но и полной суммы 
контрибуции, которую Финляндия вынуждена была выплатить 
Советскому Союзу после Второй мировой. Напомним, что в 1941-
1944 годах финские войска в тесном союзе с немецкими фашистами 
вели активные боевые действия против Красной Армии, дошли до 
Свири, Онежского озера и линии Кировской железной дороги, 
оккупировав большую часть Советской Карелии и создав на ней сеть 
своих концентрационных лагерей, замкнули кольцо блокады 
Ленинграда на севере и вышли из войны только после принятого 
СССР своевременного предложения финляндского правительства о 
перемирии. Потерпевший поражение агрессор без возражений 
заплатил тогда наложенную на него контрибуцию и подписал в 1947 
году условия Парижского мирного договора, в том числе 







Нелепая идея возложить на Россию материальную ответственность 
за оккупационную политику собственной страны, игравшей роль 
германского сателлита, запущена в начале марта на обсуждение 
широкой общественности через трибуну общенациональной 
финской газеты "Хельсингин Саномат". Вейкко Сакси скрупулезно 
подсчитал, что в современном исчислении Россия должна выплатить 
Суоми в порядке возврата контрибуции 4 млрд евро, а за все потери 
финляндской экономики в войне компенсировать ей не менее 30 
млрд евро. 
Любопытно, что примерно в такую сумму оценивается размер 
инвестиций, которые потребовалось бы вложить в восстановление и 
поднятие до европейского уровня тех самых "возвращенных 
территорий", которые ловкие реваншисты уже готовы делить между 
желающими переселенцами как шкуру неубитого медведя. Такого 
безумного коленца в мировой истории, пожалуй, еще никто не 
выкидывал. Получается вроде того: отдай свое да еще и заплати за 
чужой разбой. 
По словам главы Лахденпохского района Михаила Максимова, к 
посещающим Северное Приладожье финнам там "относятся очень 
дружелюбно, но напоминают им, что изначально территория 
древней Карелии была под властью Новгорода". 
- С XII века люди в этих местах платили налоги Новгороду и были 
под его защитой. В XVII веке Карелию захватила Швеция, и 
православные карелы ушли за Ладогу и в Тверскую землю. Это была 
гуманитарная катастрофа. Территория от Выборга до Сортавалы - 
это земля карелов. Нынешний Приозерск, который при шведах 
назывался Кексгольм, - это Корела, столица древней Карелии, город, 
который вместе построили русские и карелы, - подчеркнул М. 
Максимов (K29 22.03.2005).” 
B) Но подлинным открытием для участников конференции стала 







финский социолог Йохан Бэкман. По его мнению, государственные 
органы соседней страны навязывают населению мысль о том, что 
русские люди генетически неполноценные, они не имеют права 
жить на территории, когда-то принадлежавшей Финляндии. Как 
утверждает социолог, официальные лица считают, что через 20 лет 
Россия распадется на 10-40 государств, следовательно, Финляндия 
должна поучаствовать в перекраивании государственных границ 
(KG12 20.03.2002).” 
 
C) В одном из прошлых номеров мы обещали опубликовать 
высказывания финского социолога Йохана Бэкмана о 
реваншистских настроениях в Финляндии. Однако интервью 
оказалось настолько "горячим", что редакция попросила карельского 
журналиста Андрея Лося, имеющего хорошие связи в соседней 
стране, прокомментировать сказанное. 
Когда на недавнем военно-историческом сборе в Суоярви свое 
мнение по проблемам современных российско-финляндских 
отношений высказывал некто Йохан Бэкман, то присутствовавшим 
там его соотечественникам было крайне неудобно. Один из финнов 
потом рассказывал, что просто не знал, смеяться ему или плакать, 
слушая откровения Бэкмана, и боролся с желанием по возвращении 
домой позвонить в службу госбезопасности (SUPO), чтобы 
рассказать про странного социолога-политолога, который, чего 
доброго, перессорит два соседних государства. 
Эхо речей этого господина находим и в финской прессе: в прошлый 
вторник в газете "Карьялайнен", издающейся в Йоэнсуу, было 
опубликовано мнение Каарло Нюгрена, одного из участников 
суоярвского сбора, который сказал, что выступление Бэкмана 








Впрочем, бывали случаи, когда некоторые известные финские 
политики пытались использовать "карельскую карту" в своих 
тактических целях в ходе предвыборных кампаний. Что же касается 
настоящих, радикальных реваншистских настроений, то, конечно, 
есть в Финляндии публика, впрочем, достаточно немногочисленная, 
для кого такие настроения являются нормой жизни — достаточно 
вспомнить такого одиозного персонажа, как Сеппо Лехто и его 
организацию "Suur Suomi". Есть и организация под названием 
"ПроКарелия", которая упоминается в интервью Бэкмана. На 
Интернет-сайте этой организации опубликованы многочисленные 
материалы, в которых приграничные территории Карелии не 
называются иначе, как временно оккупированные Россией, которые 
необходимо вернуть. 
Но какая часть населения Финляндии готова подписаться под 
такими формулировками? 5 процентов? 10 процентов? (KG15 
10.04.2002).” 
D) Михаил Гольденберг, историк, директор Государственного 
краеведческого музея РК: 
— Любую территорию можно сделать спорной. Даже за Арктику 
уже спорят. Надо измерять любую территориальную проблему 
сегодняшними законами. Разговоры о всякой исконности – это 
сложные разговоры. Что такое "исконно русская" или "исконно 
финская" земля – большой вопрос. Великий российский историк 
Ключевский сказал: "Россия – страна, которая сама себя 
колонизует". Россия состоит из территорий, которые завоеваны и 
присоединены. Даже Новгород и Псков были присоединены силой. 
Начни заниматься этими паззлами — и весь рисунок рассыплется. 
Не думаю, что Ельцин думал о продаже части Карелии. Все-таки в 
его команде были вполне вменяемые люди (KG36 05.09.2007).” 
In the examples above the manner in which the Karelian press follows its 







demonstrates that Finnish voices, albeit those selected by the editorial staff, are 
quoted indirectly on occasion.  The activities of those Finnish organisations and 
individuals, in particular ProKarelia, which advocate reclaiming the territories 
lost in 1940 are reported on in some detail.  These individuals and organisations 
are consistently described as ‘revanchist’ in the Russian language press of the 
Republic of Karelia.  Often these demands are presented as a genuine threat to 
Russia and the Republic of Karelia, necessitating their refutation by other 
Finnish contributors the Karelian media has selected or the expert opinion of 
other Russian contributors.  In example B the Finns are depicted as seeking to 
‘regain’ Karelia following a complete collapse of Russia into dozens of separate 
states; example D quotes a Karelian academic similarly presenting the collapse 
of Russia ensuing from the removal of one part of the whole.  Not infrequently 
suspicion is directed towards the Finnish state itself: 
Однако российские эксперты уверены: появление подобной карты – 
это не что иное, как попытка выдать желаемое за действительное (KG35 
29.08.2009).  
In the article from which the above excerpt is taken the use of a pre-1940 
map of Finland on the website of the Finnish Land Survey is implied to be 
evidence, as attested by unnamed experts, that the Finnish authorities themselves 
harbour designs on Karelia.  Occasionally these claims are merely seen as 
somewhat insulting, as in example A where a strategy of criminalisation is 
deployed in order to characterise these claims as amounting to “отдай свое да 
еще и заплати за чужой разбой.”  The claims are generally presented as invalid 
through a number of strategies which relate the history of these areas in a manner 
which undermines or minimises their validity. 
The contemporary Finns who are depicted as demanding the ‘return’ of 
Karelia are often constructed in the discourse as being something close to 
fascists; there is an opinion that the territory gained in the wars of the 1940s was 
gained by fighting fascism and those who represent its annexation as unfair are 
depicted as being the ‘heirs’ of the fascists of the last century.  In example B for 







quoted as having pronounced the Slavic population of Russia ‘genetically 
inferior’ in language reminiscent of fascist rhetoric.  Organisations like 
ProKarelia are described as ‘radical’ as well as revanchist and generally 
portrayed as being on or beyond the margins of acceptable politics.  Indeed those 
Finns who are directly quoted by the paper generally also seek to depict those 
Finns interested in the return of the annexed territories in an unfavourable light.  
Example C appeals to the authority not of a Finn but of a ‘Karelian journalist’ 
(hence the actually ethnicity is unclear) to relay the opinions of more 
‘reasonable’ Finns who disagree with the idea of reoccupying these lands.  The 
journalist even informs us that one Finn was so disgusted with the ‘provocative’ 
rhetoric of the revanchist speaker that he was tempted to report him to the 
Finnish security services.  The article concludes by posing a rhetorical question, 
using the topos of small numbers, which diminishes the importance of revanchist 
ideas in modern Finland: 
Но какая часть населения Финляндии готова подписаться под 
такими формулировками? 5 процентов? 10 процентов? (KG15 10.04.2002). 
In these excerpts we can clearly see how there is a clear awareness within 
the Russian Republic of Karelia of ‘revanchist’ ideas expressed within modern 
Finnish society.  The groups which have adopted such ideas are clearly 
constructed as threatening the peaceful coexistence of the Russian and Finnish 
nations; both more moderate Finnish contributors, selected as they are by the 
newspapers, and the Karelian papers themselves through their editorial voice do 
however generally depict such groups as being on an extreme fringe of general 
Finnish society.    
As stated above the idea of ‘returning Karelia’ to the Finns, as expressed 
in certain parts of Finnish society, is often interpreted or represented in the 
Republic of Karelia as meaning the entire area rather than just the areas annexed 
after 1940.  The Finns are occasionally presented as demanding “карельские 
земли, некогда принадлежащие Финляндии (KG2 13.01.2010)”.  Examples B 
and D do state that the Finns are demanding the return of territories once held by 







ways at the expense of Russia.  Even where the discussion is expressly limited to 
the annexed territories the idea that these areas rightfully belong to Finland is 
generally refuted.  The first manner in which this is achieved is related to the 
characterisation of the revanchist organisations themselves; the annexation of the 
territories is narrated as the rightful consequence of the war against fascism.  In 
example A the author does initially relate the annexation of the areas as being 
partially a result of the 1939-40 Winter War; the conflict is however linked in the 
same sentence to the 1941-45 Great Patriotic War as well.  The author uses 
‘напомним’ to appeal to the ‘common knowledge’ of his addressees that Finland 
took part in the Great Patriotic War в тесном союзе с немецкими фашистами.  
Finland is narrated as having taking part in blockading Leningrad, established 
concentration camps and in general as having behaved as a German ‘satellite’.  
The actions of the Finns during 1941-44 are portrayed as those of a fascist 
aggressor or at the very least aggression in support of fascism.  In this manner 
the annexation of the territories in question from Finland and the related 
compensation the Finns paid to the USSR is justified by the author; the Finns are 
depicted as having been allied to and just as culpable as Nazi Germany.  By 
associating the Finns with the Germans, even to the extent of laying the blame 
for concentration camps and the brutal blockade of Leningrad on their shoulders, 
the author depicts them as part of the evils of fascism heroically defeated by the 
USSR in 1941-45.  The implication clearly is that the annexation is a result of 
this victory, and the consequences of such a great victory over a fascist invader 
cannot be questioned.  Although the Winter War is mentioned initially we are not 
them given any further details; it is the Finns who are described as the 
aggressors, and it is the aggressors, we must assume, who should pay the price 
for their actions. 
Another strategy we have already seen deployed above in the discussion 
around these areas is to depict them as having always been part of Russian 
territory.  Sortavala and its surrounding area are often depicted as having been 
Russian or part of some sort of Russian state for almost all of their recorded 
history; by narrating a history of the area in which Russians or their allies were 







Finnish claims undermined.  In example E for instance the question of where 
exactly the original boundary lies between Russian and Finnish settlement lies is 
stated in a deliberately ambiguous fashion by the expert quoted; the reader is 
therefore invited to draw their own conclusions as they see fit, especially as, the 
expert assures us, Russian lands have always been united by force in any case.  
Example A reproduces another narrative we have already encountered of the 
Karelian Isthmus having historically part of a Russian state.  In this example the 
local politician is quoted as ‘reminding’ his Finnish friends that the territory in 
question, conceived of here as part of ‘ancient Karelia’ has been part of a 
Russian state изначально.  Indeed the annexation of the area to the Swedish 
authorities, the forerunners of the modern Finnish authorities, in the 17
th
 century 
is narrated as a гуманитарная катастрофа.  The occupation that is depicted in 
this narrative as unjust is that of the Swedes and Finns from the 17
th
 century until 
1940; the territory remains, in the politician’s view, part of the original territory 
of the Karelian people rather than the Finns.  As the Karelians are always linked 
with the Russians of Novgorod, down to the Russians also taking part in 
constructing the capital of ancient Karelia, the events of 1940-44 are imagined 
more as the rightful owners taking back their own historical homeland from 
Finnish occupation than as forceful annexation of foreign territories.   
Occasionally however there are glimpses of an alternate, somewhat 
heretical narrative that views these areas as being part of Finland or Finnish 
territories rather than Russian or Karelian.  The annexed territories are 
infrequently described as being ‘Finnish’ or at least less ‘Russian’ than the 
remainder of Karelia; a narrative interesting in itself for highlighting the manner 
in which the remainder of Karelia is considered to be a ‘Russian’ territory.  It 
would seem that for some Russian contributors at least these districts, annexed 
after 1940, are the only areas of Karelia they feel are not part of an integral 
Russian territory.  It would also appear that the ‘Finnish’ nature or heritage of 
these areas is often narrated for a very specific purpose; to contrast the apparent 
neglect of these areas by their current Russian caretakers compared to that of the 
previous Finnish occupants   The manner in which this status is conveyed is 







Загадочная все-таки Сортавала. Город-легенда. Город, который 
упрямо, по инерции, считается самым нерусским из карельских городов. 
Старая финская архитектура, фантастические ладожские красоты. Плюс к 
этому город долгое время был закрытым, что прибавляло ему загадочности 
и мифологичности... Оказавшись здесь, задаешься единственным вопросом: 
какой же степенью варварства надо обладать, чтобы так изничтожить 
данную природой и отобранную у финнов красоту? (KG43 22.10.2003). 
The author describes Sortavala as the ‘least Russian’ of all Karelian 
towns.  Given that in fact more than 80% of the residents of Sortavala and its 
district are Russians in terms of ethnicity the town is actually one of the most 
Russian towns in the Republic of Karelia.  Only 3.2% and 1.2% of the population 
of the area are Karelian or Finnish respectively.  The author clearly does not have 
the contemporary national composition of Sortavala’s inhabitants in mind when 
he describes the town as lacking in Russian character.  It appears in fact it is the 
town’s Finnish past, as represented by its architecture, that the author feels gives 
Sortavala the status of being the ‘least Russian’ part of Karelia.  Moreover this 
Finnish past is being highlighted to convey a particular political point; the author 
clearly feels that the potential or past beauty is being squandered by the current 
authorities.  The use of ‘отобрать’ to describe the manner in which the town was 
gained by its current owners is also useful as it hints at a narrative of the 
annexation of the area which, somewhat heretically, considers its seizure 
unjustified.  The main purpose of the author, it would seem, by intimating that 
the town may not rightfully be Russian is to shame the current authorities into 
doing more to regenerate the area by restoring its former beauty.   
Using the idea of Sortavala being by right a part of Finland for political 
purposes is occasionally expressed in even more radical terms.  Although not 
directly advocated in the media, some more ‘extreme’ narratives of the status of 
Sortavala and Lakhdenpokh’ya in particular are certainly present in the Republic 
of Karelia and are reproduced at least partially in the Russian-language press.  In 
2010 a series of failures of the communal heating systems in both towns, 
alongside other perceived failures of the local authorities, led to the distribution 







these leaflets was quickly investigated by the FSB on the grounds of their 
‘inciting extremism’ indicating that as far as the authorities are concerned such 
statements are heretical to the point of illegality.  Karel’skaya Guberniya, while 
not openly advocating such a step or indeed openly supporting the right of the 
unknown individual to produce such a text did narrate these events in a 
sympathetic light:    
В замерзающих карельских городах Сортавала и Лахденпохья 
появились листовки с призывами присоединиться к Финляндии. Может, 
хоть геополитическая угроза заставит карельскую власть услышать 
мерзнущих людей? (KG5 03.02.2010) 
Evidently it extreme circumstances the idea of these areas being 
rightfully part of Finland can be and is used to coerce the local authorities to take 
action over the perceived inadequacies of the current inhabitants situation.  
Interestingly the above article appeared in Karel’skaya Guberniya only two 
issues after another piece decrying the continued threat of Finnish revanchism. 
Clearly whilst the paper tends to conform to the orthodox position of the areas in 
question as rightfully Russian it is not above using the ‘геополитическая 
угроза’ as a topos of threat with which to cajole the local authorities into action 
over perceived problems. Nevertheless the use of such narratives which consider 
these areas to be rightfully Finnish rather than Russian remains taboo; the main 
presentation of the idea of such areas belonging to Finland is as an impermissible 
heresy.   
The idea that the Finns at least consider Karelia as a whole to be 
rightfully part of Finland is also encountered within the Russian language media.  
As the below excerpt demonstrates Finns interviewed within the Russian 
language press are often assumed to hold somewhat ‘pan-Finnish’ opinions: 
– Скажите – в этом вопросе нет никакой политики: а нет ли у вас 
внутреннего ощущения, что Карелия – это не Россия, а что-то вроде 







– Нет!.. В Финляндии не поддерживают эту точку зрения! – почти 
что хором отвечают актеры. – Все знают, где проходит граница.  
– Приятно, что кое-где можно услышать финскую речь, что многие 
названия написаны на финском. Но как Финляндию мы это не 
воспринимаем. Это все-таки Россия, – говорит Пану. 
– К тому же Петрозаводск так далеко от границы. Может быть, 
Сортавала еще может вызывать такие ощущения… – добавляет Яакко (KG2 
09.01.2008). 
Although the Russian journalist attempts to gain a more ‘honest’ picture 
of his Finnish interlocutor’s views by assuring them that there is нет никакой 
политики in his posing the question of Karelia as a Finnish territory to them the 
Finns interviewed are presented to be inclined to carefully shy away from any 
such assertion.  Only one of them tentatively, qualifying his statement with 
может and может быть, offers an assertion that Sortavala is perhaps something 
of a Finnish town.  The other Finns are depicted as fully supporting the idea of 
Karelia as part of Russia, stating it is common knowledge где проходит 
граница.  Nevertheless despite the article representing the status quo as being 
accepted almost without question by the Finns the fact that the question was 
posed to them and the article reproduced in the paper at all denotes a certain 
continued suspicion towards Finland on the part of the Russian-language media.  
Undoubtedly whilst Finland is generally perceived in positive terms some 
lingering misgivings remain over their attitude towards not only the territories 
annexed in 1940 but Karelia as a whole. 
3.7 Heretical Narratives?  Karelia Without the Karelians 
 
 The claim of the Karelians to being the indigenous national group within 
the modern Republic of Karelia is occasionally questioned in the discourse.  As 
has been seen above the Karelians are very often marginalised and the validity of 
their culture and identity questioned or diminished in the Russian-language press.  
This can be pursued to the extent of attempting to deny their claim to being the 







Karelia at all.  This is important politically as has been noted above as the status 
of titular minority grants the Karelians, at least in theory, certain definite rights 
from the authorities.  An example already quoted above shows how their claim to 
be indigenous and therefore their political rights is linked: 
 Атмосфера постепенно накалялась и, наконец, взорвалась, когда 
слово взял лидер карельской организации ЛДПР Михаил Максимов, 
который является одним из главных инициаторов отклонения поправки о 
статусе карельского языка. Он обвинил карел в том, что они не знают своей 
истории, а именно того, что их предки, как утверждает М. Максимов, 
появились в Карелии всего 350 лет назад, а значит, карелы не имеют права 
называться "титульной" нацией со всеми вытекающими для статуса 
карельского языка последствиями. (K 49 04.05.2001). 
 In this example the idea of the Karelians as indigenous to the modern 
republic is explicitly denied together with the associated political rights of such 
status.  The LDPR politician quoted here attempts to delegitimise the idea of 
political rights for the Karelian minority by asserting the ‘real’ history of the 
area, as opposed to that propounded by the Karelians themselves, is that the 
minority has resided in the area for only a few centuries.  By attacking the 
narrative of continuity of Karelian residence in the area the politician puts 
forward an apparently heretical, to his Karelian audience at least, construction of 
the Republic of Karelia.  This particular historical narrative is exceedingly rare; it 
would appear that it is considered to be ‘heretical’ by at least the majority of 
those authorised to contribute to mass media discourse.  It is possible to deny the 
‘Karelian’ nature of the area in other, somewhat more subtle ways, however, 
without explicitly denying the Karelian claim to being the original or indigenous 
inhabitants of the area.  The history of parts of Karelia can be narrated as the 
history of constituent parts of the greater Russian political world.  In this 
narrative the idea of Karelia as being in any way different from the remainder of 
Russia is denied simply through it not being mentioned.  This is a much more 
common strategy within the corpus of data studied.  A good example of this 







  Кемь — город особый. Он даже внесен в реестр исторических 
городов России наряду с Петрозаводском, Олонцом, Сортавалой и 
красавцем Пудожем. Ровно 220 лет назад тогдашний губернатор Олонецкой 
губернии старик Державин Кемь заметил и в свойственной для себя манере, 
в гроб сходя, благословил. В смысле, по всемилостивейшему повелению 
императрицы всея Руси матушки Екатерины II объявил Кемский острог 
уездным городом. Нынче в честь этого знаменательного события 
Центробанк даже выпустил юбилейную десятирублевую монетину с 
изображением Кеми и надписью "Древнейшие города России. 
Вообще же о Кемском поселении известно уже лет 600 (KG11 
10.03.2005). 
 In the above description of the town of Kem’ no indication is given of the 
fact that the town of Kem’ itself or the remaining four towns listed are within 
Karelia.  In fact all five, we are informed, are listed as being внесен в реестр 
исторических городов России.  Kem’ is furthermore associated with the 
Russian poet Derzhavin and Catherine the Great by the author, and we are 
reminded of the fact it appears as an ‘ancient’ town of Russia on ten ruble coins.  
The description of the ‘Russian-ness’ of Kem’ is almost hyperbolic; the fact 
Kem’ can be listed amongst the ancient towns of Russia is stated twice within 
one paragraph.  By narrating a history of the town which excludes the use of any 
reference to Karelia and locates the history of Kem’ as being that of part of 
Russia exclusively the area is firmly associated with Russian rather than Karelian 
identity.  The article in fact goes further by associating Petrozavodsk, Olonets, 
Sortavala and Pudozh all with this idea of ancient Russia; all four are listed as 
being ancient Russian settlements or at least settlements ‘of Russia’ without any 
indication that they were ever at any time not inhabited by Russians.  In the case 
of Sortavala it is included as an ancient Russian town despite not having been 
part of the RSFSR until 1956.  This example is typical of narratives which 
incorporate the area into Russia as a whole by referring exclusively to the 
Russian aspects of its past.  This narrative uses a strategy of avoidance to 
suppress the subnational differences evident in Karelia in favour of a unifying, 








3.8 A Common ‘Spirituality’ and a Common Past: Orthodoxy and Karelia 
 
 The idea of Karelia and the Karelians themselves as sharing in the 
common religious and historical traditions of the Russian Orthodox Church is 
one of the most important historical narratives found in the discourse on history 
and identity in the modern Republic of Karelia.  By emphasising the shared 
religious traditions of the Karelian and Russian people it is possible to emphasise 
their shared past and associate the idea of being ‘Karelian’ with aspects of 
Russian identity.  By being portrayed as steeped in the religious traditions of 
their Russian brethren the Karelians can be constructed in this narrative as being 
the natural allies of the Russian people in contrast to the Lutheran Finns.  As 
shall be examined further below this religious opposition can also be invoked in 
the construction of the image of the ‘other’ and the construction of a ‘we’ group 
that includes both Karelian and Russian in opposition to those of another faith.  
The association of Karelian and Russian can also be achieved through a strategy 
of perpetuation which emphasises the unbroken unity, in religious terms, of the 
Karelian and Russian peoples in the Orthodox faith.  In fact a strategy of positive 
self-presentation is sometimes used to construct a picture of the Karelians as 
‘model’ Orthodox believers.  The narration of Karelia itself as an Orthodox 
territory also serves to incorporate it within the boundaries of the ‘Russian 
world’; by reciting the history of the various Orthodox monasteries and churches 
of Karelia the antiquity and tradition of the Orthodoxy of Karelia is established.  
As Orthodoxy and its history may also be constructed as one of the key markers 
of Russian identity the narration of Karelia in this fashion also connects the area 
to ideas of ‘Russian-ness’ and identifies it as a ‘genuine’ Russian territory.  This 
process is illustrated by the examples below: 
A) Христианское учение о Церкви как о единой вселенской общине 
позволяет объединять верующих вне зависимости от их 
национальной принадлежности. Это было особенно важно для 







княжества, где проживало множество финских племен (карелы, 
вепсы, водь, ижора и др.). Экспансия русской культуры и 
"русской веры" (православия) велась на территориях, заселенных 
финскими племенами. Одним из самых крупных племен была 
упоминающаяся в летописях "корела", предок сегодняшних 
карел. 
 
Древнерусские и европейские источники рассказывают о 
нескольких племенах, объединенных общим названием "корела" 
и проживавших на Карельском перешейке и северо-западном 
побережье Ладожского озера. С X - XI веков карельские земли 
попадают в зону политических, экономических и религиозных 
интересов Великого Новгорода. С этого же времени начинается 
история карельского православия, определившего в дальнейшем 
судьбу этого народа. 
 
Впервые карелы были насильно крещены посланниками 
новгородского князя Ярослава Всеволодовича в 1227 году. 
Скорее всего, первыми в православие обратили восточных карел, 
на земли которых претендовал и Великий Новгород, и Швеция. 
Карелы, жившие на западе, уже начинали устанавливать к тому 
времени вассальные отношения со шведами. Трудно судить об 
успехе православной миссии среди языческого населения, но 
первые находки археологов в карельских захоронениях 
предметов православного культа относятся уже к XIII веку. 
 
Когда Карельский перешеек стал ареной борьбы за влияние 
православной Руси и католической в то время Швеции, карелы 
сумели извлечь из своего двойственного положения некоторые 
выгоды. Православные священники более спокойно и терпимо 
относились к некоторым древним традициям финских племен, 
поэтому принятие карелами православия может объясняться и 







Толерантность православной культуры хорошо иллюстрируется 
примером из позднейшей истории: знаменитый финский 
фольклорист Элиас Леннрот (1802 - 1884), создатель "Калевалы", 
записал большую часть песен древнего эпоса у беломорских 
карел-старообрядцев. В то же время у карел, живших на западе и 
принявших сначала католицизм, а затем лютеранство, древняя 
эпическая поэзия уже не бытовала. (K28 19.03.2005). 
 
 
B) Я побывала в Кемском монастыре св. Новомучеников и 
Страстотерпцев Российских. Обители чуть более года, что по 
сравнению с 300-летней историей города одно мгновение, 
однако в нем спрессован весь опыт древней карельской земли, 
впитавшей в себя и духовную благодать Соловецкой обители, и 
кровь тысяч репрессированных. 
 
В первые десятилетия советской власти Кемь была пересыльным 
пунктом на пути репрессированных в соловецкие лагеря особого 
назначения, а в самом городе располагалось управление этими 
лагерями (УСЛОН). И доныне история не дает забыть о 
минувшем, постоянно напоминая о великом противостоянии 
богоотступников Богу. Монастырь расположился в двухэтажном 
здании бывшей гостиницы для работников НКВД "Прибой", в 
двух десятках метров от здания УСЛОН. И на таком же 
расстоянии от оскверненного ими Благовещенского храма. 
Величавую каменную церковь освятили в 1905 году. Большевики 
в первые годы своей власти попытались взорвать ее, ничего не 
вышло - храм устоял. Сняли крест и колокола, устроили здесь 
склады, но церковь терпеливо ждала своего часа. И в начале 90-х 
годов он настал. 
Вот еще городская достопримечательность - Успенский собор, 







Освятили его в 1714 году. Как памятник архитектуры он 
находится под охраной государства и до сих пор является 
музейной, а не епархиальной собственностью. Несколько лет 
назад здесь разрешили проводить богослужения, возобновилась 
приходская жизнь. 
Здесь, в трапезной собора, Гавриил Державин огласил Указ 
императрицы Екатерины II о присвоении Кеми статуса 
губернского города (K50 23.05.2002). 
 
C) <В этом году исполняется 780 лет, как карельский народ был 
крещен в Святую православную веру. Карельская земля очень 
богата своими святыми угодниками Божиими, в числе которых 
следует вспомнить преподобных Александра Свирского, Сергия 
и Германа Валаамских и многих других святых, которые своей 
богоугодной жизнью, трудами и молитвами несли Свет 
православной веры народам, населяющим карельскую землю. 
Всему миру известны такие памятники христианской культуры, 
как древний Валаамский монастырь, Соловки, Кижский 
ансамбль. 
Страшная трагедия 1917 года в корне изменила жизнь карела, 
разрушила его духовно-нравственные устои и традиции. Сама 
Православная церковь, ее священнослужители да и просто 
верующие подверглись невиданным доселе по своим 
жестокости, цинизму и масштабам гонениям. Итог - народ 
утерял свои народные обычаи, свою веру, себя потерял. 
Последствия всего этого мы видим воочию на всей территории 
нашей Карелии. 
Карельский народ утерял то, что во все времена являлось 








Но при всех этих добрых качествах народ калевальский, 
ухтинские карелы практически полностью утратили церковную, 
христианскую традиции, взамен которых часто можно встретить 
самые дикие, непонятного происхождения, суеверия, которые к 
карельской народной обрядовой культуре не имеют совершенно 
никакого отношения. 
Близость Финляндии, дружественные, а порою родственные 
отношения, сходство местного наречия с финским языком, 
помимо того что приносят большую пользу местному 
населению, таят в себе немалую опасность превратного 
понимания ухтинским карелом своего <идентитета>, своей 
национальной и культурной принадлежности. Не секрет, что на 
территории Калевальского района помимо Православной церкви 
функционируют и другие конфессии, приехавшие из Финляндии 
и Америки, которые ведут активную работу, особенно среди 
молодежи, используя для этого свою огромную материальную 
базу за границей. 
В чем опасность? В том, что вероучение протестантских, а 
порою и явно сектантских конфессий, насаждаемое ими, мягко 
говоря, не способствует правильному восприятию и пониманию 
народом христианской традиции, не несет оно и патриотического 
воспитания. 
В-четвертых, тесное сотрудничество, скорее, дружба с 
православными верующими Финляндии. Не секрет, что в 
подавляющем большинстве православные Финляндии являются 
карелами по национальности, и, что самое важное, они 
сохранили те православные традиции, которые мы, русские 
карелы, утратили (K81 26.07.2007).” 








Располагается святая обитель на юге Карелии, недалеко от 
Олонца. Без малого пятьсот лет назад пришел в эти дикие и 
безлюдные места на берег Важеозера монах-пустынник 
Геннадий. Был он учеником и сокелейником преподобного 
Александра Свирского. Вырыл себе пещеру, в которой и прожил 
один до конца своих дней. Затем сюда пришел другой ученик 
Свирского: монах Никифор. А потом у него появились 
последователи. Написали они челобитную тогдашнему царю 
Ивану Грозному с просьбой закрепить землю за святой 
обителью. Так появился Важеозерский монастырь. 
По преданию, мощи преподобных Геннадия и Никифора 
покоятся в основании одного из храмов монастыря — Всех 
Святых. И хотя во времена советской власти монастырское 
кладбище сравняли с землей, а в храмах устроили спортивный и 
кинозалы, эти мощи никто не тронул.” 
 
В 1612 году на монастырь напали литовцы, убили настоятеля и 
пожгли постройки. Все отстроили заново. В конце XIX века 
сильный пожар снова уничтожил деревянные монастырские 
строения. 
А в 20-е годы XX века он и вовсе прекратил свое существование. 
Монахов расстреляли, а на месте обители сначала два года был 
концлагерь, затем лагерь для военнопленных, а после войны — 
лагерь для детей.” 
 
Работают в монастыре приезжие: из Молдавии, из Санкт-
Петербурга, из Москвы. Местные жители никакого участия в 
жизни обители не принимают. Год-другой ходят они в подпитии 
мимо святой обители. Увидят отца Иллариона и просят: 
"Батюшка, нам бы покреститься!" "Хорошо, но не пей хотя бы 
месяц, а потом приходи", — отвечает тот. "Ох, не могу!" — 








Example A illustrates how the shared religion of the Karelian and 
Russian peoples can be constructed as having determined the manner in which 
Karelia and Karelians became drawn into the Russian sphere of influence.  Here 
the manner in which the conversion of the Karelians was brought about is clearly 
linked to Russian interests of the time; the author is relatively unsentimental 
regarding the motives of the Russian authorities of the time for seeking to bring 
their religion to the ancestors of today’s Karelians and the methods which were 
employed.  Nevertheless the Karelians are portrayed as being under Russian 




 century and Orthodox since the 13
th
; this 
influence and that of the Orthodox Church is characterised as being benign and 
even beneficial for the Karelians themselves.  Whereas the Karelians who fell 
under Swedish influence are depicted as having lost their cultural traditions those 
who adopted Orthodoxy are able, the author relates, to retain these traditions to 
the extent of bequeathing the world the Kalevala.  Although there are hints of 
force being employed against the Karelians the author generally constructs the 
process of adoption of Orthodoxy as being to the Karelian’s advantage; in fact 
the position of the Karelians between Sweden and Russia is even described as 
‘privileged’, allowing the Karelians to profit from the tolerance offered to them 
by Russian priests.  
Example B is a selection of excerpts from a ‘special report’ in Kareliya 
on the monasteries and churches of the northern Karelian town of Kem’.  The 
link made in the article between any national group and the history of the 
monasteries is quite weak; there is merely one reference to the re-founded 
monastery having somehow incorporated something of the ‘ancient Karelian 
land’ despite its relative youth.  Nevertheless the article attempts to narrate a 
history of the town in which the ancient religious traditions of the Russian 
Orthodox faith have survived for centuries despite political repression.  One 
church in particular is described as having survived a Bolshevik attempt to 
destroy it, waiting until the collapse of the USSR for ‘its moment’.  Buildings are 
evidently incapable of waiting for anything, but the author uses this 
personification to give the impression of a territory steeped in religious tradition 







being intimately connected with the Russian Orthodox Church; even the 
declaration, by the acclaimed poet Derzhavin, of its status as a town is made in 
one of the town’s churches we are informed.  In this example the state itself is 
associated with the church in a manner which is interesting given the increasing 
connection between the Russian Orthodox Church and the current Russian 
government, with Orthodoxy assuming a role as almost a ‘state ideology’ (for the 
connections between church and state in Russian see Papkova (2011), Knox 
(2005) and Mitrokhin (2009).  
Example C is a series of excerpts from one of a regular series of articles 
in Kareliya entitled “Православие на карельской земле” which are generally 
produced either by the clergy of the local Orthodox community or by its lay 
members.  Consequently it represents a narrative in which the Orthodoxy of 
Karelia and in this example explicitly the Karelians themselves is the key marker 
of their identity.  Once again the antiquity of Russian Orthodoxy within Karelia 
and in this instance also specifically the Karelian people themselves is 
highlighted right at the start.  Furthermore the importance of this Orthodox 
culture in Karelia is demonstrated by the author by reference to the ‘world-
famous’ sites it has produced in the territory; Karelia is represented not merely as 
a part of the Orthodox world but a ‘model’ part of it.  The article then explicitly 
equates Orthodoxy with Karelian identity, identifying the loss of this faith after 
1917 with a loss of Karelian identity itself: 
народ утерял свои народные обычаи, свою веру, себя потерял. 
Последствия всего этого мы видим воочию на всей территории нашей 
Карелии (K81 26.07.2007). 
The author then appeals to the common knowledge of his addressees, 
stating they will all be able to note the negative consequences of this 
development across ‘our Karelia’; by leaving the actual consequences for the 
addressee to determine he invites his interlocutor to project whatever it actually 
is they consider to be ‘negative’ into this blank space.  The actual aspects of 
Karelian culture he finds objectionable in the period since 1917 are left unstated 







constructed as catastrophic for Karelian identity but beyond the actual loss of 
faith itself the supposedly negative connotations for the Karelian ethos are left 
undeveloped.   The article is interesting from another angle however as it once 
again narrates a history of the White Sea or Northern Karelians as being too 
closely influenced by Finnish culture and in danger of losing that which 
identifies them as intrinsically Karelian.  Evidently in this instance the clergyman 
has, as he describes, the influence of Finnish Lutherans and other denominations 
on these Karelians however it does illustrate once again the view in some 
quarters of the northern part of the Karelian nation being ‘too close’ to Finland.  
Their proximity to Finland both in geographic and linguistic terms is explicitly 
constructed as a threat to their Karelian identity by the author.  Indeed this 
influence apparently: 
не способствует правильному восприятию и пониманию народом 
христианской традиции, не несет оно и патриотического воспитания (ibid). 
The author here narrates another aspect of the ‘Finnish threat’ seen in the 
discourse on the annexed territories above; the idea that the Finnish are detaching 
at least part of the Karelian population from their true cultural traditions and faith 
and thereby detaching them from the remainder of Russia.  The only positive 
Finnish influence the author can detect is that of the Finnish Karelians who have 
retained their Russian Orthodox faith who are in fact depicted as a consequence 
as being ‘more Karelian’ than those Karelians in the Republic of Karelia who 
have moved away from Orthodoxy. 
Example D narrates a history of a particular monastery surviving despite 
the repression of the Bolsheviks to that we have seen in example B and example 
C to an extent.  Once again despite destruction and persecution the ancient 
Orthodox site, in this case we are informed dating back to the time of Ivan the 
Terrible, has survived.  As in the previous examples this does construct a picture 
of Karelia as an ancient Orthodox territory.  Unlike the previous examples 
however this article approaches the subject with a certain amount of scepticism.  
The journalist in Karel’skaya Guberniya treats the topic of the church with a 







monastery since the medieval period as claimed by the church as a genuine 
continuity to the present day.  On the other hand the destruction of the monastery 
during the Soviet period is narrated without the emotive language seen in the 
previous examples; it is related without being denoted a ‘tragedy’ as in example 
C or without being depicted as futile in the manner of example B.  In fact 
although the narrative of Orthodoxy having a long history in Karelia is 
reproduced without much alteration in this article the author does seem to have a 
somewhat sceptical view of its current manifestation in Karelia, or at least of the 
attitude of the local inhabitants towards this ‘spiritual revival’.  The inmates of 
the monastery are all denoted as приезжие, the local population are depicted as 
having nothing to do with the place whatsoever.  In this narrative although the 
historical heritage of Orthodoxy in Karelia is not doubted its modern relevance is 
questioned.   
   
 3.9 The Past and Future of the Karelian Language  
  
 The idea of continuity is a key constructive strategy for the Karelians in 
terms of their approach to the question of the Karelian language.  By 
constructing a past in which Karelian flourished demands for the future 
development of the language are advanced.  The current use of Karelian, which 
appears to be the single most important marker of Karelian identity in 
contemporary Karelian society, is often justified (although by no means 
exclusively so) by reference to the fact it was once the dominant language in the 
area.  By idealising the past of the language and harking back to a time when its 
usage was widespread demands can be made for more attention to be paid to its 
current and future development.  The history of the language is also constructed 
to a large extent as the history of the Karelian people themselves; the history of 
its suppression and later renaissance is therefore constructed as the oppression 
and rebirth of the Karelian identity itself.  As shall be examined on further detail 
below this almost ever-present connection made in the discourse on the past of 







themselves; the top-down management of the language and its negative effects is 
also seen as the management of Karelian identity.  By apparently relinquishing or 
being unable to exert any control over the development of their language the 
Karelians construct themselves as unable to control their own destiny as a nation. 
  The antiquity of the Karelian language is often part of historical 
narratives of its use, for example: 
 Если ливвиковский и людиковский диалекты сложились в начале 2 
тысячелетия н. э. в результате взаимодействия древневепсских и 
карельских этнических групп населения на Олонецкой равнине, то 
возникновение собственно карельского диалекта связывают с племенем 
корела, проживавшим в 1 - 2 тысячелетии на побережье Ладожского озера. 
Такой вот древний язык! (K122 30.10.2007). 
The idea of the continuity and antiquity of Karelian residence seen above 
in the modern Republic of Karelia is often directly linked with this continuity of 
the Karelian language: 
 Да, мы – карелы  
Спасогубская школа с 2006 года работает по утвержденному 
республиканскому базисному плану для школ, реализующих программы с 
этнокультурным компонентом.  
Старинное карельское село Спасская Губа, расположенное на берегу 
живописного озера Мунозеро, ведет свое летоисчисление с конца XVI века. 
Учить детей в селе начали с 1869 года. Сегодня можно говорить о том, что 
именно с того времени были заложены традиции школьного образования, 
которые и сегодня преумножает Спасогубская средняя школа. 
Школу вполне можно назвать национальной. Половина детей, 
которые в ней обучаются, - финны и карелы. Проведя опрос среди 
школьников и их родителей, руководство школы приняло решение дать 







их бабушки и дедушки. С 1991 года в школе начали преподавать 
карельский язык - ливвиковское наречие. 
Уже через 8 лет школа стала базовой с этнокультурным финно-
угорским компонентом образования. В школе решили, что, имея такое 
число детей, для которых карельский язык родной, они просто обязаны 
сделать все, чтобы сохранить самобытность карел, возродить их язык, 
культуру и традиции. 
Культуру невозможно сохранить, не сохраняя язык. (K 147 
27.12.2007). 
 
Here the antiquity of the ‘Old Karelian’ village of Spasskaya Guba, 
which we are informed stretches back to the end of the 16
th
 century, is invoked 
by the author in a discussion on the teaching of Karelian in the modern village 
school.  This fact is presumably thought to have some relevance to the relatively 
modern decision to teach the local children Karelian which was taken only in 
1991.  The continuity of Karelian language and therefore identity however is 
established by the idea of the language being the children’s native language, 
spoken by their ‘grandmothers and grandfathers’.  Critically it is apparently the 
ability of the children in question to learn their ‘native language’ which then 
allows them to retain their Karelian identity.  We are explicitly informed by the 
author that it is the teaching of the language which leads to the teaching of other 
aspects of Karelian culture and traditions; in fact we are advised that the culture 
cannot be saved without saving the language.  In this example clearly the history 
of the Karelian language is an important justification for its present use; however 
it is the continued usage of the language which is seen as the key to the 
continued validity of Karelian identity. 
This strategy of invoking the long history of the Karelian language in 
debates on its future prospects is further exemplified by the example below: 
Карельский язык - это живой язык, прекрасно выполняющий все 







познавательную. Если на карельском языке говорили и говорят, то 
осуществлялась и осуществляется коммуникативная функция; если имеется 
карелоязычная художественная литература, то, без сомнения, выполняется 
эстетическая функция; если есть карелоязычные издания, значит, есть и 
читатели (кстати, литература на карельском языке на полках книжных 
магазинов не залеживается), а стало быть, реализуется познавательная 
функция. 
Корни карельского языка уходят в глубь веков. На нем издревле не 
только говорили, но и писали. Здесь не предполагается изложение истории 
карелоязычной литературы, насчитывающей столетия, упомянем в качестве 
примера лишь некоторые факты. Из древних письменных памятников на 
финно-угорских языках вторыми по древности (после венгерских) 
являются карелоязычные тексты; молитва "Отче наш" на карельском языке 
была опубликована в 1544 году; карельский язык присутствует среди 272 
языков, представленных в "Сравнительном словаре всех языков и наречий" 
под редакцией П. Палласа, изданном в XVIII в. по указанию Екатерины II; в 
течение веков выходила в свет карелоязычная литература (K 15 10.02.2001). 
In the continuation of the article from which this sample is taken the 
author goes on to plead for further support for the Karelian language and its 
development.  To appreciate the usage of this strategy it is as ever necessary to 
appreciate the context in which the text is placed.  There is a view in some 
quarters that the Karelian language is inadequately developed and/or old-
fashioned and incapable of fulfilling the role of a modern literary language.  By 
detailing the extensive history of the Karelian language, in particular its literary 
form, the author clearly hopes to counter arguments which might claim the 
Karelian language was underdeveloped and incapable of fulfilling the functions 
of a modern language.    
The impact of changing political priorities on the development of the 
Karelian language is often cited in discussion on its history and current status: 
A) Проблема карельского языка существовала с времени создания 







было положено в 1937-1940 годах, когда было запрещено 
использование финского языка и еще 96% карелов говорили на 
родном языке. Этот процесс был прерван, и не потому, что плох 
был язык, а в связи с созданием Карело-Финской ССCР.  
 
1 сентября 1940 года детям карелов вновь стали преподавать все 
предметы на финском. Массовые репрессии, оккупация и 
эвакуация, <закрытие> деревень, завоз из других регионов 
рабочих для вырубки лесов и запрет использования карельского 
языка привели к необузданной ассимиляции, сокращению 
численности карелов в республике со 109 тыс. (1933 год) до 79 
тыс. (1989 год), из которых владели родным языком лишь 51,1%. 
Сохранение языка переросло в проблему существования народа.  
В то же время продолжает угрожающе ухудшаться 
демографическая ситуация. С 1989 по 2002 год численность 
карелов в России сократилась со 125 до 93 тыс. человек, то есть 
на 25%, из них в Карелии с 78,9 до 65,6 тыс. человек, на 18%. 
Близится черта, за которой процесс ассимиляции примет 
необратимый характер. Лишь менее половины карелов знает 
свой язык. При темпах сокращения численности 2 - 2,5 тыс. 
человек в год - легко подсчитать, когда последний карел уйдет в 
небытие. Уже через 5 - 6 лет нас в республике останется менее 50 
тыс., мы в соответствии с законом РФ пополним ряды 
малочисленных (читай: исчезающих) народов. 
 
Сможем ли мы сделать из сложившейся ситуации 
безотлагательные выводы? 
 
Сейчас многое зависит и от самих карелов, и от позиции 
избранных и назначенных властей, ученых, писателей, учителей, 







поддержки со стороны всех братских народов, живущих вместе с 
нами на карельской земле. (K 36 06.04.2006). 
 
B) В силу исторических обстоятельств в 20-е годы карельский язык 
не был допущен на историческую арену. Многие десятилетия 
деятели разного рода упорно доказывали, что карельский язык не 
имеет права культурного развития. Его считали неспособным 
адекватно отражать сложные политические, экономические, 
научные явления. Преданный забвению, он все же выжил сам и 
помог выжить народу в дни тяжких испытаний, сомнений, 
господства полуправды. 
 
Как известно, в предыдущем десятилетии в соответствии с 
традицией в использовании карельского языка в республике 
сложилась практика применения двух диалектов -- 
ливвиковского и собственно карельского, поскольку, по данным 
переписи населения 1989 года, из 79 тысяч карелов, 
проживающих в республике, более 40 тысяч - это ливвики, около 
30 тысяч - собственно карелы, 5-6 тысяч - людики. 
 
Когда карельский народ в конце 80-х- начале 90-х годов снова 
осознал себя равным среди других народов, он, как налипшую 
грязь, стряхнул с себя ложь о недееспособности своего языка, 
который некоторые "деятели" недавнего прошлого называли 
"языком-уродцем", "кухонным" языком и т.д. (K 94 28.04.2001). 
 
C) Книгопечатание на карельском языке прекращается в России в 
связи с событиями первой мировой войны. Не возобновилось оно 
и после Октябрьской революции, а начиная с 20-х годов судьбу 
карельского языка и карельской национальной культуры решал 
уже не здравый ум и смысл, а политика. Правда, в 30-е годы ХХ 







исторической справедливости относительно карельского народа, 
но она потерпела неудачу. (K 16 10.02.2001). 
 
 In example A from Kareliya the starting point for discussion of the 
‘problem’ of the Karelian language is selected as the 1920 formation of the KTK.  
Once again this point appears to have been selected as the ‘beginning’ of 
Karelian history by the author of the article, who appears in this instance to be a 
Karelian (from his appeal to the “fraternal peoples living together with us on the 
Karelian land”).  The author is careful not to determine the agency at work 
behind the problems of the Karelian people during the Soviet period.  The actual 
authority behind the various decisions or lack thereof taken on the Karelian 
language and the responsibility for the repressions and subsequent decline in the 
Karelian population is not identified at any point either in this article nor the 
other two examples.  It is possible this is due to self-censorship on the part of the 
authors who wish to gloss over this troublesome period in Karelian and Soviet 
history.  It is clear, however, that the Karelians are constructed in all the 
examples as passive victims of the process, with decisions on their future taken 
by some distant and unclear agent without regard for the negative consequences 
for the Karelian population.  As a result of these decisions the Karelian 
population declined and continues to diminish; the author clearly locates the 
cause of this decline in the incorrect language policies of the Soviet period.  
From a position of strength, with 96% of the population speaking Karelian, these 
policies place the language and therefore ethnos itself, in the view of the author, 
on the verge of extinction.  Thus a strategy of discontinuation is used which 
highlights the negative historical trajectory of the Karelian language; this is 
linked to a strategy of shifting the blame for this change from the Karelians 
themselves to the unnamed authorities, thus creating a topos of persecution and 
neglect of the language.  This is used by the author to attempt to demand more 
action to right these historical wrongs.  
 Example B is from the speech delivered by Tatyana Kleerova to the 
Congress of Karelians quoted earlier.  As an address to a Karelian audience it is 







history of their language and the manner in which the consequent narration is 
used in the discourse.  Here once again the Karelian language, and consequently 
the Karelian nation itself, are portrayed as the victim of circumstances beyond its 
control.  Again the agency behind the persecution of the language is left 
unstated; beyond a vague attribution of these actions to деятели разного рода 
the mechanism by which this process was allowed to occur is not described.  In 
contrast the rebirth of the Karelian language is described as a reawakening of the 
Karelian people themselves; their inferior status is suddenly found to be a lie and 
they assert themselves равным среди других народов.  It is unstated again 
which nationalities had been exercising a superiority over the Karelians during 
this period, although the audience is clearly expected to ‘fill in the blanks’. 
Example C similarly ascribes the current undesirable state of the Karelian 
language to the political decisions of the 1920s.  As in the previous examples the 
pre-revolutionary period is narrated as a ‘golden age’ of the Karelian language.  
Example C constructs a picture of this enlightened period by informing the 
reader of the fact that the printing of books in Karelian, interrupted by the First 
World War, was never restarted under Soviet power aside from a brief, 
unsuccessful interval in the 1930s.   
 All the examples above are typical of a very commonly encountered 
narrative amongst the Karelian contributors to the Russian-language press.  
When discussing the Karelian language most narrate a history of the Karelian 
people and Karelia itself in which in the pre-revolutionary period, and indeed 
within living memory for the older contributors, Karelian was spoken almost 
exclusively within Karelia.  Indeed as we have seen above this is a historical 
narrative encountered even to a more limited extent when examining the 
narratives of the history of Karelia produced by Russian contributors.  Unlike 
their Russian counterparts the Karelian speakers idealise this period of 
widespread Karelian usage and view the current state of the Karelian language as 
being in comparison wholly lamentable.  The blame for this decline in Karelian 
usage is firmly disassociated from the Karelians themselves; they are depicted as 
being the passive victims of political processes far outwith their control.  The 







ascribed to another group in most instances beyond vague attributions to 
‘politics’ or indeed ascribed to anything at all; in most instances the agency 
behind a particular change is unstated, it merely comes to pass that Karelian is 
‘banned’.   
 Occasionally the language policies of the 1920s and 30s can be used by 
the Russian language press in a manner which seeks to unite Karelians and 
Russians however, rather than express the uniqueness of Karelian identity: 
 Коренная карелка, родилась под Олонцом. Образование Ирина 
Ивановна получала на финском языке, поэтому она до сих пор говорит по-
русски с легким акцентом, а вот по-фински и по-карельски чисто.  
– Во времена моего детства так было принято, – объясняет женщина. 
– Детям карелов запрещали в школе учиться на русском языке. Но мне в 
школе все предметы давались легко. С финским языком я дружила, хотя в 
Финляндии ни разу не была. Не хотела я туда ездить. Не люблю финнов, 
потому что мы воевали с ними (KG22 02.06.2010). 
 Example E represents a somewhat less common but discernible tendency 
within narratives of the linguistic policies of the time to find no real fault with 
the teaching of Finnish to Karelian children in the 1930s.  The journalist reports 
that the individual in question speaks ‘pure’ Karelian and Finnish, if not Russian, 
as a consequence of her Finnish-language education.  The interviewee herself has 
no issue with the Finnish language, unlike the Finns themselves who are, as will 
be seen again below in narratives of the war years, depicted as the ‘enemy’.  The 
article is unusual as the ban on teaching the ‘correct’ language, usually construed 
to be Karelian, is in this case applied by the unstated authorities to Russian 
instead.  The policies of the time seem to be depicted as an attempt to divide the 
Karelians from their Russian neighbours, although the interviewee does not 
appear to esteem her education as having suffered greatly from a lack of 
instruction in Russian.  Nevertheless the impression given by the journalist is that 
a ‘коренная карелка” should have received some education in the Russian 
language.  In the example there appears to be two competing narratives of the 







to find it unacceptable and the Karelian herself seems to have found it perfectly 
adequate.  After all, she recalls that в школе все предметы давались легко. 
 
 
3.10 Victims, Aggressors and Enemies: War, Conflict and the Other in 
Mass Media Discourse in the Republic of Karelia. 
 
i) Ancient Enmities and Modern Identities: The ‘Bulwark’ of Russia 
 
The idea of the town of Olonets acting as a ‘bulwark’ for the Russian 
state against foreign invaders has been discussed above.  By incorporating the 
town into this narrative of Russian resistance against foreign aggression it is also 
incorporated into the historical Russian homeland by virtue of its long service as 
a stronghold of Russian power.  In a similar fashion the narration of the idea of 
Karelians and Russians jointly struggling against a foreign invader serves the 
purpose of uniting the two peoples together in a ‘we’ group of long-standing.  By 
referencing their supposedly long history of common struggle against common 
enemies the continued cooperation and unity of the Karelian and Russian peoples 
is explained and justified.  Whilst descriptions of more modern conflicts are of 
key importance to this particular historical narrative the ancient history of the 
area is also invoked to explain the current ‘alliance’ between Karelian and 
Russian.  The long history of conflict between Russia and Sweden, much of 
which took place within the boundaries of modern Karelia, is described as the 
history of the Karelian and Russian peoples struggling against Swedish 
aggression. 
A) 1656 Россия начинает войну со Швецией за возвращение 
потерянных западнокарельских земель и выхода к 
Балтийскому морю. Отряд воеводы Пушкина, состоящий 
из 1000 "пашенных солдат", карел, бежавших от 
шведского владычества, а также 200 новгородских 







острог (Салми), Имбалакшу (Импилахти) и Сердоболь 
(Сортавалу). Отряд воеводы Силы Потемкина, наступая 
от Невы, занимает Волочек Сванский (Тайпале) и 
осаждает крепость Корелу. Местное карельское население 
восстает против шведов, всячески содействуя русским 
войскам. (K15 08.02.2001). 
 
B) Тесные политические, экономические, культурные связи 
карелов с русскими складывались в многовековой 
совместной борьбе с иноземными врагами. Вместе с 
русскими карелы участвовали в битвах Александра 
Невского против немецких рыцарей, вели борьбу со 
шведами, отражали нападения польско-литовских 
наемников в начале XVII века. Вплоть до наших дней 
сохранились предания об успешных походах карелов под 
предводительством крестьянина из деревни Большая 
Тикша Ивана Рокаччу против шведов. Известно, что в те 
же годы отряд Максима Рясанена из района деревень 
Реболы и Лиексы (территория современной Финляндии) 
совершал рейды против шведов в направлении Куопио 
(K122 30.10.2007). 
 
C) Издревле Россия складывалась как государство 
многонациональное, Многонациональными были и ее 
вооруженные силы. И нам, жителям Карелии, особенно 
интересно то обстоятельство, что еще более чем 800 лет 
назад плечом к плечу с русскими доблестно сражались с 
иноземцами наши карельские воины.  Темой военного 
дела средневековой Корелы по-настоящему еще не 
занимался никто - главным образом из-за недостатка 
письменных сведений. Однако, кроме летописей , в нашем 
распоряжении имеются материалы археологии, а главное, 







данными истории о военном устройстве других народов 
на той же ступени общественного развития мы получаем 
не только интересную картину военных обычаев Древней 
Корелы,но и любопытный и во многом неожиданный 
портрет карельского воина (K1 04.01.2001). 
 
 
In example A the war launched by Russia to ‘recover’ its lost territories 
in western Karelia is fully supported by the Karelian population.  Indeed a 
leading role in the fighting is undertaken by Karelians ‘fleeing Swedish 
domination’.  The local Karelians are described as having spontaneously risen up 
against the Swedes in sympathy with the Russian forces.  Examples B also 
narrates a shared history of Karelian and Russian forces struggling with the 
Swedes, as well as other foreign invaders such as the Poles and Lithuanians.  
Example C once again constructs a picture of Karelian and Russian cooperation 
against foreign enemies, in this case bringing both together as part of a ‘we’ 
group which доблестно сражались с иноземцами.  In this fashion a 
constructive strategy is deployed which conceives of both Karelians and 
Russians as united by their common purpose in fighting against unspecified 
foreigners.  Interestingly the author of the article claims that despite the 
acknowledged lack of historical documentation on this period it is possible to use 
the Kalevala as a historical source.  This use of the Kalevala as a historical 
record rather than as a cultural artefact of the Karelian people is somewhat 
unusual; the Kalevala is normally regarded not as history as such but a heroic 
epic, which records folk traditions rather than facts.  In this article the author 
seeks to use the work as a historical basis for his contention that the medieval 
Karelians fought together with the Russians against their Swedish and Finnish 
neighbours.  A further extract from the article demonstrates how this point is 
expounded: 
Судя по рунам "Калевалы", походы на соседей, ближних и дальних, 
северных и западных, "на поля сражений в Лаппи" или "на войну в Суоми" 







соседей-финнов, с XIII века иноверных, хотя и одноязычных , сохранялась 
в карельском пограничье на протяжении веков и возобновлялась с каждой 
новой войной со Швецией до присоединения Финляндии к России в 1809 
году. В свою очередь крестьяне-финны вкупе со шведами также разоряли 
деревни карел своими партизанскими рейдами. И здесь "горячие северные 
парни" ничем не отличались, скажем, от жителей Кавказа. Крестьянские 
предания об этой героической эпохе записал создатель эпоса "Калевала" 
Элиас Леннрот (K1 04.01.2001). 
 In the author’s view the Kalevala can be interpreted to record the 
traditional raiding between Karelians and Finns; in fact it is this tradition which 
Elias Lonnrot recorded and turned into the Kalevala.  By using the Kalevala in 
this fashion the author can then claim an unbroken tradition of Karelian and 
Finnish conflict all the way down to the modern era and the union of Finland and 
Russia in 1809.  In this manner the Finns can be portrayed as the ‘traditional 
enemy’ of the Karelians, whereas the Russians are the ‘traditional allies’.   
 All of the examples above are indicative of a very common narrative of 
the medieval history of Karelian and the Karelian and Russian peoples in which 
they are depicted as united against a common Swedish/Finnish enemy.  The 
Swedes in particular are normally portrayed as having been aggressive invaders 
who persecuted the Karelians and attempted to seize parts of Karelia which had 
always been jointly settled by the Russians and Karelians.  They are also often 
depicted as having been a threat to the religious faith of the Karelians, which 
they also shared with the Russians, and are often described as attempting to 
forcibly convert the Karelians to Catholicism or later Lutheranism.  In this 
manner it can be seen how this narrative of Karelian history is linked to those 
already examined of the Orthodoxy of the Karelian people and the shared 
continuity of settlement of both Karelians and Russians within what is now the 
Republic of Karelia.  Indeed it is generally the case that traces of all three of 
these constructive strategies, emphasising a shared heritage of religion, conflict 
and settlement are narrated simultaneously to illustrate the supposedly common 
origins of the Karelian and Russian peoples and justify the current political and 







have been examined separately for the sake of clarity, but it is important to 
recognise they are often intertwined to provide a more comprehensive and 
internally consistent narrative of Karelian and Russian unity.    
 
ii) The Sacred and the Heretical: Memories of the Conflicts of the 1940s 
 
The usage of narratives of the so-called Great Patriotic War in the 
modern Russian Federation and its neighbouring states has been well 
documented.  The very term ‘Great Patriotic War’ in fact gives ample clues as to 
the prominence the conflict has assumed in narration of Russian history and 
identity.  The Republic of Karelia as part of the Russian Federation is therefore 
incorporated by the local press into these narratives of the war and is 
conceptualised as having played its part in this common struggle for survival.  
Most narratives of the conflict in the Republic of Karelia are very similar to 
those popularised within the remainder of Russia as a whole.  In general the war 
is portrayed as a heroic triumph of the Russian (and to an extent Karelian) 
population against overwhelming odds.  The conduct of the war is described a 
desperate fight against a pitiless and brutal aggressor in which the virtues of the 
Russian people shone through despite horrendous losses on a national and 
personal scale.  The status of the veteran is unassailable in official discourse; 
their personal sacrifice is generally represented as entitling them to an unrivalled 
respect in contemporary society.  An example of the manner in which the usage 
of the image of the veteran in an ‘inappropriate’ fashion can lead to outrage is 
given below:  
Ветеранам намекнули  
Циничный рекламный плакат компании, оказывающей ритуальные 
услуги, появился в центре Петрозаводска.  
Название фирмы "Ветеран" на фоне георгиевской ленточки 
оскорбило многих горожан, которые тут же звонили в редакцию 







компания на том, что провожает в последний путь именно ветеранов. Да, 
действительно, люди, некогда проливавшие свою кровь за Родину, – уже в 
преклонном возрасте, но зачем же так явно указывать на близкий конец?  
– Позор! И это накануне великого праздника 9 Мая! – возмущались 
люди (KG11 17.03.2010). 
The usage of the title ‘veteran’ for advertising purposes, particularly in 
what is seen to be an insensitive fashion, is apparently so outrageous as to lead to 
ordinary people complaining directly to the paper Karel’skaya Guberniya.  This 
somewhat trivial example of the misappropriation of the image of the veteran 
shows the reverence in which their status is held; clearly actual criticism of those 
who некогда проливавшие свою кровь за Родину could be expected to 
provoke an even stronger reaction on behalf of the paper’s readership. 
Despite being the victors in the conflict, however, one of the most 
common self-images of the Russian people for that period is of their victimhood; 
the suffering and privation they endured is cited as well as the fact of invasion.  
As a consequence of this the commonly accepted narrative of the war has 
attained a mythic, almost sacred status and challenges to it are commonly viewed 
as absolute heresy.   
In Karelia there are, however, certain other factors which complicate the 
narration of this period.  Firstly there is the question of the Finno-Soviet war of 
1940, the so-called ‘Winter War’.  This conflict which is much less well-known, 
or at least much less celebrated, in modern Russian culture than the 1941-45 war 
is much more problematic.  It is generally accepted that in this war the Soviet 
Union was the aggressor rather than Finland.  As part of the conflict took place 
in what is now the Republic of Karelia and it resulted in the temporary 
annexation of areas which would finally in 1944 be ceded to the USSR by the 
Finns it can be difficult to incorporate these events in the standard narrative of 
the period.  Furthermore this war can and is used within Finland to present the 
Finns as the victims of aggression rather than the Soviets.  This further 
complicates the narrative of the 1941-44 conflict in Karelia, as the fighting here 







Karelia it is the Finns who were the invaders rather than reviled German Nazis 
creates certain potential difficulties with the application of the ‘usual’ historical 
narrative of the period as will be seen below.  Nevertheless the actions of the 
Finns are often related to those of their fascist allies by the use of similar 
terminology and strategies; thus although there may be objective differences 
between the manner in which the Finns acted to that of their allies they are 
incorporated into the over-arching narrative of Soviet resistance against brutal 
occupiers. 
A further complicating factor is the question of the position of the 
Karelian people themselves during this period.  As has been noted previously the 
Finnish occupiers of parts of the then KFSSR had a different attitude towards 
those deemed to be of a Finno-Ugric background than towards their Slavic 
neighbours.  The attitude of the Karelians towards these occupiers is therefore a 
potentially problematic issue in modern narratives of the period.  As shall be 
seen the prevailing narrative is to stress the unity of the Karelians with their 
Soviet fellow-citizens against the Finnish invader; however there does 
occasionally seem to be a certain lingering suspicion attached to their conduct, a 
suspicion that the Karelians themselves appear to be at pains to dismiss when 
addressing their Russian audience through the prism of the Russian-language 
press. 
The Winter War of 1940 receives relatively little attention within the 
Republic of Karelia as elsewhere in the Russian Federation.  In fact selections 
from an article “Вспомним всех поименно?” (K106 25.09.2003) in Kareliya 
demonstrate this fact: 
В ходе осуществления совместного российско-финляндского 
проекта "Монумент Зимней войне" поставлена задача установить имена 
всех советских и финских солдат, погибших в боях под Суомуссалми. В 
открытом 14 марта нынешнего года мемориальном комплексе на Раатской 
дороге, ведущей в Суомуссалми, вокруг памятника "Раскрытые объятия" 
раскинулось Каменное поле, где 20 тысяч камней символизируют павших 







вопрос и пытаются найти участники совместного проекта. Задача финской 
стороны практически выполнена: имена около тысячи солдат, погибших в 
оборонительных боях, уже высечены на досках, вывешенных в музее 
"Раатская дорога". 
  Задача российских участников сложнее: точное число погибших 
красноармейцев до сих пор не установлено.” 
Должен признаться, что привели меня на родину, в Тулу, и личные 
мотивы: мой отец в 1939 году был, как и многие другие запасники из 
нашего небольшого поселка Огаревка Тульской области, призван в армию 
и воевал под Суомуссалми в 365-м артиллерийском полку 163-й дивизии. 
Мне повезло: мой отец оказался в числе тех немногих, кому удалось 
вернуться из-под Суомуссалми живым. "Нас командир батальона вывел 
озерами, - рассказывал отец, - а соседний, Белевский, полк погиб 
полностью". 
Война, которая по точному определению поэта Александра 
Твардовского была "незнаменитой", оказалась сегодня и почти забытой, 
заслоненной событиями большой войны 1941-1945 годов. И словно 
вычеркнутыми из истории оказались жертвы Зимней войны. 
 The author of this article clearly feels that there is a large contrast in the 
way the Winter War is remembered within the Russian Federation and Finland.  
Interestingly although the author appears to be from Tula or Tul’skaya Oblast’ 
the article has been printed within the Karelian press; neither the engagements at 
Suomussalmi nor at Raate actually occurred within the then KFSSR or the 
modern Republic of Karelia.  Clearly the editors of Kareliya felt the topic to be 
of interest to their readership and related to ‘Karelian’ history despite the fighting 
taking place and presumably the bulk of the Soviet forces involved being from 
outwith the Republic of Karelia.  If the article and therefore topic is assumed to 
be of some interest to a Karelian readership it is clear it is not of much apparent 
interest to a general readership in Russia.  In contrast to the importance of the 
topic to the Finns, who the author notes have ‘practically completed’ their studies 







involved cannot yet determine even a figure for the total number of Soviet 
soldiers killed.  From this difference in the information each side has the contrast 
in importance to Finns and Russians respectively of the Winter War is 
demonstrated by the author.  In fact he acknowledges that the conflict is 
‘practically forgotten’ by modern Russia, overshadowed by the larger war of 
1941-45, with the names of the fallen left unknown to posterity. 
 The theme of the Winter War is not, as has been stated, often broached 
within the Russian-language mass media of the Republic of Karelia.  This fact is 
also illustrated by the example given below, an interview with an academic 
specialising in history printed in Karel’skaya Guberniya.  In this text the 
interviewee agrees with the journalist that the Winter War is a topic that was 
little discussed within the Soviet period and thus has given rise to a number of 
myths.  The interviewee however seeks to narrate a history of the conflict which 
absolves the USSR of as much responsibility for the war itself as possible, and 
links it to the impending 1941-45 Great Patriotic War: 
 – Тем не менее нельзя не согласиться и с тем, что в советский 
период было придумано много мифов. В их плену мы находимся до сих 
пор. Один из таких мифов – зимняя советско-финляндская война 1939-40 
годов. 
– Действительно, эта 105-дневная война до последнего времени 
была покрыта тайной. Сегодня многие документы рассекречены. И стало 
ясно, что не финны напали на нас, а мы выступили в роли агрессора. Но 
почему? В 1939 году стало ясно, что Вторая мировая война неизбежна. 
Поэтому то, что граница с Финляндией проходила всего в 25-30 
километрах от Ленинграда, представляло опасность. Сталин предложил 
Финляндии, кстати, союзнице фашистской Германии, отодвинуть границу 
от Сестрорецка и Зеленогорска (тогда Териоки) до Выборга. В обмен мы 
предложили территорию Северной Карелии, в два раза больше. Местные 
карельские жители об этом, понятное дело, и не ведали. Финляндия 
отказалась. Вот тогда и было принято решение о войне. 12 марта 1940 года 







озеро полностью стали нашими. Это было важное политическое решение. 
Только благодаря ему стало возможным отстоять Ленинград в Великую 
Отечественную войну. 
Сегодня Финляндия к нам никаких претензий не имеет. Если там и 
раздаются призывы к возврату потерянных территорий, происходит это не 
на государственном уровне, а по частному телевидению или в 
неофициальных газетах. Другое дело, что и поныне Финляндия 
официально отрицает, что была союзницей фашистской Германии. И вот 
это уже как раз и есть искажение исторических фактов (KG37 15.09.2010). 
The interviewee here acknowledges that “мы выступили в роли 
агрессора” against the Finns contrary to the received wisdom of the Soviet 
period, but the remainder of his contribution is an attempt to deploy several 
strategies of justification to explain the necessity of this aggression as he sees it.  
A topos of threat is created in which it was clear to the then Soviet authorities 
that the Second World War was неизбежна.  As a consequence of this and the 
‘danger’ posed by the proximity of the Finno-Soviet border to Leningrad the 
USSR is depicted as not having any choice but to take action.  The Finns are also 
portrayed as being allies of the Nazis even before the Winter War.  The choice 
given to the Finns of war or an exchange of territory is therefore in the face of 
this threat represented as entirely reasonable.  In this narrative the USSR had ‘no 
choice’ other than to declare war on Finland and gain the territory it needed to 
secure Leningrad; indeed it is only as a consequence of the Winter War and the 
gaining of the Priladozh’e that the USSR was able to defend Leningrad in the 
Great Patriotic War.  Consequently despite the earlier acknowledgement by the 
interviewee of the USSR being the aggressor in the Winter War a picture is 
painted of the Soviets as actually being the victims of Finnish unreasonableness.  
In fact by noting that modern Finland к нам никаких претензий не имеет, at 
least on the official level, the interviewee gives the impression that in 1940 they 
actually did and were therefore at least on some level culpable for the war.  This 
excerpt is a very good example of the prevalent attitude expressed towards the 
Winter War in the Russian language media; it is depicted as an unfortunate 







alliance to fascist Germany and their lack of consideration for the USSR’s 
strategic needs.  The article also indicates, as will be explored in greater depth 
below, the idea of the Finns as partners of the Nazis and hence bearing at least 
some taint of the historical guilt associated with the Germans. 
 Karelia is generally incorporated into the prevalent narratives of the 
history of the Great Patriotic War found elsewhere across the Russian 
Federation.  As stated above the war years are narrated as the triumph of a heroic 
people against almost impossible odds.   The below examples demonstrate how 
the conflict in general is narrated in the Karelian media: 
 
A) Сформированная в начале Великой Отечественной войны в 
городе сибирских шахтеров Анжеро-Судженске 69-я морская 
стрелковая бригада в ходе летней наступательной Свирско-
Петрозаводской операции освобождала от врага Святозеро и 
Пряжу, Киндасово и Эссойлу, а также целый ряд других 
населенных пунктов не только в Пряжинском, но и в соседнем, 
Суоярвском, районе. 
За участие в кровопролитной Петсамо-Киркенесской операции 
по  освобождению городов Заполярья и, в частности, города 
Печенги, бригада удостоена почетного наименования 
"Печенгская". 
Ветераны у обелисков 
По местам боевых действий в Суоярвском и 
Питкярантскомрайонах    совершила поездку группа ветеранов 
Карельского фронта из Москвы и Петрозаводска. 
"Экипаж машины боевой" - так можно было бы назвать 
пассажиров мирной "ГАЗели", что отправились утром 21 августа 
в долгий путь по местам боевой славы воинов Карельского 
фронта.  Обелиск за обелиском, поселок за поселком, встреча за 








B) Лейтенант Н.Д. Капустин, командир катера, вошедшего в 
Петрозаводскую губу первым, так вспоминал об этом событии: 
<Мы видели горящие дома, пристань и другие сооружения... 
Улицы были безлюдны. И вдруг мы увидели множество людей, 
которые бежали в сторону порта, к горящему пирсу... Нас 
обнимали, целовали, дарили цветы. Стоявшие у пирса катера 
были засыпаны живыми цветами. Каждый стремился хотя бы 
дотронуться до нас и убедиться, что все это не сон...> Спустя 
полчаса начался стихийный митинг, и был произведен артсалют 
из 21 залпа в честь освобождения Петрозаводска. В этот же день 
моряки-десантники подняли красное знамя над освобожденным 
городом (K68 27.06.2009).” 
 
C) В это время местные власти решили создать отряды народного 
ополчения. Женщины с винтовками дежурили у магазинов и 
складов, а мужчины в лесу "в секрете" наблюдали за движением 
противника. Когда до Ведлозера финнам оставалось преодолеть 
9 километров, правительство Карело-финской республики 
приказало эвакуировать оставшееся население. По дороге в 
Крошнозере она вместе с заключенными, направленными на 
оборонные работы, рыла траншеи и делала противотанковые 
рвы. Когда же наконец добралась до Пряжи, то увидела, как на 
обочинах дороги спали обессиленные долгим переходом люди. 
“Когда начали поступать первые раненые, в штате Пряжинской 
больницы были всего два врача и одна медсестра. Прасковью 
Кошелеву из райкома сразу определили в полевой госпиталь, 
который расположился в школе. 
"Я дежурила палатной сестрой у тяжелораненых, — вспоминает 
Прасковья Яковлевна. — Когда солдатиков привозили — рыжих 
от дымовой завесы, обросших, — они все на стариков были 
похожи. В одном из таких "стариков" я узнала своего 17-летнего 







Ведлозере, выдали винтовки 1895 года выпуска и отправили 
воевать. Никто из этих мальчишек даже не знал, как 
пользоваться винтовками, а финские "кукушки" (снайперы) 
метко стреляли". 
— считали многие штабисты и влюблялись. На глазах Пани 
медсестры, буфетчицы становились женами генералов. 
Практически все начальство штаба было обласкано 
представительницами прекрасного пола. Прасковья устояла 
перед чарами высших чинов. Со своим возлюбленным, 
старшиной, она познакомилась еще в 1939 году. После долгой 
разлуки их пути почти пересеклись в Беломорске. Они жили в 
домах по соседству, ходили в одну столовую, но, увы, ни разу не 
встретились. И только в 1942 году в Сегеже, куда перебрался 
штаб Карельского фронта, судьба их свела вместе. Он, уже 
лейтенант, мирно спал на диванчике после дежурств у ее 
кабинета. 
"Многие из наших девчонок начали жить семьями. Но я знала, 
что через месяц забеременеешь и отправят в тыл. Нас проверяли 
тщательно, — рассказывает Кошелева. — Мне же некуда было 
эвакуироваться: Петрозаводск был занят, Белоруссия, его 
родина, тоже под немцами. Поэтому мы с ним договорились: как 
только освободится какая-нибудь из наших местностей, мы 
поженимся. Однажды он прибежал радостный: "Оршу 
освободили!" 23 февраля 1943 года мы отметили свадьбу (KG19 
08.05.2002). 
D) Любовь, рожденная во время Великой Отечественной войны, 
живет и по сей день 
Когда Родина-мать звала воевать с фашистской силой темною, 
отцы поучали своих дочерей: "Доченьки, берегите себя и от 
нашей "саранчи", скромными будьте". Но как сейчас, так и тогда 







нередко всерьез и надолго. Ну а кто сумел превратить свое 
сердце в неприступную крепость, уж после войны капитулировал 
безоговорочно. Именно любовь излечила многих от контузий и 
тяжелых ранений. Многие петрозаводские ветераны знают об 
этом не понаслышке (KG19 09.05.2004). 
 
E) С каждым годом участников тех далеких событий становится все 
меньше. Сейчас многие перешагнули возрастную отметку 80. А 
ведь были молодые, юные, полные планов на будущее... Но 
война все круто изменила. Наши бабушки и дедушки сражались 
за свою Родину, исполняли свой, казалось бы, скромный, но 
святой долг перед ней. Не боялись заглянуть смерти в глаза во 
имя свободы своей страны. Многие не дожили до 61-й 
годовщины Победы. Недолог век человеческий, давайте же 
беречь тех, кто не берег себя ради нас! Будем помнить о подвиге 
человеческом, ведь забвенье страшнее всего (KG19 10.05.2006). 
 
F) Победительницы 
"В победе над врагом есть и частичка нашего труда", – вспоминают 
жительницы Карелии 
"Война – дело мужское".Звучит почти как аксиома. Так получилось, 
что все наши представления о войне связаны с образом мужчины-
солдата. Однако нельзя забывать, что в годы Великой 
Отечественной в армии служили 800 тысяч женщин (а просились на 
фронт еще больше). Они сделали все, что могли, для Победы (KG18 
05.05.2010). 
 The above examples give some idea of the almost ritualised language of 
commemoration employed to mark the events of the Great Patriotic War.  In 
example E for instance the reader is reminded that ‘our’ grandparents fulfilled 
their святой долг before the motherland.  The addressee is therefore included in 
the ‘we’ group who owe a debt to the wartime generation who faced up to 







neglecting to commemorate their triumph, that is to say reproduce this historical 
narrative, is represented as heretical: ведь забвенье страшнее всего.  The actual 
production of these narratives is somewhat ritualised; it will be noted that they 
generally are reproduced on or around the 9
th
 of May.  In fact it seems almost 
obligatory for newspapers to prepare a series of articles on the war in the weeks 
before and after Victory Day; it may indeed not be obligatory in a legal sense but 
appears to have become part of the conventionalised journalist genre in Russia.  
This is reminiscent of the official state narrative of the Great Patriotic War and 
its use of the commemoration of Victory Day in particular, which has undergone 
a good deal of transformation through the Soviet and Post-Soviet period (for an 
outline of this change see Ryazanova-Clarke 2008).  Within the immediate Post-
Soviet period under Yeltsin narratives of the war period often adopt strategies of 
discontinuity to challenge the then-ossified Soviet orthodoxy.  Since Putin came 
to power, however, this orthodoxy has been reasserted, albeit in differing 
manners in different stages, until now the events of the Great Patriotic War and 
in particular the commemoration of Victory Day have adopted the same unifying 
significance as signifying the triumph of the centralised state and its loyal 
subjects (see also Hutchings and Rulyova 2009).  Example A demonstrates how 
the conflict in Karelia can be incorporated into the narrative of the war across the 
USSR; the exploits of soldiers from Siberia in liberating Karelia is described 
alongside the shared commemoration of these events by veterans from 
Petrozavodsk and Moscow.  Their procession from memorial to memorial is 
described almost as a sort of religious ritual.  Example B commemorates the 
liberation of Petrozavodsk, concluding with the symbolic raising of the red flag 
over the liberated city.  The description of the advancing Soviet troops covered 
in flowers by the relieved citizens of the city clearly adds to the narrative of the 
great victory over occupying forces won by the people of the KFSSR and the 
USSR as a whole.   
 Example C is typical of the narratives of personal participation in the 
Great Patriotic War found in the contemporary Karelian press.  In general these 
are narrated by women as given their shorter life expectancy it appears most of 







It is also increasingly common for the reminiscences of those who were children 
during the conflict to be reproduced in lieu of those who actually took part in the 
fighting itself.  Whilst example C also dwells on the grim realities of the conflict 
as narrated both by the manner in which the journalist frames the introduction 
and the reminiscences of the interviewee herself both it and example D also 
illustrate the tendency to romanticise the conflict.  Both talk of the wartime 
romances of the men and women involved alongside their sufferings in the 
fighting.  In example C the sacrifice of the wartime period is even extended to 
this personal sphere by the narration of the self-sacrificial manner in which the 
couple involved put aside their personal feelings and refrained from marriage 
until at least one of their hometowns had been liberated from the invader.       
 The context of example F will further demonstrate the manner in which 
this narrative of heroic victory over the invader is reproduced.  The article itself 
‘quotes’ the women of Karelia as recognising their contribution to the victory 
over fascism.  The journalist themselves has of course invented the phrase 
attributed to these women, the “победительницы” of the title, which together 
with the text itself constructs this group in the article.  It is clearly expected 
however that the idea of such a group existing and expressing such a sentiment 
will not be disputed by the addressee however, given the manner in which it is 
stated in the sub-title of the article.  The reader is then ‘reminded’ of the 
contribution these women played для Победы by the recitation of some facts but 
also by appeal to the pre-existing knowledge of the reader.  The capitalisation of 
‘победа’ is best considered together with the image displayed beside the article; 
this is a hammer and sickle superimposed upon a red star superimposed again 
upon a ribbon of the ‘St George’s Cross’.  The text around the hammer and 
sickle reads “Великая Отечественная война.”  By displaying such an image 
beside the text the article is plainly conceived of as being commemorative; the 
images of the Soviet triumph are reproduced both visually and through the text 
itself. 
 Despite the great similarities in the manner in which the conflict in 
Karelia and that in the remainder of the USSR is narrated there are some 







This extends beyond the mere substitution of Finn for German when building an 
‘enemy’ picture of the foe against whom this great victory was obtained.  It is 
also the case that elements of the manner in which the conflict as a whole is 
narrated colour the manner in which events in Karelia are recounted.  The 
manner in which this is accomplished shall be examined further below. 
The use of concentration camps by the Finnish forces during their 
occupation of parts of the KFSSR in 1941-44 is often recalled in narratives of the 
period.  The idea of concentration camps is clearly very evocative as it recalls the 
suffering inflicted upon Soviet citizens and others in the camps created by Nazi 
Germany during the same period.  Clearly the very use of the term концлагерь 
or indeed лагерь in any narrative surrounding the Great Patriotic War will 
conjure up those images of Nazi concentration camps which are part of the 
shared discursive resources of the majority of the inhabitants of the modern 
Russian Federation.  That is to say that the use of the term will imply aspects of 
the Nazi system even when applied to the camps ran by Finnish forces, which 
were not extermination camps of the Nazi type.  The manner in which these 
camps are described is therefore of particular interest.  They are often explicitly 
described as ‘concentration’ camps: 
A) Уже в конце июля началась реэвакуация из Петрозаводска 
населения, вывезенного в начале войны из Ленинградской 
области и районов Карелии и помещенного финнами в 
переселенческие (концентрационные) лагеря.  (K68 27.06.2009). 
 
B) Не так давно "Карельская Губернiя" рассказывала об инициативе 
одного из депутатов установить в Петрозаводске монумент 
финскому генералу Карлу Маннергейму. Сразу после 
публикации в редакцию стали обращаться люди со своей точкой 
зрения на установку подобного памятника.  
В нашей семье из семи человек в концлагере №5 Петрозаводска 
от голода умерли трое – в первый же год войны, – рассказала в 
своем письме малолетняя узница Ленина Павловна Макеева. – 







недозволенное расстояние к ограждению лагеря. Через неделю 
он умер. Как же можно после этого устанавливать в Карелии 
памятник маршалу Маннергейму, человеку, который в период 
финской войны и Второй мировой войны воевал против 
Советского Союза на стороне фашистской Германии?!” (KG21 
23.05.2007). 
C) "Почти все русское население оккупированных районов 
республики заключено в концентрационные лагеря. Белофинны 
собрали женщин с маленькими детьми, стариков и старух и 
поместили их в дома, специально отведенные на окраине города 
и обнесенные колючей проволокой. Это дома смерти. Во всех 
лагерях голод и тиф уносят много человеческих жизней. Только 
в Петрозаводске имеются 6 концлагерей, в которых заключено 
свыше 20 тысяч человек", — вспоминает одна из жительниц 
столицы Карелии. (Из книги "По обе стороны Карельского 
фронта") (KG17 21.04.2005). 
 
D) Недавно газеты сообщали, что Союз бывших малолетних 
узников Карелии готовит иск к государству Финляндия. Предмет 
иска — денежная компенсация за понесенные страдания. Сейчас 
члены союза собирают по 500 рублей на судебные издержки, и 
как только наберутся необходимые 200 тысяч рублей, адвокат 
повезет документы в уездный суд города Хельсинки.  Бывшие 
узники финских лагерей уже получали компенсацию — в 1994-м 
и 1999 годах. Оба раза — от правительства Германии наряду с 
заключенными немецко-фашистских лагерей. 
 
Суммы зависели от времени нахождения за колючей проволокой 
и составляли порядка 1200-1300 немецких марок в 1994-м и 350-








С 2001 года начали выдавать третью компенсацию, самую 
значительную. Бывшим узникам концлагерей и гетто выдавали 
по 5750 евро, узникам иных мест принудительного заключения, 
приравненных к концлагерям, — 1530 евро... И тут те, кто 
находился не в немецких, а в финских лагерях, оказались 
обойденными. Немцы вежливо пояснили, что выплаты эти 
положены только пострадавшим от немецких войск, а все 13 
концлагерей, существовавших на территории Карелии, были 
созданы финнами. 
 
       Уважаемая госпожа Халонен! 
Тогда узники обратились к Финляндии. "Мы оставили дома,    
скот, имущество, — писали они в апреле 2004 года президенту 
Тарье Халонен, — и не получили никакой компенсации. 
Правительство Германии взяло на себя ответственность по 
моральному и материальному возмещению убытков... кроме 
граждан, находившихся на территории Карелии, оккупированной 
финскими войсками. Мы, бывшие узники финских концлагерей, 
теперь пожилые, больные люди, считаем, что и финляндское 
руководство должно проявить справедливость и изыскать 
средства для компенсационных выплат..."  
 
Тарья Халонен ответила, что Финляндия выполнила все условия, 
обозначенные в Парижском мирном договоре 1947 года, 
выплатила СССР огромный объем репараций. 
Любопытно, что как только бывшие узники предъявляют 
требования Финляндии, там начинает муссироваться вопрос о 
возврате территорий. 
Так было в 1998 году, когда в ответ на обращение бывших 
узников финские официальные деятели предложили создать 
постоянный международный суд, который бы судил за военные 
преступления. И первыми предлагалось привлечь бывших 







Финляндии, "грабили хутора, убивали мирных жителей". В 
прокуратуру Карелии даже пришли списки таких партизан с 
требованием выдачи их финским властям. Скандал тогда удалось 
замять. 
В феврале 2005-го узники объявили о намерении судиться с 
Финляндией, а в марте газета "Хельсингин саномат" 
обнародовала претензии общественной организации "Pro 
Karelia". Суть их — возмещение ущерба финским гражданам, 
оставившим в 1940 году родные земли, возврат контрибуций, 
навязанных Советским Союзом Финляндии, заплатить за 
восстановление разрушенного хозяйства. Общий счет — 4 
миллиарда евро. 
Вообще "Pro Karelia" многими воспринимается как организация 
националистическая и реваншистская. Официальный Хельсинки 
старается от нее дистанцироваться (KG16 14.04.2005). 
 
In all the above examples the Finnish camps are explicitly described as 
concentration camps.  In both examples B and C the Finnish camps are portrayed 
as being places of great suffering in a similar fashion to the German camps; in 
example C one part of these camps is actually described as being the дома 
смерти.  Although there is little suggestion that the Finns were actually 
executing any of the inmates of these camps they are clearly held responsible for 
the deaths which did occur there.  The descriptions given of the flogging of 
inmates to the point where they then died shortly afterwards, typhus, hunger and 
barbed-wire entanglements are also evocative of the general image of the 
concentration camp conjured up by narratives of those established by the 
Germans.  Of course even without the possibility of this broader reference given 
by the use of the term concentration camp the narratives of the suffering endured 
within these camps reproduced here in the discourse paint a very negative picture 
of the Finnish occupation.  This memory of Finnish oppression is so strong for 
the relation of former camp inmates in example B that she categorically refuses 







commemoration in Karelia; this is a man, we are informed, who fought alongside 
fascist Germany.  By reproducing the narrative of the suffering of the 
concentration camp inmate the Finns are once again associated with and seen as 
just as culpable as their German allies.   
It should be noted that these narratives of suffering associated with the 
concentration camps established by the Finns apply to the Russian population of 
the Republic of Karelia only.  As Karelians were generally not interned in such 
camps they are excluded from the group who were persecuted in this manner.  As 
shall be examined further below the difference in the historical experience of the 
Karelians under Finnish occupation is often discussed in various narratives of the 
period for various purposes. 
Example D illustrates another method in which the use of concentration 
camps by the Finns is used to compare them to the German fascists and also how 
historical narratives of the 1940s in general are used on both sides of the border 
for political purposes.  In this article Karel’skaya Guberniya sympathetically 
relates the plight of the former inmates of these camps who have, it opines, not 
been sufficiently compensated for their sufferings at the hands of the Finnish 
occupiers.  After the failure of the Germans to pay a third round of compensation 
to those imprisoned by the Finnish authorities the former inmates applied to the 
Finns for recompense, only to be refused.  Their address to the Finnish president 
is reproduced for the reader by the paper, whilst the Finnish reply is paraphrased 
briefly; before the paper goes on to note the scandalous, in its view, manner in 
which the Finns then appeared to compare the sufferings of the people of the 
KFSSR under their occupation to alleged Soviet war crimes.  These accusations 
are directly called a ‘scandal’ by the paper, and are referenced in quotation marks 
to reflect that they are not the views of the paper and also to imply their 
apparently dubious validity.  The further relation of the views of ProKarelia as 
apparently, in the view of Karel’skaya Guberniya at least, expressed in 
‘retaliation’ for the demands of the former inmates shows the manner in which, 
on an unofficial level at least, accusations of alleged war crimes are employed 
both in Finland and the Republic of Karelia to construct either side in the 1941-







The idea that the Finns were responsible for much hardship and suffering 
during their occupation of Karelia is not only expressed with reference to the 
concentration camp issue.  The occupation in general is seen as an incredibly 
destructive period for which the Finns bear primary and indeed often sole 
responsibility.  The manner in which the suffering inflicted on the local 
inhabitants of the KFSSR during this period by the occupying Finnish forces is 
presented is further exemplified by these excerpts: 
A) Мы тоже узники оккупации 
 
Когда обратят внимание на тех, кто детьми страдал под 
оккупацией? В судах наши заявления о признании нас 
малолетними узниками отклоняют. Почему - непонятно, ведь в 
то же время удовлетворяются иски граждан, которые жили в 
оккупированном Заонежье. Мы жили в деревне Сельга 
Сегозерского, ныне Медвежьегорского, района. Хочу поведать 
как. А если кто не поверит, приезжайте в Сельгу, спросите у 
стариков, еще остались очевидцы и свидетели. 
 
В деревню тайком пробирались партизаны, бабушка все три года 
помогала им чем могла (а финский полицейский участок 
находился через четыре дома от нас, узнай про это враги, 
уничтожили бы всю семью). Вокруг Сельги оккупанты натянули 
колючую проволоку. 
Помню, как тайком приходил к бабушке из леса двоюродный 
брат матери Евгений Меккелев в финской форме. Мы, дети, 
думали, что он финский офицер, и только после войны стало 
известно, что был он партизаном, подпольщиком. (В мирное 
время Евгений Ильич Меккелев стал Героем Социалистического 
Труда.) В нашей деревне погиб Филипп Федоскин, тоже 
связанный с партизанами. Он спросил у финнов разрешения 







убили. Тело привезли в санях домой и сказали, что убили 
русские. 
Моего одноклассника Петю Чаккиева полицейские забрали из 
дому, привели в школу, на наших глазах привязали к скамейке и 
стали по очереди избивать березовыми вицами. Петя страшно 
кричал, кровь его брызгала и заливала скамейку, мы закрывали 
руками уши, глаза, а полицейский отнимал руки и говорил: 
<Смотрите!> За что мальчика истязали, мы тогда так и не 
поняли: (K123 02.11.2003). 
 
B) Финны забирают у жителей советские паспорта и взамен выдают 
свои удостоверения без фотографий, причем у карелов и русских 
удостоверения разных цветов. Позже появляются паспорта с 
фотографиями. Красные — у русских, голубые — у остального 
населения. Вход в Петрозаводск осуществлялся только по 
специальным пропускам с цветными полосками. Кстати говоря, 
на этом попадались многие наши разведчики: им доставали 
пропуск с полоской одного цвета, финны же через несколько 
дней могли цвет полоски поменять. Патрульный останавливал на 
улице человека, находил у него "неправильный" пропуск и... 
Дальше, думаю, рассказывать не обязательно. Кроме того, 
русское население обязали носить на рукавах красные повязки. 
Захватчики изо всех сил стремились привлечь на свою сторону 
карелов, вепсов и других народов своей языковой семьи, но это 
им плохо удавалось 
Петрозаводск отныне именовался "Яанислинна" (дословно: 
Крепость на берегу Онего). Финны переименовали не только сам 
город, но и его улицы: проспект Карла Маркса превратился в 
"Валтакату" (Главный проспект), улица Ф. Энгельса — в 
"Кескускату Пуистокату" (Центральная Садовая), улица Ленина 
— в "Карьяланкату" (Карельская), Кирова — в "Калеваланкату" 







улицу Дзержинского финны почему-то назвали улицей 
Вяйнямейнена, а улицы Гоголя и Горького — улицами Воина и 
Воина-соплеменника соответственно. 
Вскоре в "Яанислинне" появляются газеты, магазины, два 
кинотеатра (один все в том же университете, другой — в 
нынешнем кинотеатре "Сампо", который во время войны 
назывался "Укко" — "Дед"). С виду жизнь выглядела почти 
нормальной, если бы не дома, огороженные колючей 
проволокой, и не концлагеря для переселенцев и 
военнопленных... (KG15 07.04.2005). 
C) Как только у финнов появлялось малейшее подозрение, что 
жители деревень помогают партизанам или сами являются 
членами партизанских отрядов, режим резко ужесточался. 
Иногда могли сразу все население перевезти в концлагерь в 
Петрозаводске. Многих расстреливали, пороли плетями. Финны 
практиковали увод на каторжные работы в Финляндию. 
Например, из села Паданы были вывезены 23 девушки, всех их 
продали финским кулакам. 
Колхозы во время войны продолжали существовать. Финны 
выделили жителям не самые лучшие клочки земли, за которые 
колхозники должны были отрабатывать барщину. Чтобы 
получить свою собственную лошадь в аренду, крестьяне платили 
4 марки за час ее работы. Кстати, карелам за одну и ту же работу 
платили гораздо больше, чем русским. Люди в деревне голодали 
и, чтобы хоть как-то прожить, примешивали в хлеб древесную 
кору и мох. 
Вскоре сами финны устали от войны. "Почему человеку суждено 
воевать, хотя он любит мир? Как охотно я пошел бы сейчас на 
сенокос. С каким удовольствием бросил бы все это барахло, 
оставил бы эти карельские леса, забыл бы навечно тяжелые 







Об отношении оккупантов к местному населению однозначно 
судить сложно. Историки предлагают не "ровнять всех финнов 
под одну гребенку". Воинские части, продвигавшиеся вперед к 
линии фронта, действительно отличались особой жестокостью. 
Они могли и лошадей последних забрать, и расстрелять ни за 
что. Люди старались не высовываться из домов в то время, когда 
части проходили по их деревням и селам. Финские же команды, 
жившие во время оккупации в Карелии и следившие за порядком 
(они комплектовались в основном инвалидами, не пригодными к 
службе в армии), были значительно мягче в обращении с 
местными жителями (KG17 21.04.2005). 
In example A the author recalls the suffering she endured under Finnish 
occupation and the atrocities she witnessed as a young child in an apparent 
attempt to receive an enhanced legal status as a ‘victim of the occupation’.  
Although it appears no official recognition of her claim has been given she 
appeals to the reader, should they feel any dubiety over her claims, to visit the 
village of Sel’ga where these events are apparently common knowledge and they 
will find ready testimony to the sufferings of the locals.  The Finns are presented 
as brutal occupiers, mercilessly beating a local child for no apparent reason and 
executing local people for with little or no provocation.  Sel’ga at that time was 
also most likely inhabited by Karelians or at least had a significant Karelian 
population; the supposed attempt of the Finns to claim the Russians had killed 
the executed man would appear, although no real analysis is made of the event or 
their explanation by the author, to be an attempt to discredit the Russians to the 
local Karelians.  The local Karelians, however, are clearly constructed as 
resisting the Finns, joining or aiding the partisan movement despite the evident 
danger.  It is interesting to speculate on the reasons why the inhabitants of the 
more Karelian area of rural Medvezh’egorskii District have been refused 
recognition as victims of the occupation whilst the presumably more Russian 
inhabitants of ‘Zaonezh’e’ have been so honoured.  It is possible that a perceived 
lack of ‘loyalty’ during the period, or the perception on the part of the author as 







to defend the conduct of her fellow villagers and insist on their having suffered 
as much as anywhere else occupied by the Finns.  Certainly her impassioned 
challenge to those who might not believe her testimony suggests she assumes 
some of her imagined interlocutors may harbour some sort of unspecified doubts.   
The apparent attempts of the Finns to turn Petrozavodsk into a ‘Finnish’ 
town are also referenced in example B.  The names which the Finns gave to the 
various streets of Petrozavodsk and their attempts to provide a ‘normal’ 
atmosphere to the town are described; this attempt at normality is depicted as a 
fiction, however, by reference to the concentration camp system in operation at 
the time.  Examples B and C also reference the attempts made by the Finns to 
separate the Karelian and Finnish populations; again it is only the Russian 
population that is specifically accorded the status of having suffered under the 
occupation.  It is the Russians who are depicted as being forced to wear red 
armbands; the Finns are narrated as having been more sympathetic to the 
Karelian and Vepsian communities in line with their political ends.  The 
Karelians and Vepsians are portrayed here, however, as is common, as having 
resisted the advances of their fellow Finno-Ugrians and remained generally loyal 
to the USSR. 
Example C does highlight the differences that do exist in the narration of 
the occupation of Karelia by the Finns compared to that of the remainder of the 
USSR by the Germans.  Although the article does present a picture of the Finns 
reacting harshly to the suspicion of collaboration with the partisan movement and 
also depicts them as responsible for hunger and other suffering it also suggests 
not all Finns were wholly bad.  The unwillingness of the average Finnish soldier 
to take part in the war and their desire to return home is referenced through 
quotation from the diary of such a soldier; this provides a sympathetic portrait of 
an ordinary enemy soldier removed from the general depiction of a faceless 
fascist monster.  The article indeed advises the reader, on the authority of 
unnamed historians, not to "ровнять всех финнов под одну гребенку".  The 
very idea that the conduct of the occupying forces in Karelia is a ‘difficult’ or 
‘complex’ as the article suggests rather than a one-sided litany of horror does 







the enemy, are not always caricatured as inhuman fascists.  Although they are 
often, as we have seen, associated with the Nazis in the narration of the war and 
occupation, and certainly are depicted as being the aggressors and to blame for a 
good deal of suffering, Finns are also recognised as being ‘not as bad’ as their 
German allies.    
Occasionally dissonant voices can be heard however which proffer 
alternate narratives of the period in opposition to at least elements of the general 
accounts of this period.  These alternate narratives are often vehemently 
condemned by those who adhere to more orthodox narratives of the period; in 
particular the views of certain Finnish authorities, reflected in the Karelian press, 
are regularly denounced by journalists and interested parties such as veterans and 
their representatives.  Nevertheless the reproduction of these views and the fact 
that there is a perceived need to refute them shows that they are current within 
Karelian society even if they remain a minority opinion.  Clearly the 
reproduction of the sacred narrative alone is not enough; challenges to it must be 
met and defeated to ensure its continued consecration as a key part of the 
historical narrative of Russia and Karelia.  More infrequently opinions which 
challenge part of the accepted historical narrative originate from with Karelia 
itself.  In particular the historical experience of the Karelians under Finnish 
occupation, a problematic topic as seen above, recurs as a bone of contention 
within the discourse.  The orthodox narrative of the manner in which the 
Karelians acted under Finnish occupation is exemplified by the example below: 
Захватив Карелию, финны лелеяли мечту о "Великой Финляндии" с 
границами от Ладожского до Онежского озера и по Беломорканалу до 
Белого моря. Но карелы не хотели быть в подчинении у Финляндии. В 
Краеведческом музее хранится щепка, на которой члены карельского 
батальона, сформированного финнами, писали о своей невиновности. Они 
уверяли, что попали в батальон не по доброй воле, и обещали уйти к 
русским партизанам, как только получат оружие. Кстати, именно так и 







In this narrative as the example illustrates the wishes of the Finns to 
entice the Karelians into a union with Finland were frustrated by the Karelian’s 
loyalty to their Russian allies.  The text above relates a common narrative of the 
period; the Karelians were forced to cooperate with the occupiers but at the first 
opportunity deserted to the partisans.  The Russian partisans appear in the above 
example to never have doubted the loyalty of their Karelian comrades.  Generally 
the Soviets are depicted as having had faith in the reliability of the Karelian 
population and having trusted them to fight the Finns as actively as the remainder 
of the local population.  Occasionally however there are hints of narratives in 
which the loyalty of the Karelians was viewed with some uncertainty by the 
central authorities, to the extent that repressive measures were planned against 
them:  
Зато известно, что когда в 1944 году встал вопрос о выселении 
карелов в Сибирь и ликвидации Карелии как республики, то отстоял ее 
тогдашний первый секретарь ЦК партии КФССР Куприянов, а Куусинен 
промолчал (KG37 15.10.2010). 
This narrative of the allegiance of the Karelians being questioned and 
their deportation being arranged is relatively uncommon in the mass media 
discourse in the modern Republic of Karelia.  It is, however, present in society in 
general and will be encountered in the data gathered from the interviews 
examined below.  It is a somewhat controversial narrative, however, and subject 
to vigorous denial from those who adhere to the official Soviet narrative: 
Не плюйте в прошлое 
От века доброй памяти людей заслуживали ратники - защитники 
Отечества, на острие меча несущие славу своего народа. Особой 
благодарности удостаивались воины от тех людей, которых они защитили в 
лихую годину, изгнали врага из родных пределов. На этом зиждется 
справедливая историческая память. По словам поэта Кондратия Рылеева, 
напоминать юношеству о подвигах предков - верный способ для привития 







Для жителей Карелии таким человеком, организатором ее защиты в 
1941-м и освобождения от оккупантов в предпобедном 1944 году, является 
Маршал и Герой Советского Союза Кирилл Афанасьевич Мерецков. 
 Документами, воспоминаниями очевидцев, исследованиями, в том 
числе и финскими (см. Юкка Куломаа "Город на Онего"), подтверждается, 
что финские оккупационные власти заигрывали с местным населением, 
натравливали "братьев по крови" - карел и вепсов на русских, предоставляя 
повышенный паек, смягчение режима проживания и так далее. 
Оккупантами были сформированы подразделения так называемой 
"Карельской освободительной армии" (КОА) - местный вариант 
власовщины: три национальных "братских" батальона и особый вепсский 
полк, воевавшие против Красной Армии. 
Что касается небольшой части неэвакуированного мирного 
населения, находившегося на временно оккупированной территории 
КФССР, совершивших так называемые компрометирующие действия, то 
количество их было невелико. По данным наркомата госбезопасности 
КФССР, таких лиц в 1943 году насчитывалось всего 126 (см. "Неизвестная 
Карелия. Документы спецорганов о жизни республики 1941-1956 гг.". 
Петрозаводск, 1999). 
По фактам выявленного нелояльного по отношению к Советской 
власти поведения части местного населения по установленному порядку 
докладывалось в Москву по линии контрразведки СМЕРШ, НКГБ и 
армейских политорганов. По словам Г.Н. Куприянова (цит. по "Заговор 
генералов", стр. 294), Сталин "возражает против применения к карелам тех 
же мер, какие были приняты к калмыкам, крымским татарам, 
кабардинцам... Вопрос о карелах был решен.". По-иному и быть не могло, а 
уж тем более - после решения Сталина. Секретариат ЦК ВКП(б) принял 
постановление от 31.8.1944 г. "О недостатках политической работы среди 
населения КФССР, освобожденного от финской оккупации" (см. "По обе 
стороны Карельского фронта". Док. N 376). В этом постановлении нет ни 







Как последний и решающий козырь в подтверждение домыслов о 
"заговоре генералов" с участием К.А. Мерецкова, Сергеев приводит 
документ, адресованный секретарю Коми обкома ВКП(б) Тараненко: "В 
республику направляются спецпереселенцы из Карело-Финской ССР. 
Подготовьте лагеря для их приема. Л. Берия. 14.10.1944 г.". Однако 
выступить против решения Сталина было абсолютно немыслимо даже для 
Берии. 
Совершенно очевидно, что в распоряжении Берии говорится не о 
коренном населении Карелии, а о переводе в Коми ранее высланного в 
Карелию контингента "спецпереселенцев". 
Но Сергеев, задавшись целью во что бы то ни стало разоблачить 
"генеральский заговор против карельского народа", раз за разом обращался 
в различные учреждения за документами, подтверждающими его версию. 
При этом он не стеснялся, что называется, "брать на арапа", утверждая, что 
"...в архивах ЦК КПСС имеется решение Политбюро о высылке народа 
Карелии..." и "...у нас есть документы заседания Секретариата ЦК ВКП(б) 
по карельскому вопросу от 31 августа 1944 года. На нем стоял вопрос о 
выселении народа Карелии в Сибирь...". ("Заговор...", стр. 278, 279). 
Допускаем, что в обстановке гласного сокрушения прежней 
идеологии и общественного строя, низвержения прежних кумиров могли 
быть высказанными любые взгляды. 
 Но нельзя не заметить бьющие в глаза несуразности и прямую 
безграмотность, которыми изобилует книга И. Сергеева (K16 12.02.2002).  
In the above example the publication of a book implying that there was 
an ‘anti-Karelian conspiracy’ amongst the upper echelons of the Soviet 
leadership is portrayed as a gross distortion of the historical facts, to the extent it 
is described as ‘spitting’ on the past.  The final paragraph also uses colourful 
language to emphasise the total disagreement of the authors of this article with 
the historical narrative advanced by the author Sergeev; the idea that there was 







and offensive.   The authors of the article, which was produced by 
representatives of veteran’s organisations, consider that even if the post-Soviet 
period where many previous historical narratives and ‘icons’ have been 
overturned to accuse the Soviet authorities of having doubted the loyalty of the 
Karelians is utter heresy.  Aside from pouring scorn on the author and his theory 
the article by using strategies of trivialisation and downplaying to delegitimise 
the heterodox narrative the article also offers an exposition of the standard 
narrative in an effort to refute what its authors consider to be untruths; once 
again the loyalty of the Karelian populace is asserted in the face of Finnish 
attempts to draw them to their side.  The small number of Karelians who 
collaborated with the Finns is detailed, alongside official sources which 
supposedly prove that the central authorities had no concerns over this 
collaboration.   
Another historical narrative which can cause great offense amongst 
certain sectors of the population of the Republic of Karelia is that of the 
supposed war crimes carried out by Soviet partisans against Finnish civilians.  
This has already been glimpsed in one of the texts above where such accusations 
were supposedly deployed by the Finns in a tit-for-tat manner to counter the 
claims of those who consider themselves to have suffered under Finnish 
occupation.  This narrative of the Karelian Front, which accuses the Soviet 
Partisans of having carried out brutal and unjustified attacks on peaceful Finnish 
villages, is not generally produced within the Republic of Karelia itself.  As we 
have seen with regards to the question of the annexed territories narratives 
presented in the Finnish press are reproduced by the Russian-language media of 
the Republic of Karelia alongside competing narratives which seek to refute the 
Finnish claims.  The below example is particularly interesting however as 
although initially published in Karjalan Sanomat, a Finnish paper, the text in 
question which accuses the partisan movement of such crimes is apparently the 
work of a Russian author: 
В редакцию "Карельской Губернiи" поступило письмо от десяти 
петрозаводчан, бывших партизан Карельского фронта в годы Великой 







газете "Карьялан Саномат" была опубликована корреспонденция Суло 
Кириллова, претендующая, по словам автора, на "рассказ о войне на 
территории Карелии против Финляндии в 1939-1940 и 1941-1944 гг.". 
Однако главное место в ней занимают измышления о действиях карельских 
партизан в годы войны на оккупированной немецко-финскими 
захватчиками советской территории.  
Приходится только удивляться, как мог господин Кириллов, называя 
себя "законодателем", даже не потрудиться заглянуть в материалы 
государственных архивов республики, где хранятся все материалы о 
партизанском движении в Карелии. Впрочем, это ему и не нужно, важно 
другое — подпустить побольше очернительства в адрес тех 
самоотверженных людей, которые в невероятно трудных условиях, не щадя 
своей жизни, защищали свою Родину, кстати, и его, Кириллова, в ту пору 
малолетнего парнишку. 
А теперь о том, в чем голословно обвиняет Кириллов партизан. Он 
пишет: 
"Предназначенные на смерть, наши солдаты были вооружены 
гранатами, чтобы себя взорвать". Грязная ложь. Гранаты были, чтобы бить 
врага. "Финнами был разгромлен партизанский отряд, шедший по 
ругозерской дороге". Опять ложь. Видимо, автор выдает желаемое за 
действительное. "Партизаны убили пожилого человека топором". Ложь, 
которую трудно придумать. "С территории Финляндии партизаны уводили 
в плен гражданских людей". Какая пакостная ложь! Партизаны уводили на 
советскую территорию только взятых в бою в плен солдат и офицеров. "В 
Финляндии партизанами проводились ураганные наступления на 
населенные пункты, можно было видеть только их следы: трупы стариков, 
детей и пепелища". Трудно придумать более откровенную ложь! 
Партизанские отряды не штурмовали населенные пункты на территории 
Финляндии. "Партизаны расстреливали своих раненых". И опять 
изуверская ложь. Партизаны именно тем и были сильны, что в их среде 







Газета "Карьялан Саномат", широко читаемая в Финляндии, дойдет 
до воинствующих, непримиримых националистов и поможет им лишний 
раз попытаться "ловить рыбку в мутной воде". Но подумайте, господин 
Кириллов, пойдет ли это на пользу мирным добрососедским отношениям 
между Россией и Финляндией? 
Бывшие партизаны Карельского фронта в годы Великой 
Отечественной войны, проживающие в Петрозаводске". Всего 10 подписей 
(KG26 23.06.2004). 
The article above was produced as Karel’skaya Guberniya states by 
former partisans outraged that their conduct was being called into question in the 
Finnish press.  This of course implies both that the editorial staff of the Karelian 
paper found their letter worthy of publication and that there is some cognisance 
of what is printed in Finland even amongst the ordinary citizens of Petrozavodsk; 
at the very least articles in mainstream Finnish papers on such subjects are very 
quickly brought to the attention of interested parties in the Republic of Karelia.   
The accusations levelled at the partisans, here narrated in accordance with the 
norm as тех самоотверженных людей, которые в невероятно трудных 
условиях, не щадя своей жизни, защищали свою Родину, are once again 
depicted as being gross distortions of ‘historical fact’; indeed it is stated that had 
research been done in the correct manner and had the author in question 
consulted the archives he would have found ample material which disproved his 
accusations.  The official body of knowledge, as exemplified by the archives, is 
appealed to in order to witness the absurdity of the author’s attacks on the 
partisan movement.  Each one of his accusations which is found so offensive by 
the former partisans is then listed and denoted a ‘lie’, with a more detailed 
refutation in the next sentence.  This article once again demonstrates the manner 
in which the ‘official’ or at least standard narration of the war in the then KFSSR 
has been enshrined and sanctified; any questioning of its validity is treated as 
offensive and an attempt to tarnish the reputations of those veterans who are, in 
the mainstream narrative, responsible for guaranteeing the freedom of modern 







veterans themselves, however the newspaper clearly feels that their text is 
worthy of reproduction with no critical comment.  
Apparently unjustified accusations against Soviet Partisans from within 
Finland are also dealt with within the article below, again from Karel’skaya 
Guberniya.  In this instance the journalistic staff of the paper itself produces an 
article as a reaction to narratives of partisan misdeeds from within Finland: 
Карельские партизаны гордятся собой и не боятся гнева финнов 
"Я готов, как верный сын своей родины, с оружием в руках 
действовать во временно захваченных районах, создавать невыносимые 
условия для врага и всех его пособников" Из присяги партизана. 
О партизанском движении нынче много всего написано. И хвалят 
его, и ругают. В последнее время даже политическая подоплека у этого 
дела появилась. В Финляндии создали общественную организацию 
"Гражданское население — ветераны войны-продолжения", которая 
представляет интересы финского мирного гражданского населения, 
пострадавшего от советских партизан. По их подсчетам, в результате 
рейдов партизан в тыл Финляндии погибли 176 мирных граждан. Члены 
организации рассматривают все действия карельских партизан как военное 
преступление и требуют суда. О количестве человеческих жизней не 
принято говорить: "много" или "мало", но все-таки в финских концлагерях 
на территории Карелии погибло куда больше наших граждан. 
— Когда бой идет, не считаешь, сколько убил или ранил, – говорит 
Дмитрий Александров. — Да и как можно говорить такие вещи? Нас же 
никто в отряд не гнал, сами пошли. Не отсиживались в тылу, Родине 
помогали. А чтобы без выстрелов вообще – не было такого никогда! 
Что же касается привлечения бывших партизан к ответственности 
финнами, тот тут мнения партизан еще более категоричны. 
— Они что, имели право на нашу территорию вторгаться? – 







пересчитать! Пусть судят, если хотят. Мне 83 года, я свою жизнь почти 
прожил… (KG19 04.05.2005). 
The very title of the article indicates it is narrating a history of the events 
sympathetic towards the ‘Karelian’ partisans, which the author presumably 
intends to reference a geographical rather than ethnic understanding of the term.  
This is further demonstrated by the quotation of the ‘partisan oath’ at the very 
start of the article; the reproduction of this text is clearly intended to invoke an 
image of the faithful and fearless service of these veterans towards their 
motherland.  Once again the accusations of the Finns towards the Soviet 
partisans are refuted by analogy with the Finnish use of concentration camps; the 
author indeed diminishes the validity of the Finnish claims by comparing them 
directly with these camps and accusing the Finns in turn of killing “куда 
больше” Soviet citizens.  Yet again a strategy of equivalence or the lack thereof 
is deployed in which apparent Soviet crimes are compared to the apparently 
much more heinous deeds of the Finns themselves.  In this manner the actions of 
the partisans are seen as justifiable in comparison and the Finns are invited to 
reflect more on their own conduct than that of their neighbours during the 
conflict.  This is demonstrated again by the quotations employed by the journalist 
from former partisans themselves; not only does the partisan quoted portray 
himself and his comrades as having aided the motherland but he also dismisses 
the Finnish accusations by asking if they имели право на нашу территорию 
вторгаться? 
The attitude of the Finns towards their fellow Finno-Ugrians during the 
1941-44 conflict has already been seen to be a delicate issue within certain 
narratives of the period.  We have already examined above the manner in which 
Anatolii Grigoriev constructs the village of Lambisel’ga as an authentically 
Karelian village.  In a further excerpt of this article below he contrasts the 
behaviour of the Soviet authorities towards his fellow-villagers to that of the 







У семьи Владимира Яковлева тоже непростая судьба. Его дед, отец 
матери Михаил Зайцев, здорово пострадал от советской власти уже после 
войны. 
     В начале Великой Отечественной войны, в 1941 году, многие 
жители Карелии не смогли уйти в эвакуацию. Вот и Ламбисельга почти вся 
осталась. Пришли финские войска. У карелов с финнами больших проблем 
не было. Финны предложили выбрать из числа деревенских старосту. 
Михаил Зайцев и стал старостой. После окончания войны Зайцеву все 
припомнили и сослали в лагеря на 10 лет в Красноярский край, и не только 
его, но еще нескольких деревенских. 
     Вернулся он после 1956 года изможденным и больным. Некоторое 
время еще проработал сельским почтальоном. В 60-е годы он в деревню 
привозил на лошадке почту. Очень добрый был человек и душевный. 
     Яковлевы - настоящая карельская семья. Таких бы надо всемерно 
поддерживать и морально, и материально. (K71 03.07.2008) 
In this article Grigoriev contrasts the relatively benign conduct of the 
Finnish forces, who are described as not having created any real problems for the 
Karelians, with the vindictive conduct of the Soviet authorities after the war.  For 
having cooperated with the Finns a Mikhail Zaitsev, described explicitly as a 
‘very good man’ by the author, is unjustly sentenced to ten years in a gulag 
alongside certain other villagers.  This supposed collaborator is portrayed as an 
innocent man, moreover as from a ‘real Karelian’ family.  Grigoriev here 
presents the Soviets rather than the Finns in a negative light, subverting the usual 
narrative of the war, and proposing an alternate viewpoint in which the Karelians 
were not harmed by the Finns but instead victimised by the Soviets.  It may be 
argued this could be construed as an attempt once again, as earlier in the article, 
to link the Karelians more closely with the Finns rather than the Soviets or 
Russians. 
As has been demonstrated by the examples above, however, the manner 







comparable to that of the USSR in general.  The Karelian and Russian peoples 
are normally depicted as having fought side by side despite the Finnish attempts 
to turn one against the other and thus having gained a great victory against brutal 
invaders and occupiers.  The differences between the general narrative of the 
Great Patriotic War in Karelia and the USSR in general are the most interesting 
elements and are worth noting.  Firstly the very fact it was the Finns who, for the 
most part, were engaged along the Karelian front and in particular in the KFSSR 
by the Soviets does entail the construction of a somewhat different ‘enemy’ 
picture than that encountered elsewhere; although generally portrayed as fascist 
invaders and harsh occupiers, up to and including the use of concentration 
camps, there is some sense that the Finns were somewhat less inhuman and 
brutal than their Nazi allies.  Indeed in some very marginal narratives the Finns 
are seen as behaving in a perfectly reasonable manner at least towards the ethnic 
Karelian population.  Certain Karelians do not appear therefore to narrate the 
occupation in an overwhelmingly negative fashion although this is a minority 
view.  It appears most Karelians and most Russians prefer to narrate the history 
of the occupation as that of shared suffering and resistance.  The idea that the 
Russian authorities harboured any doubts over the loyalty of the Karelians is also 
viewed as heretical; it does appear that at least some Karelians are of the opinion 
that their Russian neighbours did and may still do have doubts over whether the 
Karelians suffered at the hands of and fought against the Finns as much as they 
might have.  In general however the narrative of heroic resistance against the 
invader is sanctified and consecrated as the inviolable truth; it is for the most part 
from Finland that challenges to this narrative are perceived and such challenges 
are energetically countered.    
 
3.11 The Kantele, Kalitki and the Kalevala: Karelian History as a Brand 
A further tendency in the presentation of the history of the Republic of 
Karelia and the Karelian people themselves is a somewhat more recent 
propensity to view it as a resource to be exploited for economic benefit.  This is 







dynamics of cultural globalisation are weakening the links between the historical 
past and the sense of nation or community to the extent that these histories and 
traditions are deprived of their geographic or cultural ‘groundings’. This 
commercialisation of Karelian history and traditions is linked to the development 
of the Republic of Karelia as a centre for tourism.  Certain Karelian traditions are 
being developed into a Karelian ‘brand’ to market the region to visitors from 
other parts of Russia and overseas.  In this manner the semiotic content of certain 
symbols of Karelia is being changed or distorted to match new commercial 
requirements.  The impact of this process on the narration of national identity 
itself is hard to gauge.  It is possible that conversion of certain aspects of 
Karelian culture and certain historical sites, in particular Kizhi, into ‘tourist 
attractions’ may impact on the manner in which they are perceived within 
Karelia.  There is also the potential for these sites to be adopted as a ‘regional 
brand’ rather than an ethnic Karelian ‘brand’.  There is an awareness of this 
tendency within the press of the Republic of Karelia itself: 
 Сегодня общественное мнение относительно культуры карельского 
народа у жителей Республики Карелия в сравнении с периодом конца 1980 
- начала 1990-х годов изменилось в лучшую сторону. Брендами карельской 
культуры жители многонациональной Карелии гордятся - это эпос 
<Калевала>, карельская кухня (особенно калитки и кевятти), музыкальный 
инструмент кантеле, история карелов. При опросе жители региона 
причисляют к таким же знаковым этнокультурным явлениям и 
профессиональные коллективы - Государственный Национальный театр и 
государственный Национальный ансамбль песни и танца Карелии 
<Кантеле>, национальные костюмы, ремесленные изделия и (даже!) 
карельский язык. 
     Но эта гордость наших соотечественников от знакомства с брендами 
культуры карельского народа носит в большинстве случаев 
<экстравертный>, номинальный характер. Людей зачастую привлекают не 
собственно явления этнической и национальной культуры карельского 
народа, а их необычность, загадочность, экзотичность. Эксплуатация 







культуры создала почву для возникновения множества творческих 
коллективов, деятельность которых год от года становится все агрессивнее 
к явлениям собственно культуры карельского народа, вольно или невольно 
выталкивая подлинник на периферию культурной жизни нашего региона и 
<эрзацем> представляя регион за его пределами. Специалистам известно, 
что в подлинной этнической культуре темперамент и творческая харизма 
имеют иной, глубинный, а не броский внешний имитационный характер. 
     Сегодня в Республике Карелия свыше 120 творческих коллективов 
разной ведомственной принадлежности используют в своей деятельности 
этническую культуру карелов. Заметим, что степень погружения в область 
подлинной культуры карельского народа разнообразна. Хорошо это для 
культуры карельского народа или нет - покажет время. 
     Надо отметить, что сам карельский народ никогда не относился и 
не относится к своей культуре как к явлению <напоказ>. Отношение всегда 
было, есть и остается самым серьезным. Карелы искренне поддерживают 
свою культуру не по подсказке извне, а в соответствии с изначально 
высоким ее предназначением в карельском социуме. Культура оценивается 
представителями этноса как достояние и непременная часть жизни каждого 
карела. (K 122 30.10.2007) 
 In the rather lengthy excerpt above several important issues are revealed.  
Firstly the author lists ‘brands’ by which Karelia is recognised as a region and of 
which its inhabitants are proud.  The inhabitants taking pride in these 
manifestations of Karelian culture are not exclusively ethnically Karelian; in fact 
it is explicitly stated by the author that these ‘brands’, including the history of the 
Karelians and their language are a source of pride to all of the inhabitants of 
‘multi-ethnic’ Karelia.  The use of ‘даже’ in parentheses and with an 
exclamation mark does indicate some surprise or scepticism on the behalf of the 
author to the use of Karelian as a marker of regional identity by non-ethnic 
Karelians.  In fact the use of the traditions and culture of the Karelians as a 
marketing tool in general seems to be viewed by the author with a degree of 







as a brand as differing in a fundamental way from its usage to express Karelian 
identity; the usage of these ‘brands’ to market Karelian is described as an 
ephemeral gimmick compared to the deeply meaning way in which Karelians use 
their culture to express their own identity.  Unnamed ‘specialists’ are invoked to 
confirm the author’s opinion that genuine ethnic culture is fundamentally 
different from the pale imitation of national culture offered up to tourists.    In 
fact the author explicitly asks us to take cognisance, through the use of ‘надо 
отметить’, of the fact that Karelian culture is of value in and of itself to 
Karelians.  It is described as a part of Karelians themselves, valued for the reason 
it is part of and constituent of identity for each Karelian rather than because of its 
potential economic benefit.  It is clear that the author feels that Karelian culture 
is being used in some quarters as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.  
In particular it would seem the author feels its use by non-Karelians as a 
marketing tool could have negative repercussions for Karelian identity. 
The use of Karelian culture and history as a potential source of economic 
growth is not always negatively evaluated, however: 
A) Все знают, что "Кижи" — это музей памятников деревянного 
зодчества под открытым небом. Однако одновременно это место 
является туристической меккой, гордостью и надеждой 
республики на то, что она когда-нибудь сделает туризм важной 
частью своей экономики (KG29 18.07.2001). 
 
B) Во время летних полевых исследований научный сотрудник 
Карельского краеведческого музея Вячеслав Фролов обнаружил, 
что группа изображений на правом берегу устья реки Водла на 
полуострове Кочковнаволок (Онежское озеро) сильно 
повреждена и изуродована. Значительная часть изображений 
перебита каким-то инструментом и по сути уничтожена, рядом 
со скоплениями наскальных рисунков выбиты надписи "Дима. 
Весна 2002 г", "Максим", "Игорь". 
И хотя по данному факту заведено уголовное дело, памятник 







официальное заключение, что "эта группа наскальных 
изображений полностью утрачена как объект экскурсионного 
показа, потому что памятник культуры в значительной части 
уничтожен (KG43 09.10.2002). 
 
C) Говорят, что Кижи — это достояние республики. Только многие 
жители этой республики ни разу в именитом музее-заповеднике 
не были. Вместо нас чаще любуются красотами Кижей 
иногородние туристы, для которых северный пейзаж — экзотика 
(KG30 20.07.2004). 
 
The above examples demonstrate how sites associated with Karelian 
history, in particular the museum complex on Kizhi, are often viewed primarily 
as potential marketing and tourism opportunities.  In example B vandalism which 
destroys ancient rock carvings is presented by the expert quoted as a disaster, not 
merely because of the destruction of an ancient relic but because they are now 
worthless as the objects of экскурсионного показа.  Examples A, and C both 
depict Kizhi as primarily a source of potential revenue from tourism rather than 
as a historical site.  In example A the status of Kizhi as a ‘tourist Mecca’ is in 
fact the reason it is declared to be the ‘pride’ of the republic.  Example C further 
undermines the value of Kizhi as a marker of ‘Karelian’ identity by noting that 
although it is commonly (говорят) viewed and narrated as one of the treasures of 
the Republic of Karelia many of the actual residents of the republic have never in 
fact visited it “ни разу.”  It is in fact, the reader is informed, not ‘us’ who visits 
Kizhi but “иногородние туристы”.  These tourists are presumably 
“иногородние” in terms of Karelia as a whole rather than just Kizhi.  For these 
visitors, we are informed, the museum serves the purpose again of providing 
something ‘exotic’.  Clearly Kizhi is constructed here as being of marginal 
importance to those who actually live in the Republic of Karelia as an actual 
cultural and historical object; its true purpose is to provide a taste of the exotic 







 This tendency to view such Karelian historical sites as primarily 
important for their potential economic benefit is also opposed in the media of the 
Republic of Karelia; these sites are also sometimes depicted as valuable for their 
own sake.  Indeed the press is often hostile to the plans of the regional authorities 
to use such sites to generate income: 
 Между тем петроглифы украшают официальный Интернет-сайт 
карельского правительства. С помощью этой приманки правительство 
хочет найти деньги инвесторов для создания международного 
туристического маршрута "с использованием археологического комплекса 
"Беломорские петроглифы". Отдать петроглифы власти готовы на срок не 
менее 25 лет за 250 тысяч долларов. Инвестор получит эксклюзивное право 
на организацию туристской деятельности. По неофициальной информации, 
потенциальные инвесторы в сопровождении представителей местной 
власти уже неоднократно приезжали смотреть петроглифы (KG13 
26.03.2003). 
 
 Кижи: достояние или кормушка?  
Уже много месяцев в Петрозаводске и по всей Карелии висят 
огромные рекламные щиты, на которых изображена Преображенская 
церковь и надпись "Достояние республики". У тех, кто вырос здесь и кто 
любит наш край, нашу природу, наше неповторимое зодчество, нет 
сомнения, что Кижи — это достояние. Но не все разделяют патриотичные 
чувства по отношению к уникальному объекту этнографии. Мы уже не раз 
писали о том, как часть земли на острове пытались продать в частные руки 
под видом инвестиционного проекта. Мы не раз писали о том, что музей 
зарабатывает большие деньги за счет туристического обслуживания, но эти 
средства не идут на развитие и реконструкцию ветшающих объектов, а 
уплывают в неизвестные карманы (KG52 24.12.2003). 
The above two examples demonstrate that the use of historical sites as a 







authorities is seen as unacceptable by the Karelian press.  The first example is an 
excerpt from a series of articles written on the fate of rock carvings of great 
antiquity which are found around Lake Onego.  Karel’skaya Guberniya ran a 
series of articles on this question seeking to expose plans to sell the carvings or at 
least the rights to ‘admittance’ to see them to private interests.  Although these 
glyphs are not associated with any particular ethnicity they are deemed by the 
paper to have some sort of inherent value.  The republican government, by using 
them to украшают its website may also be seeking to use them as a ‘brand’ for 
the area beyond merely marketing the carvings themselves to potential investors.  
Kizhi is most certainly used in this fashion as a ‘brand’ by the authorities as the 
paper reminds its readers; it is also the case that the paper views Kizhi as 
important for a sense of ‘Karelian’ identity itself.  The identity itself is ‘Karelian’ 
in geographical rather than ethnic terms, including by the invitation of the author 
all кто вырос здесь и кто любит наш край, which is presumably most of his 
readership both Karelian and Russian.  For this group of ‘Karelians’ Kizhi is 
constructed as being a key marker of their identity to the extent it induces 
патриотичные чувства ; its value as such is apparently so great for there to be 
нет сомнения of this fact amongst this constructed ‘we’ group of Karelian 
citizens.  These ‘Karelian patriots’ including the imagined reader are opposed, 
however, by the journalist against an unnamed group of speculators seeking to 
make money out of the museum.  The proceeds of tourism to the site are, it is 
alleged, going not to the museum itself but to these speculators as they are 
synecdochially exemplified by the в неизвестные карманы. 
There are clearly therefore, both amongst ethnic Karelians and elements 
of the Russian press, misgivings over the manner in which these aspects of 
Karelian history and culture, both as claimed by Karelians themselves and by the 
Russian community, are being exploited as a ‘brand’ to attract tourism and 
investment.  This is however the stated policy of the republican government as 
the article reproduced below relates: 







Основная цель работы «Инвестиций в будущее» – привлечь 
инвесторов в республику. На площадках форума, сконцентрированных на 
площади Кирова, будут обсуждаться разные темы: развитие туризма, 
утилизация отходов, доступное жилье, развитие технопарков и 
инновационных технологий, молодежная политика, сохранение и 
воспроизводство лесных и водных ресурсов, экологически чистые 
источники энергии. Но, несомненно, одна из главных проблем, которую 
считает необходимым затронуть карельское правительство, – это 
духовность.  
«Карелия, которая находится в окружении трех великих островов, 
трех храмов Преображения Господня, самым естественным образом 
оказывается в центре уникального пространства Русского Севера, 
выступающего в качестве духовной опоры и одного из источников 
современного единства и обновления России. Поэтому Карелия заявляет о 
готовности выступить своеобразным духовно-нравственным аналогом 
Сколково» – торжественно сообщает нам официальный сайт форума. 
Чтобы понять, какие же суперперемены готовит нам мегапроект, вы, 
вероятно, вспомнили давно забытый предмет – философию, в курсе 
которого понятие «духовность» трактовалось как объединяющее начало 
моральных ценностей и нравственности. А если не вспомнили – то, 
возможно, не поленились достать с полки толковый словарь и прочитать 
там, что духовность – это, оказывается, свойство души, состоящее в 
преобладании духовных интересов над материальными. Впрочем, если вы 
не сделали ни того, ни другого – не беда, потому что у правительства 
Карелии для этого слова есть свое, особое значение. 
– В Приладожье, Поморье и Заонежье создается план центра 
православной культуры, – рассказал Евгений Шорохов, поясняя, в чем же 
суть мегапроекта Андрея Нелидова. – В Заонежье, например, планируется 
построить православный храм. А еще конгрессо-деловой центр, 
гостиничный комплекс и туристские центры. И, конечно, этнодеревню с 







– И там будут жить представители малых национальностей? Карелы, 
например, вепсы?.. – наивно поинтересовались мы. 
– Не-ет, – ответил Шорохов, – не карелы, а туристы. За счет этого 
шедевра мы же оживим туристическую индустрию! Это наше 
стратегическое направление (KG47 23.11.2011). 
The article above shows the manner in which the authorities have adopted 
several of the narratives of Karelian and Russian unity already examined above: 
that of the shared ‘spiritual’ history of Karelia and Russia as a whole and that of 
Karelia as constituting a part of the ‘Russian north’.  It also demonstrates how 
the exploitation of this supposed heritage is the стратегическое направление of 
the local authorities.  Both the Orthodox legacy within Karelia and the history 
and culture of the minority nationalities are presented by the authorities as being 
opportunities to attract tourism and investment.  The journalist somewhat 
sarcastically asks the official interviewed if the этнодеревнo is being constructed 
for the benefit of the Karelians and Vepsians.  The official involved, with of 
course the aid of the journalist who represents his answer in this particular 
fashion, essentially sums up the manner in which the authorities view the value 
of the historical legacy of the Karelian and Vepsian, and indeed to an extent even 
the Russian, culture of Karelia.  This policy is, as he states, aimed at benefiting 
не карелы, а туристы. 
  
 3.12 The Kondopoga Affair: Racism in Quiet Karelia? 
 The Kondopoga Affair of 2006 appeared to take the local authorities and 
their federal counterparts by surprise.  This outbreak of inter-ethnic tension 
seems to have been completely unanticipated by the government of the Republic 
of Karelia and indeed Katanandov initially attempted to deny that there was in 
fact any ethnic or racist element to the violence: 
 Мы расцениваем ситуацию в Кондопоге как локальную, которая 







занята (“Беспорядки в Кондопоге оказались неожиданностью для властей” 
Stolitsa Na Onego 04.09.2006). 
 This assessment of the situation was quickly undermined by the facts of 
the situation and already by the 9th of September Kareliya was using the term 
‘pogrom’ to refer to the events in Kondopoga, although the title of the article 
concerned, “Не в наших традициях”( K 100 09.06.2006), already suggests the 
use of a strategy of discontinuation to deny that such events were truly part of 
‘Karelian’ identity.  In fact the presence of racist and intolerant discourses within 
the Republic of Karelia ought to have come as no surprise to the local 
government; indeed a particular problem within local marketplaces had been 
identifiable within the mass media discourse for some time prior to the events in 
Kondopoga.  Perhaps tellingly little of this is to be discovered within the pages of 
the official paper, Kareliya, but rather it is found within Karel’skaya Guberniya.  
As far back as 2001 a limited number of articles hint that there was some 
resentment or predjudice amongst certain sectors at least of Karelian society 
towards specific minority groups: 
 “— Многих жителей Петрозаводска пугает наплыв кавказцев. Они 
— временные или постоянные жители? 
“— Многие их них — давно наши сограждане. Хотя есть и те, кто 
вовремя не оформил вид на жительство, не зарегистрировал своих 
родственников (KG45 07.11.2001)”. 
In the above excerpt the journalist seeks to convey the apparent ‘fear’ of 
the synedocially denoted ‘locals’ or ‘we group’ of a ‘flood’ of immigrants from 
the Caucauses.  This provides a topos of threat, using a strategy of differentiation 
to place the majority of ‘residents of Petrozavodsk’ in opposition to the supposed 
inundation of immigrants.  The immigration official who is being interviewed 
does not attempt to completely refute the opposing groups that the journalist has 
created but does so in part: they attempt to use a strategy of unification by 
reminding the journalist that at least part of the group being discussed are also in 
the ‘we’ group by being давно наши сограждане.  Nevertheless the excerpt 







upon which the local authorities should be held to account.  More importantly it 
suggests, despite the weak attempt by the official to include the people concerned 
in the ‘we’ group of local residents, that individuals from the Southern 
autonomous republics of the Russian Federation are considered by at least a 
section of Karelian society to be ‘immigrants’. 
In fact this idea that people of Chechen or other Muslim background were 
not considered to be ‘legitimate’ residents of the Republic of Karelia was 
apparently so pronounced in 2003 that when interviewed by the paper the Imam 
of Karelia, Visam Ali Bardvil, remarked: 
“— Мы чувствуем, что к нам относятся, как к чужакам. Черные — 
они и есть черные... Меня в Петрозаводске, слава Богу, милиционеры не 
останавливают. Знают, наверное. А в Москве останавливают, и только из-за 
внешнего вида. Хорошо еще борода есть, так иногда путают со 
священником православным. "Здравствуйте, святой отец, — говорят, — 
идите с Богом!" Я и иду... А жена моя как страдает! Она ведь носит платок 
и почти ежедневно слушает всякие замечания, издевки: "Аллах Агбар!" 
Хватает в Петрозаводске людей неграмотных и нецивилизованных (KG11 
12.03.2003).” 
Bardvil had prior to this interview led a campaign which attempted 
unsuccessfully to gain permission for the construction of a mosque in 
Petrozavodsk; plans for the building of such a structure were voted down at the 
municipal level amid an apparent public outcry at the idea.  Indeed the paper 
notes in the article that since this event the local Islamic organisation had 
“фактически ушла в подполье” whilst the affair had supposedly stoked a good 
deal of resentment on both sides.  Both the events themselves and the article, as 
the above excerpt demonstrates, reveal the presence of intolerance towards 
expressions of Muslim identity within a significant proportion of society within 
the Republic of Karelia.  Bardvil openly opines that the majority, the unnamed 
group synedochially expressed by those who “к нам относятся”, do not include 
Muslims within their society but regard them as “чужаки”.  He also reverses the 







the group at risk; in this case the threats are portrayed more directly as 
intimidation both from the authorities and society in general.  This treatment of 
Muslims is contrasted directly with that of the Russian Orthodox: he contrasts his 
own treatment as someone who “иногда путают со священником 
православным” with the apparent constant harassment of his wife, whose 
appearance is unmistakably Muslim.   
It should be noted that whilst Muslims and people from Caucasia more 
generally are the main groups singled out for such abuse incidents of intolerance 
towards other groups have been recorded within the Republic of Karelia: 
Перед дверьми общества еврейской культуры "Шалом" кто-то 
нарисовал несколько фашистских свастик и присовокупил к ним 
"изящный" экспромтик: "Гитлер был не виноват, евреев отправляя в ад" 
Не прошло и недели, как подобное высказывание появилось на 
еврейском кладбище. В данном случае неизвестный автор сетовал, что 6 
миллионов убитых во время войны евреев — недостаточная цифра, и 
высказывал пожелание увеличить ее вдвое. Формальности были соблюдены 
— уголовное дело возбудили. Но оптимизма, надо сказать, это не 
прибавило. 
Можно, конечно, радоваться, что по сравнению со многими другими 
регионами России наша республика в плане национальных отношений 
выглядит более-менее благополучно. За 11 лет существования "Шалома" — 
"всего" три или четыре надругательства над могилами и примерно столько 
же нападений на офис общества. Кавказские погромы в День десантника. И 
тихо тлеющая, в принципе пока не агрессивная, но стойкая антипатия ко 
всему смуглому и не курносому. Стоит ли из-за таких "пустяков" 
волноваться? Специалисты из следственных органов сообщили, что, как 
правило, они не находят в подобных фактах признаков разжигания 
национальной розни, а рассматривают их просто как хулиганство или 







This article demonstrates that anti-semitism is present within at least a 
section of the population of the Republic of Karelia.  It is of course not possible 
to determine how widespread this prejudice or intolerance towards Muslims is 
within society as a whole in the region from such incidents of vandalism or the 
anecdotal evidence of Bardvil.  The author of the above article does however 
attempt to use the desecration of Jewish sites within Petrozavodsk as a 
synedocial representation of what they perceive to be the general mood within 
the Republic of Karelia.  The perceived apathy and indifference of the local 
authorities towards the issue of racism in the area is sarcastically castigated by 
the journalist with their sardonic assurance to the reader that they can take joy in 
the fact that compared to other parts of Russia “наша республика в плане 
национальных отношений выглядит более-менее благополучно.”  The 
author uses an inverted strategy of trivialisation, listing the worrying 
manifestations of such intolerance as ‘proof’ that there is no problem with racism 
in Karelia to make the opposite point.  The title of the article is the ironic 
"Мелкое хулиганство", but the journalist actually portrays intolerance as a 
growing threat throughout society in the region: a “тихо тлеющая, в принципе 
пока не агрессивная, но стойкая антипатия ко всему смуглому и не 
курносому” which seems general.  The use of the adverbial qualifier “пока” 
suggests that the journalist is convinced violence is inevitable, in contrast the 
local authorities are depicted as treating such issues with all the cynical triviality 
the journalist mocks so forcefully.  
In fact the regional authorities of the Republic of Karelia themselves used 
discourses of intolerance and exclusion to refer to groups from the Caucasus 
area.  Indeed they openly used the language of such discourses to address 
problems within the marketplaces of the Republic of Karelia in the years 
preceding the Kondopoga Affair and its immediate aftermath.  In 2003 the mayor 
of Petrozavodsk attempted to ban ‘immigrants’ from trading in the city’s 
markets: 







Петрозаводский глава считает, что карельскими овощами должны 
торговать карелы 
На очередной планерке в мэрии глава петрозаводской 
администрации во всеуслышание дал понять, что националистические 
взгляды ему не чужды. Во всяком случае, говоря об открывающейся в 
начале октября сельскохозяйственной ярмарке, городничий отметил, что не 
потерпит у продавцов "никакого другого акцента, кроме финского и 
карельского (KG38 17.09.2003). 
The above article is revealing on a number of levels. Firstly it reveals that 
the local administration in Petrozavodsk were quite openly advocating that 
participation in local commerce be restricted on ethnic grounds; the construction 
“во всеуслышание дал понять” indicates both the forcefulness of the 
intervention and the attributed intent of the speaker for his remarks to reach as 
wide an audience as possible.  Secondly and more importantly it illustrates the 
construction of a ‘we’ group that includes Russians, Karelians and Finns but 
excludes the “националистические взгляды” of other unnamed groups.  
Nowhere in the brief article are the constituents of this unacceptable ‘other 
group’ named, but we are left to surmise whom they may be from comparison 
with the legitimised ‘we’ group.  Most interesting is the superficially baffling and 
contradictory manner in which this ‘we’ group is constituted.  Whilst the article 
states the apparent intention of the mayor that “карельскими овощами должны 
торговать карелы”, it is quite clear from the rest of the article that ‘Karelians’ in 
this sense is not intended to mean solely Karelians by nationality or ethnicity.  In 
fact the title of the article, “Овощи по-русски”, actually suggests the exclusion 
of all but Russians from the market.  Indeed Karelian and Finnish language is 
apparently not anticipated as being used either; the mayor will “потерпит” 
Karelian and Finnish accents, suggesting he expects Karelians and Finns to be 
trading in Russian.  Clearly in this example not only are Karelians, Finns and 
Russians constructed as a ‘we’ group in opposition to supposed immigrants, but 
the very term “карелы” has been appropriated by the paper and possibly also the 
authorities, although the construction of the article leaves this unclear, as 







Warnings of potential violence against ethnic minority groups, in 
particular Muslims, were made prior to the Kondopoga Affair in 2006 as has 
been noted above.  In 2004 the then head of the Republic of Karelia Katanandov 
used the recent Beslan terrorist attacks to cast doubt on the loyalties of the local 
Chechen and other Muslim diasporas with the region: 
В частности, Сергей Катанандов призвал национальных лидеров 
самим наводить порядок внутри диаспор, причем не только за их 
официальных членов, вовлеченных в культурные мероприятия, но и за всех 
остальных. В противном случае было обещано закрыть республику для 
гостей из южных регионов. 
— Мы ждем официальных заявлений об отношении к происшедшей 
трагедии от представителей национальных кавказских диаспор. Мы 
рассчитываем на то, что эти люди хотят жить с нами в мире и согласии, — 
сказал Сергей Катанандов. 
Председатель Духовного управления мусульман республики Висам 
Али Бардвил оценил эти высказывания как выражение недоверия и 
подозрения ко всем людям неславянской внешности, проживающим в 
Карелии (KG39 22.09.2004). 
In this article we clearly see Katanandov create another topos of threat 
regarding these ethnic groups within Karelia, using strategies of casting doubt 
and shifting of blame and scapegoating to depict a need for the leaders of such 
communities to “наводить порядок внутри диаспор”.  By calling upon these 
groups to offer an official assurance of their revulsion at such terrorist attacks 
and that they “хотят жить с нами в мире и согласии” this topos of threat is 
bolstered; there is an insinuation that such assurances are necessary or may not 
be readily forthcoming.  This further acts to create a division between the 
legitimised “мы” group of ordinary, law-abiding citizens of the Republic of 
Karelia and the potentially dangerous, delegitimised “эти люди”.  Once again 
the idea that these groups have any natural right to reside in Karelia is questioned 
through the formula “гостей из южных регионов”.  As the final paragraph 







outraged offence rather than apologetic submission and reassurance, and indeed 
the paper itself was critical of Katanandov’s language, noting that the sceptical 
and hostile reaction of many other political figures in the region to his remarks.   
Katanandov did not initially moderate his language on such issues, 
however, and indeed in the immediate aftermath of the Kondopoga Affair he and 
other local officials persisted in placing the blame for poor inter-ehnic relations 
squarely at the door of the minority groups concerned.  Katanandov for example 
in remarks to Kommersant that were then reprinted in Kareliya on the 7th of 
September reflected the language of the Movement Against Illegal Immigration 
(DPNI) in his assessment of the situation in Kondopoga: 
Главной причиной беспорядков стало то, что на наших глазах 
группа представителей другого народа вела себя дерзко и вызывающе, 
игнорируя менталитет нашего народа. Северных людей нужно долго 
доводить. В общем, я понимаю чувства тех людей, которые вышли на 
улицу (K99 07.09.2006). 
Thus the issue as constructed by Katanandov was the presence of ‘other 
peoples’ who did not follow the norms expected of them in Karelian society.  In 
articles printed in Kareliya at this time it was further inferred that the rioters had 
legitimate concerns.  Language such as “приезжие не уважали наши законы” 
was used by Katanandov himself in further articles (see K100 09.09.2006), along 
with further inferences that the ‘immigrants’ did not behave ‘morally’.  He also 
identified problems with the “адаптации приезжей молодежи к местному 
укладу жизни (ibid)” and further inferred they did not respect local traditions.  
There was a general tendency towards negative description of those persons 
residing in Kondopoga of Caucasian ancestry.  In Kareliya and Karel’skaya 
Guberniya they are described as ‘immigrants’, ‘kavkavtsi’, ‘incomers’ and so 
forth, whereas the Russian participants are described consistently simply as 
‘locals’.  The impression is given that at least part of the blame for the problems 
arises from an inability or unwillingness amongst those of Caucasian descent to 
adapt to the ‘norms’ of a Russian society which is paradoxically portrayed as 







being Russian citizens the victims of the pogroms in Kondopoga are not accepted 
within the media discourse of the Republic as being ‘local’ or even ‘Russian’ in 
the same sense as ethnic Russians or Karelians.  Relatively quickly after the 
events in Kondopoga a new market was established in the town, which was set 
aside for the use of the ‘local’ population only.  Once again the Head of the 
Government of Karelia, S. Katanandov, willing adopted strategies of 
scapegoating, delegitimisation and criminalisation to justify the measure, 
referring to the previous traders in the market as ‘перекупщики’ (see “Базарные 
разговоры” Stolitsa na Onego 04.11.2006) , and inferring criminal activity.  
These he contrasted with the ‘grandmothers’, ‘veterans’, ‘our citizens’ and 
‘ordinary people’ who were worried about this situation (ibid).  When reminded 
by the Karelian Minister of Economic Development that the ‘immigrants’ he 
wished to exclude were also Russian citizens he openly stated this was 
immaterial ‘есть ли у нас рынки, которые контролируются криминальными 
структурами’ (ibid).  Thus the immigrant communities in Kondopoga, or more 
accurately the so-called immigrant communities, were not accorded any rights or 
sympathy in this official discourse, but were instead made responsible, at least in 
part, for their own predicament.  The supposed discriminatory regime towards 
the ‘locals’ prevalent in the markets, which was attributed to administrative 
failings and corruption as well as the activities of ‘speculators’, were also noted 
at a Federal level.  During the ‘telemost’ of October 2006 Putin devoted some of 
the discussion to questions of trade in such markets and promised action, linking 
this issue, despite the question not being openly couched in such a manner, to 
issues of migration. 
The official response to the Kondopoga incident sought to localise the 
issue, attributing failings steadily downwards from federal, regional and 
ultimately to a local level, with many articles seeking to suggest the problems of 
Kondopoga were just that and were not reflective of any broader issues in 
Russian or Karelian society (see for example the article“Кондопога: уроки, 
выводы, перспективы” K131 23.11.2006).  The journalists of Karel’skaya 
Guberniya were more willing however to see the events as representative of a 







В Кондопоге произошел конфликт, обнаживший серьезные 
межнациональные проблемы, существующие как в России вообще, так и в 
Карелии в частности. Мы, по традиции продолжая считать себя 
гостеприимным народом, на поверку являемся нетерпимыми ко всему 
чужому. И нетерпимость эта пронизывает все слои нашего общества. К 
примеру, хозяева большинства петрозаводских клубов не пускают к себе 
кавказцев. Не тех, кто как-то плохо зарекомендовал себя во время 
предыдущих визитов, а всех без исключения. А некоторые интеллигентные, 
добрые и образованные работники мэрии уверены, что это правильное 
решение, и сетуют на то, что кавказцам, в принципе, разрешают приезжать 
в Петрозаводск. 
Бывший военком республики требовал у мэрии лишить людей права 
торговать овощами рядом с военкоматом только потому, что у них были 
явные признаки кавказской национальности. Мэр же, вместо того чтобы 
объяснить военкому, что его требования противоречат Конституции, 
потребовал от своих подчиненных решить проблему. С азербайджанцами 
была расторгнута аренда, а военком ушел на повышение и стал генералом 
(KG38 12.09.2006) 
In the above excerpt the paper explicitly refutes the idea that the 
Kondopoga Affair was an isolated incident and instead declares it representative 
of a more general intolerance in Karelian and Russian society.  The strategy of 
positive self presentation used in the official discourse of society in the Republic 
of Karelia being tolerant and welcoming is inverted: as the journalist constructs 
the Kondopoga affair as a ‘test’ which has revealed the true nature of local 
society as “нетерпимыми ко всему чужому”.  The singularity of the 
Kondopoga Affair as constructed in the official discourse is denied by 
comparison to the discriminatory policies of Petrozavodsk clubs which will not 
admit ‘кавказцы'; a strategy of unification is used to highlight that this is not 
merely an attitude found amongst the fringes of society but that it “пронизывает 
все слои нашего общества”.  Most dammingly the journalist accuses the 
authorities of being just as prejudiced towards such groups as the remainder of 







the military official related shows the expression of intolerance towards these 
groups is not only permissible but appears to be rewarded. 
In summation it is clear from the above texts that there is an issue with 
intolerance and outright racism within the Republic of Karelia.  No firm 
estimation can be made of the depth or scale of this prejudice across differing 
groups from the material in the corpus of data to hand; it is not at all clear if 
ethnic Russians, Karelians or Vepsians are any more or less tolerant of certain 
minority groups.  What can be ascertained is that any prejudice against the 
Finno-Ugric inhabitants of the area is clearly formulated and conceptualised as a 
separate issue from that which is directed towards groups of Muslim heritage.  In 
fact when intolerance towards ‘incomers’ or ‘immigrants’ is expressed the 
Finno-Ugric populace appear to be included in the ‘we’ group of legitimate 
residents who are allotted the right, in this discourse, of residence in the area.  It 
should also be noted that through the use of strategies of exclusion, 
delegitimisation and negative presentation such groups such as Chechens or 
Dagestanis, despite being legally Russian citizens, are not conceptualised as 
legitimately part of either ‘Russian’ or more especially ‘Karelian’ identities.  
These groups are almost always viewed as immigrants within the media 
discourse studied regardless of citizenship or length of residence.  It is clear that 
the increase in intolerance towards these groups noted across Russia is a 
phenomenon to which Karelia has proved in no way immune.  The analysis 
above shows that from the early years of the last decade there was at least a low-
level awareness of a problem with intolerance within the Karelian press, 
although it appears not have been expressed at all in the official media.  General 
indifference towards this issue, especially on an official level, was however 
shattered by the dramatic events in Kondopoga in 2006; this period seems, at 
least in terms of media coverage of these issues, to have marked the high-water 
mark of racist prejudice.  Since 2007, when another killing in Olonets threatened 
to spark more minor tensions, coverage of such issues and expressions of such 
intolerance have become less marked; the Karelian authorities in particular since 
their initial reaction to the crisis appear to have been careful to moderate their 







this does not mean the problem itself has necessarily in any way disappeared or 
even moderated; clearly at least within sections of society within Karelia 
intolerance towards certain groups is present, and the above evidence would 
suggest it is present within the governing elite of the region itself. 
  
 Conclusions 
 The representation of ‘Karelian’ identity within the mass media has 
several notable features which may be related back to our theoretical discussion 
of the usage of historical narratives within the construction of national identity.  
Firstly it can be argued that there exists a conventionalised, traditional approach 
within the Russian-language mass media to the production of ideas of Karelian 
identity which is strikingly reminiscent of the Soviet-era discourse of the 
‘younger brother’.  This phenomenon is especially prevalent in the official 
discourse on national identity as exemplified by Kareliya.  This may be in part 
due to the standardising and conventionalising effect of the genre of newspaper 
discourse itself as identified above which has facilitated the persistence of this 
method of constructing ‘Karelia’.  It is argued above however that this 
persistence may well be in large part due to the perceived persistence of the same 
social relations and structure within the Republic of Karelia, with the Russian 
majority continuing to dominate at the expense of the Karelian minority and thus 
the Russian-language press perceiving no need to moderate or alter their method 
of constructing ‘Karelian’ identity.  It would also appear that the continued usage 
of this discourse is linked to the strategies of continuation utilised by the local 
authorities to legitimate the survival of political autonomy within Karelia and 
their own relations with the Finno-Ugric minority groups.  This presentation of 
Karelian identity as more ‘ethnic’ than ‘national’ and the location of Karelian 
identity with the distant, folkloric past also has a marginalising effect; this can be 
related to the construction of the imagined reader in the Russian-language press 
which contains referential dissimilation and trivialisation and minimisation to 
portray the Finno-Ugric groups as insignificant and emphasises their minority 







employment of ethnographic or Orientalist type discourse on such matters also 
has the effect of limiting conceptions of Finno-Ugric territory to a very restricted 
area. 
 As noted above the foundation of the KTK appears to have been selected 
by the local authorities as a ‘named beginning’ or ‘foundational myth’ for the 
Republic of Karelia.  This also appears to be an attempt to construct a form of 
‘civic’ nationalism or identity, albeit on rather ethnicised terms to justify and 
legitimate the continuation of Soviet-era power structures.  The usage of this 
narrative appears to have increased in the official media since 2005, with a 
potential peak in 2010 around the 90
th
 anniversary of the KTK; it should be noted 
however that this narrative is opposed by certain groups within Karelian society 
and in general outside of official rhetoric its influence is arguably weak, as shall 
be explored further in the interview material.  Certainly it is opposed by Karelian 
activists as their conceptions of ethnic identity are produced with narratives 
which seek to clearly predate 1920 by hundreds if not thousands of years.  Their 
conceptions of a more ‘ethnic’ Karelian identity are also based on a strategy of 
continuation but use historical referents of much greater antiquity.  It should be 
noted however that they do not generally appear to select any one ‘myth’ or date 
for the foundation of Karelian identity.   They do also use the foundation of the 
KTK to narrate an alternate conception of Karelian identity in which the 
Karelians are marginalised and exploited by the Russian majority.  In this sense a 
topos of the ‘broken promise’ is often created to oppose the official narrative 
with a sense of the disenfranchisement of the Karelian people and the need for 
some form of recompense.  In rare instance the Ukhtinskaya Respublika is also 
offered as an alternate ‘foundational myth’ however the event appears to be 
conceptualised more as the start of political autonomy rather than national 
history. 
 As noted above both Stuart Hall and Leszek Kolakowski considered a 
consciousness of the past, expressed variously as historical memory or emphasis 
on continuity, to be an important facet of the construction of national identities.  
Certainly in the material studied both Karelians and Russians extensively used 







centre of culture for their respective groups and thus legitimise their sense of 
national identity.  In both cases, as discussed above, the continuity of residence 
in various localities was used to construct narratives which depict Karelians and 
Russians as the ‘indigenous’ peoples of Karelia.  One of the most striking aspects 
of this process was the manner in which this tended to be extremely localised to 
certain regions, towns and especially villages.  Both Russians and Karelians 
offered narratives which depicted a particular locality as ‘purely’ Karelian or 
Russian, for example Grigoriev’s Lambisel’ga, Tuomi’s Kalevala or the Russia 
Za’Onegzhe; these narratives which tend to fragment and localise ‘real’ 
manifestations of Karelian and Russian identity are often simultaneously 
juxtaposed with representations of other areas which are depicted as lacking this 
‘model’ national character.  This idea of an ideal ‘pure’ community is also 
heavily related to the representation of Karelian language and its subsequent 
decline.  There is therefore a tension present between the narration of the 
exemplary, almost ‘pure’ ethnos or national group resident in some areas and the 
representation of its absence or debasement in others.  A rather peculiar 
patchwork of Karelian identities is thus depicted with certain areas identified as 
‘more Karelian’, and occasionally ‘more Russian’, than others. For putative 
ethnic Karelian identities this seems a problem as it is unclear how a unified 
Karelian identity can be created which elevates ‘Karelian-ness’ from the village 
to the nation.  Conversely this is much less of an issue for ideas of Karelia as a 
‘Russian’ area, and indeed as has been noted certain narratives construct Karelia 
as almost entirely a preserve of Russian culture from time immemorial with very 
little Finno-Ugric influence.  It is difficult to discern what trends may exist in 
either phenomenon; indeed it would appear both are relatively stable.  The idea 
of Russian influence being colonial in nature does appear but is very rare in the 
Russian-language media; aside from the contributions of Grigoriev only isolated 
examples could be found in the data studied, mostly from Karel’skaya 
Guberniya in one particular series of articles from 2008. 
 Strategies of continuity and legitimisation are also the key resources 
utilised in the representation of the territories annexed from Finland in 1940.  







the narration of a historical issue as a result of social and political change.  The 
topic of Sortavala and other such areas appears to have been taboo to the point of 
being entirely off-limits within the Soviet period, and indeed even in the 
immediate post-Soviet period little discussion seems to have been present on the 
issue within the Karelian press.  Silence on the matter has now been replaced by 
the delegitimisation of perceived Finnish ‘revanchism’.  This is achieved once 
again by strategies of continuation which emphasise the continuity of Russian 
occupation of the area; interestingly the idea of Karelian residence in the locality 
seems to be viewed by certain contributers as equating to ‘Russian’ residence 
rather than being a point in favour of the Finnish claims.  This narrative is also 
bolstered by the delegitimising and discrediting strategies which seek to equate 
Finnish claims with Nazi aggression.  The image of the Finn as the fascist 
aggressor is deployed to justify current political realities.  It should also be noted, 
however, that the former Finnish status of the towns can be utilised to lobby the 
local authorities for improvements to current political realities; this narrative 
remains taboo however, to the point that its open espousal is grounds for arrest. 
 The history of Russian Orthodoxy within Karelia is also used to promote 
Russian claims to legitimate residence within Karelia and the idea of Karelia as a 
genuine ‘Russian land’.  As noted above this is achieved through the narration of 
Karelia as a ‘model’ Orthodox territory, a status which again associates it closely 
with more general conceptions of Russian identity.  This process is not unique to 
Karelia by any means, and must be viewed, as discussed above, within the 
context of the increasing association of the Russian political elite and the 
Orthodox church.  In general this association of Russian (and thus Karelian) 
identity with Orthodoxy seems to be uncritically promoted by the official media 
whereas the unofficial media are somewhat more sceptical.  Orthodoxy also 
plays an important role in the construction of Karelian identity itself by being 
used to divide Karelians from the Lutheran Finns and associate them more 
closely with a broader Russian identity.  Karelians are rountinely, in the official 
media, either presented as ‘model’ Orthodox believers or as having neglected 







 This positioning of Karelian identity as closer to Russian than Finnish 
identity was also a marked feature of the historical narratives which addressed 
various conflicts.  In such narratives Karelians are routinely portrayed as the 
loyal allies of the Russians against foreign aggression, be it by the Swedes, Finns 
or Germans.  The Karelian experience of such conflicts is regularly wedded to 
the ‘national’ experience of Russia as a whole, both in official and unofficial 
media.  This creates a ‘collective memory’, as discussed above, in which 
Karelians and Russians are constantly united as a ‘we’ group in opposition to a 
menancing ‘other’.  This process is especially marked in the fairly constant 
commemorative discourse of the Great Patriotic War; every year, especially 
around Victory Day in May, this discourse is ritualistically reproduced as thus 
are these conceptions of national identity.  In contrast the more problematic issue 
of the Winter War is almost entirely neglected in both official and unofficial 
media and is commemorated in any significant way.  The ubiquity and discursive 
‘weight’ of narratives of the war however, elevated as they have been throughout 
modern Russia to a position of extreme importance in the relation of a ‘national 
story’, make it of extreme importance to counter any heterodox interpretation of 
these historical events.  As also exemplified in the discourse on the annexed 
territories the Karelian press is acutely aware of such heterodox narratives 
produced in the Finnish press and actively attempts to counter them.  The Finns, 
whilst not treated as harshly as the Germans, are almost universally depicted as 
the oppressive invader.  Any challenge to this picture of the Finns as the enemy 
is robustly countered, as is any attempt at establishing any equivalence between 
Soviet and Finnish misdeeds.   
 Despite the general predominance of unifying narratives which seek to 
use the apparent shared historical experience of Karelians and Russians to create 
a ‘we’ group in opposition to the enemy picture of the Finns occasionally 
glimpses can be caught of a narrative that positions the Karelians closer to the 
Finnish occupiers than the Russian ‘liberators’.  This narrative suggests either 
that the Karelians did not really suffer under the occupation or, in its most taboo 
form, that they may have collaborated with the Finns.  A related narrative 







supposed collaboration in the post-war period.  As has been seen these narratives 
are generally held to be taboo to the point of active refutation, and are marginal 
at best compared to the overwhelming predominance of the unifying, 
commemorative narratives which seek to unify Karelians and Russians.  There 
does seem to be a consciousness of such narratives amongst the Karelian 
contributors however and this affects the manner in which they present 
themselves.  In the context of contemporary Russian society a narrative which 
portrayed Karelians as ‘allies’ of the Finns would present them negatively and 
would exclude them from the ‘we’ group of the majority of Russian citizens.  
Consequently to avoid this potential exclusion it is evident from the analysis 
above that Karelians, when contributing to the Russian-language media, often 
proffer narratives which reassure their Russian interlocutor of the continued, 
unbroken loyalty of the Karelians to the Russian state.  They thus actively seek to 
deconstruct this imagined, generally unspoken, topos of threat which they must 
perceive to be current within ethnic Russian society.  This can also be observed 
within the discourse on the Karelian language when this same implicit topos of 
threat is refuted by contributors in debates upon the adoption of a second 
language; it is thus clear that Karelians themselves understand there to be a 
narrative within which their loyalty is questioned even if this narrative is not 
generally openly reproduced in the mass media discourse.    
  The only directly heterodox contribution noted to the discourse on the 
Great Patriotic War was that of Grigoriev.  Whilst other texts acknowledged 
heterodox narratives from the Finnish press or appeared to argue against an 
implicit heterodox narrative without its open espousal Grigoriev does construct 
an alternate narrative of the Karelian war experience.  His narrative, again 
localised and indeed personalised down to village and personal family 
experience, does challenge the orthodox view.  Once again he inverts the 
established historical narrative and asserts the essential unity of the Finns and 
Karelians in opposition to the Russians.  In his narrative it is the Russians who 
inflict the greater damage to the ‘real’ Karelian population whereas the Finnish 







Karelian space this history of Lambisel’ga places Karelians nearer to Finnish 
influence than Russian.  
 In all of the above narratives Karelians, when contributing directly to the 
discourse themselves, offer an interesting method of self-presentation; their 
contributions are striking for the levels of passivity and helplessness that they 
attribute to their ‘nation’.  This heteronomisation is marked in all the various 
historical narratives sampled but is particularly striking in discussions on the 
Karelian language and its decline.  As shall be argued further below this is of 
extreme importance as the usage of Karelian appears to be the fundamental 
defining characteristic of Karelian identity for a large section, if not the absolute 
majority, of self-identified Karelians.  Karelians appear to use historical 
narratives to create an idealised version of a ‘pure’ Karelian territory as noted 
above and the former dominance of the Karelian language is an important aspect 
of this narrative.  This topos of a ‘golden age’ of Karelia is strongly linked to 
monolingualism in Karelian.  The loss of this linguistic dominance is strongly 
negatively evaluated by Karelians as shall be explored further below.  At this 
point it is sufficient to note the manner in which this loss is narrated in the mass 
media discourse is marked by high levels of heteronomisation; Karelians 
themselves are almost invariably depicted as passive victims of the machinations 
of unnamed ‘others’ who preside over the decline in their language without the 
Karelians themselves being able to intervene to halt this process.   
 The discourse on language loss peaked in 2001 as at that time debates 
around the potential adoption of Karelian as a second official language were at 
their peak; although these efforts failed attention has been paid to the problems 
of the minority language on a fairly consistent basis in the following period.  The 
commercialisation of symbols of Karelian identity is a phenomenon which 
appears to have increasing resonance in Karelian society.  As shall be seen from 
the texts sampled above the usage of Kizhi as a ‘brand’ for the region is nothing 
new and has potentially limited implications for Karelian identities; as noted 
above most of the structures on the island of Kizhi were relocated there from 
across Karelia within living memory.  Nevertheless it is important to note the 







‘symbols’ as a means to earn tourist dollars.  In the Republic of Karelia the usage 
of symbols of the Karelian people in particular, and to a lesser extent also the 
Russian population of areas such as the Za’onezh’e, is actively being pursued by 
the local government in an effort to ‘sell’ the region to tourists and investors.  It 
is not possible to determine if any such devaluation has occurred from the data 
studied given the relative novelty of this process and the consequent relative lack 
of texts on this subject.  The texts do indicate however an awareness of this 
possibility and a hostility to this process amongst certain sectors of the Karelian 
population.   
 Another more recent phenomenon is the apparent increase in hostility 
towards certain minority groups within the Republic of Karelia, in particular 
people from Caucasia and those of an Islamic background.  This is certainly not 
unique to the area and is reflective of broader developments across the Russian 
Federation as a whole.  Over the period sampled this issue grew from a 
trivialised concern of the minority groups themselves to a pressing issue that 
demanded immediate intervention from the local authorities as the Kondopoga 
Affair made headlines both nationally and internationally.  From the texts above 
it can be seen how the local authorities helped foster this climate of intolerance 
through the promotion of narratives using strategies of exclusion, 
discontinuation, discreditation and deligitimisation which excluded the 
possibility of these groups from ‘legitimate’ residence within the Republic of 
Karelia.  Even in the immediate aftermath of the tragic events in Kondopoga 
such strategies were still employed to exclude these groups from the ‘we’ group 
of ‘genuine’ Karelian residents.  It is not possible to determine from the corpus 
of data if ethnic Karelians themselves are any more or less antipathetic to these 
groups than their ethnic Russian counterparts, nor is it possible to attempt to 
gauge how widespread this intolerance may be.  What can be determined is that 
such intolerant views are held by a significant section of the region’s population 
and that these views are at least tolerated by the local authorities and indeed on 
occasion promoted by them for their own political ends.  Importantly it can be 
seen from the discourse on the excluded groups that the Finno-Ugric minorities 







same legitimation as residents of the region as the Russians themselves.  Indeed 
Karelians and Russians are incorporated in the ‘we’ group in opposition to 
Muslims and ‘immigrants’ from Caucasia.  It is also instructive to note that 
Karelia itself is constructed in this discourse, as in many of the other narratives 
analysed above, as a part of ‘Russia’ itself, in contradistinction to areas such as 
Chechnya which appear to be constructed as beyond the boundaries of a ‘real’ 
Russia; in this narrative as in others sampled above Karelia is Russia.  























































 Following on from the analysis of the mass media discourse in the 
preceding chapter an examination shall now be made of the interview data to 
determine both the manner in which the participants constructed and used 
historical narratives to advance differing conceptions of Karelian identities and 
to investigate the relationship between this process and the mass media material.  
Firstly further demographical information on the participants involved shall be 
presented in order to further clarify the particular context within which each 
excerpt is located and the potential discursive ‘weight’ of each contribution.  The 
analysis shall then focus on the creation of differing conceptions of Karelian 
‘space’ as exemplified by the interviewees’ responses to questioning on the 
status of differing national groups within the Republic of Karelia and the extent 
to which these groups may be seen as indigenous to the region.  This includes the 
examination of the construction of strategies of continuation and marginalisation 
which seek to exclude or justify the claims of differing groups to Karelia as their 
‘indigenous’ territory.  Narratives which associate Karelian identity with the 
Russian cultural sphere and thus identity shall be examined together with those 
which seek to diminish this influence or exclude it altogether.  This shall also be 
related to the construction of Karelia as a ‘model’ Russian-Orthodox territory 
and the implications of this for ideas both of the Russian character of the region 
and ethnic Karelian identity itself.  The manner in which the supposed shared 
historical unity of the Karelians and Russians is constructed in opposition to 
enemies both ancient and more modern shall also be examined; it shall be argued 
that this phenomenon is less marked in the interview material, although still 
present, and is related to a a much less prounounced ‘enemy’ picture of the 
Finnish ‘other’.  The role of familial experience and recollection in altering or 
refuting the mainstream mass media narrative of this period shall also be 
explored.  It shall be argued that this alternate source of knowledge is used to 
construct narratives which make the position of the Karelians more ambiguous in 
relation both to their supposed allies and enemies.  A further examination of the 
usage of the foundation of the KTK as a ‘foundational myth’ or ‘named 
beginning’ and thus a basis for a form of ‘civic’ identity in the Republic of 
Karelia shall be made.  It shall be argued that this effort has limited resonance in 







based on alternate historical resources; this includes, for a small group, the 
foundation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika.  The usage of the Kalevala as a 
potential alternate source of such a ‘mythic’ beginning shall be examined 
together with its possible limitations.  The extremely important issue of how the 
decline in Karelian language usage is narrated and the implications of the 
narratives and strategies used for putative Karelian identities shall also be 
addressed.  The format of the interview process also allowed a direct 
examination of the importance of historical narratives for the production of 
identity as perceived by the participants themselves; the interviewees were asked 
to evaluate the importance and role of history for themselves and more broadly 
within society in the area.  Through this process the importance of history to the 
production of potential Karelian identities was indicated not merely by the 
positive evaluation of its significance by those surveyed but by the manner in 
which this was expressed.  Finally the very marked heteronomisation identified 
in the data is analysed in more depth and its significance explored. 
 
 
  4.1 The Composition of the Interview Data 
  
During the interview process participants were asked to self-identify their 
nationality, a question which unsurprisingly caused some difficulty for certain 
participants.  Although some had reservations about choosing one particular over 
another, for example A6 who declared: 
Я вообще человек без национальности. 
This was due to his mixed heritage, a problem which led him to decline 
providing any answer to this question.  Participant A7 answered by noting he had 
both Karelian and Russian heritage: 
Дело в том что по матери я прихожусь с карельской семьи, но там 







This resulted in the interviewee freely interchanging between using the 
terms ‘we’ or ‘us’ to describe both Karelians and Russians.  
Nevertheless despite most participants were able to provide a national 
identity, which if the two individuals above are excluded provides a sample of 18 
Karelians (including one Tver’ Karelian), 1 Vepsian and 3 Russian interviewees.   
All but 5 interviews were conducted in Petrozavodsk with individuals 
currently residing within the city.  The remaining interviews were all conducted 
in the town of Olonets with current residents of that town.  Organisational 
difficulties precluded the conducting of interviews outwith these two locales.  
Nevertheless many of the participants were originally resident in or self-
identified as being ‘from’ a diverse array of different towns within the Republic 
of Karelia: 
Petrozavodsk:     7 
Olonetskii Raion:    6    
Kalevalskii Raion:    4  
Pryazhenskii Raion:    3   
Segezhskii Raion:    1 
Prionezhskii Raion:    1 
Suoyarvskii Raion:    1 
Outside Karelia:    1 
 
The sample of participants is therefore representative of the Republic of 
Karelia in general terms to the extent that many interviewees although resident 
primarily in the main urban centre had strong links to the provinces also.  As 
shall be discussed below some small differences in attitudes across the regions 







anonymised hence the exact ages of the participants were not recorded; they 
were however placed into three age groups as below: 
18-35: 5 participants (N Antonova, A3, 4, C1 and D 14) 
35-55: 12 participants (A1, 5, 6, 7, 8, B1, D1, 4, 6, 8, 10 and 11) 
55 +: 7 participants (A Grigoriev, Z Strogal’shchikova, B2, D2, 7, 15, 16) 
These age groups divide the participants into those who had little or no 
experience of living within Soviet-era Karelia, those who had spent at least their 
formulative years under the Soviet system and those who had spent most of their 
life in the USSR.  The grouping is quite broad hence there is the potential for 
some relatively significant differences in historical experience yet it was felt they 
were adequate to determine any general divergences between those raised and in 
particular educated under different systems.  The educational experience of any 
individual is, as discussed above, of key importance in determining the structure 
of their habitus and thus critical to understanding how differing national 
identities may be generated.  It should be noted that the interviewees who 
participated in this study were almost uniformly very well educated.  Only four 
of the subjects had completed only a secondary school level education; and of 
this three it should be noted one was currently undertaking university education 
and another had completed extensive technical education in the field of 
mechanical engineering.  All the remaining participants had completed a 
university education to the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree and five had also 
subsequently gained doctoral or other higher academic or professional 
qualifications.  Further information on the particular qualifications or other 
material which may be considered of relevance in elucidating the production of 
certain narratives identified in the texts below shall be adduced as required.  It 
shall suffice to say at this point that the data gathered represents a very highly-
educated and thus potentially influential section of the population of the Republic 









4.2 Indigenous or Immigrant?  The Interview Data 
 
i)  Narratives which exclude the Vepsians 
 
 
The interview participants were asked to give their opinions on the 
Karelian, Vepsian and Finnish peoples and languages being officially recognised 
as ‘indigenous’ to the Republic of Karelia.  The basis of this recognition and its 
legal and administrative implications are discussed in the first chapter of this 
thesis.  The idea of one or more of these groups or indeed others as indigenous is 
also used to support and reject various historical narratives and associated 
conceptions of identity in the mass media as examined above.  It was therefore 
considered important to test the conceptions of Karelian space constructed in the 
mass media discourse and official rhetoric with those produced by the interview 
participants.  A number of participants agreed with the official position without 
reservation: 
Да, да, хотя...исконными, исконно-историческими титуальными 
нациями являются Карелы и Финны и Вепсы (A7). 
Это историческая правда от которой не возможно уйти (D2). 
Despite participant D2 describing this formulation of the indigenous 
groups of the Republic of Karelia in positive terms as an actual historical ‘truth’, 
thus imbuing it with the status of fact, most other participants sought to negotiate 
an alternate list of indigenous peoples which excluded one or other of those on 
the official list or included an alternate contender for this status.  As has been 
seen in the mass media discourse discussion on the Vepsian population often 
marginalises them as a group by limiting their ‘legitimate’ territory to the small 
area around Shyoltozero.  A similar tendency to restrict the territory of historic or 
indigenous Vepsian settlement to this area can be seen in the examples below: 
Ну да, коренные.  Но нет коренные дело в том что как бы я не могу 
сказать точно про вепсов потому что я, то есть историю вепсского народа я 







есть в Карелии в Шёлтозеро где проживают, ареал проживание вепсов, и 
такой же ареал проживание вепсов есть и на территории Ленинградской 
Области (D4).  
Коренные народы Карелии, Каряла, Карелы и Финны, а Вепсы они 
здесь если будет объективно, две деревни есть, Шёлтозеро, и всё.  А 
остальные Вепсы южнее, в Вологодской Области вот так понимаете (A. 
Grigoriev) 
In both the examples above although the Veps are not totally disqualified 
from making a legitimate claim to being indigenous within Karelia the claim is 
restricted to one small area.  Both participants locate the broader homeland for 
the Veps outside the boundaries of Karelia, or indeed the even more Finno-Ugric 
Karjala as Anatolii Grigoriev denotes the area.  Interestingly both participants D2 
and D4 are from the Olonets region which is geographically relatively close to 
the Vepsian area thus created however D2 seems more inclined to grant Vepsians 
the title of indigenous to a broader Karelia whereas D4, although qualifying her 
statements with an acknowledgement of an apparent lack of expertise, is more 
inclined to restrict Vepsian identity to a more limited area.  
 
   
ii) Narratives Which Exclude the Finns 
 
Aside from the two examples mentioned above however most 
participants did not seek to question the claims of the Vepsian minority to 
indigenous status within Karelia.  A much more common phenomenon was the 
rejection of the idea of the Finns as indigenous within the modern Republic of 
Karelia as exemplified below: 
Лично я считаю что Карелы и Вепсы коренные да, коренные народы 
Карелы. Вепсы даже раньше появились а Финны наверное просто пришли 








Нет но Финны не является коренным народом, нет в законе 
прописано что коренным народами являются Карелы и Вепсы, но и Русские 
в смысле если говорить о коренном народе поскольку Заонежье, и если 
говорить о Финно-Угорских там то есть коренными народами являются 
Карелы, Вепсы и Русские.  Финны они не могут не мой взгляд считаться 
коренными потому что они приехали и появились только в 30-х годах 
прошлого столетия (D15). 
Я бы изключил Финнов по той простой причине что вот я же говорю 
что вот они моменты когда начились 19-20-й век, потом революции, приход 
к власти Коммунистической Партии, решение чисто геополитических 
вопросов, когда важно было наитй союзников среди Финляндии, для того 
чтобы...(D7). 
In the examples above the idea of the Finns having a legitimate claim to 
be considered as one of the indigenous peoples of the area is explicitly denied; in 
fact participant D15 goes as far as to state (incorrectly) that only the Karelians 
and Vepsians are legally recognised as indigenous.  The first two examples refute 
the official narrative by offering an alternative in which Finns appear within 




 century; indeed participant 
D15 is of the opinion that the Finns arrived in the area as late as the 1930s and 
not before.  In both examples the Finns are also further presented as an ‘other’ 
group by the use of verbs which describe their appearance in Karelia in terms of 
them ‘arriving’ from elsewhere.  Their refutation of the idea of the Finns as 
indigenous is made somewhat tentative however, by their usage of cautious 
language; D6 for example prefaces their comments by redundantly informing 
their interlocutor that what follows is their personal opinion, and by using a 
linguistic marker of uncertainty such as ‘наверное’ to highlight their hesitancy in 
making such a claim.  Although D15 is to some degree more strident in their 
rejection of Finnish claims to indigenous status they also inform the interlocutor 
that this is ‘their view’.  It would appear that there is some imagined ambiguity 
over this issue and that both participants feel that the rejection of such Finnish 
claims must be presented as a personal opinion rather than a bald statement of 







through which the claims of the Finns to indigenous status are rejected by the 
depiction of such claims as being a political fabrication; the idea of the Finns as 
indigenous to Karelia is linked to the political manoeuvrings of the leadership of 
the USSR.  In this way the claims of Finns to be indigenous to Karelia are 
disparaged by a strategy of equivalence that compares them to the artificial 
manipulation of boundaries for strategic political ends.  All the above 
participants are Karelians from the southern areas of the Republic of Karelia, 
either from Olonets Raion or the neighbouring Pryazhenskii Raion.  This group 
of Karelians have traditionally been seen as more remote from Finnish influence 
and certainly the above samples seem to demonstrate a reluctance to include 
Finns within the ‘we’ group of traditional residents in Karelia amongst these 
Karelians; interestingly as D15’s contribution indicate they may be more willing 
to acknowledge Russian residence in certain areas, although again this is 
restricted to a specific named locality. 
As has been glimpsed in the media discourse however one group of Finns 
are accorded special status in this debate, at least by certain participants.  
Although an outright dismissal of any suggestion Finns are indigenous in the 
area was more common it was also not unusual for Ingrian Finns to be 
constructed as having a particular claim to residence in the modern Republic of 
Karelia: 
A) Исторический то коренными народами чисто Карелии являаются 
три, Русские, Карелы и Вепсы.  Вот это вот чисто коренные 
народы.  Что касается Финнов-Ингерманландцов да, и Финнов, 
то что в нашей территории...Финны-Ингерманландцы они из 
Ленинградской Области вокруг Санкт-Петербурга это на их 
исторической территории.  А Финны они жили, жили у нас но 
очень, можем сказать в незначительном количестве...но 
поскольку, значит, да что политика особенно после 20-х годов 
прошлого века у нас была построена да, то сегодня после вот 50-
х годов у нас уже преобладает точка зрения что у нас 4 да 









B) То что Карелы и Вепсы коренные народы это точно, вот а Финны 
не коренные, эти Ингерманландцы это Ленинградская Область, 
там их родина.  Это 49-м году их выдали, вначале в Сибирь 
сослали все, всех Ингерманландцев, а потом после войны потому 
что рабочая сила не хватало Куприянов бывший секретарь 
обкома партии, или ЦК партии, Республика была Карело-
Финнская, он обратился к Сталину, он обратился куда он 
обратился я не знаю, и попросил разрешение этим приехать 
сюда.  Потому что рабочих не хватало.  И тогда я помню 56-м 
приехали сюда, порядочные приехали, и они работали и многие 
здесь осели.  Но они не коренные, не коренные в Карелии, а 
именно вот оттуда.  А так вот Финнов, Финны это не коренное 
население (D16). 
 
Although both examples above from Karelian contributors explicitly 
exclude Finns in general from the recognised group of indigenous peoples, which 
in example A also includes Russians, both also accord the Ingrian Finns a special 
status.  In example A the method through which this comes about is left 
unspecified; once again as has been seen in the media discourse ‘politics’ 
synecdochially replaces any actual recognised agency through which a change 
has occurred.  Example B is similarly vague when it comes to attributing the 
blame for the removal of the Ingrian Finns from their ‘motherland’, as Leningrad 
Oblast’ is described.  By contrast the mechanism by which the Ingrian Finns 
were allowed to settle in Karelia is definitely attributed to the efforts of Gennady 
Kupriyanov, who is as shall be seen below often constructed as something almost 
approaching a hero by certain Karelian contributors.  Although Kupriyanov has 
to again appeal to Stalin or authorities of which the participant claims to have no 
knowledge he does bring about the immigration of the Ingrians.  The settlement 
of the Ingrian Finns, who are positively assessed as “порядочные” in example 
B, is therefore definitively attributed to a specific period, the 1950s; in fact in the 
latter example the participant actually claims to have witnessed their arrival first-







unwillingly resettled from their historic homeland to Karelia, and thus are 
constructed in a sympathetic light.  In example A in particular the fact that they 
were forcibly removed to Karelia is narrated as having given rise to a popular 
opinion “у нас” that the Ingrian Finns at least could be considered worthy of 
being denoted ‘indigenous’.  It would appear therefore that at least for some 
participants the historic persecution of the Ingrian Finns grants them some 
special status within the modern Republic of Karelia even if Finns as a whole are 
not considered to be one of the indigenous peoples of the territory.  It should be 
noted that both participants belong to the eldest group of participants, indeed 
D16 is a pensioner, and thus perhaps for this group of Karelians the idea od the 
‘arrival’ of the Finns is associated with this specific event; being able to identify 
a period when many Finns arrived in what would have been, following the 
purges of the 1930s, their almost complete absence, may equate for these 
participants with the ‘beginning’ of Finnish residence in some areas.  D16, 
although a keen amateur historian, has only a secondary school education and 
thus has not completed the same amount of education as the doctoral graduate B2 
and thus may be unaware of any Finnish residence in Karelia prior to this point; 
B2 is aware of this fact but again seeks to diminish and trivialise it to an 
insignificant quantity. 
 
iii) The Status of Russians 
 
As has been glimpsed in the discussion on the Finns above the Russian 
population is accorded the status of indigenous to the modern Republic of 
Karelia by certain Karelian contributors alongside the Karelians themselves.    
A) Они всё время здесь жили, особенно вот Заонежье...вот и 
Белое Море, Поморье, эта территория Карелии но там 
тоже жили люди там столько же сколько мы...поэтому 








B) Здесь изначала как говорится уже жили и Карелы, и 
Вепсы, и какая-то малая часть Финнов, вот но и Русские 
естественно, и поморы, те же самые Русские но уже 
думаю несколько другие Русские то есть которые более 
привыкли к суровым условиям Белого моря и которые 
находили с постоянным контактом с местным населением 
(D10). 
 
In the examples above Karelian contributors are prepared to acknowledge 
Russians as indigenous to at least parts of the modern Republic of Karelia.  Both 
examples date Russian settlement within Karelia to time immemorial 
(“изначала” or “всё время”), indeed in example A Russian settlement in certain 
areas is constructed as having been of equal duration to that of the Karelians 
themselves.  In both examples however this history of settlement is narrated as 
having been confined to the area around the White Sea or the Pomor’e; it is 
therefore implied that the remainder of Karelia is the original territory of the 
Karelians and Vepsians.  Indeed in example B the Karelians and Vepsians are 
described as being the ‘local’ or ‘местное’ inhabitants of Karelian in opposition 
to the Russians, despite these very Russians being in supposed “постоянным 
контактом” with their Finno-Ugric neighbours.  The idea of Russians being 
indigenous to Karelia is therefore acknowledged by the Karelians but at the same 
time diminished: only some Russians in certain areas are accorded this status.  In 
fact in example B the actual ‘Russian-ness’ of these indigenous Russians is 
played down; they are depicted as being Russian but at the same time both 
adapted for life in the harsh climate of the north and also constantly influenced 
by their Karelian neighbours.  As noted above D7 is a participant from Olonets 
and the putative willingness of Karelians from this area to accord at least some 
recognition as indigenous has been noted.  Participant D10 although born and 
resident in Petrozavodsk is a self-described ‘Northern Karelian’ with strong links 
to the Suoyarvskii Raion; again the participant is willing to accord recognition to 
Russian claims of indigenous status but he attaches even more caveats to this 







The number of Russian participants who took part in interview process 
was quite small, thus the data derived from their interviews could not on its own 
provide a meaningful sample of their views on whether or not their national 
group can claim to be indigenous to Karelia or the manner in which these views 
are expressed discursively.  A survey of the mass media discourse however has 
already provided us with a clear indication that Russians frequently do depict 
their national group as having a legitimate claim to be considered indigenous 
within the modern Republic of Karelia.  The Russian participants interviewed 
tended to advance similar views as exemplified below: 
Русские также составляют коренные в Карелии но только те скорее... 
Заонежский район, Пудожский, Поморье, Беломолрский в котором там же 
Поморы живут...но естественно что необходимо не только Карельский язык 
развивать но и местные диалекты поддерживать (D11). 
In the above excerpt the Russian participant again cites the heritage of the 
Zaonezh’e and Pomor’e to narrate a history of Karelia in which at least some 
parts of the region can be claimed as part of a historical Russian homeland.  This 
interview was especially interesting as the participant then developed the idea of 
Russian settlement in what is now Karelia in an unusual fashion; the idea of this 
ancient Russian territory and its history was invoked as representative of another 
aspect of Russian identity and culture in opposition to that which the participant 
felt dominated contemporary Russian society: 
Понимаете исторический это возможно это действительно так и есть 
учитивая как бы местную Русскую культуру и Заонежскую, Поморскую и 
так далее, но у нас сейчас просто идётся такая вот новая волна вот этой да 
имперской унификации да и говорят что все Русские всюду одинаковые вот 
и люди иногда эту слушают и начинают вот слишком себя упрощать что 
есть, они как бы сводятся себя какой общерусской идентичности которая нa 
самом деле большой миф.  Потому что действительно Русские разных 
регионов разные, и тех то здесь на севере живут это как бы такие 







In the above excerpt the Russian participant appeals to the supposed more 
independent and democratic heritage of the Russian population of Karelia in 
opposition to the centralising, ‘imperialist’ politics of the current Russian 
authorities.  The current Russian population of the Republic of Karelia are 
constructed as the descendants of the Pomor’e and Zaonezh’e, the “наследники 
Новгородских республиканских традиций”.  In this narrative therefore the 
local Russians are constructed as having been remote from the authority and 
traditions of the Tsarist state; they are narrated as having descended not from the 
acquiescent serfs of central Russia but as free citizens of a Novogordian, not 
Muscovite, Republic. The participant here uses a deconstructive strategy, citing 
supposed ‘Karelian’ exceptionalism to deconstruct the usual ‘we’ group of 
Russians and promote his idea that “Русские разных регионов разные”.  The 
idea of a single Russian identity is in fact dismissed explicitly with a direct 
statement that it is in actual fact a “большой миф.”  This particular participant 
was a relatively young (in the 35-55 group) journalist from Petrozavodsk who 
sought to promote a consistently ‘regionalist’ discourse, as discussed further 
below, which distanced the Republic of Karelia from the federal centre but did 
not attempt to dilute its essential Russianess; Karelia is allotted distinguishing 
features but Russia is characterised by this regional diversity.  
A somewhat more typical contribution from a Russian participant, which 
is also very reminiscent of those narratives found in the mass media, seeks not to 
divide the ‘we’ group of Russians but to create a broader ‘we’ group of 
Karelians, Russians and others as part of a single unified people: 
   И тут они стались вместе с Карелами с Вепсами с Финнами 
перемешаться, жениться пережениться и тут прошла, произошёл вот этот 
братский народ уже.  И уже не разбирёшь что и где.  Ну никакие здесь, как 
сказать, каких-то разговоров то "вы Вепсы, вы Карелы вы Финны вы 
Русские" тут такого нету.  И кстати мой пример это поддерживает то есть я 
ещё повторю что да это уже всё нормально (C2). 
 In this narrative the Karelian, Finnish, Vepsian and Russian peoples are 







народ.”  The intermarriage of individual Karelians, Veps and Finns with each 
other and Russians and other incomers, is synecdochial shorthand for the 
creation of a single ‘fraternal’ people.  The interviewer is advised that one cannot 
now even determine which nationality an individual may be; this constructive 
strategy is further emphasised by the interviewee’s statement that the question of 
an individual’s nationality is never raised in this unified society.  This situation is 
insisted upon by the participant as the norm: “я ещё повторю что да это уже 
всё нормально.”  This participant was a Russian married to a Karelian which 
may account for their formulation of a ‘fraternal people’ through analogy to their 
own personal situation.    
 The idea of Russians are indigenous to the modern Republic of Karelia is 
however occasionally refuted by the Karelians themselves.  In particular Anatolii 
Grigoriev and Natalya Antonova were sceptical of the idea of Russians being 
considered an indigenous group alongside the Finno-Ugric minorities: 
A) Что касается Русские поимаете, н нас сейчас комитет по 
национальной политике...вот и там некоторые говорят «и 
Русские Заонежья»> такой термин тоже коренные.  Знаете что во 
первых Карелы, Финны, Вепсы, Эстонцы там, Венгры 
Поволжские, не Финны, это особоя языковая группа, Финно-
Угорская группа.  А Русские, Англичане, потом Украинцы и так 
далее, Индо-Европейские.  То есть понимаете, вот и всё.  Это я 
же, этнография понимаете?  Совершенные другие языковые 
группы (A Grigoriev). 
 
B)  Ну вообще это и правда и не правда, потому что если как бы 
понять из каких территории состоит Республика Карелия в 
целом, то по большому счёту это конечно же неправда.  Если 
смотрить конституцию Республики Карелия и сходит от того что 
мы должны чего-то отталкивать и как-то себя позиционировать, 
то это правда.  Да здесь есть такие районы и здесь есть такие 
территории где Карелы проживали исконно, и где Вепсы 







давно проживают например Финны-ингерманландцы, причём 
проживают компактно особенно те кто выгнали из 
Ленинградской Области.  Вот, здесь также проживают ...большие 
группы этнографических Русских, учёные полагают конечно что 
земля которая населённая Русскими например Поморыми или 
Пудожьяными или Заонежьскими, они всё равнo имеют прa-
Финский и прa-Саамский аспект.  И это в принципе даже я не 
учёный даже я понимаю хотя бы если взять то что название, 
топонимы говорят о многом, даже название топонимов там где 
живут Русские имеют Финское начале.  И даже не Финское а 
прa-Финское начале в этом прa-Финском есть также и 
Карельское да, просто как пра-Финское племя.  То есть понятно 
то эта территория сначала была населенный не Русскими 
этнического исконно как бы не Русскими и может быть где-то 
параленно от своей шло как Новгородцими так как и Финно-
угорцами но всё равно большая часть территории Республики 
Карелия была охваченна прa-Финским (N. Antonova). 
 
In example A above Grigoriev is somewhat dismissive of the idea of non-
Finno-Ugric nationalities being considered indigenous to the Republic of 
Karelia.  The usage of the term “Русские Заонежья” is attributed by him to 
unnamed colleagues within the Committee for National Politics and is 
immediately decried; Grigoriev uses a strategy of delegitmisation noting that 
Russians belong, alongside the English, to the Indo-European language group not 
the Finno-Ugric.  Although the point is not fully developed the inference made is 
that Karelia is a Finno-Ugric territory; Russians cannot therefore put forward a 
valid claim to be considered indigenous within it.  In example B Natalya 
Antonova uses a different strategy to delegitimise the idea of Russians being 
indigenous to parts of Karelia by narrating a history in which these Russians 
themselves are actually descended from Finno-Ugric roots or are at the very least 
inhabiting lands which were originally settled by Finno-Ugric tribes.  By 
claiming that even the supposedly most Russian areas of the modern Republic of 







derivation Antonova seeks to deconstruct the idea of these areas as being the 
indigenous territory of the Russian people.  The entirety of the modern Republic 
of Karelia is constructed using a strategy of continuation in this narrative as 
having been the territory of Finno-Ugric peoples from time immemorial.  In both 
examples both Grigoriev and Antonova construct an image of Karelia as being 
the indigenous territory of the Finno-Ugric peoples.  Interestingly in both the 
Finns are accorded some kind of legitimate status as indigenous; this is achieved 
by their inclusion in the Finno-Ugric ‘we’ group of legitimate indigenous peoples 
by Grigoriev and by Antonova’s insistence on the ‘Proto-Finnish’ derivation of 
almost all Karelian place-names.  It must also be noted that Antonova is 
somewhat equivocal about what being indigenous might mean; it clearly for her 
has both a ‘factual’ and a ‘political’ aspect.       
 
 
4.3 The Indivisible Narrative?  Links Between Karelian and Russian 
History  
 
i) Karelia as Russia From (Almost) Time Immemorial 
 
Participants in the interview process were asked to identify, if possible, 
what differences they felt existed between Russian history and Karelian history 
and to describe how, in their opinion, Karelia became part of a Russian state.  
The purpose of this exercise was to determine to what extent the tendency in 
some narratives to depict Karelian history as indivisible from that of Russia as a 
whole found in the media discourse was present within the manner in which 
ethnic Karelians in particular approached the history of the area.  Certain 
participants did construct an image of Karelians as always having been 
associated historically with a Russian state: 
Сказать чтобы Русские ну то есть вот Новгородцы да вначале, или 
Московские Русские они занимались какое-то унитожение в Карелии или 







То есть, как-то, никакого особого притеснения не было, или борьбы, на 
самом деле не было большие борьбы за самоидентификацию Карельского 
народа, никогда было если в истории посмотрим да?  Были крестьянские 
бунты но крестьянские бунты они во основом были против строя, как бы, и 
не против государственной устройства или, отделение (A7). 
In the above example we see a unifactory strategy within which both 
Karelians and Russians are depicted as never having been in conflict with each 
other.  The Russians are narrated as having never attempted to forcibly dissolve 
the Karelian people and the Karelians in turn are narrated as having never 
attempted to forcibly remove themselves from Russian over-lordship.  In this 
manner the current relationship between Karelians and Russians is narrated as 
the result of centuries of peaceful coexistence.  The actual method through which 
Karelians came to live under Russian rule is unstated; it appears in this narrative 
as this has always been the case, as if it were a natural fact.  As noted above the 
participant involved freely switches between usage of ‘we’ and ‘the Karelians’ 
whilst relating the narrative which is indicative of their own mixed heritage; it 
also indicates the potential possesion of a ‘multiple identity’ of both Karelian and 
Russian.  This individual was the only participant to offer any real indication of 
such a mixed or shared identity in the data collected. 
In the example below respondents from the town of Olonets reference the 
narrative, which we have encountered previously in the mass media discourse, of 
the town as being the ‘bulwark’ of the Russian state:   
История Карелии и история России они взаимосвязанные, то есть 
это получается что здесь...наверное если бы уходил в глубины то есть как 
образовалось племя Корела то там немножко да эта история расходиться 
самого образования племени Корелы, а потом уже то есть так как Карелия 
была то есть как бы Новгородская Губерния поэтому здесь история 
взаимосвязанная, что Олонец был форпостом, защищал границу России 
наверное здесь как бы связанно (D4). 
Сейчас есть очень много публикации по этому вопросу, и понятно 







1137 год Олонца, 1137 год.  Но у нас есть археологическое доказательство 
что здесь люди жили 5-6 тысяч лет до нашей эры, так что надо исходить из 
тех времен.  И сложно говорить о том, кто к кому привыкнул, Карелы 
Русским или Русские Карелам (D7). 
Although the interviewee in the first example hints at a potential history 
of Karelia which does exclude Russian influence they are unable to develop this 
beyond the merest of sketches; they tentatively identify the ‘foundation’ of the 
tribe of ‘Korela’ as being a period before Russian and Karelian history became 
intertwined.  This historical moment is located in the “глубины”, however, that 
is to say it is constructed as being almost beyond historical record, in the extreme 
distant past.  Beyond this initial foundational moment the history of the Karelian 
people is narrated as being inseparable from that of Russia itself; in fact Karelia 
is directly equated to a ‘Novgorodskaya Guberniya’ from this point onwards, and 
therefore incorporated into the familiar narrative of Olonets District defending 
the Russian border.  The second example also invokes a period of extreme 
antiquity, 5-6,000 B.C., with reference to the Olonets area; the interviewee 
however is reluctant to draw conclusions from this about a period of Karelian 
history which excludes Russian influence.  The narrative of history is pushed 
back from 1137, a date in which Olonets is mentioned in Russian historical 
sources, to ancient prehistory, thus potentially hinting at an exclusively Karelian 
or Finno-Ugric period.  The participant is unwilling to construct such a narrative, 
however, and relates their inability to determine whether Karelians were more 
attracted to the Russians or vice versa; Karelian history is thus once again tied to 
Russian history from an extremely early date.  It is interesting to note that both 
participants are well-educated to degree level; D4 has both a degree within the 
field of Karelian studies and is employed as a tour guide in the Olonets area 
whilst D7 is a teacher at the local school.  Despite this level of education and 
interest in local lore neither can relate a historical narrative of Karelia without oe 
before Russian influence in anything but the vaguest of terms.  D7 is in the older 
age group whilst D4 is in the youngest age group.  This would appear to indicate 
that despite the changes in education since the collapse of the USSR little 







very difficult for Karelians to offer any coherent historical narrative which 
excludes Russian influence. 
The idea of the border playing a critical role in the development of 
Karelian identity is also present in a somewhat different form in the excerpt 
below: 
У нас, Карелы сами да, оказались разделёнными между двумя 
культрами.  Одна культура эта культура будем так называть значить да 
можеть быть российская, и вторая культура западная да скажем 
протестантская финнская, вот эта страна.   То есть Карелия у нас 
появляеться разделённой границей, государственней границей, больщая 
часть Карелов на сегодняшний день живёт сейчас в Российской Федераций 
притом в Российской Федераций мы тоже разделённые ещё да, 
административными границами да?  Вот есть Карелы в Карелии и Карелы 
Тверьские.  Поэтому если говорит о Карелах которых, российские Карелы 
да, то надо сказать что...что мы исторически так сложилось что эта часть 
карельского населения искони веков тяготела к Российской 
государственности да?  Поскольку была включена в систему 
польитических, экономических отношений да?  Военных отношеннии на 
этой территории (B2). 
The above example is representative of the manner in which a large 
proportion of the participants narrated the manner in which Karelia or Karelians 
themselves became part of the Russian state.  In this narrative the Karelians are 
passive subjects of a process which takes place entirely outwith their control; as 
in this text where for example the Karelians “оказались раделёнными” with the 
agency by which this process was achieved and the attitude of the Karelians to 
this process left unstated.  The division of the Karelian people and Karelia as a 
territory is presented as a fait accompli: the inclusion of the Karelians within a 
Russian state is presented as something which “исторически так сложилось.”  
In this manner a sort of strategy of inevitability is invoked in which the Karelians 
cannot influence their fate and are therefore resigned to being incorporated into 







again this is indicative of the heteronomisation displayed within the process of 
identity construction by Karelians.  As in the mass media discourse the Karelian 
population is depicted using a form of negative self-presentation, similar to the 
manner described for the Russian population by Oushakine or Gudkov noted 
above, which constructs the Karelians as helpless bystanders unable to positively 
influence events.  
Occasionally participants narrated a history of Karelia or the Karelian 
people in which Russian influence is limited to one particular period rather than 
being present from, or almost from, the very beginnings of the narrative.  
Participant A7, for example, did opine that there were differences between 
Karelian and Russian history, but that after the 1917 revolution: 
Hу дальше это конечно, история Карелии едина с истории 
Советского Союза что есть естественно война, то есть это все беды, это 
коллективизация, идустриализация, то есть все Сталинские, как сказать 
репрессия которая прокатились по нам очень серьёзно, по каждoй нашей 
семье, это и уничтожение языка...знаете дело в том что для меня здесь 
история Карелии воспринимаю с точки зрения своей семьи...мой отец из 
семьи репрессированных которых здесь выслали (A7).   
In this narrative it is the 1917 revolution that severs the thread of 
independent Karelian development, in the interviewee’s mind, and ties the fate of 
the Karelian people together with that of the USSR as a whole.  The participant 
does not clearly state in what way Karelian history actually differed from 
Russian history prior to 1917, but nevertheless clearly formulates this period as 
the time when Karelian history ceased and the Karelians were subjected to the 
same historical processes, which the interviewee lists, as the remainder of the 
Soviet people.  In this narrative the 1917 is constructed as a topos of ‘diaster’, 
which leads to a litany of negative consequences including, significantly, the loss 
of the Karelian language; once again the Karelians themselves are also 
constructed as passive throughout these processes.  A somewhat similar narrative 
was offered by Zinadia Strogal’shchikova, an academic and leading authority on 







histories were identical at any period, she did offer a narrative in which until the 
fall of the USSR the Finno-Ugric minorities were unable to influence the 
development of their own history: 
Это уже последный период когда мы сами могли влиять на эту 
историю, и сами формулировать как-то её.  В частности например мы в 
1989-м году в апреле мы утвердили, здесь документом ещё, свою 
писменность это для нас важно.  Или мы создали 90-м году орган который 
занимается национальными политиками, то есть такие даты которые 
связанные с нашем национальной историей (Z. Strogal’shchikova). 
In the excerpt above Strogal’shchikova not only denies the ability of the 
Finno-Ugric minorities to influence the manner in which their history developed 
prior to 1989 but also their ability to ‘formulate’ this history; that is to say to 
narrate their history for their own ends.  In this narrative the Karelians and 
Vepsians, whilst evidently possessing a different culture and different traditions 
to their Russian counterparts, are unable to influence their own affairs until 
relatively recent history.  The real political history of the Karelians and 
Vepsians, therefore, within which they are able to determine the own affairs, is 
constructed as a recent phenomenon; prior to this date these affairs were, we 
must assume, being managed by unnamed others, presumably Russians.  In this 
narrative, therefore, almost all Karelian and Vepsian history is associated with 
Russian history, but without positive connotations; once again throughout this 
history the Finno-Ugric peoples are depicted as being powerless over their own 
destinies.    
Some Karelian contributors were willing to construct a history of Karelia 
in which parts of the territory had been associated with Russia since time 
immemorial whilst denying that status to certain other locales: 
Ну знаете сейчас тяжело судить потому что поскольку я знаю эта 
часть Карелии она была всё время в составе России.  Значит наш район 
никуда не переходил, если мы говорим о южной Карелии тут вот район 







Шведов в старину время...  В тех районов живут переселенцы нет Карелов 
нет там Финнов, никого нет (D16). 
Although the interviewee is prepared to construct their part of Karelia as 
having been part of Russia since time immemorial (“всё время”), they also 
determine that there are areas which were never part of a historic Russian state.  
Whilst their local area is described as having never changed hands and thus a 
legitimate part of the modern Russian state, the area around Sortavala is 
recognised as having been once under Swedish and Finnish rule.  The modern 
inhabitants of the area are denoted “переселенцы” or incomers as opposed to the 
Karelians and Finns the participant appears to view as the genuine inhabitants of 
the land.  The illegitimacy of the current settlement of the land is further 
reinforced by the statement that in these areas “никого нет”; it would appear that 
in the interviewee’s mind the absence of Karelians and Finns is the absence of 
real and permanent settlement of the area.   
 The Russian participants also often narrated the history of Karelia that of 
Russia in general.  Participant C2, for example, found it impossible to narrate a 
history of Karelia separate from that of Russia itself:  
- Очень трудно, история Карелии и России как-то разрывать потому-
что всё одно целое.  И на мой взглад вот это самая важная события есть 
победа в Великой Отечественной Войне потому-что на, могла вообще 
государственность российская прекратить свое существование.  В случае 
поражение в этой войны не только Россия а вся Европа бы перестлала свое 
существование.  Поэтому на мой взглад самая важная и знаковая события 
двацатого века это победа в Великой Отечественной Войне. 
- Понятно, что вы не видите... 
- Вне Россий Карелии нету, что это одно целое (C2). 
The interviewee was unable or unwilling to conceive of a distinct 
‘Karelian’ history, instead affirming that Karelia was an inseparable part of 
Russia.  Indeed the very idea of Karelia was considered to be impossible outside 







“одно целое”.  In this rather extreme example the possibility of a discrete 
Karelian history and therefore identity in opposition to Russian equivalents is 
described as actually impossible; Karelia and Karelians cannot exist in isolation 
from Russia as a whole.  This excerpt is very reminiscent of the strategies of 
unification and continuation sampled from the mass media discourse and thus 
demonstrates the resonance of these narratives within at least part of the Russian 
population of the Republic of Karelia.  
   
ii) The Role of Orthodoxy 
 
As in the mass media discourse the apparent role of the Russian Orthodox 
Church in unifying Karelians and Russians is a major thematic concern in 
narratives which seek to depict a shared cultural and political heritage and thus 
identity for these two nationalities.  The supposed long history of the Orthodoxy 
of Karelians and Karelia was also used to explain the mechanism through which 
Karelia became part of a specifically Russian state by certain of the participants 
in the interview process.  Once again by stressing the apparently innate 
Orthodoxy of the Karelian people these participants firmly associated an 
important part of Karelian identity with Russian identity itself.  The example 
below is typical of this process: 
Главное что нас обединило с Русским народам и с Русским 
государственным это православие.  Это мое глубокое убеждение...если вот 
взять всей территории России, православный ортодоксальный, то на 
территории Карелии среди коренных жителей, Карелов и Вепсов, больще 
всех местных чтимых святых....и естественно что народ ориентированных 
на своих святых и православие как государственную религию уже не 
отделял себя от Московского государство (A7). 
The excerpt above is typical in the manner in which it constructs an 
image of Karelia as the archetypal Orthodox territory; not only are the Karelians 







Orthodox ethnicities in all Russia, with the potential exception of the Russians 
themselves.  Once again Karelia is constructed as a ‘model’ Orthodox land and 
the Karelians and Veps as ‘model’ believers, as identified in the mass media 
material.  The interviewee uses deterministic language to narrate a situation in 
which the Karelians could not do anything other than orientate themselves 
towards the Russian state.  In fact the idea of Orthodoxy was so influential that 
the Karelians “уже не отделяли себя” from the Russian authorities; in this 
example the Orthodoxy of the Karelian people is narrated as having been so 
profound as to have removed the very possibility of their independent existence 
outside of the Russian world.  As in the excerpt from the participant quoted 
above this creates a strategy of inevitability in which Karelians are drawn into 
the Russian cultural sphere; again given the form of multiple identity proferred 
by this participant the process, although inexorable, is not narrated as being 
undertaken against the Karelians’ will although without their direct participation.  
Many of the participants were of the opinion that it was the religious 
affiliation of the Karelian people which determined their affinity for Russian 
culture.  As in the media discourse the Orthodoxy of the Karelians is also 
narrated as having led them into a military alliance with the medieval Russian 
state; this military and spiritual alliance is seen as directed against an 
Finnish/Swedish ‘other’ in opposition to the Orthodox ‘we’ group of Karelians 
and Russians: 
Но я думаю в многом  зависило о том что всё-таки в древние времена 
Карельские племена всё-таки больше поддерживали скажем так, то же 
самый Новгород, и так далее потому что, насколько я помню, в 
Новгородских дружинах служили Карелы.  Потому что Финляндия это 
была, но это лютераны, в том что Финляндия была долгие годы под 
владычеством Швеции, а у России Швеции скажем так да не в коем 
отношения не всегда были гладкими...Карелы успели обратить своё время в 








In the example above the Karelians and Vepsians are explicitly equated to 
Russians in terms of their religious faith, they are Orthodox “точно также” like 
their Russian counterparts.  Indeed the Orthodoxy of the Karelians is depicted as 
something which they chose themselves rather than having been imposed upon 
them.  The participant narrates this shared religious feeling as dating back to time 
immemorial; the Karelians are depicted as having been allied with the 
Novgorodian Russians since ‘ancient’ times in a shared enmity towards the Finns 
and Swedes on primarily religious grounds.  In this manner a narrative is 
produced using a unificatory strategy which represents Karelians as being the 
willing allies of the Russians in fighting for the Orthodox church and thus 
positions the idea of Karelian identity close to that of Russian identity itself.   
 
 
4.4 Karelia as a Finno-Ugric Territory 
 
Certain participants, however, in particular the Karelian interviewees, 
narrated histories of Karelia as an area and of their ethnic group which played 
down or excluded Russian influences.  In these narratives Karelia is constructed 
as having been an exclusively or almost exclusively Finno-Ugric territory.  Such 
narratives tend to locate this period of autonomous cultural development in the 
relatively distant past, often with reference to the pre-history of the area prior to 
the recorded arrival of the Russian state.  In the excerpt below, for example, 
participant A4 narrated a history of the area prior to the creation of political 
boundaries which emphasised common Finno-Ugric elements: 
Раньше не было такого, ну, разделения Карелии то есть если говорить 
про, из началa земли когда мы даже не под русским были то была земля 
Карело-Финская, я точно не помню как она тогда называлaсь...то есть этa 
былa в приципе более менее одна земля и одна народность то есть не была 
никакой определенной границы просто были жили на каких-то, 
определённых, земле как говорится.  Вепсы, как назывались раньше 







где-то Финны, но это было, соотвественно было более менее одна земля и 
очень похожий образ жизни, быта, язык (A4). 
In this narrative the supposed common origins of the Finno-Ugric peoples 
of the region are emphasised; the interviewee constructs an image of an ancient 
Finno-Ugric area in which Finns, Vepsians and Karelians live almost identical 
lives and are essentially “более менее” one group.  The interviewee depicts a 
land in which division between the Finno-Ugric peoples is non-existent to the 
extent that there are literally no borders.  This commonality between the Finno-
Ugric peoples is traced back to time immemorial; these peoples are living this 
common existence at the ‘beginning’ of Karelia, before the arrival of the 
Russians.  Indeed the implication is that it is the arrival of these Russians which 
ends this Finno-Ugric unity; this ‘golden age’ is explicitly dated to a time when 
“когда мы даже не под pусским были”.  This narrative unifies all the Finno-
Ugric peoples to a certain extent by emphasising their common origins, and 
therefore associates the Karelians much more strongly with the Finns than the 
Russians.  It should be noted that the interviewee in this case was from the 
northern group of Karelians.  This group were more inclined to narrate a history 
of Karelia in which the border between Karelian and Finn in literal terms and in 
terms of identity appeared at a much later date.  In contrast to their southern 
counterparts Russian influence is depicted as arriving much later and of being of 
much less importance to the area and their sense of identity.  These differences 
shall be examined in greater detail below.  The interviewee was also one of the 
younger and less well-educated participants which may account for his relative 
lack of concrete historical information; the topos created of a Finno-Ugric 
‘golden age’ is somewhat indistinct in nature due to the use of vague, qualified 
language. 
An interesting perspective on the construction of Karelia as a Finno-Ugric 
territory was offered by a Tver’ Karelian who had moved to Karelia from her 
native area.  She constructed a narrative of Karelian history in which Karelians, 
although not the actual original inhabitants of the area, nevertheless inhabited a 







depicted as having, in contrast to their situation in Tverskaya Oblast’, developed 
a more secure Finno-Ugric identity:  
Я думаю что разница конечно есть довольно большая.  А чем я бы 
обяснилаь это...во первых территория Карелия эта территория, 
которая...постоянно происходила смена коренного населения, это 
лапладнцы, потом приходят карелы потом приходят русские конечно это 
влияет на исторую, и на самосознание, как на карелов как на русских 
которые здесь проживают.  Я думаю что как с другой сторони в Тверской 
Области эта та же ситуация, жили славяне, потом пришли Карелы, потом 
славяне вернулись, на данную территорую.  Но по сравнению с остальной 
Россий какая разница наверное есть.  И также вот это приграничное 
положение рядом с Финландий и учитивая что карелы это, родственный 
народ с финнами поэтому здесь большинство людей всё-таки считают себя 
немножко как-то, на мой взглад даже отрезанными от остальной Россий, 
они ближе к Финляндии.  Так как вся остальная Россия относится к 
Карелии, у меня есть много знакомых которые считают что Карелия эта 
другая страна (A3). 
In the above example the Karelians are not acknowledged as the ‘original’ 
indigenous inhabitants of modern Karelia; in contrast to any other Karelian 
interviewee the Tver’ Karelian did not think Karelians were the first residents of 
the area; instead she allotted that distinction to the Saami.  Karelia is instead 
described as an area in which the population is continually changing.  
Nevertheless Karelia in contrast to Tverskaya Oblast’ is imagined as being 
intrinsically less Russian; Karelians within Karelia are depicted as living beside 
their “родственный народ” whereas in Tverskaya Oblast’ they are living on a 
previously Russian territory surrounded by Russians.  Indeed the interviewee 
considers Karelia and the Karelians within it to be closer to the Finns than to ‘the 
remainder of Russia’.  If identity is negotiated reciprocally, as we have suggested 
above, it would appear that, in this interviewee’s opinion at least, this apparent 
affinity with the Finns has resulted in other Russian citizens not acknowledging 
the Karelians as part of their own ‘we’ group; according to her “вся остальная 







contrast to her own native area this Karelian narrates a history of Karelia in 
which Finno-Ugric, in particular Finnish, influence is so great as to almost, but 
not quite entirely, negate the ‘Russian-ness’ of the territory.  It should be noted 
however that as she is a Karelian from the Tver’ region her opinions may not be 
representative of those of Karelians from within Karelia itself; also as a then 
doctoral student at the Karelian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
specialising in matters related to Karelian culture she also has access to historical 
information that will not be readily available to most inhabitants of the Republic 
of Karelia.  It seems unlikely, therefore, that this narrative which assigns the 
status of indigenous people to the Saami rather than the Karelians has much 
currency in broader Karelian society within the region.  
One participant in particular emphasised Finnish influence to the extent 
that it not only negated the Russian influence on the Karelian people but 
undermined the idea of a distinct Karelian people in opposition to a more general 
Finnish identity.  Anatolii Grigoriev constructed a narrative of Karelian history 
in which, once again, the border is represented as having played a key role in the 
creation of the idea of a distinct Karelian people.  His narrative went somewhat 
further than those we have examined above, however, which merely represented 
a rather vague and indistinct pre-historical period of common Finno-Ugric 
origins for both the Karelian and Vepsian peoples, however.  Nor does, in 
Grigoriev’s narrative, the creation of this border thereafter link the Karelian and 
Russian peoples.  Instead the border is a historical accident which masks the fact 
that Karelians are actually just a subset of the Finnish nationality: 
Вот и ещё моя позиция личная...моя позиция такая, то карелы одно 
из финских племён.  Знаете.  Вот, и никакой-то там самостоятельный народ.  
Вот потому что некоторые тут у нас рассуждается но в частности Зинаида 
Строгальщикова и другие что Финны нам чуть ли не, вообще, никто.  Но 
моя позиция не такая.  Дело в том что каждый народ имеет местечковые 
особенности...также Карельская, так скажем, племя, по сути это Финны, но 
значит особенности в силу того что значит от центра Финландии да?  Ещё 







такая позиция.  Хотя вот признаю карельский народ один из финских 
народов (A. Grigoriev). 
In this narrative Karelians are part of a more generalised Finnish identity, 
merely possessing regional rather than national differences from their Finnish 
neighbours.  Pre-history is cited once again, in this case by denoting Karelians as 
one of a number of ‘Finnish’ tribes rather than by, as in for example the excerpt 
from the interview with participant A4 referenced above, imagining a pre-history 
in which Finns, Karelians and Vepsians lived side-by-side but still in discrete 
groups.  The Karelians are artificially separated from the remainder of the 
Finnish people in Grigoriev’s narrative by the border, which is the responsibility 
of the Swedes in the first instance and then the euphemistic “и так далее.”  This 
narrative therefore completely denies any legitimate Russian influence over 
Karelians and by extension Karelia by incorporating Karelian identity into the 
broader Finnish identity.   This is a controversial opinion as Grigoriev 
acknowledges; he is careful to note several times that this is his view, and indeed 
acknowledges that others, including the academic Strogal’shchikova, are of a 
markedly different opinion.   
Karelians were not alone in constructing a history of the area in which 
Russian influence had been minimal for at least periods of the historical past.  
Strogal’shchikova may not, as Grigoriev intimated in the example above, go so 
far as to construct a picture of Karelia as a Finnish territory, but she did narrate a 
history of the area in which Finno-Ugric influences had been dominant in the 
more distant past: 
Вся проблема и том что вот например, первоначально когда 
создалась Карельская Трудовая Коммуна, с первыми границими, туда 
Вепсы не входили, в 20-м году.  А их отнесли только в 24-м году, через 
несколько лет.  И они отнесли почему? Потому что эту территорию, раньше 
исторический она входила в административной единице так-называемый 
Петрозаводский уезд.  Который от Петрозаводска и дальше шёл по 
Онежскому озеру...все развитие этого региона было связанно с 







год, то Вепсские деревни начинают от самого города, Петрозаводск это 
наверное Вепсская территория.  Поэтому они взяли то что, как бы, в 
сознании тогда, приближали к Петрозаводску  (Z. Strogal’shchikova). 
In the excerpt above whilst explaining the reasons for the inclusion of 
predominantly Vepsian areas in the expanded KASSR of 1924 Strogal’shchikova 
narrates a history of these areas which emphasises their Vepsian heritage.  She 
references the very earliest available authorities to witness the fact that in 1723, 
and therefore presumably prior to this, Vepsian villages were to be found “от 
самого города” outside Petrozavodsk.  In this manner she constructs an image 
of the relatively ancient history of the area in which Vepsian, rather than 
Russian, influences are paramount.  Indeed she then ventures a more hesitant 
statement that Petrozavodsk itself is “наверное” originally Vepsian territory.  
This is important as the idea of Petrozavodsk itself is clearly intimately 
connected with Russian identity; not only is the name of the town 
quintessentially Russian it evokes the creation of the town by Peter the Great in 
1703.  Strogal’shchikova is here insinuating that the area was Vepsian before the 
arrival of Russian settlement; Petrozavodsk thus appears as an outpost in 1723 of 
Russian culture in a predominantly Finno-Ugric landscape.  In this manner both a 
strategy of continuation is used to emphasise the antiquity of Vepsian claims to 
the area whilst a strategy of discontinuation is employed to deny the Russian 
population the same status; Petrozavodsk is depicted using a topos of the ‘foreign 
body’ appearing in an originally ‘pure’ Vepsian area.  
The idea of Russian settlement, in particular Petrozavodsk, as being 
something alien to Karelia and in conflict with its Finno-Ugric heritage was 
expressed by several other participants.  A good example of this tendency were 
the views expressed by participant A8, a Northern Karelian, towards the 
foundation of Petrozavodsk: 
Cам Петрозаводск это не Карельский город и как карел не сказал бы 
что это Карельский город это ваш город, Русским, вашим Петром, вашим 







чудовищный элемент потому что Русские прибыли сказали здесь будет 
(A8). 
In this excerpt the participant strongly refutes the notion that 
Petrozavodsk itself has anything to do with the legitimate historical heritage of 
Karelia; in fact he opines that it is impossible to “говорить о Петрозаводске как 
Карелия”.  He explicitly rejects Petrozavodsk “как карел”, and attributes the 
town, its foundation and everything associated with its history to ‘you Russians’.  
In this manner a strategy of attribution is used which ascribes all these historical 
figures, dates and events to the ‘other’ group of Russians whilst denying their 
relevance to the Karelian population.  Furthermore the actual creation of 
Petrozavodsk is depicted as a “чудовищный” process, in which the Russians are 
depicted as having arrived from somewhere outside Karelia and decreed the town 
be founded; in this manner Petrozavodsk is seen as alien to the Karelian people, 
as something unnatural and forced.  This assertion of a primacy of Finno-Ugric 
heritage and history and the rejection of Russian claims to be considered 
‘indigenous’ in Karelia seems to be more sustained and forceful amongst 
Northern Karelians such as this participant than amidst the Olonets Karelians as 
referenced above.   
The above examples are particularly useful excerpt as they help place into 
context the mass media material written by Grigoriev referenced above and 
reinforce the argued placement of Karelian identity in those pieces closer to 
Finnish identity than Russian.  In this interview excerpt Grigoriev actually goes 
further than he permits himself or is permitted within the pages of the Karelian 
press and openly asserts, albeit with an acknowledgement of the potential 
heterodox nature of his views, the essential unity of Karelian and Finnish 
identity.  Interestingly he is aware of and notes the opposition of the Vepsian 
Strogal’shchikova who is related as taking an almost opposite stance.  These 
excerpts indicate that there is an active debate amongst the Finno-Ugric 
intelligentsia of the Republic of Karelia as to the positioning of Karelia identity 
closer to or further away from Finnish identity.  Both Grigoriev and 
Strogal’shchikova are influential figures within the Finno-Ugric movement 







histories of the region in which Russian influence is minimalized or excluded 
completely is surely of great importance.  Clearly those Finno-Ugurs most active 
in the promotion of rights for their respective minorities use the idealised image 
of a past without Russian influence to argue for the promotion of their own 
conceptions of identity and associated political rights.    
 
4.5 Karelians and Russians: United Against a Common Enemy? 
 
The historical legacy of mutual antagonism towards the enemies of 
Orthodoxy has as described above been used both in certain participant’s 
contributions and certain media texts to narrate a history of the Karelian and 
Russian peoples which unites them from the very earliest periods of recorded 
history.  As has been examined above past conflict with the Swedes and Finns 
more generally is also used in certain historical narratives to construct a picture 
of Karelian and Russian unity in the mass media discourse.  Somewhat similar 
narratives were advanced by some of the Karelians interviewed for this study, as 
the excerpt below exemplifies: 
Потому что Карелов всегда были, защищали свою родину, и в этом 
отношение конечно второй вот такой этап, всё-таки мы сохранились как 
этнос, я считаю конечно борба с шведами.  Всё-таки вот это Православие, и 
свою, свою культуру язык сохранили даже вот те, те же Карелы которые 
вынуждены были бежать в центр России это вот Тверская Областные, 
конечно и Ленинградская они всё равно же сохранились...(D15). 
In this example the Swedes threaten the Orthodoxy and culture of the 
Karelians to the extent that the struggle against them is depicted as a struggle for 
Karelian identity itself.  This Swedish threat is so great as to necessitate the flight 
of some Karelians to the heart of Russia, where they are represented as having 
survived as a distinct ethnic group.  In this narrative the alliance with the 
Russians actually protects the Karelian people from dissolution into some other, 
unnamed ethnicity.  The Karelians are represented as having from time 







invasion but also the disappearance of ‘Karelian-ness’ itself.  Not only is 
Orthodoxy represented as a key part of Karelian identity but Russia itself is 
constructed as a refuge for the Karelians within which they can protect their 
identity from those who would seek to destroy it.  The participant involved was a 
lecturer at the State Pedagogical University in Petrozavodsk who had been 
involved in the preparation of cadre for the various schools which use some 
element of Karelian language within teaching in the region and hence can be 
seen as part of the local Karelian ‘intelligentsia’.  In contrast to Grigoriev or 
Antonova, however, she constructs a narrative using unificatory strategies which 
link the Karelians and the Russians as allies against foreign aggression.  It is 
clear therefore that the mass media discourse which uses similar narratives and 
strategies to position Karelian identity closer to Russian identity in opposition to 
foreign aggression has some resonance even amongst well-educated Karelians.  
The idea of Olonets as a bulwark against Swedish or other foreign invasion 
has already been noted in the examples above in relation to the manner in which 
parts of Karelia are constructed as having undergone Russian influence from 
time immemorial or at least the beginning of recorded history.  In the below 
example whilst Karelia is constructed as having been initially an exclusively 
Karelian territory the Russians are depicted as having arrived in the area in order 
to aid the Karelians in its defence from invaders:  
Потому что земля была богатая, край лесов и озёр, богатой в то время, 
богатая конечно же для в то время России, и Российского государства 
земля была нужна.  На эту землю много раз сюда приходили к нам и немцы 
и литовцы и шведы на Карельскую землю.  Поэтому конечно поскольку 
Карелы сами защищаться не могли, к нам сюда на помощь пришла Русь, и 
вот были построены первые форпосты России, как Олонецкий, Олонецкая 
крепость, конечно вот я считаю что это самое главное что Карелия была 
интересна и выгодна для России.  Поэтому они пришли сюда.  Хотя вот 
Новгородцы в то же время они сделали много хорошего и они сделали 
много такого негативно для карельского народа.  Потому что вот начал 
смешиваться язык начал смешеваться народ то есть конечно было 







Somewhat paradoxically the territory is depicted as having been rich 
enough to be coveted by foreign invaders and too poor to be able to defend itself 
against them.  Nevertheless the important aspect of this excerpt from another 
Olonets Karelian is the manner in which the Karelians and Russians are depicted 
as having come to be unified in opposition to such invaders; the Russians are 
incomers but they are incomers who arrive “к нам сюда на помощь”.  This 
narrative depicts the arrival of the Russians as beneficial to the Karelians, who 
were unable to defend themselves.  In fact the Russians and Karelians are to an 
extent represented as deriving a degree of mutual benefit from the experience.  It 
must be noted however that the interviewee appears to imply it was the Russians 
who decided to defend Karelia for their own interests rather than merely as a 
favour to the Karelians; the most important reason for this unity is ascribed to 
Russian self-interest: “Карелия была интересна и выгодна для России.”  This 
unity of Karelian and Russian, brought about by struggle against a common 
enemy, is also evaluated somewhat ambiguously; whilst it allowed the Karelians 
to defend themselves in this narrative it also is depicted as beginning the process 
of assimilation which threatens the independent existence of the Karelians as an 
ethnic group.  The two examples above thus demonstrate two conflicting 
narratives of this alliance between Karelian and Russian; one the one hand as we 
have also seen in the mass media narratives Karelians and Russians are often 
narrated as having defended their common interests and homeland against 
foreign aggression and thus defended their own future, on the other this very 
alliance is depicted as having threatened the existence of the Karelians as a 
discrete ethnicity.  
A somewhat anomalous narrative of these conflicts was offered by one 
participant in particular from the northern group of Karelians who related an 
unusually detailed narrative of one particular event in this period: 
Ну всё что связано может быть, с таким это, войнами связано с Руси 
если начинать сначала, те же самые Шведы когда шли, не помню как 
назывались но сейчас скажем Архангельские земли то есть Шведы […] 







Даже в истории моей деревни с этим связано то есть почему на 
самом деле называется «пролив костей» потому что, то есть я могу 
рисовать?  Вот это получается Куйто это в Карелии четвёртая по величине 
озеро оно состоит из верхнового озера, потом соединяется с системи 
протоков, проливов с среднего и потом здесь с нижем Куйто, здесь тоже 
вот пролив такой, большой.  А деревня как раз находится здесь...раньше, по 
моему столетии 17-м, 18-м сейчас немножко не готовился не поскажу, 
давно мне рассказывали информацию, проходили как раз Шведские войска, 
соответственно Шведские через Финладиию на Архангельские земли как 
раз проходили через Карелию...и соответственно вот они шли отсюда и 
шли как раз вот и у них был такой вот, удобный путь через вот этот пролив, 
чем он был, удобен, он был здесь как бы, ну не то что он был удобен 
наверное больше подходит слово неудобен, он там был очень мелко, то 
есть очень мелко ну на узком пространстве...и могли там пройти 
соотвественно только вот чтобы более менее безопасно это вариант пару 
всадников.  Соответсвенно шведы там в то время они уже были таких 
обычных войн, с шлемами со всеми доспехами а Карелов никогда не было 
никаких не войск не войн они были просто земледельцы.  А Карелы как раз 
здесь вот на этом проливе очень сильно как сказать потрепали войска 
Шведов потому что им можно пройти колоннами и они здесь встречали 
толпа с такими там простыми топорами, мотыгами, палками и 
соотвественно очень много на этом проливе даже мы в детстве играли здесь 
в этом, на этом берегу с одной сторона деревни и проливе много 
похороненные человеческие останки. 
Шведы положили конечно всё там население мужское потому что 
всё-таки они не (...) были, и ни чем, но как так, я уже говорил был русский 
поход, карелам тоже мало-численная, как кучка Карелов 
неорганизованных, не обычних, всё-таки Шведские войска потрепать 
удалось. A4 
This example is notable for a number of features.  Firstly it is unusual for 
its extremely positive self-representation of the Karelians involved in the defeat 







mismatch between experienced Swedish troops and ordinary Karelian peasants.  
The Swedes, we are informed, were fully-equipped regular forces whereas the 
Karelians were locals armed with простыми топорами and other tools.  Despite 
the unfavourable odds the Karelians are depicted as having inflicted such a 
defeat on the Swedes as to force their opponents to recognise their courage and 
to have made them incur such losses that children can easily turn up their bones 
whilst at play.  This representation of the Karelians as brave, cunning and 
successful warriors is somewhat unusual as the Karelians usually represent 
themselves in historical narratives as peaceful to the point of total passivity and 
entirely unable to influence historical events.  The excerpt is also unusual in that 
the Karelians are represented here as fighting the Swedes entirely unaided by 
their Russian allies; although the interviewee does locate this event in the more 
general context of Swedish and Russian conflict, with the Swedes represented as 
going через Карелию, presumably on their way into Russia proper, it is 
nevertheless a narrative of a battle between Karelian and Swedish forces only.  
To a certain extent therefore the usual narrative of these conflicts as being a joint 
and therefore unifying enterprise between Russian and Karelian against a 
Swedish foe is minimised.  In this narrative the emphasis is not on a joint 
struggle between Karelians and Russians but on the heroic exploits of the 
Karelians themselves; it is thus to an extent a narrative of an independent, 
Karelian conflict with foreign invaders in which their Russian allies play an 
almost invisible role.  Interestingly once again this narrative which minimises 
Russian influence is presented by a Northern Karelian, furthermore one of the 
youngest and least well educated participants with only a secondary school 
education.  Clearly such narratives of local history are current within a large 
section of the Karelian population of these areas as it appears to have been 
derived from ‘common knowledge’, according to the participant.  It should also 
be noted however that this narrative is, as is quite common with narratives of 
Karelian history in general, quite localised.  Although the interviewee initially 
describes these conflicts in general terms, with Karelia as a whole under attack 
from the Swedes, the main narrative is the history of his own village.  This is 
representative of a tendency already discussed in reference to the mass media 







localised, as a rule to their native village or district.  This tendency shall be 
discussed in greater detail below.  
 
 
4.6 The Sacred and the Heretical in Private: 1940-44  
 
i) Private and Public: Personal Recollections and Official Narration 
 
The almost sacrosanct nature of the main historical narratives of the Great 
Patriotic War has already been examined in reference to the mass media 
discourse.  It has been noted that the standard picture of heroic resistance against 
brutal fascist invasion and oppression, and Karelian and Russian unity in the face 
of such oppression, forms a kind of orthodoxy which it is extremely controversial 
to attempt to alter or undermine.  The existence of such heterodox views, 
however, albeit in the main either marginalised or reproduced from outside, 
mainly Finnish, sources, has also been demonstrated.  The manner in which 
narratives of this period were related in the interview data, however, was one of 
the most informative and interesting aspects of this method of research.  The 
narratives recorded were produced in a private setting; albeit not an entirely 
natural one given they were produced in the given context of an academic study 
rather than a private conversation between two acquaintances or the like.  
Nevertheless in this more private setting it would appear that participants felt 
able to produce narratives which would have been controversial to say the least 
had they appeared in print within Karelia.  The narratives were similar to those 
found in the printed media in the sense that they were often based upon or 
referenced personal family experience or that of the interviewee’s local area 
during the war years; this local or familial experience however was often 








It must be stated that not all participants were in any way critical of the 
general narrative of heroic Soviet triumph against fascist invasion.  One 
participant in particular was, in general terms, supportive of this narrative: 
- Ну это угроза гозударственности да?  И поэтому я считаю что это 
очень важный момент.  Если бы мы проиграли войну, что история совсем 
другая бы началась.  И государство я думаю, такого, ну во-первых не был 
бы государство Советский Союз там и я думаю даже не было государство 
Россия, Я думаю что вообще Славянские народы они вообще 
государственность потеряют.  То есть они бы прекратились там вот, наций 
которые то скажем так были даже Эстонцы, там Литовцы, Лативцы эти все 
были нации которые государственности не имели они входили в составе 
других государств.  Наверное такая бы история была потому что, а, немцы 
видели Славянские наций возле своего мирого господства, мы бы, исчезают 
фактический, поэтому я считаю что этот, повторяю самое главное событие 
(C2).  
Participant C2, a Russian in the median age catergory, considered the 
triumph in the Great Patriotic War to be the single most important event in 
Karelian and Russian history by recreating the topos of the ‘averted catastrophe’ 
constructed in the mainstream media discourse on the event.  This is not 
surprising given that he volunteered his time on a regular basis to aid in the 
location and reburial of Soviet soldiers who had fallen in the conflict and whose 
graves had not been recorded at the time.  For him the efforts of these soldiers 
prevented the complete disappearance of the USSR and therefore Russia and 
perhaps even the Slavic peoples as ethnic groups.  Clearly, therefore, there are 
those within Karelia to whom the importance accorded to the Great Patriotic War 
in the media discourse and the reverence in which the victory is held is entirely 
appropriate. As shall be explored further below, however, even this participant 
appeared to think the official narrative somewhat lacking and offered a more 
nuanced narrative of some elements of the conflict.  
It must also be stated that, in general, the Karelian respondents evaluated 







positive manner.  The main differences which were noted in the interview data to 
the narratives derived from the mass media were in the presentation of certain 
aspects of the war.  In particular the conduct of the war by the Soviet forces was 
occasionally portrayed as inefficient or even to a degree incompetent and 
counter-productive.  The ‘enemy-picture’ of the Finns created in the mass media 
discourse, whilst not as negative as that ascribed to the Germans, can still be 
quite damning; in the interview data the Finns are often depicted quite 
sympathetically.  The excerpt below exemplifies some of these tendencies: 
Пришлось их партизанскому отряду, было постановлено задание 
зажечь несколько деревень в зимнее время чтобы они не достались тогда 
находящимся на территории Карелии Финнским войскам, но что там не 
было возможности Финнам где-то жить.  И их отряд вот, но был против 
жечь деревни где отец родился и вырос до войны.  Ну многие были 
выходцы из деревни […] то они сами сожгли свои дома потому что так был 
приказ, решились сам сжёг чем кто-то другой, но впоследствие он сказал 
что конечно это был не самый разумный приказ потому что уж то Финны, 
которые также привычные к этим суровым климатическим условиям, есть 
дом хорошо не будет дома они точно также построить себе дом или 
землянку.  Там уже Финны в основе своей отхода из территории они не в 
отличие от Немцев они не сжигали дома жителей то есть в приципе могла 
быть ситуация которая Финны тут поселились, потом их вышибли оттуда, 
дома могли бы сохраниться, а так в деревнях грубо говоря всё было 
сожжено и уже после войны туда никто не вернулся (D10). 
In the above example the burning of Karelian villages during the war, 
which is narrated as having had the negative effect of essentially completely 
destroying such communities and preventing their post-war re-establishment, is 
ascribed not to the Finns but to the Soviets.  The Finns, we are informed, in 
explicit contrast to the Germans did not burn villages; had they been left 
untouched the Finns would, in the opinion of the interviewee, have been 
removed and the villages reoccupied by their previous inhabitants.  The local 
Karelians are instead provided with a не самый разумный приказ by the 







the participant’s отец родился и вырос.  In this narrative it is the Soviet 
authorities who are constructed as being responsible for the most damaging 
destruction rather than the Finnish forces; furthermore the Finns appear as 
competent, adaptable northerners whilst the Soviet authorities order the reluctant 
Karelians to follow orders of dubious military value.  The Karelian participant 
involved was again in the median age group and this narrative of Soviet 
incompetence is in stark contrast to that of the Russian participant quoted above; 
this shows the potential power of familial knowledge in the creation of alternate, 
heterodox narratives of Karelian history.  Both participants had gone through 
similar educational experiences and grown up within a similar cultural milieu, 
however access to his father’s recollections has conditioned the Karelian 
participant to be somewhat more ambilvalent about the meaning of the local war 
experience.   
The idea of familial recollections undermining the ‘official’ narrative of the 
war period is also illustrated in the excerpt below:  
В Советской литературе писали о том что это было очень сложный 
период, вот, хотя опять на примерах знакомых наших и моей семьи я могу 
сказать что Финны, но Карелов, Карелов, они не обижали, они не обижали 
и они сделали всё чтобы Карельские семьи жили хорошо, но конечно же не 
просто так вот подачкими чем-то там но они заставяли работать, но для 
этого они давали всё что можно было там и нашим людей и семьям и всё.  
И у моей мамы её сестра вышла замуж за Финна во время оккупации, всю 
жизнь жила в Финландии...Карелы которые здесь были под Финнами в 
оккупации они не жаловались, а с Русским населением конечно было 
сложнее (D6). 
In the above example the interviewee, an Olonets Karelian, directly 
compares the official narrative, as exemplified by Soviet literature, to the 
примерах знакомых наших и моей семьи. The interviewer is therefore invited 
to evaluate what has been codified as the official narrative of the Finnish 
occupation against the actual ‘real-life’ experience of the interviewee’s friends 







with reference to the official narrative by citing her own family experience and 
eye-witness testimony.  She uses such testimony to prove that the Finns behaved 
well towards the Karelians; the claim that the Finns gave всё что можно to the 
Karelians is witnessed by the fact her aunt married a Finn during the occupation 
and therefore lived the remainder of her life in Finland.  In fact a number of 
participants in areas which had been occupied talked of relatives either marrying 
and therefore emigrating or otherwise choosing to leave for Finland with the 
occupiers upon their retreat from Karelia.  Such family histories were often 
apparently a taboo subject in the Soviet period; it was only after 1991 and then 
with some reticence that such narratives of the Finnish occupation could 
apparently be related.   
In the last example the Finnish occupation was assessed positively, but the 
participant did acknowledge that the situation for Russians was “сложнее”, thus 
introducing an element of ambivalence into the narrative and suggesting that 
there were negative aspects to the manner in which the Finns behaved.  More 
rarely the Finnish occupation is depicted as either entirely positive or far better 
than the alternative of evacuation to Russia:  
Как это повлияло знаешь я опять же не историк, ну это конечно 
Финнские концлагери и всё такое, это навернoе имеет место быть потому 
что есть свидетельство есть источники я не спорила тогда как бы да?  Но 
эта Гитлеровская кампания и Финны были как бы в этом в том числе, но я 
могла об этом хотя бы исходя из своей семьи.  Мой папа сейчас семьдесят-
пять лет, и пережил Финскую оккупацию.  А мама в период Финской 
оккупации была с своей семьей значит она была тогда очень маленкая их 
эвакуировали на Урал, очень далеко.  Так вот моя мама одна выжила из 
всех детей свойх, будучи в бегах на Урале, они убежали от Финской 
оккупации.  А семья папы остались в свой деревне жить.  Так вот мой папа 
жил благополучно, он получил образованние на Финском языке он каждый 
день питался хорошо, он был воспитан, у него был Финский учитель в 
школе, его никогда не били, ему выдавали витамины и я в полном серёзном 







источников из семейных примеров то что Финны когда были в Карелии 
ничего плохого не сделали (N. Antonova). 
In this excerpt Natalya Antonova indirectly queries the validity of 
narratives which equate the Finns to the Germans; although she is careful to 
preface her comments with a declaration that the interviewer is aware that “я 
опять же не историк”, and therefore is not claiming her remarks should be 
taken as authoritative, she does query the relevance of narratives which paint the 
Finnish occupation in a negative light, using a downplaying strategy which 
minimises the negative aspects of the period.    Although she acknowledges that 
there is evidence for Finnish concentration camps narratives of such camps are 
still only, in her eyes, at best marginal, as they merely “наверное имеет место 
быть”; it is further suggested that they existed against the will of the Finns who 
were only tangentially “как бы в этом в том числе” allied to the Germans.  She 
appeals instead to her own familial experience and in particular the contrasting 
fates of her parents under Finnish occupation and Soviet evacuation.  Her mother 
is evacuated to the Urals, “очень далеко”, where she alone out of all the children 
who fled with her survives to return to Karelia after the war.  In contrast her 
father whose family elected to stay under the Finns lives “благополучно” to the 
extent that he receives an education and a daily dose of vitamins.  In this manner 
Antonova compares the treatment of her parents and thus the treatment of the 
Karelians as a whole under Soviet and Finnish rule during the war years; after 
narrating such a positive personal account of her own family’s experience she 
then expands the context of her comments to conclude that the Finns in general 
когда были в Карелии ничего плохого не сделали.  This narrative inverts the 
orthodox narrative of the war period and achieves this through the partial 
inversion of the usual strategies employed to create an ‘enemy’ picture of the 
Finns; responsibility for the negative effects of the war is redistributed in this 
narrative from the Finns to the Soviets who are constructed as the force actually 
oppressing the Karelians.  Once again these strategies delegitimise the 









ii) Further Narratives of the Occupation  
 
As has been seen from the brief excerpts above one of the major areas in 
which narratives of the war period differ in the private as opposed to the public 
arena is in the manner in which the Finnish occupation is narrated.  The Finnish 
use of concentration camps has as discussed above a particular potential 
resonance in narratives of the occupation period.  The existence of such camps 
was referenced by certain participants, however even the Russian participant 
quoted above who reproduced in large part the standard narrative of the heroic 
war period seemed to feel it was important to draw distinctions between the 
Finnish model of concentration camp and its Nazi equivalent: 
Ну сто восем-десять тысяч суда Финнов приехали с Финляндей, 
захватили этой земли, сто восем-десять тысяч приехали.  Они 
действительно стремились за то что эта территория осталaсь за ними и 
государственная политика стали проводить за то что вот то что сто восем-
десять тысяч приехали, Финны-Карелы сюда к нам, и Славяне всех в 
концлагерях это было.  Эти и есть исторические факты. 
- И концлагери Финнов они конечно были... 
- Но они естественно никто там никого не жёг с огнемётом, ну 
работали, заставали работать.  Ну и естественно несвобода, но зверство 
таких фашистов не было (C2). 
In the above example the interviewee does depict the Finns as aggressors 
and occupiers; the interviewee by informing their interlocutor of the actual size 
of the Finnish occupying force seeks to convey the seriousness of their intent.  
This is associated with their establishment of concentration camps for the Slavic 
inhabitants of the area; the interviewee declares that these are the исторические 
факты.  This narrative therefore seeks to establish the actions of the Finns as 
clearly aggressive and evaluates them in a negative light; moreover the 
interviewee presents this as not merely his opinion but an objective assessment 
of what actually happened.  Nevertheless even in this narrative the Finns are 







that никто там никого не жёг с огнемётом; although acknowledged as 
несвобода and therefore evidently assessed as a negative phenomenon the very 
worst war crimes are not ascribed to the Finns.  Clearly the term concentration 
camp does, in the mind of the interviewee, conjure up images of such atrocities 
and the presence of таких фашистов; the Finns are explicitly pronounced as free 
from any such taint.   
If Russian participants generally assessed the occupation of the KASSR 
as having been disastrous albeit not to the extent of that of other parts of the 
USSR Karelian participants, as has been glimpsed in the examples above, tend to 
have a more ambivalent attitude.  This ambivalence is well exemplified in the 
excerpts below: 
A) Потому что больше трех лет оккупации этои территории, 
не все были эвакуированы, в силу разничих причин да, 
оии опять открыли Финские школы изучали Финский 
язык....Финны воспринимались, то есть и среди Карел 
произошло разделение, кто-то считал Финны друзями 
называли товарищами да, и даже незначительный, мог 
Карел уехать в Финладиию 44-ом году.  Часть из них 
было возращено потом но часть так осталась.  Разние 
точки зрения да, даже в одной Карельской семье один 
считал что Финны они чисто врагами чуть не там, 
фашистами а другой нет значит сказали что они не такие 
(B2). 
 
B) Бабушка проживала в годы войны в Мегреге, посёлок 
Мегрега где ...то есть квартировался батальон или 
дивизия вот этих Финнских солдатов.  Бабушка работала 
в столовой, да то есть кормила, и потом другая бабушка 
которая к сожалению в годах войны, то есть были 
сильные бомбёжки и молодой девушки 17 лет, 17-18 лет 
получается…(…) что есть мой бабушки 







Она рассказала что были Финны которые хорошо 
относились к Карелам, то есть как бы, но а также 
рассказала о зверствах которые происходили с 
партизанами, то есть...Советские партизаны которые 
вырезали звезду на живём по живому телу она тоже этого 
видела но она долго молчала... 
Финны да вот к партизаном относились сурово, но к 
местным жителям особенно Карелам, более, более менее 
лояльно то есть... 
Не жгли деревни здесь, не убивали народ целами 
деревнями..(D4).  
С) По поводу Финской оккупации да тут конечно их 
концлагери существовали, и это известно как говорится 
не только из Финских но из наших источников что Финны 
более лояльно относились к местному населению вот и 
конечно более жёсткое, жестоко, скажем так, не Карелам, 
не Вепсам, не Финнам-Ингерманланцем, но всё равно они 
не поступали как поступали Немцы всё-таки концлагери 
которые они располагались как на территории 
Петрозаводска и Карелии их все равно нельзя сравнять с 
Немецкими например.  Но на севере Финское население 
например да не только на севере на юге они 
организовались здесь даже как сказать народные школы, 
учили население по крайне мере Финскому языку, 
способных людей и желающих, но это конечно ещё дети и 
молодежь, даже приглашали на учёбу на Финлядию или 
работать там, потом вывели обратно.  Но эта как 
говорится одна из сторона просветительская с другой 
сторони никак не отрицает от того что эта была война и 







In the above examples various Karelian interviewees narrate histories of 
the occupation period, often with reference to familial experience, in which the 
Finns are depicted in both a negative and positive light.  In example B once again 
the Finnish occupation is seen in ambivalent light due to the fact that the 
interviewee has a relative who departed for Finland with the occupying forces in 
1944; in example A the interviewee does not relate such a personal anecdote but 
nevertheless acknowledges that certain Karelians did retreat to Finland with the 
occupying forces.  Examples A and C both relate a history of the period when the 
Finnish forces undertook the work of educating and assisting the Karelian 
population.  In these examples a narrative of the period is produced where the 
aggression of the Finns is mediated by their positive attitude towards the 
Karelians.  Such narratives are interesting in contrast to the predominant 
narratives of the war and those of the Russians under Finnish occupation; the 
most positive narrative a Russian appears to be able to produce of the period is 
that Finnish occupation was not as bad as that of the Germans.  In these 
examples the Karelians appear to use both a strategy of downplaying and 
minimising the negative aspects of the period and also a deconstructive strategy 
which undermines the orthodox narrative in which the Finns are portrayed as 
vicious aggressors or fascists. The ‘other’ picture created of Finnish aggressors is 
therefore somewhat blurred in these narratives for at least some Karelians.  In 
examples B and C, for example, the attitude of the Finns towards the Karelians is 
described as “лояльно”; the connotations of the word vary somewhat from its 
direct English equivalent, in this instance it could be translated as the Finns 
behaving ‘correctly’ or ‘properly’ towards the Karelians.  Indeed the context in 
both examples mean the word could be interpreted strictly in this fashion only; 
nevertheless it does have some connotations of political loyalty in the English 
sense which would infer some sort of intrinsic affinity between Karelian and 
Finn.  It should be noted that the two examples are from individuals with 
connections to the Southern and Northern groups of Karelians respectively thus 
indicating this narrative is present throughout Karelia.  It is also interesting in 
example A that the interviewee informs his interlocutor that some Karelians view 
the Finns as чисто врагами чуть не там, фашистами.  This can be seen as 







of ‘фашисты’, the same enemies that are accused by participant C2 in the 
example above of committing, outwith Karelia, all kinds of atrocities.  It would 
appear that even those Karelians with the most negative opinion of the Finns, 
however, in the eyes of participant B2, view them as almost but not quite 
‘фашисты’ in this sense.  In all examples the narrative of the Finnish occupation 
is related in an ambivalent manner.  In excerpt A for example the interviewee 
portrays the split in Karelian opinion by synecdochial reference to a typical 
Karelian family; the Karelian nation is split in its approach to the period in the 
same manner as the family which cannot decide if the Finns are almost as bad as 
the Germans or не такие.  In examples B and C the Karelians, whilst narrating 
the experiences of their own ethnic group under the Finns as almost uniformly 
positive, do feel the need to acknowledge that for non-Finno-Ugrians the 
situation was completely different.  In example B for instance the interviewee 
relates the gruesome details of the manner in which the Finns punished partisans, 
although interestingly these partisans are represented as having been from 
outwith the local area or at least the ‘we’ group of “местным жителям” that the 
interviewee creates.  In example C the participant directly constructs the Soviet 
forces as the ‘we’ group that the Finns attack, noting that despite their good 
conduct “эта была война и они воевали против нас”.  These narratives 
therefore do undermine the standard narrative of the Finnish occupation through 
the relation of a more ambivalent assessment of the period within which the 
Finns are both praised and condemned in almost equal measure.  
We have already seen above that a narrative within which criticism of the 
Finns was almost entirely absent for the period of the occupation was produced 
by Natalya Antonova.  Another individual who produced a narrative of the 
period which was generally favourable to the Finns was Anatolii Grigoriev.  In 
his view during the occupation:   
Никаких проблем не было, но были партизаны слышали там 
предположено, Мария Мелентьева там погибла, но это понимаете это такое, 
как сказать, там подожгли, в силу военного времени раз подожгли там, 
диверсию совершили, вот расстреляли, вот такой.  А проблемa не былa, 







It is worth remarking here that Maria Melent’eva was a Karelian partisan 
(by nationality) who was executed during the war by the Finns for her resistance 
activities and was later declared a Hero of the Soviet Union.  A street was named 
in her honour in Petrozavodsk and there is a museum dedicated to her in her 
native town of Pryazha. The narrative Grigoriev offers here is therefore 
potentially, if aired in a public arena, quite controversial to say the least.  
Melent’eva’s actions and fate are not described in terms befitting a national hero; 
her task is depicted as somewhat mundane, she is credited merely with having 
“диверсию совершили”, as is her fate.  The execution of the young woman, the 
act which led to her being elevated to the pantheon of war-time heroes in the 
Soviet period, is narrated by Grigoriev as simply вот расстреляли, вот такой.  
By narrating the death of a Hero of the Soviet Union in this manner Grigoriev 
normalises the attitude of the occupying Finns who are depicted as having no 
other option, в силу военного времени.  In this narrative it is Melent’eva who 
appears to provoke her own demise by attacking the Finnish forces; the ordinary 
Karelian civilians, after all, are represented as having никаких проблем with the 
Finnish forces.  In this manner once again Grigoriev, in a similar manner to 
Antonova, presents a narrative of the Finnish occupation in which the Karelians 
and Finns, as fraternal peoples, are able to exist without any issues.  Once again a 
strategy of shifting blame is employed and a strategy of downplaying which 
invert the orthodox narrative of heroic Karelian and Russian joint resistence and 
create instead a topos of a benign occupation which is threatened more by Soviet 
belligerence than Finnish aggression.  Such narratives undermine the idea of 
Karelians and Russians jointly oppressed by and resisting the Finns, and offers 
an alternate view in which the Karelians seem to be almost better off under 
Finnish than Soviet rule. 
iii) Responsibility for the Conflict 
 
As has been discussed above the usual narratives of the period depict the 
Finns as being part of the more general unprovoked aggression of various fascist 
powers towards a peaceful Soviet people.  In the interview data collected, 







alternate narrative in which the Finnish invasion and occupation of 1941-44 was 
a response to the Soviet attack on Finland in the Winter War: 
Нам говорили что конфликт начинали со стороны Финляндии, то 
есть Финны стали первые […], стали первые бомбить, от нас хотели бы 
воевать свою прежную территорию но Олонец часть никогда не была, 
Финской территории, он был приграничный, потому что граница 
проходила 60-й км от Олонца.  Но уже сейчас да...я читала другие книги и 
другой материал где говориться о том что всё-таки в этом конфликте 
виноват Советский Союз (D4).  
Уже признанно что Советский Союз напал на Финландию, агрессия, 
более того.  Хотя наши не признают Советский Союз один из главных 
виновников Второй Мировой Войны.   
Это всё специально так скажем, сделается почему? Потому что вот 
чтобы оправдать нападение на Финляндию 39-го года (A. Grigoriev). 
In the above examples the Karelian participants construct a narrative of 
the conflict in which the USSR rather than Finland is held responsible for the 
conflict; in fact participant D4 actually contrasts this narrative to the official 
representation of the war as purely defensive.  In her interview she describes the 
orthodox view of the conflict; the Finns are accused of having attacked first and 
of coveting territories that had never belonged to them.  This orthodox view, 
represented by the construction нам говорили, which presents these ideas as 
reported speech attributed to unnamed but presumably influential and 
authoritative ‘others’, is contrasted with другие книги which the interviewee has 
been able to obtain which level the blame towards the USSR instead.  The 
context of these comments can be discovered in the remainder of her interview in 
which she reveals that as a fluent Finnish speaker she is able to directly access 
Finnish publications and converse with Finnish acquaintances who have, it 
would appear, influenced her opinions.  This example demonstrates therefore the 
manner in which their relative competency in Finnish provides Karelians in 
particular with direct, unmediated access to Finnish texts and the manner in 







The second excerpt, again from Grigoriev, goes even further in constructing the 
USSR as the aggressor in the conflict; not only does he acknowledge that the 
USSR attacked first this is directly stated to be “агрессия, более того.”  In 
narrating the history of the period in this way Grigoriev not only ascribes 
responsibility for the war to a different party, he also identifies the USSR as 
culpable, один из главных виновников, in a manner which associates the USSR 
with other unnamed countries responsible for the very worst aggression in the 
period; the context is left unstated but this would presumably refer to the fascist 
powers.   
The behaviour of the Finns during the occupation is as has been described 
above generally narrated rather ambiguously by the Karelian interviewees, with a 
certain emphasis in some accounts on their relatively positive behaviour.  
Occasionally this positive assessment is applied more broadly to their actions in 
general.  A number of the Karelian participants narrated a history of the war in 
which the Finns had no intention of doing more than recovering their former 
territories, and were drawn into a wider conflict by Soviet complicity or 
incompetence: 
В 40-х годов их цели были то что они дойдут до реки Свири, вы 
знаете да?  Это не далёк, это десяти километров от Олонца, что они дойдут 
до реки Свири и остановятся на, то есть на нашем берегу, то есть ещё на 
терртории Карелии, и дальше они не пойдут...но Сталин решил что Финны 
всё-таки пойдут через реку и тогда было большое сражение и была большая 
бомбёжка реки Свири и гидроэлекторстанци которую стоит на реке (D4).  
The above example is a good illustration of this narrative, in which the 
Finns are portrayed as being unwilling to advance much beyond their former 
borders, or as the interviewee describes it их цели были то что они дойдут до 
реки Свири.  The line of the River Svir’ is not that of the former border between 
the USSR and Finland, being as the interviewee describes “ещё на терртории 
Карелии”, but it is not far distant from it.  In this narrative however the Finns are 
not allowed to halt their advance at this point; Stalin is directly credited with 







narratives the Finns are drawn unwillingly into further aggression by the 
machinations of the Soviet authorities, in this instance generally attributed to the 
named personage of Stalin.  In other such narratives the Finns are forced into 
occupying an abandoned Petrozavodsk or refrain from participating in the 
blockade of Leningrad or launching further offensives after 1941.  These 
narratives use a strategy of minimalisation to once again downplay Finnish 
responsibility for the conflict and its negative effects; this has the, generally 
implicit, effect of reassigning at least some responsibility to the Soviet Union.    
This relatively sympathetic assessment of Finnish involvement in the 
1941-44 war was not limited to the Karelians alone.  It would appear that at least 
some of the Russians in Karelia have a fairly nuanced picture of the manner in 
which the conflict came to pass; the sample size is too small to determine if such 
views are generally prevalent however one participant offered a narrative quite 
similar to those offered by the Karelians above.  Although not questioning the 
more general narrative of the war, which the participant as described above 
found to be in broader terms the single most important historical event in 
Karelian and Russian history, he did draw some distinctions between Finnish and 
German conduct as has been seen with regards to the existence of concentration 
camps.  It should be noted that the participant was married to a Karelian and had 
access through knowledge of Finnish to texts produced for a Finnish audience.  
Nevertheless the below example illustrates the fact that not all Russians narrate 
the events of 1940-45 as unprovoked Finnish aggression:    
- Ну вы знаете что у нас отношение к войне с Финнами оно не такое 
катергорическое как война с Немцами, потому что Немцы, они значит 
действительно напали на нас, вот, а по отношение к Финнам не тут такая 
неоднозначеная ситуация, потому что в трицать-девятом году на Финнов 
первые мы напали. 
- Да, Зимная Война... 
- Вот, и у Финнов значит, есть вот то что у нас называется Зимная 
Война, и Великая Отечественная Война, а у Финнов называется talvisota, 







- Немножко, но... 
- Ну talvi зима, sota война так что talvisota называется как у нас.  А 
Великая Отечественная Война у них называется jatkosota, Продолженная 
Война, знаете да? 
- Да. 
- И поэтому здесь, Финны как бы они пошли вместе с Немцами даже 
не союзниками они им называли они как-то там братья по-оружию, да.  И 
значит они не нападали на Советский Союз а они как бы, пытались вернуть 
свои земли.  Другой вопрос когда они дошли до территорий, до границ, и 
они потом дальше [...] здесь небольшой нюанс, то там же было дажe 
увольнение Финладии по этому поводу там даже Маннергейм там уже как 
бы я не знаю как дальше вести войска, ну и Финны высказали всё мы свою 
землю отбили больше не пойдём никуда.  Они даже там в Ленинградской 
Области дошли до своих территорий они даже Маннергейм […] Петербург 
даже не обстреливал.  И поэтому Маннергейма, когда в сорок-шестом году 
сдано был председателем коммисии по военным преступлением, он в 
Португал уже отпустили, Маннергейма улетел на самолёт в Португал 
отдыхать и его не судили, потому что был моменты  конца Маннергейм как 
бы понимал что тут вроде, здесь свою землю отвоевали, может быть и […].  
Поэтому у нас такое жесткое отношение к Финнам как к Немцам нет у, в 
обществе у нас (C2). 
The participant above does link the Finnish invasion of 1941 to the 
Winter War of 1940, and is aware of the fact that the Finns consider the two wars 
to be separate parts of a continuous conflict.  Whilst the Germans are accused of 
having quite straightforwardly “действительно напали на нас”, the participant 
presents the actions of the Finns in a more ambiguous light, to the extent that 
whilst involved in the attack on the USSR the interviewee feels it is incorrect to 
label the Finns as actual allies of the Nazis with all the associated negative 
connotations of such status.  Once again an alternate narrative is presented, 
potentially at least partially derived from access to Finnish narratives of the 







are depicted as having a relatively just cause.  Once again the participant also 
narrates a history in which the Finns, in this case personified by Marshal 
Mannerheim, are depicted as being unwilling to advance beyond their former 
borders.  As a consequence the interviewee constructs a picture of Karelian 
society in which the Finns are spared the sort of antagonism which it is indirectly 
expressed is directed towards the Germans.  As stated above this participant did 
in other remarks generally reproduced the unifying narrative of resistance against 
foreign invasion which characterisied the mass media discourse; it appears that 
direct access to Finnish language material has provided alternate narratives 
which have added to his knowledge base or habitus and thus promoted the 
production of a more nuanced narrative which disassociates the Finns from 
aspects of the ‘enemy picture’ created in the mainstream media discourse.  
 
iv)  Karelian and Russian Relations After the Occupation 
 
 
A) Если не были бы эти конфликты, России с Финляндей 
я думаю что ситуация, хоть Карельская, хоть 
Вепсская, хоть ижорская, хоть Ингерманландского, 
она была бы лучше, она бы не была хорошая но она 
была бы лучше.  Не было бы этих, специально 
заведённых […] НКВД дело шпионских связь с 
Финляндей, не погубили бы наших 
учёных...(Strogal’shchikova) 
 
B) Ну и потом, но были такие мнения что почему язык 
скажем бывших наших врагов у нас вторым языком?  
(D16) 
 
C) Карелов действительно иногда называли предателями 
и думаю что раз как мы родственный Финнам народ 







власти, на самом деле этого не произошло потому что 
просто скажу что читая много литературу про войну и 
как раз малые национальности тогдашнего Советского 
Союза порой боролись против оккупации ещё по [...] 
чем русские (D10). 
 
D) - Что мы ненадёжные?  Да да, такие есть, и всегда 
считались как бы негласно среди Финно-угоров, всех 
Финно-угоров в России, самые не благонанёжные 
Карелы, всё из того как мы близко к Финландии, и 
Коми народ, не знаю почему Коми но, всегда считали 
что мы самый обструктивный, самый не 
благонанёжный, самый ненадёжный да так всегда 
считалось (A1). 
 
The examples above demonstrate the manner in which a significant 
section of the Karelian and Vepsian participants viewed the historical legacy of 
Finnish involvement in the wars of the 1940s.  These participants narrated a 
history of the post-war period in which the Finno-Ugric inhabitants of the USSR, 
in particular the Karelians who had been under Finnish occupation and spoke a 
very similar language to Finnish, were the subject of heightened suspicion from 
the Soviet authorities.  In example A the war with Finland is related as having 
led to an even greater loss amongst the Finno-Ugric identity within the USSR 
than would otherwise have been the case.  The legacy of the war is not glorious 
triumph in this narrative but NKVD repression of Finno-Ugric academics.  In a 
similar fashion example B relates the abandonment of Finnish language 
instruction as being the direct consequence of ‘their’ view that Finnish was the 
language of бывших наших врагов; once again a strategy of avoidance used 
which in both examples refrains from attributing these negative actions or 
opinions to any named group.  In example C the interviewee similarly relates the 
suspicions of an unnamed group of Karelian loyalty and the feeling in some, 
presumably Russian, quarter that the Karelians were always liable to повернуть 







the manner in which, certainly for many of the participants, such apparent 
accusations are considered to be unjustified; the interviewee represents the 
minority groups as actually having done more for their country than the Russians 
themselves.  Finally example D demonstrates that certain interviewees believe 
that this imagined lack of loyalty amongst the Karelian population is a 
contemporary as well as a historic issue; in her eyes the modern authorities show 
the same amount of distrust to the самый ненадёжный Karelians.  In all of the 
above examples a narrative of the post-war period is produced in which the 
Karelians and Vepsians, rather than benefitting from the victory over Finland, are 
suspected of not having been sufficiently loyal and are thereafter punished or 
subject to suspicion.  In this manner a deconstructive strategy is deployed, 
similar to that used when discussing the conduct of the Finns themselves, which 
subverts the orthodox narrative of Karelian and Russian unity and posits a unique 
Karelian and Finno-Ugric experience of the war years.  Three of the above 
participants, Strogal’shchikova and D10 and A1, occupy influential positions 
within Finno-Ugric society; D10 and A1 both hold important posts within the 
Finno-Ugric language media of the region.  This perceived resentment towards 
Karelians and Vepsians on the part of the authorities is thus held by a large 
section of the local Finno-Ugric intelligentsia; indeed we have seen an implicit 
recognition of this supposed antipathy in the mass media discourse from those 
Karelians such as Tanya Kleerova who sought to counter unspoken suspicion of 
their minority group when agitating for more political concessions.  Participant 
D16 however was one of the oldest and less well educated interviewees and 
appears to be drawing from personal experience of the post-war years to 
formulate his narrative.  
A number of participants considered the legacy of the war in a different 
manner, however, and constructed a narrative in which it alienated Karelians 
from the Finns in the post-war period: 
Может быть какая-то лишняя ненависть появилась к Финнам, к 
соседям. 







Ну да...были случаи когда учёные приезжали, после войны, в 
деревни, и те же которые были, которые служили в Финской армии, были 
на территории Карелии, и жители сознали, ну и даже говорят что бросались 
там с лопатами, что их назад разгоняли (D14). 
 In this example the legacy of the war is to divide the Karelians 
unnecessarily, by means of лишняя ненависть, from their Finns neighbours.  
The interviewee could not have witnessed such things himself, he was one of the 
youngest participants, but it is apparently common knowledge (“говорят”), that 
such was the antagonism towards Finns that they were chased out of Karelian 
villages.  This demonstrates that there is a residual resentment towards the Finns 
in some sectors of the Karelian community, who narrate the post-war period as 
being filled with anti-Finnish rather than anti-Finno-Ugric sentiment.  It is not 
possible to determine if this apparent redistribution of resentment towards the 
Finns rather than from the Russians towards Karelians is a generational issue; 
this would appear not to be the case, however, as the other participants in this age 
group did not reproduce this narrative whilst others, such as Antonova, were 
firmly in opposition to any narrative which sought to divide the Karelians from 
their Finnish neighbours. 
v)  The Potential Deportation of the Karelian People 
 
Whilst the idea that the Karelians were in danger of deportation to Siberia 
or Central Asia occurs only sporadically in the mass media discourse, and is 
treated for the most part within such texts as heretical, a distortion of the 
historical truth, it was much more prevalent in the interview data.  Many of the 
Karelian participants were able to relate a narrative of this potential event: 
 
A) На уровне, чуть ли не Сталина было принять решение 
о насильственном переселении с территории Карелии 
Карелов, это то же самое что в 40-х было предприято с 
Чеченским народом.  Но благодаря Геннадию 







республики он, не то что он возмутился но он 
выступил против этого и как то это решение удалось, 
но замять не замять отменить чтобы таких репрессий в 
отношении к Карелам не было (D10). 
 
B) Все документы были подготовленными для 
переселения Карелов, и был такой, он был член 
военного совета, был такой Куприянов, который в 49-
м году попал в большой упадок в так называемом 
Ленинградском деле, в своё время я даже пару раз 
видела...исторические записки есть что если был бы 
нет его влияния, нет его вмешательства...то вполне 
могла быть и в Карелии депортация (D2). 
 
C) В 90-е годы открылся тот факт что Сталин хотел 
действительно нас вывести как Чеченцев от 
территории Чеченцкого народа, так и Карелов.  Это 
вот историчики открыли архивные документы этого в 
Советском времени не говорилос, об этом как то 
старались не говорить.  И только руководитель 
Куприянов, руководитель республики, ему удалось 
отстоять от Сталина судбу Карельского народа и 
доказал что Карелы стояли как всегда на форпосте то 
есть люди которые не по своей воле оказались в 
оккупации и они не виноваты что Финны отношились 
к ним как родственным народам.  Там всё равно 
конечно репрессия если кто то занимался 
партизанством, партизанскую борьбу, то есть всё 
равно от Финнов погибал.  Даже Мария Мелентьева и 
Анна Лисицына которые Вепсы, одна Вепска, 
представитель Вепсского народа другая Карелка они 








D) Не знаю если правда не правда, а памятник Кирову 
стоит, а Сталин когда-то хотел посадить в эшелон все 
Карелы и отсюда увести, чтобы стереть эту Карелию и 
какоe-то национальное сознание, не знаю если это 
правда не правда, сказка не сказка но Киров, якобы, 
противодействовал, как-то мешал...(A8). 
 
Whilst as we have seen in the mass media discourse the idea of such a 
deportation is ridiculed and discredited, in the interview material it is generally 
presented as an objective fact, only the interviewee in example D is unsure as to 
its authenticity.  The decision to deport the Karelians is directly attributed in 
examples C and D to Stalin himself, the highest possible authority, and in 
example A it is ascribed to almost as exalted a level, чуть ли не Сталина.  The 
genuine nature of the threat to the Karelian people is represented in example B 
by the representation that документы были подготовленными; the interviewee 
constructs an image of an imminent threat on the cusp of execution.  In examples 
A, B and C it is only the intervention of the aforementioned Gennady 
Kupriyanov which saves the Karelians from this fate.  In example D the 
interviewee somewhat confusedly attributes this intervention to Sergei Kirov, 
nevertheless there is still a narrative of one man able to somehow как-то 
мешались and save the Karelians from deportation.  In example C this 
intervention is made possible by the representation of the fact that Карелы 
стояли как всегда на форпосте; the strategy of continuation is invoked once 
again in defence of the Karelians to witness their unbroken loyalty.  The 
interviewee also invokes the memory of Melent’eva and another Hero of the 
Soviet Union, the Vepsian Lisitsnyna, in this case to witness the loyalty of the 
Finno-Ugrians and the injustice of the charges against them.  In all the above 
examples the orthodox narrative of Karelian and Russian unity is undermined 
and juxtaposed against a narrative in which the Karelians, despite their 
demonstrated loyalty and courage in some texts, are unjustly threatened with 
repression by their supposed Soviet allies and are only saved by the principled 







shows its ubiquity amongst both the Karelian intelligentsia and somewhat less 
educated Karelians; it was produced by university lecturers, journalists, actors 
and hotel employees.  All of the participants who reproduced the narrative were 
in the upper two age groups which may be accounted for by the fact that the 
documents which detailed this potential deportation were uncovered shortly after 
the Soviet period, an event which they may personally recall.  Whilst in example 
C this supposed threat is countered by a unificatory strategy which again seeks to 
witness the shared wartime sacrifice of the Karelians and Russians once again 
the striking feature of the narrative is the constructed heteronomisation which 
prevents the Karelians from saving themselves and leaves them dependent on the 
whims of those in charge in the federal centre. 
vi) The Annexed Territories 
 
The status of those areas annexed to the USSR from Finland as a result of 
the Winter and Continuation Wars was not often brought up by the interviewees; 
those participants who did broach the topic brought up the issue in a number of 
different ways, as illustrated below:  
 
A) Сложный вопрос вернуть ли территория к 
Финляндии...это не нужны на самом деле, и есть конечно 
те Финны которые требуют эти территории но это, это не 
как японцев с Курилами да? 
Есть люди которые хотят что, не вся Карелия вернуть, им 
вся Карелия не нужна, нужно вот Карельский Перешеек, 
то что 41-м их оттяпали.  Понимаешь, это вот им надо 
вернуть (A8). 
B) Когда я веду экскурсии честно говоря если есть такая 
возможность пропустить тему то есть высказыванние 
своего мнения о истории именно вот этого конфлитов то 
лучше её пропустить потому что многие Финны очень 







болезенно реагируют потому что от них забрали часть 
Финнской территории да?  Это то что, территория 
Сортавалы, территория Питькяранты (D4).  
 
C) До Октябрьской революции, то есть до 17-го года, вот это 
наш Октябрьская Железная Дорога, вот Мурманск-
Москва, всё что западнее это всё Карельская территория, 
что есть там не было Русскоязычное население буквально, 
100% там были а сейчас получается что после войны 
практический всё приграничье оно всё буквально было 
очищеннно, Карелам там не разрешалось то есть, и те 
особенные районы то есть Сортавала, Лахденпохский, 
западное побережье Ладожского Озера...то есть исконная 
территория Карелов то есть где были племена Корела, 
отсюда мы пошли (D15). 
 
In example A the Finnish claims to these areas are presented relatively 
sympathetically; the interviewee, a Northern Karelian, is careful to note that the 
Finns ‘require’ only the return of those areas they lost in 1941; the fact that all of 
Karelia is not in question is directly stated.  The relative modesty and justice of 
these demands and the relative modest number of Finns involved is illustrated by 
comparison with the situation in the Russian Far East; это не как японцев с 
Курилами, whose demands are represented as being, for unstated reasons, 
beyond the pale.  The interviewee, an Olonets Karelian, in example B is also 
relatively sympathetic to Finnish sentiment on the issue, and also recognises the 
areas as territory that was от них забрали, although once again the agency 
behind the action is unclear.  Nevertheless the main strategy demonstrated is one 
of avoidance; she would far rather avoid if at all possible discussing the matter 
with her Finnish guests as they apparently react in a manner she is uncomfortable 
with to the topic.  This demonstrates that even when raised the issue is apparently 
considered somewhat taboo; the interviewee was prepared to briefly touch on the 







the matter with Finns to avoid controversy.  Example C illustrates a somewhat 
different approach to the topic; for this Karelian contributor the offensive issue is 
not that the territory is under Russian and not Finnish control but that it has been 
буквально очищенно of Karelians.  The interviewee constructs a picture of 
these areas as having been the birthplace of the Karelian nation; it is the 
homeland of the original Karelian tribe.  Until the post-revolutionary period and 
in particular the post-war era the area is “100%” Karelian and free of Russian 
influence.  Finnish influence in the area is not referenced or recognised.  In this 
narrative the negative consequence of the war is not that the Finns were 
displaced from these areas, but that the Karelians were replaced by Russians.  It 
should be noted that none of the interviewees in the data collected resided or 
claimed to be originally from the areas in question; for that reason it is not overly 
surprising that discussion of the topic was minimal.  It would appear from the 
examples above and the narratives of responsibility for the war itself examined 
above that there is a certain sympathy for the Finnish position on the areas; at 
least some Karelians, however, regard the areas in question as genuinely 
Karelian rather than Finnish.  In contrast to the mass media discourse this 
Karelian claim to the territory does not seem to be used to bolster that of the 




4.7 The Foundation of the KASSR: A Named Beginning? 
 
The apparent official use of the 1920 foundation of the KASSR as a 
foundational event for ideas of Karelia in general has been noted with reference 
to the mass media discourse above.  The interviewees were asked what this 
anniversary meant for them in an effort to gauge its effectiveness as a potential 
‘named beginning’ for the Republic of Karelia itself and Karelian identity in 







Karelians and also a civil servant, had actually been involved in organising 
commemoration of the anniversary: 
- Ну, ...это год, 90 лет республики, но это год не карелов а, как 
скажем, гоcударствa, образования нашей республики....исторический так 
получилось да что, пока нет письменных каких-то исторических 
доказательств на что когда-то на этой территории, было самостоятельно 
государство каких-то финских народов.  Вы знаете.  Поэтому, пока не 
черта.  Хотя есть упоминание что вроде на этой территории было такое 
государство […], который может стать государство, но было это 
государство карелов подходить не возможно.  Поэтому так случилось что, в 
начале двадцатого века, силу различных исторических, политических и все 
других проблем да которые были на севере Европы да? 
- Да 
- Вот была создана такое автономное образование в составе 
Российской Федерации, Карельская Трудовая Коммуна, да?  И для нас, для 
карелов да...наша Карелия, вот эта территория, а для всех карелов, в мире 
которые есть да, это создавилось чего-то пробразом государственности.  
Поэтому мне эту дату, как сказать, с чем уважаем, это нам позволяет по 
крайне мере на сегоднящний день заявить не только на а, что мы еще живы, 
но заявить о наших проблемах, значить их поднять.  Да, сказать о том что, 
эти проблемы мы будем решать, значить поэтому эта дата в нашей жизни 
является, ну как скажем, значительная.  И мы когда изучался вопрос, [...] 
это было десять лет тому назад, на какую же дату [...] взять, республики 
дата,  памятная дата да?  Было много вариантов, но мы остановились на 
этом варианте и решили что это самый такой значимый вариант, который 
призван на сегодняшний день, и внутри нашей страны, и самое главное что 
это призван и в международной арене.  Поэтому для нас дата значительная, 
для карелов, и мы, и, но еще раз надо подчеркнуть что всё-таки дата 








In this excerpt the participant clearly explains the motivation, at least on 
his part, for the selection of this date in particular for official commemoration.  
In his view it is the first manifestation of any form of Karelian political 
statehood, as prior to this date he is unable to identify the existence of  any sort 
of самостоятельное государство каких-то финских народов; that is to say 
before the KTK no Finno-Ugric, let alone Karelian, national group had achieved 
political representation.  In this narrative the KTK arises rather inorganically, “в 
силу различных исторических, политических и все других проблем да 
которые были на севере Европы”, and is again organised apparently from 
above for the benefit of the Karelians rather than by the Karelians themselves.  
Nevertheless the interviewee views the date as the beginnings of Karelian 
politics if not the Karelian people; it is the progenitor of their own state.  The 
historical importance of this fact for the interviewee is that it provides a starting 
point for the Karelian political movement and endows them with certain political 
rights.  By narrating the foundation of the KASSR as the political recognition of 
the Karelian people he uses a strategy of continuation, as we have seen in the 
media discourse, to demonstrate to the wider world that “мы еще живы”; this 
allows the Karelians to narrate a history of their own political action and posit 
future political solutions.  In his eyes this date is representative of the Karelian 
people across Russian and internationally as the beginnings of their political 
existence if not their actual existence as an ethnic or national group.  It is 
important to note, as he does, however, that it is conceived of as strictly speaking 
a political rather than national landmark; he extends its importance to not only 
Karelians but all здесь живущие, and therefore infers it can be used as a 
unifying rather than divisive factor in national politics.   
Certain participants did refer to this anniversary in a positive fashion as 
intended by the authorities, and used it to narrate a history that associated the 
beginnings of at least some form of Karelian autonomy and political self-
realisation with this date: 
A) Безусловно важно в своё время было создание 
государства....конечно было важно создание Трудовая Коммуна 







большевистский лозунг, но это был момент объединения, это 
был момент когда, думаю что проживащие на этой территории 
почувствовали себя в конце концов нация, какой-то народности, 
какой-то, единый, общий (D2). 
 
B) Ну возращаюсь к созанию Карельской Трудовой Коммуны, 
думаю что это всё-таки одной из самых важных событий, потом 
всё таки думаю что важное событие было конечно в конце 20-х, 
30-х годов когда сюда приехали очень много Американских и 
Канадских Финнов, но, потому что всё-таки с их помощью, не 
только с помощью Советской власти скажем так а с их помощью 
здесь начали развиваться многие отрасли промышленности, 
особенно лесной промышленности, думаю что строительной 
промышленности, потому что я ни в коем разе (...) достойнство, 
умение, местного населения Карелов устроить, вести хозяйство, 
но у Американских Канадских Финнов приехавших сюда было 
более современное оборудование, техники, они не привезли не 
только топор и пилы они привезли целый агрегат и станки сюда, 
то есть этот дал толчок, какой-то толчок, новый шаг к развитию 
производства, промышленности (D10). 
 
C) Ну это как бы офицальная, офицальная годовщина, 
государственности скажем так Карелии поскольку вот [...] от 
создания Трудовой Коммуны, ну лично для меня это вот 
определённый век в истории Карельского народа поскольку, всё-
таки решение о создании было принято на таком 
государственном уровне с участием Карелов, Карелы.  
Карельская Трудовая Коммуна представители Карел из районов 
собравшись 90 лет тому назад они как бы давали своё согласие 
на создание вот отдельный, скажем так, республику 
отдельный...республики Российской Федерации.  Поэтому такая 








The Karelians interviewed above produced a somewhat similar narrative 
to that offered by the initiators of the anniversary, narrating the foundation of the 
KTK as an important step in the development of the Karelian people.  Example B 
is interesting as a representative of a relatively prevalent narrative amongst the 
interview data which portrays the foundation of the KTK as leading to an influx 
of Finnish workers and specialists.  Although other aspects of this Finnish 
influence are often narrated in more ambiguous or even negative terms their 
contribution to the development of Karelian industry is generally represented in 
wholly positive terms.  In this narrative the foundation of the KTK brings about 
the arrival of these Finns and the consequent industrialisation of Karelia; the 
American Finns are literally represented as having brought the first modern 
machinery to Karelia in opposition to the relatively primitive tools used by the 
locals: “привезли не только топор и пилы они привезли целый агрегат”.  In 
this manner these Finns are also associated with the idea of American modernity 
and progress.  Although the interviewee is careful to note that he does not think 
the local Karelians were in any way inferior to these Finns the narrative 
nevertheless constructs an image of the foundation of the KTK as being the 
beginning of a new, modern era for the Karelians, it is a “ноый шаг к 
развитию” for the Karelian people. 
The interviewee in example A is somewhat sceptical of the foundation of 
the KTK or at least the circumstances which attended it; it is somewhat 
pejoratively denoted a большевистский лозунг, which infers that the 
interviewee does not accept that it was created by the local Karelian populace 
itself.  The actual moment of creation of the KTK is nonetheless narrated as 
having been the creation of a sense of Karelian nationality; it is this moment 
which the interviewee constructs as the “момент объединения” of the Karelians 
as a nation.  This narrative of events is probably the closest example found in the 
interview data to the ‘official’ narrative of the foundation of the KTK and of its 
use as a ‘named beginning’ for the Karelian people; this narrative does construct 
this date as the point at which the Karelians first felt themselves to be a nation 
and recognised their essential unity.  Indeed in this interview the participant also 
described the commemoration of the date as important for the contemporary 







Example C also narrates the event in terms of it being the starting point 
for Karelian unity on a political level at least.  In this narrative the Karelians are 
at least involved with the unnamed authorities on the “государственном 
уровне” in the creation of the KTK, although it appears that they only do so in 
order to ratify or “давали своё согласие” to a decision taken by others.  This 
contribution however also identifies one of the main issues with commemorating 
this date in particular as a ‘foundational’ date for the Karelian people: although it 
is important on the political level as the creation of autonomy for the Karelians 
the participant does not think it important beyond this.  The appearance of the 
KTK is narrated as having been of some importance, but the Karelians appear to 
be involved only somewhat passively;  thus the interviewee thinks it important in 
a limited political sense but “не более того”.    
 
For the representatives of Karelian cultural associations the commemoration 
of the 90
th
 anniversary of the foundation of the KTK had important contemporary 
political connotations.  Both Anatolii Grigoriev and Natalya Antonova 
approached the anniversary of the creation of the KTK by comparing the aims 
behind its creation and the then political situation with the current societal 
realities of the Republic of Karelia: 
A) Ну вот, потом Советская власть когда пришла прозвучали хорошие 
лозунги, право народов на самоопределение то есть и до отделения 
будет знаете, да, и в конституции.  Вот создали республику, […] 
хотя в то время уже Карелов было большинcтво в 20-м году, хотя 
Карельская Турдовая Коммуна на этой территорий это не сейчас 
меньше была чем, 60 с лишком процентов Карелов было.  А теперь 
10%, знаете, и даже вот может быть меньше будет когда перепись 
сейчас была, и уже меньше.  Две причины значит во первых, главная 
причина того что мы стали меньшиством экспансия из федерального 
центра, из союзного центра, вот индустриализация привезли много 
людей потом в 40-м году захватили Финские земли или назову 
Западная Карелия, все Карелы ушли в Финляндию 400 с лишком 







годы не давали Карелам из Восточной Карелии там селиться знаете 
да?  Украинцы там и всё.  Вот Сортовала, Лахденпохья, Суоярви это 
всё настоящие Карельские земли но они русифицированные 
польностью (A. Grigoriev). 
 
 
B) Я считаю что это было празднование в таком духе в котором мы 
привыкли праздновать.  Да хорошо где-то ремонтировали дороги, 
где-то ремонтировали фасад улиц, то есть была такая внешняя 
уборка, была привидена, и это тоже хорошо, это тоже должно 
обязательно быть, но наше участие как такого...что какой-то 
национальный фактор был, это что-то дал новое карелам или какой-
то отдельный проект был бы организован, ничего подобного не 
произошло (N. Antonova). 
 
C) Для меня, для меня это значит что...что к сожалению 90 летие 
Республики встретили не так, как хотелось, потому что Республика 
формально сушествует но Карелов с года в год становится все 
меньше, нас меньше 10% общего населения и...а...все, что нам 
обещало государство 90 лет назад: широкая автономия, что язык 
будет везде использоваться, мы видим что этого нет.  Что мы не 
участвуем, а, не в принятии каких-то важних законов в Республике 
Карелии - очень мало депутатов карелов в законодательном 
собрании.  А...очень мало, а...очень умников высокого ранга, там 
министров, заместители министров карелов.  Поэтому мы не можем 
активно влиять на...не на политическую не на эконимическую жизнь 
республики, а что касаетвся языка что это вообще отдельная тема 
(A1).  
 
In example A Grigoriev composes a very similar narrative of these events to 
that which we have already seen him produce in the mass media discourse; the 
status of the Karelian people in 1920 is compared unfavourably with their current 







differences between ‘then’ and ‘now’ are emphasised to stress the plight of the 
Karelian people.  Although we are informed that in principle at least the Soviet 
authorities promoted “хорошие лозунги” about political rights for the minorities 
the situation has in fact become much worse in the intervening period.  This 
creates a kind of topos of the ‘broken promise’ to the Karelian people, who have 
been denied the political rights they were promised in 1920.  In a similar fashion 
thanks to policies which are attributed to the Federal or Soviet authorities the 
Finno-Ugric nature of the territory has been undermined, to the extent that there 
are areas of “настоящая Карельская земля но она русифицированные 
польностю”.  Example C also uses a very similar narrative strategy of 
juxtaposing the supposed aims of the KTK and the modern Republic of Karelia 
with the actual course of events.  In this example the interviewee, the editor of a 
Karelian-language publication, uses the same topos of the ‘broken promise’ to 
narrate these events, in fact stating that “нам обещали” that Karelians would 
have autonomy but that “мы видим что этого нет”.  The interviewee appeals to 
common knowledge to witness that as Karelian is not used “везде” and that as 
the minorities do not have a weighty political voice the potential of the KTK has 
been unfulfilled.  This example demonstrates that this narrative of Karelian 
history which uses strategies of discontinuation to construct the idea of a ‘broken 
promise’ is not confined to the more radical fringes of Karelian activist circles 
but is current within the Karelian intelligentsia as a whole.  Example B from 
Natalya Antonova approached the anniversary in a slightly different but related 
manner; although she did not dwell on the disappointing, from a Karelian 
viewpoint, performance of the KTK in terms of honouring the commitments of 
its founders she criticised the use of the anniversary by the current authorities by 
employing a slightly different strategy of discontinuation.  In her view the 
national or ethnic component of the anniversary was underplayed to the extent 
that her organisation and Karelians in general could derive little benefit from it; 
in this narrative the commemoration is merely a “внешняя уборка” that does not 
address the real historical legacy of the event or the current social and political 








 Many of the Karelian participants however were unimpressed by the 
manner in which the foundation of the KTK was presented in the official 
narrative; the view was often expressed that it did not adequately express the 
duration of Karelian history: 
A) Потому что история то Карелии на самом деле она насчитывает 
не 90 лет она насчитывает столетие и может быт тысячлетие на самом деле.  
Когда здесь постеппено начали приходить племена, скажем так, в том 
числе и карелов, постеппено потесняют саамов на север.  Это процесс 
длился, посколько я знаю тысячлетие, так что... 
- Что можно сказать что 90 лет Карелии это немножко 
исскуственный? 
- Исскуственный да, немножко исскуственный праздник.  Либо 
пусть она тогда бы, он бы пусть назывался 90, но пусть бы на этом году 90 
лет со дня образования Карельской Коммуны, а не 90 лет Республики 
Карелия.  Но это вот моё мнение такое (D10).  
B) Но на самом деле это а, коммунистический праздник, я считаю 
так, потому что...и двацатом году коммунисты обявили да?  Но тогда это 
была, ты знаешь историю этого праздника?  Трудовая Коммуна Карельская.  
Это наш коммунистический праздник, я удивлён что так широко […] 
сейчас, потому что глупо говорить 90 лет Республики Карелии да?  То что 
Карелии, карелам больше лет намного да? (A8).  
The above excerpts exemplify the manner in which many Karelian 
participants evaluated the usage of the anniversary of the KTK as a foundational 
event for Karelia in general terms as inadequate or even somewhat offensive.  In 
both examples A and B above the interviewees appraised the selection of the 
foundation of the KTK as unrepresentative of the extent of Karelian history.  In 
example A the interviewee narrates an alternate view of the history of Karelia 
which the development of the territory is represented as taking place over a much 
longer period, “столетие и может быт тысячелетие”.  The commemoration of 







would rather the anniversary was presented in a manner which made the context 
of the event clearer and did not give the impression that the Republic of Karelia 
as representative of Karelia in general had a mere 90 years of history.  The 
participant in example B also objects to a narrative of Karelian history which 
appears to limit its duration to the 90 years since the foundation of the KTK; 
indeed such a narrative is pejoratively assessed as “глупо”.  This interviewee 
also proffered an alternate narrative in which the KTK, the foundation and 
commemoration of which is ascribed to “коммунисты”, is contrasted with the 
more meaningful, in the interviewee’s mind, formation of the Ukhtinskaya 
Respublika:    
Тесно связанно, тесно связанно да...нет не очень тесено но ты 
знаешь вот вчера говорили допустим о, не знаю если знаеш о Ухтинской 
Республике.  Там немножко, здесь 90 лет назад...что там по-моему 23-й или 
22-й год, наверние это было важное событие на мой взглад, в Республике 
Карелия, я был счастливый если прожил там на самом деле.  
Но если было бы эта Ухтинская Республика, оно важное какое-то 
событие но не случилось. 
Знаешь к моему стыду много не расскажу, но и думаю что ты уже 
знаешь и можешь найти уже, из книг которых Финны уже много писали, 
много об этом написано о Ухтинской Республике...я знаю что была 
Ухтинская Ресбублика, знаю есть, был свой символ, флаг, а то есть сейчас 
неофицальный флаг Северных Карелов да, примерно там границы, 
правительство, я честно говоря много не знаю.   
 Ты знаешь ничего, что происходило, не знаю.  Олонецкая Губерния 
была, там на севере Ухтинцы да, как сказать эти бело-финны прибыли, 
какие которые были против власти и ещё пытались и сражались, не знаю 
если они были финансированные на счёт Финляндии, это где-то читал, ну 
по-моему финансировали часть за счёт Финляндии, но самая революция эта 







Although the interviewee, as he admits at various points in his 
contribution, is not very well-informed on the actual details of the Ukhtinskaya 
Respublika he does assess its formation as much more important than the 
foundation of the KTK.  A topos of a ‘lost chance’ for the Karelian people is 
constructed, in which there was for a short period the possibility of creating an 
independent Karelian state.  The narrative of this period is exceedingly vague 
and confused; the manner in which the Ukhtinskaya Respublika came about is 
not described in any detail at all and the interviewee has little more knowledge of 
what happened beyond the mere fact of its apparent existence.  Nevertheless the 
interviewee describes the period as having been exceptionally important to the 
extent that he would have был счастливый если бы прожил там на самом 
деле.  The symbolic value of this attempt at apparently genuine self-
determination is important to the extent that even though it did not succeed the 
interviewee considers it to have been of the upmost importance.  The ‘banal’ 
nationalist, symbolism of its flag, as Bilig (1995) would recognise it, is 
appropriated by the interviewee and, apparently, northern Karelians in general as 
their contemporary неофицальный flag; the interviewee himself is a Northern 
Karelian, the group for which this narrative appeared to have by far the most 
resonance in general.  The interviewee here uses a strategy of dissimilation and 
discontinuation to reject the orthodox narrative which locates the beginnings of 
Karelian autonomy in the KTK and instead proffers a narrative in which it is the 
Ukhtinskaya Respublika that provides the starting point for Karelian political 
independence.  The idea that it was a ‘White-Finnish’ plot is countered by the 
comparison of the rumour that the Karelians were financed by the Finns with the 
well-known accusation that the Bolsheviks were themselves financed by the 
Germans; if taking money from abroad is acceptable for a Russian political 
movement it is acceptable for its Karelian equivalent.  This also demonstrates a 
strategy of equivalence which not only legitimises Karelian actions but also 
elevates the formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika into the pantheon of 







References to the Ukhtinskaya Respublika were relatively rare, but they 
were made by other Karelian contributors including Olonets Karelians, who also 
assessed it as the actual first manifestation of Karelian political autonomy: 
В двацатых годax, я думаю, то что прошёл, была создана вот эта 
Ухтинская Карелия, вот первый союз, впервые наверное в 20-х годax 
заговорили о самосознании Карелии...(D6). 
In most of these contributions, however, detail of what actually occurred 
in this period was notably lacking; beyond being able to state the mere fact of its 
existence many were unable or unwilling to narrate an actual history of this 
period.  In particular those Karelians without higher education and those who 
were from the Olonets group tended to be somewhat less able to narrate a history 
of its formation or had not heard anything substantive about it at all.  Anatolii 
Grigoriev presented a narrative of the period in which the choice offered to 
Karelians in the 1920s was not between independence and the KTK but between 
Russia and Finland: 
Почему в Финляндии так живут сейчас, лучшая страна в мире, а тут 
рядом под боком такой же климат, такая же география, такие же люди, 
живём так? 
То невольно возникает сомнение, а правильно ли поступили карелы 
в 20-м году?  В 1920-м году, когда значит остались в России и не 
присоединились к Финляндской Республике, потому что если бы тогда 
территория Восточной Карелии вошла бы в Финляндию мы же бы жили как 
живут финны (D13). 
In this narrative the Karelians choose to remain within Russia rather than 
unite with Finland; the Karelians are for once here presented as having 
determined themselves to take a course of action rather than being dictated to 
from above.  Their actions in 1920 are, however, evaluated as an error; had they 
joined Finland they would now be enjoying a much better standard of life.  
Karelia is presented through a unificatory strategy as being essentially the same 







somewhat tentatively expounded by Grigoriev who appears to appreciate its 
heterodox nature, however it is presented as being so obvious as to “невольно 
возникает сомнение” even if one should seek to avoid it.  This narrative 
deconstructs once again the image of the foundation of the KTK as providing 
Karelians with the required autonomy and other benefits promised by its creation 
and offers an alternate narrative in which the Karelians made a historic mistake 
by not joining their Finnish brothers.  Once again Grigoriev uses a historical 
narrative, as has been seen above in the mass media material and in other 
interview excerpts, which positions Karelian identity closer to Finnish than 
Russian. 
The most common response of the interviewees to questioning on the 
value of this anniversary was, however, a degree of indifference:  
A) Дело в том, что для меня, как интеллектуальный человек 
имеющий университетское образование и знающий историю 
России, я считаю эти даты абсолютно искусственные, не 
отвечающие исторической правде, и в […], 90 лет тому назад, а, 
была сформированна Карельская трудовая Коммуна.  Это 
абсолютно большивисткое образование которое к национальому 
вопросу в Карелии не имеет никакого отношения.  То есть вот 
так.  Это абсолютно искусственная дата которая по-моему под 
собой исторической базы не имеет (A7). 
 
B) -Нет ничего особенного (B1). 
C) Но для меня только понимание того, что 90 лет назад, скажем как 
просто....дали имена, звания республике, не какой-то, вот, земли 
вепсские, волость [... ], карельские, а именно республика... этого 
звания.  Ну...как бы, какой-то, сверх...такого важного понятия, не [... 
]....не интересно просто (A5).   







- Ничего, нет? 
- Ну сами, как бы, понимаете, 90 лет, я наверное…но не была там, 
(laughs), ну и сколько, (laughs) создание республики.  Поэтому живу 
себе и живу, то есть как бы, ну, от политики далека (D8).  
In the above examples the level of irrelevance attributed by the 
participants to the anniversary of the KTK is quite marked; for many 
interviewees the event held no particular significance for themselves that they 
were able to identify.  In example A this indifference appears to stem from the 
interviewee rejecting the historical narrative they consider the event to represent. 
The interviewee presents themselves as an informed, ‘university educated’ 
individual and thus represents themselves as possessing the required knowledge 
and authority to determine the validity of any such commemorative event; the 
foundation of the KTK is therefore represented as failing this test.  Both the 
foundation of the KTK and its commemoration are presented as “абсолютно 
искусственный”, as outside the real historical narrative of which the 
interviewee, through their knowledge of history, is apparently aware.  Participant 
A5 struggled, as shown by the many lacunae in the transcript, to identify the 
significance of the date; the pauses and inaudible muttering were representative 
of their hesitancy.  The date is represented as commemorating merely the 
declaration of the KTK rather than its foundation, and indeed the interviewee 
appears somewhat confused as to the actual title that was bestowed on the area at 
the time.  It is represented as a political move from ‘above’, which for the 
ordinary citizen of the modern Republic of Karelia is “не интересно просто”.  It 
should be noted that this individual, although possessing a higher education, was 
a Russian who had spent a large period of their life outside the Republic of 
Karelia; although further data would be required to make a definitive conclusion 
it would therefore appear that for Russians within the Republic of Karelia the 
anniversary of the KTK is of no real interest.  This apparent lack of resonance 
around the foundation of the KTK and its usage as a putative ‘named beginning’ 
for at least a sense of civic ‘Karelian identity’ clearly seems to indicate the ethnic 
Russian population have little need for this form of identity and relate their sense 







attitude of complete disregard for the commemoration of this date; in each 
example the interviewee clearly does not feel the date to have any particular 
resonance in terms of the manner in which they themselves narrate their own 
national history and thus identity.  Interviewees B and D were both Karelians and 
both had a higher level of education; B was employed as a journalist and D as a 
teacher.  Their absolute indifference to the date shows that even for a large 
section of the Karelian intelligentsia the idea of the formation of the KTK as a 
‘foundational date’ has no resonance whatsoever.    
One of the Russian participants interviewed also assessed the 
commemoration of this particular date as ‘artificial’ in a similar fashion to the 
Karelian contributors sampled above:  
Я к этому отношусь очень иронично потому что, я уже сказал что 
само слово Карелия это встречается на средневековой карте, 
четырнадцатом-пятнадцатом веке, долго..и почему-то сейчас говорят что 
это 90 лет.  Причём в плакатах были некоторые очень смешные...там силуэт 
Кижей, да?  Там и церкви, на Кижах, и написано там "90 лет".  То есть как 
эти (laughs) это не понятно совершенно.  Потому что, так, гораздо древнее 
да?  И тут 90 лет.  Что она в советское время появилось?  Я пологаю знаете 
что, ну всё у нас сейчас в политике очень примитивно, да?  Я думаю что 
вот тот господин Катанандов который был губернатор, он решил эти 
годовщины просто, чтобы каких-то личных дотаций получить.  Он не 
получил, правдо, наборот он (laughs) убрали но...конечно полагаю что 
праздники республиканские нужные, но и более естественные да?  Не [...] 
вот эти мы искусcтвенные праздники, годовщины.  А праздники нужные, 
вобщем нужно забираемая власть, нормальная, но к сожалению система 
пока власть вертикали и она немножко подавлается нормальной 
становление этносамосознания, и тех же регионалнных брэндов и так 
далее.  То есть если занимались брэндинг, профессиональный да?  То это 
действительно бы придавать регионом свое новое лицо и характер и так 
далее.  Вот, и вертикаль власти этого опасается, боится что страна […], и 
выгоднее что мы все были одинаковые но вот, я думаю что они наборот, 







повторится история Советского Союза, когда тоже однопартиная система, 
все были одинаковые и потом конце концов всё просто разоваралось 
потому что это не соотвествует уже...характеру и приципам совремменого 
мира, раздуманной развития.  То есть везде в мире как бы растёт 
оргинальное многообразие, а у нас они пытаются искусственно подавлять.  
Вот, но они подавляют-подавляют, но потом, может разовараться.  То есть 
если вы сейчас всё сделали так дипломатично так и, вот позволяли бы, 
скажем, регионом...обратит [...], всё будет бы нормально, Россия бы ставала 
своей федерацией какая она является по констуции (D11). 
In a similar fashion to some of the examples analysed above the 
interviewee rejects the commemoration of the founding of the KTK or at least 
the manner in which it is presented.  To this interviewee as with certain of the 
others it appears that the date is being represented as the ‘foundation’ of Karelia; 
the use of the image of Kizhi together with the date of the anniversary is 
presented as implying the absurd suggestion that “она на советское время 
появилось”.  The interviewee presents this clumsy narration of Karelian history 
as a direct effect of the “очень примитивно” political system that he considers 
to be in operation in Karelia and across Russia as a whole.  This lack of political 
nous is represented by a transformative strategy which presents the current 
situation in a negative light; it is stated that this lack of attentiveness to ‘real’ 
regional and ethnic feeling will lead to a disastrous conclusion.  The inability or 
unwillingness of the local authorities to create a coherent, rational narrative, as 
the interviewee sees it, of Karelian history, is presented as symptomatic of an 
overly-centralised political system which will induce the very thing it seeks to 
prevent: “распад”.  Russia is also negatively compared in this regard to other, 
‘normal’ states internationally where these centralising tendencies are less 
pronounced.  The participant is not necessarily here in any way advocating 
Karelia is less ‘Russian’ than any other are; as we have seen above in the same 
interviewee’s construction of a ‘Novgorodian’ past for Russian Karelians this 








4.8  The History of the Karelian Language 
Most of the Karelian participants interviewed viewed the most important 
element of their ‘Karelian’ identity to be linguistic; many of them offered the 
opinion that it was the fact they spoke Karelian that established their status as 
genuine Karelians.  This is somewhat significant as they were not actually 
required by the interviewer to assess which factor they considered as of primary 
importance in the creation of their national identity.  These declarations of the 
importance of the Karelian language cannot, for reasons of space, be related here 
but are available within the interview data presented in the appendices.  The 
importance of the Karelian language was stressed by some participants to the 
extent that it was declared that should the language disappear, the Karelians as a 
discrete group of any sort would cease to exist.  The manner in which the history 
of the language is narrated is therefore of key importance in terms of how 
Karelians construct broader narratives of their own history.  Indeed it would 
appear that for many of the interviewees historical events were evaluated 
primarily in terms of how they impacted upon the Karelian language; this is not 
surprising given that if the language itself is the determining factor in Karelian 
identity its promotion or suppression is therefore seen as the promotion or 
suppression of the identity itself.  One of the most important periods of Karelian 
history is therefore that between 1920 and 1956 in which, at least in theory, a 
second official language existed alongside Russian.  The complexities of the 
actual language politics of the period have been examined above, however it is 
important to analyse how these politics are presented by the interviewees and 
how they are assessed.  In general the Karelians interviewed did not offer 
positive assessments of the language politics of the period, presenting them as 
artificial or unsuccessful:     
A)   Я даже когда-то в раннем детстве у бабушки видела эти книги, 
они были написаны на кирилице, и даже я когда читала мне было 
смешно....потому что это настолько становилась как глупый язык.  Поэтому 







B)   Эта трудовая книжка, он получил его в 37-м году когда, значит, 
было принято решение о карельском языке.  И тогда финский вобщем, 
значит, отменили и на эту книжку...значит, там написано по-карельски, да?  
Но его поймёт любой русский, значит, поэтому если по-русски депутат то 
по-карельски «депутату»,  райком - «райкому», и вот в таким образом 
(D16). 
In example A above the interviewee, an Olonets Karelian in the older 
group of participants, has some personal acquaintance with the ‘Soviet’ Karelian 
language, presumably in this context that of the later 30s devised by Bubrikh; the 
books concerned which the participant has seen were printed in Cyrillic.  This 
Karelian language however is presented as having been so awkward as to make 
the interviewee laugh; it appears to the child as a kind of “глупый язык”.  In 
example C the interviewee, also from the older group but this time a Northern 
Karelian, is also acquainted through familial experience, in this case that of his 
father, with the Karelian language implemented in 1937; it is somewhat unusual 
that the interviewee, a non-specialist without a higher education, can name the 
actual date of its introduction and this again may be due to having access to eye-
witness accounts and documentation.  The language is again presented, however, 
as being an artificial and clumsily formulated parody of the real Karelian 
language; it is presented as having been devised in order so as to be 
understandable to “любой русский”, with Karelian-sounding endings merely 
mechanically affixed to the end of every word.  These examples are typical of the 
manner in which the interviewees who had some knowledge of this period 
narrated the brief period in which an actual Karelian language was adopted 
within the KASSR; it is presented as having been an almost laughable imitation 
of the real language.  The interviewees clearly interpret this period as a crude 
attempt to Russify the Karelians through the Russification of the Karelian 
language itself.       
Most Karelians who were interviewed, if they were aware of the events at 
all, considered the ‘Karelian’ language of 1937-39 to have been an experiment of 
little relevance to the genuine linguistic needs of the Karelian people themselves, 







language to satisfy the cultural and social requirements of the Karelian and 
Vepsian peoples are also generally narrated in a similar fashion:   
A)        Здесь вот в приципе и политика как раз Гуллинга была 
направлена на то, чтобы создавать финские школы, чтобы обучать людей, 
особенно карело-язычное население, грамота с помощью финского языка.  
То есть шла некоторая финнизация конечно. 
То есть, естестественно, указанние сверху через репрессии, этот 
процесс как бы прекратился или сошёл почти на нет (D10). 
B) Никакой возможности, никакой, потому что с того времена, 
37-го года, когда здесь у нас запретили использовать и карельский и 
вепсский языки, ну карельский попозже запретили использовать, 
естественно когда нету, и даже то что было...это всё было прекращено, то 
никакой культуры, кроме на финском здесь могла бы развиваться.  И всё 
это восстановленная уже начиная с 1987 года самостоятельно. 
Карелия как раз очень специфическая республика была потому что 
её когда организовали, то не сами карелы её организовали, её организовали 
финны, которые приносили, даже финны которые не жили в России.  Если 
брать Эдвард Гуллинг и всех его, и у них был очень сложное отношение к 
карельскому, вепсскому языкам, поскольку они не видели они как 
самостоятельные языки (Z. Strogal’shchikova). 
C)  Oни работали на финском языке.  Потом было вид попытка в 
трицатах годах ввести карельский язык, и сейчас, например, грамматика 
того же Бубриха, но попытка не увенчалась успехом, он как бы, там всё 
было такое что русский язык с карельским окончаниями, и подсчитали что 
язык вообщем невыгодный для использования в деле производства, и стали 
пользоваться финским языком.  Вот, то есть на том этапе, как бы, да я так 
полагаю что...вот этот вот финский фактор и то что Финляндия была, под 
Россией, Карелия была периферийным регионом как бы, конечно повлиял 







но хотя они не пострадали на том этапе я считаю на этом совремменом 
этапе они ведь много могли бы взять уже у финнов (N.Antonova). 
In the above examples the use of the Finnish language is narrated as 
having been either actively harmful for the cultural development of the Finno-
Ugric peoples of the KASSR or as having merely been entirely unsuccessful.  In 
example A the interviewee does not necessarily narrate the use of Finnish as 
harmful in and of itself, but opines that the policy of using the language “сошёл 
почти на нет”.  Once again the decision to introduce Finnish, as well as the 
decision to reverse the policy, is depicted as having been taken without the input 
of the Karelians themselves; Finnish is introduced by Gylling, who is then 
dispensed with alongside his policy by the somewhat euphemistic “указанние 
сверху через репрессии”.  The policy is nevertheless denoted “финнизация”, 
thus establishing that it was intended to promote Finnish rather than Karelian 
identity.  In example B Strogal’shchikova also offers a narrative of the period in 
which the usage of Finnish, again attributed to Gylling and the Finnish 
immigrants, is implemented with a view to ensuring that “то никакой культуры 
кроме на финском здесь могла бы развиваться”.  In this narrative these Finns 
are directly represented as not having viewed Karelian and Vepsian as distinct 
identities and attempting to assimilate the Karelians and Vepsians with the Finns 
through promotion of their own language at the expense of those of the local 
inhabitants.  Once again in contrast to Grigoriev, and to some extent to 
Antonova, the Vepsian Strogal’shchikova uses a strategy of discontinuation to 
reposition the Karelians and Vepsian population further away from Finnish 
identity.  The usage of Finnish is also seen as harmful for Karelian by Antonova 
in the last example; she however offers a narrative which mitigates the harmful 
effects of these political decisions and rationalises them in a more sympathetic 
manner.  In this narrative the Finns adopt Finnish (once again) after the so-called 
Karelian language of Bubrikh is discovered to be inadequate and deemed a 
failure; the Finns are presented as having to adopt Finnish as it is a language 
“выгодный для использования в деле производства”.  The damage to 
Karelian caused by the decision is recognised but is minimised by being 







Finnish should not, her in eyes, stop the Karelians from taking what they can 
from contemporary Finnish culture as necessary.  All three examples above offer 
a narrative of the adoption of Finnish which depicts it as having been a negative 
factor in the development of Karelian.  In the first two examples this narrative is 
quite negative, particularly that of Strogal’shchikova which uses a strategy of 
implied threat to accuse the Finns of attempting to dismantle and dissolve other 
Finno-Ugric identities other than their own; clearly this also has the effect of 
positioning contemporary Vepsian and Karelian identities at a certain distance 
from Finnish.  Antonova also assesses the impact of the policy in a negative 
fashion but seeks to rationalise it and minimise its effects in order to avoid such 
an alienation of Karelian from Finn; historical cooperation, no matter how ill-
conceived or poorly-executed, between the two groups has to be sympathetically 
narrated to ensure future cooperation. 
Certain participants did not, however, negatively evaluate the usage of 
Finnish as an official language for the Karelian population.  Although such 
opinions were somewhat rare narratives were nevertheless produced which were, 
if not necessarily overly positive towards the adoption of Finnish, at least not 
entirely hostile towards it.  One participant in particular, Anatolii Grigoriev, 
offered a narrative in which the adoption of Finnish was an entirely justified 
decision:  
Дело в том что карельский язык это язык как скажем деревенский, 
потому что настоящие карелы деревенские жители.  И как таковой 
литературы не было, то что “Калевала” эта скорее как бы сказание, 
понимаете.  Вот, поэтому когда Советская власть начилась, в 20-м году, 
коммунисты понимали что карельские диалекты вот три диалекта знаете, 
да?  Они не могут выполнять функции современного языка, на уровне там 
управления там на уровне экономики, и правильно решили что финский 
язык готовый, и вот он был фактически государственным основным 
языком.  Мои родители, отец, мать учили в школе там, в Ламбисельге, все 
предметы были на финском языке, кроме русского языка, и математику и 
всё.  Поэтому они знали и русский язык, и финский язык, и карельский 







этот расстрел, то решили ну финский язык отменить и перешли на 
карельский и даже с латиницы перешли на кириллицу, правописание.  Но 
видите что всё там запутал потому что снова вернулись когда ещё 
территорию захватили от Финляндии снова к финскому языку.  И как 
такового карельского и диалектов не развивили, он был народным говором 
в деревне, сельской местности.  И когда 56-м ликвидировали Союзную 
республику вот и стал вопрос, потому что у союзной республики всегда 
был свой офицальной государственный язык и у автономних не было, 
такого статуса понимаете?  И формально по некоторым претензии ещё 
развивали финский язык, вот до, как сказать, до 80-х конца 80-х годов.  А 
карельские диалекты нет.  А потом что получилось?  Но туть виноваты 
может быть сами мы, карелы, что финский язык он такой, ну рассуждали 
там, то надо развивать карельский, а его как такового нет, он не годится для 
21-го века, и мы оказались без языка (A. Grigoriev). 
In this narrative the adoption of Finnish is seen as fully justifiable given 
the “деревенский” status of Karelian, which is described using a dissimilative 
strategy which emphasises its division into dialects, a status which apparently 
prevents its use as fully-fledged contemporary literary language.  Even when an 
attempt is made to create such a language it remains a “народным говором”, 
and, albeit for generally political reasons, does not advance beyond the level of 
the ‘village’; indeed Karelian is still presented as being even now unfit for the 
modern world.  Finnish is presented in contrast as a ready-made modern 
language capable of fulfilling all appropriate functions.  Once again familial 
experience is referenced to justify a historical narrative; Grigoriev relates that his 
parents had no difficulty using Finnish at school.  The failure to maintain 
provision of Finnish in a meaningful way is identified by Grigoriev as one of the 
main reasons for the decline in the Karelian language itself; without any form of 
official Finno-Ugric language during the later Soviet period the Karelians are 
left, by the late 80s, “без языка”.  As in his narration of the apparent historical 
failure of the Karelians to join the Finnish Republic in 1920 the non-adoption of 
Finnish is narrated as being, at least partially, the fault of “сами мы, карелы”.  







which ‘historical failures’ of the Karelian people and ‘lost opportunities’ are used 
as rhetorical techniques to emphasise the essential unity of the Karelians and 
Finns.  Once again had the Karelians followed the Finnish example they would 
have been better off; indeed it might be argued Grigoriev, here and elsewhere, 
appears to limit ‘Karelian’ identity to the level of the village and see a necessity 
for Karelians to embrace a broader ‘Finnish’ identity if they are to succeed in the 
broader world.  At the same time, however, the actual possibility of the Karelians 
determining their own future then as now is downplayed by a strategy which 
constructs the Karelians as powerless and shifts responsibility onto generally 
unseen, unnamed forces; aside from one reference to “советская власть” and 
associated communists the agency behind the various sudden changes in 
language policy is unclear; thus the correct choice for the Karelian people is 
highlighted alongside their inability to make it. 
   This strategy of constructing the Karelians as powerless to influence 
language policy and attributing such decisions to vague and nebulous political 
forces is one of the major elements of narratives which address the history of the 
Karelian language.  In such narratives the changing language policies of the 
Soviet period are generally attributed to either topoi of external constraint or 
force or other heteronomous influences:   
A)   С языком была такая ситуация что в школах изучали и 
карельский, потом был такой период когда на перый план вышёл финский 
язык, затем вот снова перешло карельском языком, там ситуация была 
очень сложная, поэтому, вот, ну я не знаю, хотя наши родителы тех кто 
занимались в школах в то время они хорошо знают и карельский и финский 
языки, изучались.  Такая была вот сложная ситуация конечно с языком.  
Может быть это послужило тому что после 39-го года даже скорее всего во 
время Великой Отечественной Войны отошли на второй план и все 
перешли на обучение на русском языке.  Поскольку Олонец и Олонецкий 
район, много, большая территория Карелии были оккупирован финнами и 
такое вот неприятие карельского языка и финского языка, карелы, финны 
народ одного племени, финно-угорского племени, вот я думаю что это 







B) Да, но я обяснила это всё-таки приграничное положение, 
рядом с Финляндий, и...а в Тверской Карелий, которая находится за тысячи 
километров от Финляндии и Карелии таком особняком стоит над всех не 
столь важно не было.  Если бы...попытались провести образование на 
финском языке он был бы непонятен всё-таки никому, а здесь, в Карелии, 
большое количество финнов же, тогда же было. 
- И...так что можно считать что тверские карелы в тех годах 
получили с точки зрения языка более, более...автономии, чем у карелов в 
Карелии? 
- Да я считаю что да, так... 
- Несмотря на то что в Карелии, в принципе Карелия эта была 
автономная республика? 
- Да (A3). 
C) Самые важные собитие для меня наверное связанные с 
языком, потому что в своё время, то есть это после кампании, Финнской 
кампании, после войны то есть Зимная война или Финская война, когда, 
когда преподавание языка было запрещенно, как финский язык так и 
запрещался карельский язык, вот это очень страшно потому что, то есть я 
могу сказать что даже сейчас что язык умирает.  Язык умирает потому что 
хотя, я по своей специальности то есть своей профессии я тоже филолог, но 
филолог финно-угор.  Фино-угорский, потому что я преподавала 
карельский язык, восемь лет, в фино-угорской школе города 
Петрозаводска, плюс в педогогическом колледже города Петрозаводска.  Я 
преподавала карельский язык,...и получается очень печальная картина, 
когда сокращается число часов преподавания. 
Получается, что я работаю на этой работе, моему государству 
усилю, но она никому не нужна (D4). 
D) Я до школы по-русскии не разговаривал, то есть я жил в 







к другом только по-карельский.  В школе я начал изучать по-фински, даже 
не по-карельским.   
По карелам да и по вепсам да если мы будем об этом двум народам 
говорит то языковая политика была, в течение 19-го, 20-го века очень, 
противоречивая, так скажем, помягче (laughs)...и это была связанно с 
разными взглядами тех руководителей, которые всилу всяких причин 
руководили зту территорую. Я хочу сказать что не было однозначыми 
позиции среди карел…(B2). 
In all the above examples the adoption or rejection of Finnish or Karelian 
as official languages is attributed to forces beyond the control or even the 
influence of the Karelians themselves.  In a number of the above examples the 
changes are not even ascribed to a definitive source; in examples A and C for 
instance the changes in language policy merely occur without any hint of the 
particular political figures or groups taking these decisions.  In example B they 
are euphemistically termed “тех руководителей”, whose own appearance in 
positions of authority is obliquely explained as the result of “всилу всяких 
причин”.  Despite having previously constructed an image of the Republic of 
Karelia as an intrinsically more Finno-Ugric territory than her homeland of 
Tverskaya Oblast’, the interviewee in example B narrates a history of this period 
in which Tver’ Karelians appear to have more cultural autonomy than those in 
Karelia by virtue of their distance from the border; the “приграничное 
положение” of Karelia is invoked once again to explain the relative lack of 
autonomy suffered by the Karelian populace.  In example C this heteronomy is 
applied not merely to the past but also the contemporary status of the Karelian 
language.  The interviewee recounts a history of language politics in which the 
Karelian language is neglected and manipulated for political purposes and links 
this directly with the current status of the language.  The historical persecution of 
the Finno-Ugric languages is narrated as continuing down to the present day, 
with the interviewee outraged that despite its, to her mind, intrinsic worth her 







In general terms the historical experience of the Karelian language was 
presented in very negative terms by most of those interviewed.  As can be seen 
from the examples presented above most participants narrated a history of the 
Karelian language in which it flourished, at least within the village environment, 
prior to the revolution or up until the 1940s and 50s.  The decline in the usage of 
Karelian and consequently the idea of Karelian identity itself is generally 
attributed to the negative consequences of the language policies of the Soviet 
government.  As the examples below demonstrate, and as indeed many of those 
above also demonstrate, many of the interviewees felt that these had been 
directed with the express aim of suppressing the Karelian language and thus 
destroying notions of Karelian identity:  
 
A) Естественно, естественно, разница колоссальная, потому что 
я, например, помню то время, когда детям не разрешалось говорить по-
карельски, не разрешалось говорить по-карельски не потому, что вообще 
разрешалось говорить, а был очень хороший мотив, «вы говорите по-
карельский, значит вы будете хуже» то есть все дети которые, у которых 
очень сильный карельский язык, вот их родной, и они начинали ходить в 
школу, у них всегда была проблема безударная гласная, они сделали очень 
много ошибок...и когда наши кто-то приежал в школу говорили «почему 
ваши дети говорят по-карельски?  Вы хотя бы на переменах разговаривайте 
с ними пусть они по-русски говорят?»  То есть, эта Россия все она 
пережила (D2). 
B) Много сделали господа коммунисты и компартия, грамотный 
сделали да, грамотный, они вытеснили язык, вытеснили это, вот, 
национальное самосознание, тогда это действительно стали стыдно быть, 
непрестижно быть карелом (A8). 
These examples demonstrate the very common opinion amongst the 
interviewees that the failings of the language policies, as they would perceive 
them, were part of a conscious effort, particularly in the post-war period, to 







from an Olonets Karelian and a Northern Karelian respectively, indiciating both 
groups appear to perceive this process of Russification and evaluate it as a 
negative.  In many of the examples we have already examined above where the 
negative consequences of the language policies are described they are depicted as 
being driven towards the dilution or dissolution of Karelian identity without the 
agency behind such policies being made clear.  The two examples above 
illustrate the less common tendency to at least partially ascribe the desire to 
destroy Karelian identity to a particular group.  Example A is typical of 
narratives which relate personal experience of the usage of the Karelian language 
in official contexts being deemed unacceptable by the Soviet authorities.  It 
exemplifies a perceived attitude on the part of the authorities that “вы говорите 
по-карельски, значит вы будете хуже” and narrates active efforts on the part of 
the educational system in particular to remove the Karelian language and thus 
Karelian identity from younger generations.  This narrative is still somewhat 
incongruously related in a rather ambiguous manner; in example A there is at the 
same time an example of agent deletion, with Karelian ‘banned’ by unnamed 
forces, and the parents of Karelian speaking children are still euphemistically 
scolded by “кто-то приезжал”, yet the negative politics of the period as a whole 
as described as being “эта Россия”.  There is thus at least a weak sense that the 
dissolution of Karelian identity is being directed by Russians for the purpose of 
Russification.  In example B the blame for such policies is directly attributed to 
the “господа коммунисты и компартия” who are narrated as having been 
determined to destroy Karelian language and thus identity.  Regardless of the 
manner in which blame is or is not attributed what such narratives have in 
common is the construction of a historical period in which the Karelian language 











4.9  The Kalevala: Foundational Myth or Irrelevance? 
 
The possibility of the foundation of the KTK as a form of ‘named 
beginning’, at least in certain narratives of Karelian history, has already been 
examined.  One of the reasons for the rejection of such a strategy by some 
interviewees was the perception that it did not adequately reflect the much longer 
history of Karelia and the Karelian people themselves.  The epos Kalevala is 
occasionally put forward as an alternate foundational point, if not quite a named 
beginning given that the events supposedly related in the Kalevala could not, 
even by its staunchest proponent, be considered dateable to any particular period 
of recorded history.  The response of the interviewees to the Kalevala was in 
general much more positive than to the foundation of the KTK; almost all of 
those who were interviewed thought it was of importance to Karelian identity in 
one way or another.  For many of those interviewed the Kalevala did play the 
role of a foundational myth or mythological past of the Karelian people in some 
manner: 
 
A)   Я не бы сказал, что это исторически, это, наверное, всё-таки 
более такой, часть былин, былиная часть и историческая, ну и имеет какой-
то но только с той стороны подоплёки что, там может быть передаётся 
какой-то, может быть, какой-то дух тех карелов (A4). 
B) Ну. во-первых. этот эпос играет не только в истории Карелии. 
а сыграет роль в мировой литературе. как один из многочисленных 
источников этнической исторической памяти, творчество и...я вот люблю.  
Для меня есть две книги Библия и Калевала  (A7). 
C) Это очень важно, очень важно, эпос, карелы его знают и 
очень много, что написано в эпосе, оно подсознание людей, оно как-то 







Бывает что ты открываешь книгу и у тебя ощущение что ты это где-
то даже как будто проживал.   
Это исторический документ и я думаю что это документ, как бы вам 
сказать, это документ больше всё-таки...то что касается    
Эта не сказочка, это рассказ о наших каких-то предках, о наших 
каких-то корнях (D2). 
D) Калевала эта история жизни карельского народа, от рождения 
до сегодняшнего дня, Калевала эта история жизни карелов.  Мы гордимся, 
конечно, там написано буквально всё, все традиции, все традиции 
карельского народа (D6). 
E) Во приципе, для меня Калевала эта история моей земли, 
причём не сто лет назад, не двести лет назад, даже не тысячу лет назад, это, 
с момента рождения земли. Хотя вот офицально там происходило восемь-
семьсот лет назад, крещение карелов, я думаю, что всё-таки что карелы 
были христианами намного раньше.  И это история христианства на нашей 
земле (D7).  
The Kalevala is described in the above examples as containing in some 
form or another something of the most ancient past of the Karelian people; in 
examples D and E it is narrated in metaphorical terms as being derived from the 
very “рождения” of the Karelians and Karelia, whilst in example C the 
interviewee views it as containing information “о наших каких-то корнях”.  For 
the participants sampled in examples B, C, D and E the epos is constructed as 
having some kind of genuine historical value, although the exact historical value 
of the text is unclear in some of the statements.  As a mythological beginning the 
Kalevala would seem to function quite well for these participants, however as 
such a concept of a mythological foundation by its very nature would tend to be 
located in the very depths of history; the vague and somewhat poetic language 
employed to talk of the “дух тех Карелов” or feelings of innate ‘Karelian-ness’ 
in “подсознание” of modern Karelians is to be expected of such a mythic event.  







conception of Karelian identity which itself therefore stretches back into the 
mythic past, to a point where conventional history cannot follow.  Examples B 
and E also interestingly equate the Kalevala with Christianity, in the first 
instance directly with the Bible and in the latter with the “история христианства 
на нашой земле”.  Both individuals therefore elevate the Kalevala to the highest 
possible importance, in their eyes, by either equating it to a sacred text or 
imbuing it with religious meaning.  In this manner the Kalevala is presented as 
itself sacrosanct, associating Karelian identity with the interviewee’s religious 
identity and presenting the Karelians once again as inherently Christian.  The 
participants quoted above span all age ranges, educational levels and 
geographical groups of Karelians, indicating the importance of the epos across 
Karelian society. 
As can also be glimpsed in example B many of the participants identified 
the possession of a ‘national epic’ as part of the fundamental attributes of any 
national group; possessing the Kalevala, therefore, elevates the Karelians to the 
same level as any other widely-recognised nationality: 
У всех народов мира есть определённый эпос, эпическое 
произведение да, которое стоит в основе свой национальной 
идентичности....может быть у американцев, канадцев это немного по-
другому.  У нас, поскольку нашу территорию, мы были долгие годы без 
письменного языка, хотя в истории доказано да, то есть найдёны 
офицальные документы...которые [...] 1242-м году в Новгороде где 
офицально написан текст на карельском языке.  Это офицально 
установленный факт, от которого никто не может уйти, что есть это язык, 
уже давно существовал....народ сохранял свою историческую культуру в 
эпических песнях.  Поэтому Калевала как собрание эпических рун 
эпических песен да....в этих эпических песен собрана душа народа и 
культура народа (B2). 
The narrative above also addresses one of the major potential 
shortcomings of the Kalevala as a mythological beginning for the Karelian 







Lonnrot in the 19
th
 Century.  The interviewee in the example above both points 
to the recorded use of Karelian in 1242 and the continuity of tradition amongst 
Karelian folk artists who were unable to read and write to establish the essential 
antiquity of the Kalevala itself.  As the epos is based on the work of generations 
of Karelians dating back to the very earliest history of the people it is an 
“офицально установленный факт, от которого никто не может уйти” that it 
is also a source of the very essence of Karelian identity.  A strategy of 
continuation is thus employed to trace the antiquity of the Karelian language and 
Karelian epic poetry which simultaneously proves the antiquity and power of 
Karelian identity itself.  As noted above this participant was involved in the 
selection of the 90
th
 anniversary of the foundation of the KTK as a ‘national’ 
holiday for the Republic of Karelia, however as hinted above even this individual 
distinctly separates the idea of the political autonomy of Karelia from the 
antiquity of Karelian identity, which is once again constructed as having very 
ancient roots. 
 The Karelian nature of the epos is established in another manner by a 
further interviewee, again with reference to the accustomed strategy of reliance 
on familial experience:    
Я нашёл своих родственников, пра, пра, пра которые были 
рунопевцами, и даже в 1872-м году, в те времени когда финны ездили, 
собрали эти руны, значит, от него было написано несколько рун, и о них 
опубликованы книги...поэтому Калевала им надо использовать для того 
чтобы не больше туристов ездили, там есть что-то показать, есть о ком 
рассказывать, потому что эти вот рунопевцы....(D16). 
For this participant the Kalevala and other such folk poetry is intrinsically 
Karelian; it may have been written down by Finns but he can trace the origin of a 
particular piece to his own ancestors.  This interviewee, despite being one of the 
less well educated participants, has once again been able to draw on familial 
knowledge to construct a narrative using a strategy of continuation that locates 
the production of these texts within the historical experience of the Karelian ‘we’ 







modern context is somewhat problematic for this interviewee, however, as it 
would appear that he views its contemporary use as being directed, by the 
ambiguously constructed “им”, more towards ensuring “больше туристов 
ездили” than promoting Karelian culture.  This example demonstrates that 
although the Kalevala appears important to the average Karelian it is also used 
within the Republic of Karelia as a regional brand, something with which at least 
some Karelians are uncomfortable. 
Some interviewees were more sceptical about the use of the Kalevala as a 
pseudo-historical text or mythological basis for ideas of Karelian identity.  For a 
few interviewees the circumstances within which it had been compiled were an 
issue, for some participants its contemporary relevance to the ordinary Karelian 
was questioned:  
     На самом деле, я знаю, много карелов эпос не знают, только 
слышали, что там кто там...я считаю что да, если так говорим немножко, о 
том что это нам действительно какой-то фундамент, для всей 
культуры...действительно как будто бы Библия которая описывает как 
создали этот народ,...я считаю что он важен, конечно, другое дело, что...не 
все даже читали (A8). 
The interviewee in the excerpt above does construct a strong case for the 
epos to be considered a foundational myth, using the three of the main strategies 
already examined above: equation to the bible, equation to the usage of similar 
mythic histories across the world and the narration of the Kalevala as comprising 
some kind of story of which “описывает как создали этот народ”.  The 
interviewee, however, despite recognising in this manner the potential uses and 
importance of the epic seems to harbour doubts as to whether it is in actuality a 
source of Karelian identity: most Karelians are narrated as having at least heard 
of the work, but “не все даже читали.”  Another participant, the Tver’ Karelian, 
constructed an image of the Kalevala in which it was not regarded as important 








я пока не приехала в Республику Карелию, об этом не слышала 
вообще, вот, однако более старшее поколение, то есть поколение моих 
родителей, они с этим знакомые, в то время, когда они учились в школе... 
- Так что для, но особенно для молодёжи, ну может быть и в целом 
для тверских карелов это не является главный источник национальности? 
- Нет, нет конечно, значение не играет практически никакого, 
особенно постольку-поскольку никто даже незнаком (A3).  
The interviewee here deconstructs the importance of the Kalevala to 
Tver’ Karelians at least by informing the researcher that it is practically unknown 
to Karelians in her native area.  She illustrates this from her own personal 
experience by advising that until she arrived in Karelia she had “не слышала 
вообще” of the epic.  Even for the older generation of Tver’ Karelians the 
Kalevala is depicted as somewhat of an introduction, a text they only became 
acquainted with through school education.  It would appear therefore from the 
above examples that whilst most Karelians within Karelia consider the work 
important and something equivalent to a mythic history of foundational myth 
such a feeling is absent in Tverskaya Oblast’.  In Karelia itself it seems that 
although some may not have actually read it, all Karelians are expected, by the 
majority of their counterparts, to be at least aware of the Kalevala; it is not 
possible from one interview to determine if the idea that “никто даже 
незнаком” with the Kalevala amongst other groups of Russian Karelians is an 
accurate reflection of the truth.  It does however highlight that whilst it would 
appear important to most Karelians a sense of Karelian identity can be 
maintained very well without reference to such a ‘mythic foundation’ at all. 
Those Russian participants interviewed were generally respectful of, if 
somewhat disinterested in, the Kalevala.  They did occasionally treat the work as 
if it could be regarded as a source of regional identity rather than national; that is 
to say as a source of identity for the Republic of Karelia as opposed to the ethnic 







Она играет, к сожалению, незначительная совсем, только [...] что 
осталось название кинотеатра, Калевала, (laughs), Сампо там, вот, 
некоторая символика. Хотя некоторые у нас есть художественные проекты 
такие...но я думаю что перспективы конечно вот того уже говорил, да, что 
когда будет восстание как регионального сознания, да так или иначе, я 
думаю, Калевала я думаю станет одним из, элементов как бы преподавания 
в школах, то есть её необходимо естественно ввести на современной 
культурный контекст, да...и я думаю, что это поможет формированнию  
такого регионального сознания (D11). 
The interviewee was sceptical about the role the epos played in the 
formation of identity in contemporary society in the Republic of Karelia; he 
constructed a strategy of devaluation which depicted the Kalevala as obsolete, in 
need of translation into a “современный культурной контекст.”  Rather than 
constructing an image of the work as a sacrosanct Karelian shibboleth it is 
referenced as being merely the name of a cinema; it should be noted that 
‘Kalevala’ and ‘Sampo’ are in actual fact both the names of cinemas in 
Petrozavodsk, alongside the equally symbolic ‘Pobeda’.   The Kalevala itself 
however is still regarded as a potential source of “регионального сознания” by 
the participant; in this context it would appear that the identity thus formed 
would encompass all the inhabitants of Karelia.  The potential symbolic value of 
the work is proposed without its ethnic component, thus proposing a Karelian 
identity that is inclusive of any group within Karelia that would wish to claim it.  
 
4.10 Does it Matter Anyway?  The Importance of History 
 
Given the nature of the interview process it was possible to not merely 
ask the participants for answers to specific questions on Karelian history but to 
ask them to assess the importance such a history held for them personally and to 
gauge the broader influence of history, if it existed, within society in the 







this research project in general was that historical narratives played an important 
part in the production and reproduction of national identities; clearly had the 
majority of those interviewed pronounced themselves wholly uninterested in the 
history of the area and its people this would have weakened the theoretical 
backbone of this research.  It should be stated that, unsurprisingly, some 
participants were much more interested in discussing the topic than others.  
Indeed the relative length of the interviews recorded, from around twenty 
minutes to well over an hour, alongside the relative paucity of examples cited 
from some of the interviews, demonstrates the comparative lack of interest in the 
subject evinced by some participants.  The great majority of those interviewed 
however did engage positively with the process and produced complicated 
narratives of historical events and answered the questions as fully as they were 
able.  Questioning of their attitude towards the importance of history in general 
also revealed that the majority did think it of importance to themselves and 
society more generally:   
 
A)  Это не маловажно, что это осталось и кто-то не бы смог 
вычеркнуть этот язык, и этот народ, и эту культуру, потому что, ну хотят 
да?  Правительство хочет, чтобы всё было попроще и полегче (A8).      
B) Если я называю себя карелом, или карелкой, значит пусть не 
всю историю, но какую-то часть истории своего народа человек должен 
знать.  И из этого как бы формируется мировоззрение и как бы отношение к 
своему народу (D4).   
C)  Ну конечно важно, и мне кажется, для каждого человека 
историю надо знать. 
Но это мое мнение, но если ты живёшь в Карелии, то ты должен 
знать и уважать культуру, даже если ты не родился а приехал, допустим 
(D14).  
D) Это важно для меня, но самое интересное, что это важно для 







это важно и для молодёжи.  Они очень, с большим удовольствием 
послушают нас в библиотеке, педагогов, сами приходят, изучают эту 
историю и, но конечно важно, без прошлого нет будущего (D6).  
For the interviewee in example A the history of Karelia and the Karelian 
language was important as it demonstrated to the authorities and society more 
generally that Karelian identity still existed; it is constructed as one of the 
barriers which prevent the authorities from carrying out their intention to 
assimilate the Karelians with the remainder of the populace.  The interviewee 
again identifies a threat against which Karelian history can act as a defence; a 
strategy of unification which warns against a topos of threat and dissolution.  For 
the participants in examples B and C knowledge of Karelian history is 
constructed in differing ways as being a requirement for inclusion within a 
legitimate group of Karelians or residents of Karelia.  Both participants construct 
a picture of legitimacy to reside in the area or be considered Karelian as 
conditional on knowledge of Karelia; those coveting such status “должен знать” 
the history of the Karelian people.  Both participants appear to conceive of 
Karelians themselves requiring such knowledge, but for the interviewee in 
example C in particular such awareness is demanded even of those who “не 
родился а приехал” if they are to be permitted to reside in Karelia.  In example 
D the possession of such historical awareness is narrated as being important to all 
Karelians, even the ‘youth’; this generation of Karelians, which might, the 
interviewee seems to imply, be expected to be less interested in the past than 
their elders, is depicted as willingly, “с болбшим удовольствием” seeking out 
such authorities to learn of their history.  In this narrative the future itself, more 
particularly a future for the Karelian people, is conditional on knowledge of the 
past.  Example C is from one of the youngest, least-educated participants 
showing that interest in history was not limited to the older or more educated 
group of intereviewees. 
The interviewees often also identified historical narratives as being of 
direct importance for their own personal sense of national identity; this was not 







that of their immediate family but also articulated as a concept by the 
interviewees themselves:  
Ну, я бы так сказал, да, что поскольку я 100%-ный карел, в моей 
семье все мои родственники карелы, как со стороны моей материнской 
линии, так и со стороны моей отцовской линии, значит вот на этой земле 
находятся могилы всех моих предков......поэтому, конечно, для нас, моего 
возраста, постарше моего возраста...наших детей наших внуков, это 
культура, этой территории, жизнь этой территорий, не безраличны, 
представляет большой интерес (B2). 
При всех обстоятельствах, какая она ни была, она моя история, 
концлагерь сталинский - это моя история, финская оккупация - эта моя 
история, нашествие мамая - эта моя история, Олонецкие полки были на 
Куликовском поле, 1812, нашествие Наполеона - эта тоже моя история, 
потому что там Олонецкие полки тоже участвовали, историю надо просто 
знать и самое главное, я считаю, не надо делать, повторять ошибок (D7). 
 In the first example above the interview deploys a strategy of 
perpetuation which depicts the continuity of his own personal Karelian heritage 
and identity; his ancestors are referenced as having been Karelians back to the 
beginnings of time to the extent that within Karelia “находятся могилы всех 
мойх предков”.  An appreciation and respect for Karelian history and culture is 
depicted as being unavoidable in these circumstances, as such a storied personal 
history of Karelian identity cannot be ignored and must be valued.  The second 
example also uses a similar strategy to personalise a perceived historical heritage 
and thus depict it as an intrinsic part of the individual’s own personality.  In both 
examples the historical narrative is interwoven, for the participant, with a 
personal, familial narrative which emphasises the importance of such histories to 
the sense of identity of that individual. 
As we have already seen above the importance of Karelian history can be 
viewed as its potential value in safeguarding the Karelian people from putative 







organisation with political goals, also presented a picture of Karelian history in 
which it was useful in the political arena:     
История Карелии важна для того чтобы развивать современную 
жизнь.  Почему например?  Потому что даже когда мы беседуем с 
представителями власти, мы им напоминаем, что право карелов, например, 
на представителей в органах власти, на распоряжение землями, 
природными ресурами, в местах компактного, они определенные в 
историческим прошлом, в частности Тартуский мирный договор 20-го года 
между Финляндией и Советской Россией (A. Grigoriev).    
   For Grigoriev the history of the Karelian people is important as it 
witnesses the political neglect of the Karelians by the authorities and reminds 
them of the promises that were supposedly made and left unfulfilled by previous 
governments.  Historical narratives which present the Karelians as having been 
mistreated by the forbearers of the current authorities allow those such as 
Grigoriev and the organisation he represents to “им напонимаем” of what was 
promised to the Karelians in the past.  In this manner the responsibility of the 
modern Republic of Karelia to assist the Karelians is established by a strategy of 
continuation which depicts it as inheriting the duty to implement, for example, 
the “право Карелов” apparently awarded to them by the Tartus Peace Treaty of 
1920.  This also recollects the topos of the ‘broken promise’ to the Karelian 
people on the part of the Soviet authorities and their Russian successors which 
Grigoriev, as noted above, created in his articles within the mass media 
discourse.  
For Zinadia Strogal’shchikova the history of the Finno-Ugric peoples of 
Karelia is potentially important for another reason:   
Я думаю, что если больше как бы, люды информированные, 
население Карелии да?  О том, о карелах о вепсах, и здесь очень большая 
часть населения это карелы-вепсы, которые обрусели...просто сейчас они 
считают себя русскими.  И конечно, это, но для этого у нас есть пресса, но 







пресса, на этом больше выделяла внимание, то это было бы лучше, но это - 
зависеть от людей, которые там работают (Z. Strogalshchikova).  
In this narrative much of the ‘Russian’ population of Karelia is identified 
as Karelians and Vepsians who have been Russified and “просто сейчас они 
считают себя Русским”.  Such individuals are imagined as having lost their 
Finno-Ugric heritage and thus identity at least in part due to the lack of 
information available to them on this heritage and culture.  Strogal’shchikova 
appears to believe that if these individuals were able to access such information 
the situation “было бы лучше”, although how this would manifest itself it 
unclear.  It can be inferred, however, from these comments that she considers 
knowledge of Karelian and Vepsian history to be a key factor in preventing the 
loss of such identities to assimilation with the Russian majority.  It is also 
interesting to compare her perception of the attention given to Karelian and 
Vepsian history by the Russian-language press as inadequate with the study of 
the mass media material made in the previous chapter; it has been argued that 
this discourse is marked by the marginalisation of the Finno-Ugric minorities and 
this is clearly a phenomenon perceived by the intelligentsia of these minorities 
themselves. Strogal’shchikova explained why she believed such a situation had 
arisen in some detail: 
Можно сказать что вообще история Карелии для большeй части 
населения она конечно неизвестна.  Потому что основной части населения 
Карелии, значительная часть, она начала формироваться вообще после 
войны.  Много здесь люди которые здесь приехали.  И это конечно большое 
упущение.  Если бы, ну сейчас у нас руководство тоже не местное.  Если у 
нас было местное руководство, то есть, люди, которые родились здесь, и 
они были во главе республики, то эта другая ситуация, совершенно.  
Сейчас когда у нас только что поменялось руководство, мы видим, что есть 
люди, которые приехали вообще из других регионов.  Я думаю, что хотя 
новый руководитель говорил, что для него это интересно и важно и что он 
будет поддерживать, и мы видели что он приехал на 
конференцию...системы не такой, конечно работа как бы по воспитанию 







Если вы посмотрите старые книги, наших историков, они никогда не 
затрагивали этнической аспект.  То есть для них население Карелии это 
население без этнической принадлежности (Z. Strogal’shchikova). 
In this narrative a large part of the population of the Republic of Karelia 
are identified as those who “приехали”, for the most part after the war.  These 
individuals are depicted as wholly uninterested in the traditions and culture of the 
Karelian and Vepsian peoples.  In particular the leadership of the area is denoted 
as “не местное” and thus not concerned with the propagation of ideas of Finno-
Ugric history.  She also accuses previous historians, in this context those of the 
Soviet period in particular, of neglecting the Finno-Ugric heritage of the area in 
their work; they are portrayed as having “никогда затрагивали этнической 
аспект” of Karelian history.  In this manner the historical narratives available to 
the majority of the population of the modern Republic of Karelia are represented 
as being narratives which omit all reference to the actual Finno-Ugric heritage of 
the area; Karelia is presented as just another Russian province.  
Strogal’shchikova is here attempting to dismantle what she sees as the prevalent 
historical narratives available within the Republic of Karelia by presenting them 
as avoiding and omitting reference to the most important aspects of this history.  
It is interesting to note here and from the contributions of Grigoriev analysed 
above that two individuals who were actively demanding increased political 
rights for the Finno-Ugric minorities in the 1990s are still, at least in private, of 
the opinion that the political system of the Republic of Karelia does not answer 
their needs.  As we have seen from the mass media discourse analysed, in 
particular from Grigoriev’s texts but also from Antonova’s, activists in the 
Finno-Ugric communities often use narratives and discursive strategies that 
position Karelian identity further from Russian identity or closer to Finnish.  It 
has also been noted however that this conception of Karelian identity is rarely 
directly stated but is indirectly inferred; certainly nothing in the data is as 
heterodox as an outright denial of Russian influence and an associated claim for 
political priority if not outright superiority such as characterised 
Strogal’shchikova’s and Grigoriev’s newspaper articles in the 1990s.  The 







the basis of their contributions to the discourse; both Grigoriev and 
Strogal’shchikova remain of the opinion that the leadership of the Republic of 
Karelia should pay much more attention to the problems of the Finno-Ugric 
minorities and indeed would like to see these minorities more involved in the 
power structures themselves. 
This layer of Finno-Ugric activists are not alone in presenting an image 
of contemporary society in the Republic of Karelia in which narratives of the 
Finno-Ugric history of the area are lacking or almost altogether absent.  Several 
of the other interviewees thought that their own historical knowledge or that of 
society in general was somewhat inadequate: 
A)    Ну, не знаю, знаете?  Во первых, я как бы выросла в России, 
да?  И вот вам говорю, что когда было мое детство когда вот ребёнок [...] и 
объясняем вот...я была как русская, хотя дома говорила по-карельски но я 
себя вот, больше к русским относила.  И когда началось там в девяностых, 
когда немножко воз-возрождение, я это, считаю, что теперь это как 
мёртвым припарки, безполезно потому что у нас большинство уже не 
говорит на карельском языке (D8).  
B)  Я думаю, что у нас не всё в порядке, что историю знают 
слабо...что у нас один только вот, одно имя есть только вот Рокаччу, 
который вот упоминать что в борбье с Шведами провел себя геройство и 
мужественно и в Музерском районе есть памятный знак, там написано об 
этом.  И больше всех со старинных времён ни одного, карелов нигде ничего 
нету.  Поэтому, поэтому, но может быть потому что не было тут таких 
сражений, как, скажем, Полтава и Куликовская битва и прочее и прочее.  
Но здесь малонаселённое...но я считаю, что это не достаточно, того что мы, 
у своих героев карелов [...] только единственное Рокаччу знаем, и даже не 
всех спроси любого школьника и он сказать «кто он такой?», так что он не 
национальный герой скажем так (D16). 
C) К сожалению, история Карелии у нас только [...] и 
неизучимый, даже вот по официальным данным...и если мы посмотрим тут 







Республики то есть, это было как бы с остальной частью Новгородской 
Республики причём здесь как везде было своё вече то есть всё было не 
сверху как бы назначалось, а как бы посредством решалось.  Притом, вот, 
крепость Корела, которая вот там на Ладожском озере, естественно там, 
там было свои...и культурные и политические основы, то есть и крепость 
называлась Корелой, то есть строил-то есть понятно тогда что уже была 
такая город-государственность.  Но это потом вот когда началось это 
переподавание, сведение всему о...унифицированной имперской истории, 
это потихонечку было забыто и переименовали город Приозерск (D11). 
In example A above the interviewee, an Olonets Karelian within the 
median age group and thus educated in the Soviet period, narrated a personal 
history in which she had been educated on narratives of Russian history 
exclusively to the extent that “я была как русская”; for her the only 
distinguishing factor which identified her as a Karelian rather than an actual 
Russian was that she “дома говорила по-карельски”.  She uses a strategy of 
marginalisation to address the issue of contemporary Karelian identity; she 
opines that the attempts to narrate alternate histories of the Karelian people are 
useless as Karelian identity itself is “как мёртвым припарки”.  In this narrative 
the damage to Karelian identity has already been done throughout the Soviet 
period in which Karelians such as herself were reared on Russian historical and 
cultural traditions; the older generation has no other Karelian heritage left to pass 
down aside from the language itself, and in her opinion “у нас большинство 
уже не говорит на карельском языке”.  As in example A the interviewee in 
example B identified the 1990s as the period in which it was possible to produce 
distinct narratives of Karelian history rather than Russian or Soviet history.  
Although he was much more positive about the re-emergence of the possibility to 
produce such narratives he also considers that “не всё в порядке, что историю 
знают слабо”.  He exemplifies this tendency by citing the fact, as he sees it, that 
Karelians have next to no national heroes to commemorate.  He can identify only 
one such character, Ivan Rokachchu, a Karelian who fought against the Swedes 
in the 16
th
 century.  Even this figure is commemorated by just one memorial and 







advised that “любого школьника” would not know who he was.  The 
interviewee, within the older age group, evidently does not perceive any positive 
change towards a greater role for Karelian history in the school curriculum since 
the collapse of the USSR.  A topos of ignorance is constructed within which 
Karelians do not know their own history very well and lack historical narratives 
which they can take pride in; further in the interview the participant actually 
described his efforts to organise a memorial to a Karelian Olympic skier for the 
express purpose of creating another “национальный герой” for the Karelian 
people. 
In example C the Russian participant who we have seen attempt to 
narrate a history of Karelia which emphasises its supposed Novgordian roots 
laments the fact that this aspect of history is minimised in more orthodox and 
widely-propagated historical narratives.  The Novgordian past is described as 
practically “неизучимый”, with the ‘official’ narrative of history being viewed 
as a deliberate attempt to replace this apparent historical legacy with a unifying 
“имперской истории” which emphasises not the democratic traditions of 
Novgorod, as the participant sees it, but the role of the central state.  In this 
narrative the fortress of Korela is renamed Priozersk not to diminish its Finno-
Ugric heritage but to diminish the supposed Novgorodian heritage of the area.   
All of the examples above agree that during the Soviet period the history 
of Karelia was either ignored or related in a manner which downplayed its 
differences from that of the history of Russia as a whole.  Karelian participants in 
particular viewed the manner in which the Soviet authorities narrated history as 
an attempt to dissolve conceptions of Karelian identity either by actively 
promoting Russian historical narratives or by passing over in silence those 
aspects of history which could be seen as promoting a sense of a distinct Finno-
Ugric identity.    Anatolii Grigoriev also narrated a history of the Soviet period in 
which the official narratives of Karelian history were altered to diminish 
Karelian feelings of identity or political aspirations: 
Действительно, когда была Гражданская война, 20-е годы, вот 







хотели к Финляндию уходить, они хотели быть вместе с Россией, ну так 
говорила советская историография.  Вот, но если брать вот ситуацию 
конкретную из деревень, как мне рассказывали старики, вот деревень 
которые жили вот, я помню эти разговоры, конкретные, карелы хотели 
жить самостоятельно.  И чтобы от русских не зависить, но с финнами был 
постоянный контакт, многие, наши из моей деревни, Ламбисельги, ходили 
на заработки и в Питер и в Финляндию, и из Финляндии приходили, 12 км.  
И прекрасно знали и финский язык, вот русский, хуже знали, очень, 
многие, вобщем, не знали русского языка, понимаете?  Вот, поэтому вот 
такая ситуация (D13). 
In the above excerpt the Karelians are once again positioned closer to the 
Finns than the Russians, this time by comparison of their supposed fluency in 
Finnish with the fact that “многие, вобщем, не знали русского языка”.  The 
main aspect to examine here however is the manner in which Grigoriev contrasts 
the orthodox Soviet narrative, that the Karelians were given a choice between 
Finland and Russia and “они хотели быть вместе с Россией”, to information he 
obtained first hand “из деревень как мне рассказывали старики”.  These eye-
witness accounts, which are described as “конкретные”, are invoked to prove 
that “карелы хотели жить самостоятельно”.  In this manner Grigoriev attempts 
to discredit the orthodox Soviet narrative by showing that rather than the choice 
supposedly offered to them the Karelians themselves actually wanted a third 
course of action: independence.  The validity of the “советская историография” 
is denied by recourse to the supposedly irrefutable weight of eyewitness 
testimony that Grigoriev possesses.  This strategy also attempts to demonstrate 
once again the manner in which the authorities attempt to note only associate the 
Karelians with the Russians rather than the Finns but also the manner in which 
they have attempted to suppress Karelian identity in general.  
This idea of the Soviet authorities suppressing narratives in which the 
Karelians seek to express an independent identity in opposition to and distinction 







Тоже исторические данные об Ухтинской Республике, они 
буквально по- другому трактовались в советское время, то есть, когда вот 
смотришь, открываешь документы, то, чего хотели представители Карел, 
организюут эту Ухтинскую Республику, это были вот действительно не с 
целью не столько политической, но сколько направленной на сохранение 
народа, на образовательные цели, то есть, образование народа, создание 
школ на родном языке, то есть, в принципе то, о чём сейчас в 90-й годы 
говорили любой в России, [...], право на преподавание в школах на родном 
языке, право на газеты, на средства массовой информации, то есть, вывести 
язык и культуру на более высокий уровень.  Поэтому этого мы например не 
знали, и сейчас...в приципе в образовательной системе нет такого вот упора 
что, в принципе, на мой взглад, через истории своего народа мы начинали 
бы уважать историю в целом государства, и ещё историю мировую. 
В школе, когда мы изучали, я лучше знала наверное историю 
Англии, Война Красной и Белой Роз, и Франции и так далее, чем историю 
родного народа (D15). 
In this excerpt the interviewee alleges that the Ukhtinskaya Respublika 
was deliberately misrepresented by “они” during the Soviet period to 
delegitimise its apparent actual aim of the “сохранение народа”.  Unlike certain 
other participants she does not represent the Ukhtinskaya Respublika as having 
been an actual threat to the unity of Karelians and Russians, or at least not 
necessarily so; this also implies that were the Karelians to be allowed to learn 
more about it there would not be any immediate reduction in their loyalty to the 
Russian state.  The demands of the Karelians in the 1920s are represented as 
nothing more than those of the Karelians today, the chance to “вывести язык и 
культуру на более высокий уровень”.  It would appear however that any 
education on this period or Karelian history in general was deemed politically 
dangerous in the USSR, however, as the interviewee alleges that she “лучше 
знала, наверное, историю Англии” than that of Karelia itself.  Once again the 
interviewee appears to narrate a history of their own youth in which narratives of 







remainder of the state and to preclude the development of strong feelings of 
Karelian identity.   
The neglect, deliberate or otherwise, of Karelian history within the Soviet 
period was often seen by the interviewees as having left the Karelian people with 
an inadequate reserve of historical knowledge.  As alternate, Karelian historical 
narratives are, as we have seen, often derived from personal or more often 
familial experience rather than through the educational system or mass media the 
inevitable attrition of those with first or second hand knowledge of events is a 
real threat to their production.  Many participants were worried that the loss of 
older generations was a threat to the idea of Karelian identity itself: 
Потому, что я общаюсь с людьми, и умирает старое поколение, 
старое поколение которое не передаёт свое знание новому поколению.  
Потому что новое поколение этим не интересуется, ему не интересно.  Нет 
мотивации, то есть я считаю, что не создаётся, не создаётся ситуация 
которая была заставила молодёжь и мотивировала молодёжь изучать язык и 
говорить на родном языке (D4). 
As evidenced in the above excerpt this steady loss of the older generation 
and the failure of this generation to hand down its knowledge to the next was 
seen as one of the main threats to the future of the Karelian language.  It was also 
identified by the interviewees as a threat to the future of Karelian culture and 
identity in general; with the younger generation not learning Karelian and being 
reared on narratives of Russian history and Russian traditions there remains 












4.11 Karelian Self-image: Heteronomy and Helplessness 
 
The image of the Karelian people themselves constructed by the 
interviewees was quite instructive in and of itself.  In general, with one or two 
exceptions which have been noted above, the Karelian participants constructed 
an image of their own identity which was peaceful to the point of total passivity.  
Karelian identity, as evidenced by the historical narratives themselves, was 
associated with a chronic inability and also to some extent an unwillingness to 
influence events.  In this regard it was surprisingly similar to the manner in 
which Oushakine (2009) and Gudkov (2004, 2007) have determined Russians to 
construct ideas of their own self-image and identity.  Karelians tend to view their 
history as having been a narrative of tragic events, almost as a litany of disasters 
in certain cases, over which they as a group have had little or no control.  Even 
those interviewees who did not assess Karelian history as having been entirely 
negative tended to depict the Karelians as either unwilling to assert themselves or 
as having been marginalised or assailed by stronger powers or political forces 
they were unable to contest:  
A)  Я думаю, что карелы на самом деле, ну, по крайне мере, 
раньше, когда они, может быть, не были в составе, они были достаточно 
такой, ну народ мирный, спокойный, простые земледельцы, охотники 
рыболовы, и соотвественно, нашлись опредённые народы там, которые 
захотели этим пользоваться.  И естественно, требовал защиты, и раньше все 
эти, князья, так сказать, Руси, они как раз ну постепенно [...] эти 
территории как раз как они могут взять под защиту...то есть пользоваться 
эти территории но в то же время и защищать, то есть, чтобы простой народ 
может спокойно жить и трудиться (A4). 
B) Честно я на этот вопрос я затруднаюсь ответить.  Почему?  
Может быть...это такой, вот более миролюбивный народ, народ который 
могли подчинить, который не будет, то есть который не восстаёт, как 







Я думаю, что вот такого стремления быть отдельным государством у 
карелов не было.  То есть хоть у финнов было (D4). 
C) Я думаю что в основе, сути своей характера карела, эта была, 
это было восприятие всех других народов как свободных и равных 
тебе...вот отличие может быть, в чём, вот каких-то других наций, были 
нации которые считали - да ты равен, но я это я, вот это есть в 
многонациональной семье есть такие, я главный.  Карел по сути своей 
очень миролюбив, очень терпим, и в силу этого я думаю что все процессы 
какие, ассимилицонные идут они очень серьёзные влияют на карелов (D2). 
D) Карелов тоже в степени как и русским...терпеливости в 
крайней степени и подчиняемость (A7). 
In all the above examples the Karelians are portrayed as having been and 
indeed, as these are the self-portrayals of the interviewees, as being utterly 
passive.  In examples A the Karelians are depicted as having been “простые 
земледельцы” and thus entirely able to defend themselves against external 
enemies; they are therefore required to ask for Russian protection in order for 
them to continue their peaceful life.  Interestingly this excerpt is from the 
participant who gave the narrative of Karelians defending their local area 
sampled above which was least marked by these features of heteronomisation; 
clearly the interviewee constructed a general picture of Karelian identity as a 
whole marked by a lack of self-determination.  Although he does attempt to 
construct a narrative within which the Russian presence is tolerated and 
beneficial to the Karelians he again characterises the local population as simple 
peasants who are politically unsophisticated and thus require protection from a 
third party.     In all of the examples the Karelians depict themselves and their 
ancestors as patient and peace-loving, a people the interviewee in example B 
explains “который не восстаёт”.  In examples B and C the Karelians are 
compared to other nationalities which do assert themselves, such as the Finns, 
French or unnamed others who might be willing to declare “я главный”.  This 
easy-going and accommodating nature is depicted as the reason why in the one 







other as the reason they happily live as junior partners in a 
“многонациональной семье”.  Examples A, B and C all use the narrative of 
Karelian singularity, as an exceptionally peaceful and tolerant people, to 
rationalise the manner in which the Karelians failed to develop as an independent 
nation.  Although in example A there appears to be a certain reciprocity in the 
arrangement by which the Russians come to defend the Karelians in examples B 
and C there is some sense of the tolerance of the Karelians being ‘taken 
advantage of’; it is because of their extreme peacefulness in example C, for 
instance, that the “ассимилиционные” processes are allowed to occur, 
presumably because the Karelians are too easy-going to object.  Interestingly the 
interviewee in example D, whom it is worth repeating had Karelian and Russian 
heritage, constructed both ethnic groups as being equally submissive and tolerant 
to an extreme degree:“в крайней степени”. 
Aside from asserting the docile and subservient nature of the Karelian 
people the interviewees also tended to use a strategy of heteronomisation, or 
attributing the agency behind changes to factors outwith the control of the 
Karelians themselves.  This strategy has been encountered throughout our 
examination of both the media and the interview data, and is worth examining in 
a little more detail here:    
A)   Тут, я думаю, не спрашивали никого...они просто как бы, 
многие может быть считают что лучше бы были с Финляндией, но мне 
кажется, что в те годы рядовой карел, не думали - присоединили или не 
присоединили (D14). 
B) Но сейчас я рассказываю собственное мнение, вот мне 
кажется что территория была, но дикая, будем говорить.  И как бы центр 
России пошли в Сибрь, пошли в Карелию, и знаете, просто карелы жили 
маленькими группами, они вот на берегу озёр, и были как бы сами по себе.  
То есть они, ну как бы жили и жили по себе (D8). 
C) Дело в том что Карелия как регион маргинальный, 
пограничный, история карельского языка, карельского народа, карельской 







какого-то крупного государства, будь то Россия или будь то какое-то, 
северное в Европе, шведское, финское, но шведское да?  И поэтому то что 
мы, то есть карельский народ оказались польностю с раннего 
Средневековья связаны с народом русским, это исторический факт.  Мы не 
можем говорить о том, что было если было, да? (A7). 
D) Потом ещё стратегически, ты знаешь как мы находимся, 
здесь вот эта Финляндия, находимся да...потому что стратегически надо 
был охранять Питер. 
Да не было выбора у карелов, абсолютно то, что я думаю ни у 
карелов, ни у чувашей ни у кого не было выбора потому что, большая, 
большая Россия, княжество [...] нет, не было выбора, никто не спрашивал, и 
никто не спрашивал в 90-х да, когда из коммунизма перешли, к якобы 
демократии, тоже никто не спрашивал, хотите, может быть там, 
самостоятельной республикой, тоже...не спрашивают нас (A8). 
E) Здесь пытали сделать в общее изначально, здесь было очень 
много красных финнов, так называемых, которые, там их Маннергейм 
разгромило и все убежали сюда.  Вобщем, изначально было ещё и в 
сталинское время был проект...что есть здесь создавали как бы плацдарм.   
Но это был чисто такой как знаете иделогический, 
коммунистический проект...Но сейчас как раз надо думать, надо разработки 
уникальних региональних брендов которые были бы действительно с одной 
стороны отличать Карелию и от там Москвы, да, и с другой стороны, всё-
таки отличали бы и от Финляндии (D11). 
In the examples above a number of different means of realisation for this 
strategy are exemplified.  In all of the above the ability of the Karelians to 
influence their own fate is denied or downplayed by referencing external factors 
or actors which shaped events.  In examples A and D the Karelians are 
constructed as having not given, nor indeed been asked for, their consent to the 
various political changes.  Both examples once again feature agency deletion 







named.  The important feature of these examples is the narration of a history of 
the Karelian people in which they are continually ignored.  In example A it is 
considered possible that Karelians may have preferred to be united with Finland 
rather than Russia, however their opinion is not sought.  The interviewee also 
uses the negative self-presentation analysed above by then imagining that the 
“рядовой карел” of the period was uninterested in such questions; in this 
manner not only do the authorities not ask the Karelians their opinion the 
Karelians are depicted as quite possibly not even having one.  In example D the 
interviewee uses a strategy of continuation to narrate a history of Karelia, and 
also the Finno-Ugric minorities of Russia in general, in which they have never 
been and still are not asked for their consent to the political changes which occur.  
This constructs a history in which “не быдо выбора у Карелов” at any point in 
time, constructing a topos of ‘continual oppression’ in which the Karelians are 
always forced to do as they are instructed.  Example D also invokes the idea of 
the Karelians as ‘cursed’ by their strategic location.  As we have already seen 
above in this narrative, as also exemplified in example E to an extent, the 
position of Karelia and the Karelians on the border between Russia and Sweden 
or Finland leads to the manipulation of the normal development of Karelian 
identity for strategic political ends.  In example E the Russian contributor views 
this process as having interfered with the development of “уникальных 
региональных брендов” rather than Karelian identity but the process involved 
is much the same.  Excerpts B and C exemplify another means through which 
this strategy is realised; the narration of Karelia as having been a poor, remote 
and underdeveloped marginal area which cannot successfully develop in 
isolation.  In this narrative the Karelians, who “жили маленкими группами”, 
are unable to either defend themselves or maintain their independence even had 
they been so inclined.  In example C in particular their incorporation into some 
form of larger political entity is described as being so inevitable that “мы не 
можем говорить о том, что было если было”.   
All of the above narratives exemplify a discursive strategy of 
heteronomisation which denies the possibility of the Karelians influencing their 







backwardness, a lack of political power or leverage or, as further demonstrated 
by the prevalent construction of Karelian self-image, simple unwillingness to get 
involved.  Very occasionally however an interviewee did allude to this 
phenomenon being a result of direct political oppression: 
Выбор всегда у человека есть, или в Соловки или дома остаться 
(D7). 
In this short statement the interviewee elliptically inferred that some 
Karelians may have desired to influence their political destiny but were unable to 
do so as a result of actual repression.  In this sentence the participant narrates a 
history in which it was possible to attempt to alter the Soviet political landscape 
but also infers that, once again, it would have been impossible to succeed.  The 
Karelians, and indeed Soviet citizens in general, are narrated as having had the 
choice between passive acceptance or arrest.  There is also some weak sense, in 
the usage of the present tense, that this is still the choice on offer.   
It is also worth noting that whilst not a particularly common concern 
certain Karelian participants were concerned that their heritage and identity was 
being expropriated by contemporary Russian society as potential economic 
resource.  These participants clearly though this somewhat offensive and narrated 
it as a potential threat to their sense of Karelian identity: 
 Естественно что Республика осознаёт, новый глава Республики, они 
всё-таки осознали, что карелы всё-таки являются как сказать, брендом, 
брендом Республики.  Но любой бренд нужно, конечно, эконимически 
подпитывать и люди должны понимать, что не, но я вообще против такого, 
выставления своего этноса на продажу.  То есть люди ведь не для того 
говорят по-карельски, чтобы продать себе под туристическим, как 
туристический продукт, но говорим просто поскольку мы карелы (D15). 
For the interviewee in the example above the idea of Karelians 
themselves being designated a “бренд” is presented as being quite objectionable; 
the interviewee is offended by the idea of the “выставления своего этноса на 







earning money of tourists but because it is an intrinsic part of their identity.  The 
appearance of the idea of marketing various symbolic markers of Karelian 
identity as attractions for tourists is quite new and is not yet as developed as the 
authorities in the Republic of Karelia appear to envisage.  It would seem as if it is 
already, in certain quarters at least, stirred resentment amongst the Karelians 
themselves.  The idea of Karelian identity as a brand is here depicted as an 
outright assault on the true, deeper meaning of that identity, which is the sense of 
self it gives to the Karelians as a people.   
 
Conclusions 
The manner in which differing conceptions of ‘Karelian’ identity were 
constructed within the interview data shows a number of important similarities 
with the mass media data but also an equally significant number of divergences.  
As noted above the composition of the interview data means it is a perhaps more 
representative reflection of the views of the ethnic Karelian intelligentsia and to 
some extent ethnic Karelian society as a whole and can therefore be seen as 
somewhat of a ‘corrective’ to the data derived from the more Russian-dominated 
mass media discourse.  In both sets of data attempts to negotiate and define 
‘Karelian’ space through establishing or denying the right to be held as 
‘indigenous’ for certain groups in certain areas acts as a powerful strategy of 
continuation and legitimisation.  The tendency identified within the mass media 
discourse to localise this sense of ‘indigeneity’ to specific areas was also marked 
in the interview material.  Once again Vepsian identity tended to be restricted to 
a very limited area on the extreme southern fringe of the Republic of Karelia; the 
only real exception to this rule was, perhaps unsurprisingly, given by the Vepsian 
contributor Strogal’shchikova who constructed a much larger historical territory 
for her people which encompassed much more of the modern region.  As noted 
above Strogal’shchikova was the only Vepsian interviewed and hence it is not 
possible to draw any conclusions as to the resonance of this narrative within the 
broader Vepsian populace as a whole solely from this one statement.  Only one 







was identified in the mass media material but taken together these two texts do 
demonstrate the existence of a narrative, albeit perhaps an extremely marginal 
one, in which Vepsian identity was once much more pronounced.  Despite the 
general marginalisation and localisation of Vepsian indigeneity however it 
should be noted it was rarely if ever completely rejected. 
The status of Finnish identity within the Republic of Karelia was far more 
controversial.  The rejection of the idea of Finnish presence within the modern 
Republic of Karelia until quite recent times was most marked amongst those 
interviewed who belonged to the Olonets group of Karelians.  This group of 
Karelians most often used strategies of discontinuation to deny any Finnish claim 
to the status of an indigenous people; indeed as noted above a strategy of 
equivalence which related their presence to political manipulation of borders was 
often present.  As has been noted from the analysis of the mass media discourse 
Ingrian Finns are accorded a special status within the region by certain 
participants; once again they are awarded an ‘honourary’ right to settle within 
Karelia as they are excluded from their own historical homeland.  The influence 
of these Finns was generally constructed as benign or actively positive; it is 
interesting to note that those participants who touched on the question of these 
Ingrian Finns were in the eldest age group and hence had some personal 
recollection of their arrival which appears to have conditioned them to be more 
sympathetic of this particular group of Finn’s status within the area.  It is also 
interesting to note that the circumstances by which this group of Finns comes to 
settle in Karelia is narrated using strategies of heteronomisation in a similar 
manner to the way Karelian history in general is narrated; these Finns are forced 
to relocate to Karelia by the Soviet leadership rather than choose to come there 
of their own accord.  This clearly distinguishes them from Finnish immigrants of 
the 1920s and 30s who not only choose to come to Karelia but then take over the 
leadership of the area at the expense of the existing inhabitants.  It is possible 
therefore that Karelians perceive the later group of Finnish immigrants more 
sympathetically as ‘fellow victims’ of the authorities whilst earlier immigrants 
are more ambiguously constructed due to their active participation in the then 







of Finns whatsoever and thus may not necessarily have any information on their 
history or be aware of their existence as a specific group. 
Russians are the other group whose status as indigenous to Karelia is a 
matter of contention within the interview material collected.  Those narratives 
discovered in the mass media discourse which attempted to use strategies of 
continuation to construct a picture of almost unbroken Russian residence within 
the Republic of Karelia were reflected in the contributions of all of the Russian 
participants interviewed.  As noted above one participant in particular 
reproduced the Soviet-style discourse characteristic of the mass media by 
constructing the Finno-Ugric minorities and Russian majority as part of one 
‘fraternal people’ which all had equal right to live in the area and amongst which 
there was no inter-ethnic discord.  The antiquity of Russian presence in Karelia 
was also utilised by a marginal ‘regionalist’ discourse, not noted in the mass 
media, which sought to establish a more decentralised, less homogenised 
‘Russian’ identity based on the ‘Novgorodian’ past of the region.  The 
respondant who produced this narrative is a journalist and thus potentially this 
construction of a more autonomous, regional Russian identity has a reasonably 
significant discursive weight; its absence from the mass media material analysed 
would suggest however that it does not have significant resonance within 
Russian society as a whole within the Republic of Karelia.  
The non-Russian participants addressed this idea in a number of different 
ways.  Narratives were produced which did recognise the Russians as indigenous 
to Karelia; indeed amongst the Olonets group of Karelians and other southern 
Karelians this phenomenon seemed particularly marked.  The manner in which 
these Karelians associated Russian identity with Karelian identity shall be 
discussed further below, however it should be stated here that the manner in 
which they constructed the history of Olonets itself in particular strongly 
associated the area with the Russian state from the beginning of at least recorded 
history.  Indeed recorded history often seems to begin with Russian presence at 
the foundation of Olonets; by being included at this ‘foundational’ point 
Russians and Karelians are constructed as being allied almost as far back as time 







pre-historic Finno-Ugric past in which the Russians appear not to be involved; 
nevertheless the connection between Russian and Karelian identity thus 
established is of extreme duration and thus narrative significance.  Most 
Karelians interviewed also constructed a version of Karelian space in which 
certain peripheral areas were inhabited by Russians from time immemorial, in 
particular the Zaonezh’e region or other areas around the White Sea.  In contrast, 
however, to those narratives analysed in the mass media which sought to 
construct these areas as exemplifying ‘model’ or ‘pure’ Russian culture those 
Karelians which did identify these areas as zones of traditional ‘Russian’ 
settlement often qualified this judgement by diminishing this very ‘Russian-
ness’; the inhabitants of these areas are related as being adapted to a different 
way of life and influenced by Karelian or more generally ‘northern’ culture. 
In contrast to the media discourse, in which narratives which constructed 
Karelia as a wholly ‘Finno-Ugric’ territory were relatively rare, two main groups 
of interviewees constructed conceptions of Karelia which minimised or excluded 
Russian influence.  The first group which tended to construct such narratives 
were the interviewees from the Northern Karelian areas.  These individuals often 
rejected the idea of Russians being considered to be an ‘indigenous’ group and 
offered a narrative which used a topos of colonisation, rejecting Russian 
presence as an ‘alien’ element introduced into Karelia at a much later date.  This 
was related to the construction of a topos of a ‘pure’ Karelian area which had 
existed since time immemorial; in this sense it can be related to the ideas of Hall 
and Kowakolski noted above.  The second group to use this discursive strategy 
were those individuals, Grigoriev, Antonova and Strogal’shchikova, who might 
be described as ‘activists’ in the various Finno-Ugric societies of the Republic of 
Karelia.   
As described above certain Karelians, in particular those from the Olonets 
group, had difficulty relating a history of the Karelian people which differed in 
any significant way to that of Russia as a whole.  In the mass media discourse as 
analysed above Karelian and Russian historical experience was often related as 
indivisible, thus positioning Karelian identity extremely close to Russian identity 







identified in the mass media was also strongly present in the interview material 
collected in Olonets and had much the same unificatory effect.  Even well-
educated Karelians as a whole appeared to find it difficult to construct historical 
narratives which minimised or excluded Russian influence or narratives of a 
period before Russian influence.  As in the mass media discourse the role of 
Orthodoxy was stressed as a unificatory factor; once again through strategies of 
unification and continuation Russian influence on Karelia was stressed and 
Karelian identity positioned close to Russian identity as a whole.  Orthodoxy was 
identified as a key factor in uniting Karelians and Russians by most of the 
interviewees and indeed it would appear to be perceived as perhaps more 
important to Karelians themselves in uniting them to a Russian state than might 
be appreciated from the mass media material.  Karelia was once again 
constructed as a ‘model’ Orthodox territory and Karelians, by most participants, 
as ‘model’ Orthodox believers.   
The supposed shared historical experience of Karelians and Russians as 
united against foreign enemies in defence of Karelia has been noted within the 
mass media discourse as another unifying narrative which allies the two groups 
in opposition to an enemy picture, generally that of the Finns.  The interview 
material generally cleaved to this pattern but some very important differences 
were also noted.  Firstly the enemy picture of the Finns constructed by almost all 
the interviewees was much more nuanced and ambiguous than that offered by the 
mass media.  Even some of the Russian participants constructed an image of the 
Finns which did not equate them with the general enemy picture of unspeakable 
fascist aggression and brutality but rationalised and downplayed their culpability 
for the conflict and their conduct within it.  As noted above it would appear that 
knowledge of the Finnish language was the key factor at work behind the 
production of this moderated enemy picture for at least one Russian participant; 
through competency in Finnish this individual had access to alternate historical 
resources and thus his habitus or store of collective memory was able to offer an 
alternate picture of the war years.  The Russian participants selected for this 
study however were generally very well educated, and knowledge of Finnish is 







outside of this most educated strata; it remains to be seen, therefore, if this more 
nuanced narrative of the war is common outside of anything more than a small 
section of the Russian population. 
The Karelian participants were also generally well-educated and most had 
either a good knowledge of Finnish or an ability, through knowledge of a 
Karelian dialect, to at least understand some of the language.  The main resource 
which conditioned the Karelian participants to produce narratives of the war 
years which were at variance with the mainstream narratives of heroic, shared 
resistance to a brutal invader were their access to familial memory.  It would 
appear that many Karelians can construct heterodox narratives of this period due 
to access to the recollections of their families who had lived through the war and 
occupation.  Together with, at least among some Karelians, study of Finnish 
material this has provided the Karelian participants with a somewhat different 
‘K-device’ in relation to the war years.  This appears to be the case for all age 
groups, educational levels and geographical groups of Karelians, although 
evidently the youngest group of Karelians does appear to have access to 
somewhat less information, presumably as a consequence of the gradual loss of 
‘first-hand’ witnesses.  Consequently the narratives produced by Karelians 
relating to this period are characterised by a far greater ambivalence compared to 
those seen in the mass media.  This ambivalence was often synecdochically 
conveyed by the image of division within the Karelian community or family 
itself over whether or not the Finns were fascist invaders or a beneficial 
influence.  Karelians either tended to construct themselves as passive observers 
of a war between two ‘other’ groups, the Soviets and the Finns, or as allied with 
the Soviets but with both sides inflicting damage to the Karelian population.  
This split loyalty was also synecdochically related by familial experience of 
certain relatives retreating with the Finns or having fought against them with the 
Soviets.  The triumphalism of the media narrative is replaced by a much more 
ambiguous narrative in which Finnish guilt is downplayed or minimised. 
  It should be stated that the only individuals interviewed to completely 
refute the mainstream narrative on these issues were Grigoriev and Antonova; 







greater responsibility for the damage inflicted during the war years and the Finns 
are related as having aided rather than harmed the Karelians.  As we have seen in 
his article on Lambisel’ga Grigoriev has openly subverted the established 
narrative in the past, however in the interview process he also deconstructed the 
hero-status of Melent’eva and opined that the Finns did nothing wrong in their 
treatment of Karelians.  Such a narrative is arguably too taboo for publication in 
the Karelian mass media and is certainly strongly in opposition to the majority of 
the data collected for this study.  This narrative clearly positions the Karelians as 
natural allies of the Finns rather than the Russians with all the implications of 
their national identity that follow.  It would appear however that heterodox 
narratives in general are quite common within the Karelian population.  The 
potential deportation of the Karelian people, ridiculed or discredited in the media 
discourse, for example, was treated seriously and constructed as a real threat by 
most of the Karelian participants.  Post-war relations between the Karelians and 
the Russians, an issue not addressed within the media material, are generally 
narrated as having suffered due to suspicion towards the Finno-Ugric minorities 
after the occupation on the part of the authorities.  Thanks to their ability to draw 
on an alternate source of information through this resource of familial 
recollection Karelians produce narratives which have the effect of undermining 
the unity between Karelians and Russians positied by the mass media discourse.  
The manner in which the foundation of the KTK in 1920 has been 
selected by the modern authorities in the Republic of Karelia as a form of 
‘foundational date’ has been explored in the analysis of the mass media material 
above.  One of the interviewees was involved in this process and his 
contributions reinforce the idea of the anniversary being utilised as an attempt at 
the creation of a foundation for a kind of ‘civic’ Karelian nationalism, based on 
the solution of the problems of a specific ethnic group but now more broadly 
applicable.  There is a considerable tension, however, even within his remarks 
between ethnic identity and this putative civic identity; the participant, a 
Karelian, clearly also wants to use the date to give a sense of the persistence of 
an ethnos, the Karelians, and as a rallying call for the solution of their 







anniversary as significant, at least as the foundation of political autonomy for the 
Karelians, however it was rejected more broadly on a number of levels.  Certain 
participants, in particular the Northern Karelians surveyed, would rather use the 
formation of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika for this purpose, as a more ‘genuinely’ 
Karelian formation.  It would appear these efforts are mostly stymied however by 
a lack of historical information in broader Karelian society about this event.  A 
number of other participants felt that the anniversary inadequately expressed the 
continuity of Karelian presence in the area and the antiquity of their ethnos; 
indeed this lack of an ‘ethnic’ component seemed to reduce the significance of 
that date for many Karelians to practically zero.  The most common reaction, as 
indicated above, was that of simple indifference.  Even amongst well-educated 
Karelians it would appear that the selection of 1920 as the anniversary of 
‘Karelia’ has not real resonance or meaning.  Russian participants were equally 
indifferent and indeed the supporter of ‘regional’ identity viewed it as an 
example of ‘primitive’ branding.  Clearly the foundation of the KTK cannot 
function as a foundational date for ethnic Karelian identity and appears to be 
little regarded as a foundational date for any putative ‘civic’ version. 
The Kalevala appears to be much more relevant to any discussion of a 
potential ‘mythic beginning’ for ideas of an ethnic or national Karelian identity.  
It would appear that most Karelians, across all ages and groups, identify the epos 
as their ‘national myth’ or ‘national epic’, and actively equate the work to other 
such recognised epics to elevate Karelian identity to the level of a properly 
constituted national identity.  Possession of such a national epic appears, to the 
interviewees, to ‘normalise’ Karelian identity as a recognised national identity on 
a level with any other.  The Kalevala was generally constructed as in some 
fashion containing part of the essence of Karelian-ness, as the ‘soul’ or ‘bible’ of 
Karelian identity in the interview material.  The actual historical value of the 
epos was generally not admitted by the interviewees, especially those with higher 
academic qualifications, due to the circumstance of its composition by the Finn 
Lonnrot, although some of the less well educated participants did view it as a 
‘historical document’.  Those who viewed it as a work of literature did find its 







nevertheless tended to argue it did contain some form of kernel of Karelian 
identity if only as a compilation of genuine Karelian epic poetry; as noted above 
even one of the less well-educated participants was able to do this by the 
accustomed strategy of familial recollection and connection to the actual 
circumstances of its compliation, although it should be noted he was one of the 
oldest participants.  The Kalevala would thus seem to fulfil, with certain caveats, 
the basic criteria of a ‘mythic beginning’ for the Karelian people.  A number of 
participants expressed some doubt about this, noting that outside of better 
educated circles few had actually read the epic; arguably this lack of actual 
acquaintance with the text does not necessarily preclude the idea of the Kalevala 
from operating as a foundational myth.  It would appear, however, from the 
limited data gathered, that Tver’ Karelians construct a sense of Karelian identity 
without any regard for the epic whatsoever.   
The key role of the Karelian language in the formation of conceptions of 
Karelian identity has been discussed above.  In terms of the historic usage of 
Finnish within the Republic of Karelia this was a matter of at least indirect 
personal experience for a small number of the eldest participants who narrated 
this period using strategies of delegitimisation which viewed the impostion of 
Finnish as harmful to the development of Karelian.  This can be contrasted to the 
discourse employed by Antonova and Grigoriev who, in different ways, seek to 
position Karelian identity closer to Finnish and thus either justify the usage of the 
language as entirely appropriate or seek to minimise its perceived negative 
effects.  Antonova constructed a narrative which, in common with most of those 
sampled from amongst the Karelian population, used strategies of 
discontinuation and delegitimisation to attack Soviet language policy; she did 
however attempt to use strategies of minimisation and downplaying to convey 
her appreciation of Finland and the Finnish language in general.  Grigoriev 
sought to use strategies of discontinuation in a different way to present a topos of 
a lost opportunity or failure for the Karelian people to transcend the limitations 
of the localised Karelian dialects to embrace a broader Finnish identity.   
The interviewees almost universally agreed that history was important.  







but some of the broader statements made in its justification are of relevance here.  
Firstly most Karelian participants appeared to view the possession of some form 
of specifically ‘Karelian’ history as a safeguard against the threat of the 
dissolution or disappearance of the Karelians as a group.  Although the Karelian 
language was generally identified as the defining factor of Karelian identity 
knowledge of history was generally constructed as an important factor in 
motivating the retention of this language and thus identity.  In this sense the 
continuity of history equates to the continuity of identity; the importance in many 
of the narratives above of strategies of continuity is thus highlighted once again.  
For those Finno-Ugurs, including but not limited to Antonova, Grigoriev and 
Strogal’shchikova, who wanted to obtain more attention from the local 
authorities for their minority groups, history is also very useful as a political tool.  
The topos of the ‘broken promise’ is the most striking aspect of this usage of 
history but many other historical narratives, such as the essential loyalty of the 
Karelians to the Russian state or the antiquity of their residence in the region or 
language, can be and are employed as leverage on the local authorities in the 
attempt to gain benefits for the minority communities.  Despite this there is a 
clear perception amongst the interviewees that there is a lack of historical 
knowledge within the Republic of Karelia related to the Finno-Ugric minorities.  
The existence of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika, for example, is mentioned by a 
number of participants but detail, which is extremely useful in order to construct 
a coherent and convincing historical narrative, is clearly lacking.  
Strogal’shchikova and a number of the other participants identified a lack of 
knowledge about the minority groups within the ethnic Russian elite as a 
negative factor; as this information is absent in the educational system and the 
media it is not reproduced, hence the associated identities are not easily 
reproduced.  Many of the participants were of the opinion that the paucity of 
information on Karelian history within the media and educational system was a 
deliberate assimilative tactic on the part of the state; indeed Strogal’shchikova 
again opined that this had led to an accelerated rate of assimilation into ‘Russian’ 
identity once language had been lost.  The ability to draw on an alternate source 
of information through the recollections of previous generations and to a limited 







shown above, allows the production of heterodox narratives which do position 
Karelian identity as at least more distinct than the generally assimilative 
narratives of the mass media would tend to suggest.  This resource is available to 
Karelians of all educational levels, and as the above analysis shows is utilised by 
both the least and best educated Karelians to construct narratives in partial or full 
opposition to the orthodox media narratives.  That the Karelian intelligentsia 
produce these narratives also offers the strong possibility of their dissemination 
through at least the Karelian-language media.  This resource, essentially 
amounting to ‘oral history’ is however fragile; as noted by certain of the 
participants it depends on the older generation passing its knowledge to the 
younger.  The younger participants within this study did seem to be in possession 
of at least some of this oral history and therefore some of this ‘collective 
memory’, which allowed them to articulate narratives in opposition to those 
discovered in the mass media analysis.  As the number of self-identified 
Karelians continues to fall, however, the longer term viability of this process 



















The corpus of data collected from the Russian language press of the 
Republic of Karelia and the data collected through the interview process 
demonstrate the manner in which historical narratives are employed in both 
arenas to produce and reproduce competing notions of national identity in the 
region.  It is worthwhile reflecting at this point on the main historical narratives 
which were encountered in this study and how these were deployed to achieve 
bolster or diminish one putative identity or another.  As has been described in the 
previous chapters one and the same historical event or process can be related in a 
number of ways, using a variety of strategies, to construct pictures of Karelian 
identity and Karelia itself which are entirely at variance with one another.  It is 
also worth considering how the production of such narratives appears to relate to 
the broader context of their construction; that is to say to examine why it would 
appear certain actors develop and deploy a given strategy, how it is presented 
and how it would appear to be received.   
The creation of historical narratives must be related back to the social 
context within which they are produced in order to fully understand their 
potential role in making and unmaking various putative groups.  It is necessary to 
understand the discursive resources upon which these narratives are constructed 
and the social position and background of those producing such narratives.  The 
position of the Russian-language press within Karelia clearly does not regard 
itself, as this study has shown, as speaking to or for the Finno-Ugric minorities.  
This is shown by the existence of a conventionalised, traditional approach within 
the Russian-language mass media to the production of ideas of Karelian identity 
which is strikingly reminiscent of the Soviet-era discourse of the ‘younger 
brother’.  This phenomenon is especially prevalent in the official discourse on 
national identity as exemplified by Kareliya.  This may be in part due to the 
standardising and conventionalising effect of the genre of newspaper discourse 
itself as identified above which has facilitated the persistence of this method of 
constructing ‘Karelia’.  It is argued above however that this persistence may well 
be in large part due to the perceived persistence of the same social relations and 







dominate at the expense of the Karelian minority and thus the Russian-language 
press perceiving no need to moderate or alter their method of constructing 
‘Karelian’ identity.  It would also appear that the continued usage of this 
discourse is linked to the strategies of continuation utilised by the local 
authorities to legitimate the survival of political autonomy within Karelia and 
their own relations with the Finno-Ugric minority groups.  One of the most 
striking phenomena present both within the mass media data and the interview 
data is that of the marginalisation of the Finno-Ugric minorities.  In terms of the 
Vepsians it has been discussed above how their apparent legitimate territory or 
homeland is often restricted by the Russian language press and by some of the 
Karelians interviewed to a relatively small area in the south of the Republic of 
Karelia.  In general terms they are marginalised by being constructed through the 
use of Orientalist or semi-colonial language which constructs an image of them 
as a quite exotic ‘other’.  The Russian-language press also uses such language to 
approach the Karelian population itself, and offers historical narratives of the 
Tsarist period in particular in which the Karelians are depicted as natives or 
semi-civilised in constrast to the Russians, who are the bearers of European 
progress and enlightenment to the region.  The Finnish minority is generally not 
marginalised in this manner, however it is subject to construction as the ‘other’ 
in a different fashion by being accorded the status of ‘historical enemy’, as shall 
be discussed further below.  Only the Ingrian Finns are accorded some right to be 
considered legitimate residents within Karelia; it must also be stated that they are 
almost entirely absent from discussion within the press and are little regarded 
within the interview material.  In general historical narratives are employed to 
reproduce an orthodoxy within which Russian identity is almost hegemonic and 
Finno-Ugric identity only reproduced as a peripheral phenomenon outside 
mainstream experience.  
 This marginalising approach to the Finno-Ugric minorities appears to be 
deeply engrained within the Russian-language press and it is therefore reasonable 
to assume it is common to Russian society within the Republic of Karelia as a 
whole.  The interview data was complied in order to obtain a more representative 







ethnic Karelian society as a whole to provide a possible ‘corrective’ to the data 
derived from the more Russian-dominated mass media discourse.  In analysing 
the interview data it is important to consider the mechanism by which such 
narratives may be produced by the respondents.  As noted above the apparent 
‘official’ and ‘orthodox’ narratives of Karelian history produce an image of 
‘Karelian’ identity which is marginalised and heavily associated with a more 
dominant Russian identity.  The interview material demonstrates, however, the 
production of alternative narratives of history which distance Karelian from 
Russian or, in rarer instances, reject the orthodox narrative outright and propose 
a formulation of Karelian identity much more distinctly Finno-Ugric or even 
almost analogous to Finnish.  To produce such narratives the habitus of the 
individuals concerned clearly draws on alternate resources than those which 
propound the orthodox narrative.  It would appear that the ‘K-device’ of these 
individuals, the ‘general world knowledge’ on which these narratives are 
constructed is not that derived from the educational system or mass media; 
several participants openly rejected the ideology reproduced in these organs as 
overly russified or inaccurate and incomplete.  The primary source of these 
alternative resources would appear to be access to familial recollections or at 
least a form of local ‘oral history’ which provides, to use Kaufmann’s term, an 
alternate set of ‘referents’ upon which these Finno-Ugric minorities can construct 
their historical narratives and thus advance an alternate conception of national 
identity.  The very localised nature of some of these identities thus produced and 
the regional differences perceived between Northern and Southern groups of 
Karelians may in large part be down to the source of referents used to construct 
these narratives.    
One of the main group of discursive strategies encountered throughout 
the corpus of data, in particular within that of the mass media studied, is that of 
unificatory constructive strategies.  It would appear that within the Russian 
language mass media of the Republic of Karelia there is a pronounced tendency 
to use such strategies of unification, cohesion and continuity to narrate the 
history of Karelia and the Karelian people in a manner which emphasises its 







duration of Russian-Karelian cooperation in a number of spheres but particularly 
in their joint history of apparent enmity towards their Western neighbours.  
These narratives are important as exemplifying the idea of historical memory and 
continuity identified by Hall and Kowakolski examined in chapter two; by 
emphasising this shared historical continuity the contemporary social context, in 
which Russians and Karelians are associated together as a ‘we’ group, is 
legitimised as the natural order of things.  This narrative is also closely linked 
with that of Karelian orthodoxy, which places Karelia itself within the Russian 
cultural and spirtitual world; it should be noted that this strategy of stressing the 
orthodoxy of Karelia itself can also be used to boost ideas of the region as an 
innate part of the ethnically Russian world to the partial or complete exclusion of 
the Karelians themselves.  The use of Orthodoxy as a key repository of Karelian 
or Russian identity in the press may be, to an extent, symptomatic of the 
increased usage of Orthodoxy as a state ideology in general within the Russian 
Federation (Papkova 2011, Knox 2005), however as the interview process 
showed a number of the Karelian participants themselves identified the shared 
history of Orthodoxy as being a key factor in uniting Russians and Karelians, as 
well as distinguishing Karelians from their Finnish neighbours. 
A related aspect of the usage of unificatory strategies to position Karelian 
identity closer to that of the Russian majority is the marked tendency within the 
mass media discourse in particular to portray the Karelians as the eternal allies of 
the Russians against foreign aggression, be it by the Swedes, Finns or Germans.  
The Karelian experience of such conflicts is constructed as an element of the 
‘national’ experience of Russia as a whole, both in official and unofficial media.  
Karelians and Russians are thus forever united as a ‘we’ group in opposition to a 
menancing ‘other’.  This process weds the Karelian war experience with the 
almost sacrosanct war experience of Russia as a whole and thus has a great 
discursive weight and significance in the construction of conceptions of Karelian 
identity.  As a consequence it must be vigorously defended from heterodox 
narratives, such as produced in the Finnish press, which might undermine this 








Strategies of unification are also employed, as evidenced particularly 
within the interview data, to position Karelian identity closer to another putative 
‘fraternal’ nation: the Finns.  This strategy manifests itself within the 
contributions of Antonova and Grigoriev in particular who often employ 
narratives which stress the supposed shared experience, heritage or 
characteristics of the Karelians and Finns to dissolve the orthodox ‘we’ group of 
Karelians and Russians and establish an alternate Finno-Ugric group.  It is 
arguable from the data analysed above that these individuals, involved in the 
political side of the ethnic Karelian movement, posit a conception of Karelian 
identity much closer to the Finnish variant than the orthodox narrative would 
allow.  Grigoriev in particular would appear to conceive of Karelian identity as 
essentially merely a regional subset of a broader ‘Finnic’ identity.  It would also 
appear that this strategy of conceptualising Karelian identity as essentially 
related to Finnish is not universally accepted within the Finno-Ugric 
intelligentsia.  Although particularly concerned with Vepsian issues 
Strogal’shchikova does not appear to wish to strongly associate the Finno-Ugric 
minorities of the region with either Russian or Finnish identity, preferring instead 
to promote their existence in their own right.  These tensions within the 
narratives and strategies analysed here seem to reflect debates within the 
minority communities about the usage and development of the minority 
languages.  As noted above Grigoriev in particular had no issue with the 
historical usage of Finnish; hardly coincidentally he proposed its adoption by the 
Karelians as a ‘ready made’ written language in the contemporary context.  
Antonova, whilst more sceptical of past language policy was at pains to use 
strategies of minimisation and downplaying when considering the historical harm 
it may have caused due, it would seem, to a desire to at least use Finnish as a 
model for the development of Karelian without going so far as to adopt the 
language itself.  Strogal’shchikova, as a Vepsian and thus arguably a member of 
a group more linguistically distinct from the Finns, was more critical of the 
historic use of Finnish and coincidentally position Karelian and Vepsian 
identities distinctly away from that of the Finns.  The potential symbolic power 
of these utterances is important as they represent contributions from individuals 







Republic of Karelia.  They are indicative of the manner in which historical 
narratives are produced to construct and dissolve ‘Karelian’ identities in an 
important political context.   
Russians also lay claim to a share in a form of ‘Karelian’ identity, 
however, by using such constructive strategies to narrate a history of the region 
in which their residence is of just as long duration as that of the Karelians 
themselves.  The ideas of Kowakolski (1995) or Hall (1996) on the ‘body of the 
nation’ or ‘narrative of the nation’ if understood as pertaining to ideas of 
territories and landscapes are readily applicable here and indeed quite pertinent 
to the data analysed; for all groups under examination within Karelia the idea of 
the region as being their ‘historical homeland’ or ‘indigenous territory’ appeared 
to be quite important.  Whilst Karelians themselves used the idea of Karelia as a 
historically Finno-Ugric or Karelian ‘space’ to bolster their idea of national 
identity Russian participants were just as keen to use these strategies to advance 
narratives in which they laid claim to be considered as native to parts or all of the 
current Republic of Karelia. Both groups, especially within the media data, 
advanced an inclusive narrative in which Russians and Karelians had both been 
resident in the modern region since time immemorial, or at least the beginning of 
recorded history.  The manner in which the town of Olonets is represented in 
these narratives by both Karelians and Russians often produces an image of 
Karelia in which both groups play a role, cooperating to defend and develop a 
shared space.  Olonets Karelians in particular, both from the mass media and 
interview material, would appear to associate themselves and be associated with 
the Russian state through the usage of historical narratives which construct their 
native territory as an intrinsic part of the Russian state.  Although within the 
interview data there was a weak sense of a purely Karelian ‘pre-history’ the 
constant association of the ‘founding’ of Olonets by the Russian state produces a 
narrative within which the Karelians are associated with the Russians from 
(almost) time immemorial to the present day.  In this manner Karelian identity 
for the Olonets Karelians is always associated with the Russian state.  A lack of 
alternate referents, even from oral history, deprives these Karelians of any ability 







‘independent’ narrative.  For this group of Karelians in particular language usage 
becomes the fundamental distinguishing factor between Karelian and Russian 
identity as the historical narratives available tend towards assimilation with the 
Russian state and thus identity.  It may be argued that the Northern group of 
Karelians, who came into contact with the Russian state at a later date and less 
intensively until relatively modern times, have alternative referents which can be 
used to provide a more distinct conception of Karelian identity.  In particular the 
usage of the Ukhtinskaya Respublika and the Kalevala, which they construct as a 
product of ‘their’ area, provide alternative referents which position Karelian 
identity outside the Russian state and cultural sphere.  More broadly however, 
and across all groups of Karelians, the historic lack of Karelian statehood does 
appear to impair the ability of Karelians to narrate a distinctly Karelian history 
that would help support a uniquely Karelian identity; historical association with 
the Russian state is generally used, by Karelians and most importantly within the 
mass media, to conceptualise Karelian identity as part of a broader Russian social 
framework.   
  The notion of constructing ideas of historical space is often used for 
different purposes, however.  Certain Karelians, in particular Antonova and 
Grigoriev in the interview data but also other participants, constructed an image 
of historic Karelia which excluded all non-Finno-Ugric influence.  Conversely 
this tool could be and is used by Russians, particularly within the press, to 
advance a notion of the historical range of Russian settlement which depicts 
much of Karelia, and on occasion the entire region, as having been inhabited by 
Russians from the earliest historical periods.  In particular this strategy is 
employed with regards to those areas around the White Sea and the Eastern shore 
of Lake Onego which are claimed to be the heartland of Pomor or Novgorodian 
culture.  As hinted at above the idea of continuity of settlement and the putative 
status of one or more group to be considered indigenous is also related to the 
narration of a particular location as the ‘birthplace’ of a nation or national 
culture.  This is most strongly exemplified by the manner in which the town of 
Kalevala is presented as the birthplace of the eponymous epos and hence 







present the somewhat amorphous ‘Za’onezh’e’ as the nexus of Russian culture or 
at least certain manifestations of it.  The most interesting aspect of this 
phenomenon identified in the current study was the contribution made by one 
interview participant (see chapter four above) in which he narrated the history of 
this area as comprising Novgorodian traditions of autonomy in opposition to the 
apparent overly-centralised Muscovite heritage of central Russia.  This was an 
isolated example and no similar instances of such a narrative being produced and 
such strategies employed could be discovered in the interview process or the 
media data.  Nevertheless it is important as it illustrates the manner in which a 
putative heterodox national identity can be wrought from almost any historical 
narrative in opposition to a perceived orthodoxy.  Clearly there are limits to this 
process; the participant could hardly have claimed, in any meaningful manner, 
that the local Russian population has imbided democratic traditions from the 
American Revolutionary War of 1775-1783.  It does demonstrate, however, the 
manner in which the narration of history can be used to produce a conception of 
national identity contrary to the orthodoxy; the continuity of Russian authority in 
Karelia is here not used to bolster the credentials of the current political system 
but to subvert them. 
The modern unity between Russians and Karelias was justified in the 
media data not merely by the fact that they had supposedly lived side by side 
with each other for millennia but by their apparent shared heritage of mutual 
enmity with various ‘other’ groups.  The creation of an ‘other’ is key to the 
construction of any national identity (see Bhaba 1990), and in this regard the data 
analysed here has been no different.  Although the Swedes are of some 
importance in narratives which address the medieval history of Karelia the Finns 
are the nation most commonly constructed as being the ‘common enemy’ by 
some distance.  Within the newspaper material the Finns are strongly associated 
with the Great Patriotic War and are thus commonly depicted as being aggressors 
and, to a certain extent, fascists in line with the image of the Germans which is 
narrated within the orthodox discourse on this subject.  As the commemoration 
of the Great Patriotic War currently plays a key role in the narration of national 







identity so it is also of primary importance in Karelia.  Firstly the apparent 
aggression of the Finns is used to justify the annexation of Sortavala and other 
areas which were ceded to the KASSR in 1944, although this is also commonly 
justified by reference to their apparent Russian heritage prior to 1917.  More 
importantly their shared exploits and struggles against the Finnish invader is used 
to associate Russians and Karelians together into a common ‘we’ group; just as 
importantly of course it divides Karelians from the potentially attractive, on 
linguistic grounds and in terms of their economic wealth, putative ‘we’ group of 
Finno-Ugurs which could be constructed from Karelians, Vepsians and Finns.  
The Finns are generally not represented in as damning terms as the Germans are 
depicted when this period is narrated, however the use of terms such as 
концлагерь when employed with reference to the occupation and the relation of 
their supposed atrocities does build an enemy picture of the Finns which, in the 
press, is almost universally damning.  As the Finns can be, as we have seen, 
potentially constructed as an alternate ‘we’ group together with the Karelians in 
opposition to their putative alliance with the Russians there is clearly a strong 
motivation within the social context of the Republic of Karelia to isolate 
Karelian identity from Finnish as well as promoting the ‘Russian-ness’ of 
Karelian space; Karelia itself, as a border region, must be constantly 
reconstructed as an integral part of the Russian, not Finnish, cultural and political 
sphere.     
The narration of Karelian and Russian unity against this other group is 
also of note as it is used by Karelians themselves to assure the Russian 
readership of the newspapers of their loyalty to the Russian state; it is often 
invoked to bear witness of such loyalty as a demonstration that giving more 
language or other political rights to the Karelians does not threaten this apparent 
unity or risk the Karelians ‘defecting’ into the Finnish camp.  Within the media 
data studied Karelians often appear to be reacting to an implicit perception of 
disloyalty which would accuse them of betraying their allegiance to their Russian 
allies and fraternising too closely with the Finns.  This demonstrates 
heteroglossia in action as the Karelians are clearly producing texts in reaction to 







which cast doubt on their role in the war.  Karelians who present themselves 
within the Russian language media seek to reassure the authorities that this 
speculation is unfounded by relating historical narratives which prove their 
unbroken loyalty.  This topos of threat or disloyalty is also clearly evidenced in 
the interview data where the participants also narrated histories of the post war 
period in which Karelians were further victimised by a suspicious state.  Once 
again this putative victimisation demonstrates the marginalisation of Karelian 
and other Finno-Ugric identities within the modern Republic of Karelia.  There is 
clearly some suspicion that the profession of a Finno-Ugric identity makes an 
individual somehow of dubious loyalty to the Russian state as a whole.  
Arguably the production of non-Russian identities within the modern Republic of 
Karelia must, to be accepted within the orthodox discourse, be done in a manner 
which associates that identity with a broader Russian identity. 
The interview data is of great interest as it demonstrates that the narrative 
of the Finns as aggressors and brutal occupiers is often subverted or completely 
rejected by the Karelians.  In contrast to the narratives offered by the Russian-
language press, which tend to use a strategy of avoidance to omit reference to the 
Winter War, the interview participants, including those Russians interviewed, 
mentioned this conflict.  Certain of the Karelian participants were even prepared 
to offer a heterodox narrative in which the USSR was constructed as the 
aggressor.  The Karelian participants often deconstructed the official narrative by 
delegitimising Soviet claims of Finnish aggressive intent or offering alternate 
narratives of the occupation period in which the Finns are represented in a 
sympathetic light.  The interview process also revealed the manner in which 
certain narratives had been, and to an extent still were, considered unacceptable 
and thus had been repressed; although entirely absent in the media data in the 
interviews narratives were offered in which individual Karelians collaborated 
with the Finns to the extent of having resettled in Finland after the war.  In this 
fashion a picture of Karelian identity was offered which was closer to that of the 
Finns than allowed in the orthodox narrative.  Most Karelians continued to view 
the period as having been that of occupation and related familial experiences of 







participants tended to view the Finns as having acted decently towards the 
Karelians and many represented the Finns as being unwilling victims almost to 
the same degree as the Karelians themselves.  The most outspoken individuals on 
this issue and many others were those Karelians who represented political and 
cultural organisations; they offered narratives in which the Finns were presented 
as having acted in an entirely proper manner, as opposed to the Soviet authorities 
who were depicted as reckless and uncaring.  In this manner these Karelians, 
who are attempting to lead a regeneration of Karelian identity, offered a 
representation of Karelian history which moved their identity away from unity 
with the Russians to affinity with the Finns.  Once again this ability to construct 
a heterodox narrative of the war years appears to rely on the ability to access 
alternate ‘referents’ and thus an alternate collective memory.  Partially, in 
particular for the Russian participants interviewed, this would see to be through 
familiarity with Finnish language texts and thus the narratives of history 
reproduced within Finnish society.  Most importantly this is again a product of a 
store of ‘oral history’ within Karelian families and communities which 
reproduces narratives of taboo or heterodox phenomena such as deportation, 
cooperation with the Finns or Soviet repression which are either rejected within 
or completely intolerable to the orthodox media narrative. 
The impact of the war is also of primary importance to Karelians as it 
appears to be conceived of as having had a particularly pernicious influence on 
that aspect of their identity to which they would appear to attach most 
importance: the Karelian language.  Narratives of the history of the Karelian 
language, in general produced by Karelians themselves, are of primary 
importance in the mass media data in attempts to advance ideas of Karelian 
identity.  The majority of articles which deal with the Karelian, Vepsian and 
Finnish languages within the Russian-language press of the Republic of Karelia 
are produced by members of the respective minorities; as has been seen above in 
chapter two when Russians do produce articles on the languages their attitude 
appears at best indifferent and occasionally outright hostile.  In their narratives of 
the history of Karelia and their people the Karelians often create a topos of the 







everywhere, constrasting it to the current linguistic situation.  In this manner the 
clearest approximation within the data studied to the idea of a ‘pure’ ethnos or 
people, as proposed by Hall or Kowakolski, is seen; Karelians very positively 
evaluate this era of monolingual Karelian communities and view the increased 
dominance of Russian entirely negatively.  The loss of Karelian language is the 
loss of Karelian identity and thus the historical dominance of Karelian is narrated 
as the apogee of the Karelian people themselves.  The continuity of language use 
from ancient times down to the modern era also provides another constructive 
strategy for creating a sense of Karelian identity in opposition to Russian 
identity.  In narrating a history of the Karelian language in which incorrect 
political decisions, neglect or open Russification is responsible for its decline 
Karelians either in the press or in private create an argumentative strategy in 
which they are not culpable, or at least only partially so, for the language’s slow 
decay.  By using such a historical narrative not only can the responsibility for 
this language shift be placed on the historic authorities the onus can be placed on 
their modern equivalents to make good this supposed historic debt.  The 
representatives of Karelian social and political organisations in particular create a 
topos of the ‘broken promise’ of the KTK or other associated Bolshevik policies 
of the 1920s which is used to lobby for more resources and attention to Karelian 
problems from the local authorities.  The perceived history of deliberate 
Russification that some Karelian participants in the interview process identified 
also would appear to be important to their current political situation and their 
sense of identity; by narrating such a history of Russification these Karelians 
using a strategy of continuation the Karelians present an image of contemporary 
Karelia in which the same processes are at work and can accuse opponents of the 
usage of Karelian of continuing this history of discrimination.  It is therefore 
clear that historical narratives of this language shift are of an immediate political 
use to Karelians and also help provide another element of their sense of self.  
Both Hall (1996) and Kowakolski (1995) identified foundational myths 
or a named beginning, concepts which would appear essentially identical, as 
central to the narration of the nation.  The material analysed here has not 







appear to be a definite attempt by the current authortities in the Republic of 
Karelia to establish the foundation of the KTK in 1920 as a foundational event in 
some form; certainly this event is narrated by the authorities as the genesis of the 
current political structure and also the beginnings of cultural and political 
autonomy for the Karelians themselves.  Somewhat confusingly the narrative 
employed is, as has been demonstrated above, very fluid and also seeks to 
present modern Karelia as the rightful home of all nationalities currently resident 
there at the same time as tracing its heritage to the autonomy granted to one 
specific national group.  In this manner the current authorities of the Republic of 
Karelia appear to be attempting to build a form of civic Karelian identity which 
incorporates all the current national groups of the region around this historical 
narrative.  It has already been stated above that those Karelians engaged in active 
civic work within the Republic of Karelia have managed to subvert this narrative 
with an alternate construction which uses the date to demand restitution for the 
supposed failings of past and present administrations.  In general however the 
foundation of the KTK is a failure as a foundational myth or named beginning as 
it does not address the contradiction of attempting to play this role for both 
Karelians and all the other national groups of the modern Republic of Karelia.  
Firstly it appears to have, based on the examination of both sets of data, virtually 
no resonance amongst the Russian population, who do not view it as especially 
significant and have little to say on the subject.  For both Russians and Karelians 
the selection of this date is also seen as inadequate as it cannot address the 
thousands of years of the history of Karelia prior to this relatively modern event.  
In the interview process in particular whilst some participants did view the date 
as important as the start of the autonomous political history of the Karelian 
people they did not find it of significance in any broader sense; for many it was 
also narrated using the strategies of heteronomisation seen above with attributed 
its foundation to outside, non-Karelian forces.  As a putative brand of ‘civic’ 
nationalism it also does little to advance conceptions of Karelian nationality for 
the Karelians themselves whose nationalism, such as it exists, appears to be 
based more on the ‘ethnic’ referents of their language and culture.  It was also 
juxtaposed by a small number of Karelians with the foundation of the short lived 







does, offer the chance to narrate the beginnings of political self-realisation 
amongst the Karelians in a manner which excludes all Russian, and to a degree, 
Finnish participation and instead emphasises the demands of the Karelians 
themselves, thus formulating a more positive and proactive conception of 
Karelian identity. 
As a political event encompassing both Karelians and other groups, and 
also as an attempt to provide a foundational date for a regional political 
formation, the foundation of the KTK seems ill-suited to the role of foundational 
myth or named beginning.  One potential source of such a phenomenon could be 
the epos Kalevala. Although the heritage of the Kalevala is on occasion 
appropriated by the modern Russian residents of the Republic of Karelia, 
particularly as shall be seen below as a regional ‘brand’, its most important 
function appears to be as a source of Karelian national identity.  It has already 
been observed that it plays such a role for the Finns and the data analysed in this 
study, particularly that obtained in the interview process, would seem to show 
that for many Karelians it has just as much significance in their sense of self. It 
should be noted that what little data that was obtained with regards to the Tver’ 
Karelians appears to show it has next to no significance for their sense of 
national identity; a further examination of this area would be required to 
definitively answer this question.  Despite an apparent poor knowledge of the 
work all Karelians appear to have at least some sense of the Kalevala as 
important as some kind of repository of information on Karelian history or 
culture.  For some Karelians the work is elevated to a level of significance 
equivalent with that of the Bible, and is therefore viewed as of primary 
importance in their construction of their idea of personal and national identity.  
The actual perceived historical value of the work is somewhat more ambiguous, 
with respondents being divided as to whether it was merely an artificial 
assemblage of poetic verse or contained genuine historical fact.  Clearly the 
Kalevala does approximate to something like a foundational myth or named 
beginning for some Karelians, however it is also evident that far from all are as 
enthusiastic in identifying it as having any historical relevance.  The epos itself is 







not claim to explain, in the manner of a history, the beginnings of the Karelian 
people.  It would appear a better term for the role the work plays is that of a 
national mythology, in which certain folk tales and customs of the Karelian 
nation are purportedly enshrined.   
As has been noted above Karelian identity is often marginalised within 
the mass media through the narration of histories of Karelia which use a strategy 
of heteronomisation to exclude the possibility of the Karelians themselves 
influencing the historical development of Karelia or their own people.  This is 
not only evidenced within the Russian language press by contributions from 
Russian journalists but even more strongly by Karelian contributors and within 
the interview material by Karelian participants.  A common refrain within these 
texts is the perceived inability of the Karelian nation to influence its own destiny, 
whether with regards to the formation of various variants of the border, its 
political destiny or the fate of its language.  Karelian participants very rarely did 
anything other than use this strategy when constructing narratives of the history 
of their people; furthermore they often employed strategies of shifting 
responsibility to justify perceived negative outcomes.  Despite often constructing 
narratives within which the Karelians could not avoid a negative fate or bring 
about a more positive outcome they also generally used strategies of avoidance 
to refrain from attributing these negative processes and decisions to any other 
group; euther referential vagueness or synecdochial constructions such as ‘the 
war’, ‘the border’ or ‘political decisions’ are used which do not assign the blame 
to a specific group.  This avoids apportioning blame to the Russian group in 
particular and thus also avoids potential discord or tension; in the media 
discourse in particular Karelians can thus avoid distancing themselves from the 
Russians or appearing disloyal.   
In this fashion Karelian participants avoid assuming or attributing blame 
for a history which is often presented as a litany of disasters; very few positive 
events were identified by the interview participants, especially after 1917.  Very 
few figures were put forward in either corpus of data by Karelian participants 
who could be identified as ‘national heroes’; the closest such figure may be that 







threatened deportation of the Karelian people to Siberia.  In the main the 
historical narratives offered by the Karelians were those of decline, in both 
linguistic and demographic terms.  There is even a sense expressed that Karelian 
identity is somehow ‘dying’ or even functionally ‘dead’ and that it will soon be 
dissolved by ongoing Russification.  To a certain extent this method of self-
presentation is similar to that employed by Russians as described by Gudkov 
(2004) and Oushakine (2009) in which the ‘we’ group is associated with negative 
characteristics and also deprived of the ability to assert a more positive psat or 
present.  In the Karelian context this leads to the narration of a Karelian history 
in which they are marginalised and oppressed, powerless to avert catastrophe.  In 
this sense the fate of the Karelians is often contrasted with that of the Finns, 
especially those such as Grigoriev who posit a close association with Finnish 
identity, who are narrated as having struggled and succeeded.  If Kolakowski’s 
idea of ‘anticipation and future orientation’ is applied to the Karelian context it 
can be seen that the Karelians do look to the future of their nation; they posit this 
future based on the tribulations and failures of the past, however, and see nothing 
but decline and dissolution as the future of their ethnos. 
In general there seems to have been little perceptible change in the 
manner in which historical narratives were used to create potential national 
identities within the Karelian context over the period studied.  Certainly since the 
early 1990s the advocates of Karelian identity in the political arena have 
moderated their rhetoric, at least in the public arena, however this change was 
not greatly noticeable over the particular time period analysed.  A more radical 
conception of Karelian identity than that offered in the media discourse was 
discernable in the interview material but it would appear that this has not been 
fully articulated in the public arena over the period studied.  It is difficult to get a 
sense of changes over this period from within the interview data as it represents 
one particular episode of fieldwork.  It would seem that since 2001 little has 
changed; Karelian identity is positioned in the orthodox narrative in close 
association to Russian identity, and Karelia itself is incorporated into a ‘Russian’ 
historical space.  The most noticeable change over the period studied within the 







or who adhere to the Muslim faith.  As stated above any differential in levels of 
such intolerance between Karelians and Russians is not quantifiable from the 
data obtained for this study.  A clear progression can be seen however in the 
media data from a trivialisation and minimisation of the issue to its emergence as 
a significant problem in the aftermath of the Kondopoga Affair of 2006.  In both 
official and unofficial discourse the presence of these particular minority groups 
was delegitimised and criminalised; indeed the official narrative evolved from 
denying the existence of a problem to conceptualising these minorities as the 
problem.  This phenomenon is not isolated to Karelia alone; in fact it is reflective 
of the broader rise in such intolerance across the Russian Federation. 
 
  In summation the tool of historical narratives was used, in the data 
analysed, to posit a variety of potential ‘Karelian’ identities.  These identities 
were not mutually exclusive, and the manner in which Karelians and Russians in 
particular were associated together through certain narratives, and to a lesser 
extent Karelians and Finns, must represent the phenomenon of multiple 
identities.  Certainly through their Orthodox faith Karelians and Russians were 
often presented as having much in common and, on some level, a shared identity 
which united them in opposition to those ‘others’ who possessed a different faith.  
Conversely for at least one of the interview participants, Anatolii Grigoriev, the 
Karelians could be presented as being part of a broader Finnish identity.  It 
would appear one of the major roles of historical narratives in the Republic of 
Karelia are to position ‘Karelian’ identity itself as closer to or more distant from 
the competing dominant identities and nationalities of the Russians and Finns.  
As has already been stated above the Vepsian minority appears not to be subject 
to these pressures, being regarded as an exotic other and thus unclaimed at least 
by the Russian language press of the region. 
A related point is that the tool of historical narratives is employed to 
negotiate understandings of the idea of ‘Karelia’ and the ‘correct’ position of 
state, cultural and linguistic borders within the broader region.  Narratives which 







important as they are used to legitimise or de-legitimise current political and 
social realities, such as the presence or dominance of one national group or the 
proclamation of one or other identity in a given setting.  Narratives of the 
historical conflicts in the area and the attribution of responsibility to one or other 
of the competing groups also aids in the legitimisation of current boundaries or 
their subversion.  In this manner the Russian press in particular justifies the 
annexation and retention of former Finnish territories on the basis of prior right 
to these areas or Finnish war guilt.  Russians also attempt to establish their right 
to be resident in the modern Republic of Karelia and thus possess an authentic 
‘Karelian’ identity through this narration of continuity of settlement at the same 
time as this strategy is employed by some Karelians to deny this right.  It should 
also be noted that the representation of ‘Karelian-ness’ in particular was often 
associated with the village or rural district within both the interview and media 
data.  In this fashion this analysis concurs with Suutari (2010: 225) that the 
performance, in this case by narration of history, of identity by Karelians is often 
extremely localised.  Karelians are more likely to provide a narration of their 
own village or district when asked for historical narratives and are also more 
likely to associate their own sense of self, as evidenced through familial 
experience for instance, with reference to the past of their village.  This may be 
due to a lack of knowledge, as a consequence of certain factors examined below, 
of historical information beyond this very personal or local level; it does 
however hinder these Karelians from being able to construct narratives of a 
history of ‘Karelia’ or the ‘Karelian nation’ as a whole, as all experience is 
refracted through the narrow prism of the village. 
 One interesting phenomenon identified in this research was the 
increasing commercialisation of markers of Karelian identity and indeed this 
identity itself.  The heritage of the Karelian people, and to a lesser extent that of 
those Russians historically resident within the modern Republic of Karelia, is 
increasingly being viewed by the authorities as a potential ‘brand’ with which to 
entice tourists and investment to the region.  This is a relatively modern 
phenomenon and its long-term impact on ideas of Karelian identity is not 







facets of Karelian national and ethnic identity as a marketing tool will lead to 
their devaluation and inability to perform the production of such identity in the 
future.  Aside from identifying that this was a new threat to Karelian identity and 
the intent of the authorities to embark upon such initiatives this thesis cannot 
offer much more comment on this issue.  It is clear, however, from what limited 
data was obtained that at least some Karelians are concerned that their history 
and other symbols which help produce and reproduce a sense of distinct, 
‘Karelian’ identity are threatened by this development. 
Karelian identity itself, however, would appear to be threatened by a 
variety of existing issues.  The data collected for this study would support the 
contention of Kovaleva (2010: 36) that Karelians self identify as such 
predominantly through their ability to speak the Karelian language.  As the 
number of Karelian speakers has declined the number of individuals thus 
identifying themselves as Karelian has also declined.  The reasons for the decline 
in the language cannot be examined here, but a number of factors can be 
identified to ascertain the manner in which competency in Karelian is identified 
with Karelian nationality.  Firstly it must be recognised that Karelians do not 
live, for the most part, in isolated, ethnically homogenous groups but alongside 
Russians and other ethnicities, and indeed the number of multi-national 
marriages in Karelia is quite high.  Secondly Karelians are not distinguished by 
any other evident factor than their language from the surrounding Russian 
majority; the economic and social way of life of the modern Karelian is 
practically indistinguishable from that of the neighbouring Russians.  Karelians 
also undergo and have throughout the Soviet period undergone an assimilative 
educational experience in which they have been taught the Russian language and 
also Russian cultural norms and historical perspectives.  Many of the interview 
participants identified their own reasons for why Karelian language and identity 
had declined and these can be accessed on the appendix provided.  The interview 
process also ascertained, however, that many Karelians felt they had not had an 
adequate education on their own history or the history of Karelia itself and thus 
were unaware of many historical facts.  It is also clear from the interview data 







potential deportation of the Karelians to Siberia or Central Asia, were until the 
1990s considered taboo; it can be seen from the mass media data that indeed 
such historical narratives are even now quite heterodox and subject to rejection 
as invalid.  In this manner Karelians are, especially those who do not possess 
access to alternate information through their profession in the higher educational 
establishments or through access to Finnish material, frequently relatively poorly 
educated with regards to their knowledge of Karelian history.  As a consequence 
much of the information they are aware of appears to be derived from familial or 
local knowledge and is thus highly localised to their own district or even village.  
  
Historical narratives are, as has been demonstrated throughout this study, 
of major importance in the construction of national identity within the Russian 
Republic of Karelia.  They can be employed to legitimise or de-legitimise the 
current boundaries of the area, to establish one or more national group’s apparent 
‘right’ to reside in an area or across the whole republic and are utilised to 
maintain or subvert existing political structures and social realities.  Such 
narratives are employed within the Russian language press to legitimise, in the 
main, Russian presence in Karelia and to associate the Karelians and Russians 
toegether in opposition to the Finns across the border.  The most important 
aspect of identity production as expressed through the creation of historical 
narratives within both the media and the private sphere in the Republic of Karelia 
is that of the marginalisation of the Karelians themselves.  Not only is this 
expressed through the semantic content of their narratives and the linguistic 
strategies they choose to employ in their creation, but in their relatively weak 
nationalism.  Karelians, with a number of strident exceptions, often narrate their 
history as that of a helpless people, forever fated to exist within one empire or 
another.  They can identify few differences between the history of their own 
nationality and that of the dominant ethnic group.  With a number of exceptions 
they cannot offer narratives of history within which Karelians play an active and 
decisive part, potentially due to the fact there has never been a Karelian nation 
state.  If the Karelians as a national and ethnic group disappear over the next 







lack of historical knowledge alone.  Clearly the decline in competency in the 
Karelian language, if not reversed, would at present appear to have the inevitable 
consequence of dissolving any trace of Karelian identity.  Part of the reason such 
a loss of linguistic identity would lead to such a cataclysmic, for the Karelians, 
end is surely due to their relatively weak sense of national history.  Karelians 
clearly can offer narratives of their history which could be used, and indeed to an 
extent are used, to construct an image of Karelian identity which would not be 
dependant on either Russian or Finnish identities; such narratives would not, 
however, appear to be propagated through media exposure or education within 
the modern Republic of Karelia.  In such circumstances the outlook for ideas of 
Karelian identity as a distinct, Finno-Ugric, national identity would appear to be 
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“Воины земли Калевалы” K1 04.01.2001 
“Военное тысячелетие Карелии” K 15 08.02.2001 







“ ЗЕМЛЯ КАРЕЛЬСКАЯ” K 94 28.04.2001 
“Карелы обижены на депутатов” K 49 04.05.2001 
“Мы - птенцы одного гнезда. Размышления после съезда карелов” K 94 
28.08.2001 
“Ветераны у обелисков” K 24 28.08.2001 
“Северный Вавилон” KG45 07.11.2001 
“Неизвестный известный Швиндт” K96 01.09.2001 
“Не плюйте в прошлое” K16 12.02.2002 
“Элита или хорошие специалисты?” K100-101 21.09.2002 
“К новым горизонтам: уверенно, спокойно и с оптимизмом“ K50 23.05.2002 
“Обида карелов” K50 23.05.2002 
“На земле новомучеников” K50 23.05.2002 
“Вепсские названия деревень в Андоме” K105 03.10.2002 
“Путешествие в "Страну вепсов"” K122 22.10.2002 
“Вспомним всех поименно?” K106 25.09.2003 
“Страна за Онегой” K 106 25.09.2003 
“Мы - карелы! "Круглый стол" в Калевале” K 117 21.10.2003 
“Мы тоже узники оккупации” K123 02.11.2003 
"Чем сильнее вертикаль, тем строже порядок",Kareliya 116 2004 
“Законы смешанного леса” K 28 19.03.2005 
“Отдай и заплати“ K29 22.03.2005 
“Народ, преданный забвению” K28 19.03.2005 







“Я русский бы выучил...” K128 17.11.2005 
“Карелы: модели языковой мобилизации” K 36 06.04.2006 
“Вели себя дерзко, игнорируя менталитет нашего народа” K 99 07.09.2006 
 “Путь к гражданскому согласию” K100 09.09.2006 
“Не в наших традициях” K 100 09.09.2006 
“Край Пудожский былинный” K 123 04.11.2006 
“Кондопога: уроки, выводы, перспективы” K131 23.11.2006 
“Земля: легенды, были, карелы” K 136 05.12.2006 
“Православие на карельской земле” K81 26.07.2007 
“Vienan Karjala - ваша газета” K122 30.10.2007 
“Подлинник и экзотика” K122 30.10.2007 
“Да, мы – карелы” K 147 27.12.2007 
“Олонец - посад старинный” K 62 10.06.2008 
“Снится мне Ламбисельга” K71 03.07.2008 
“Освобождение Петрозаводска” K68 27.06.2009 
“Здесь Родины моей начало “ K107 26.11.2009 
“На родине древнего народа“ K 106 25.09.2010 
 
“Праздник вепсского края” K110 05.10.2010 
“Снова в гости к вепсам” K98 29.12.2011 
“Завершается прием заявок на республиканский конкурс журналистских 
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“Двадцать две стороны одной медали” KG29 18.07.2001 
“Фасад облупился, но протезы пока не нужны“ KG44 31.10.2001 
“Подстоличная печаль” KG4 23.01.2002 
“Совершенно секретно от Пани Кошелевой”  KG19 08.05.2002 
"Мы больше ничего не должны ингерманландцам" KG9 27.02.2002 
“Русские люди генетически неполноценные?” KG12 20.03.2002 
“Кому выгодно закрыть "Губернiю?” KG 13 27.03.2002 
“Возможно, у Йохана Бэкмана нет чувства юмора?” KG15 10.04.2002 
“Пять веков духовности” KG36 21.08.2002 
“Ученики Герострата” KG43 09.10.2002 
"Мелкое хулиганство" KG50 27.11.2002 
“Расизм в тихой Карелии?” K.G34 20.08.2003 
“Всего 400 лет пьянства“ KG10 05.03.2003 
 “Муфтий, полконфеты и покладистая борода” KG11 12.03.2003 
“Миллионы лет ничьи” KG13 26.03.2003 
“Овощи по-русски “ KG38 17.09.2003 
“Город Зеро” KG43 22.10.2003 
“Кижи: достояние или кормушка?” KG52 24.12.2003 
“Кому война, а кому сваха” KG19 09.05.2004  
“Партизаны протестуют” KG26 23.06.2004 







“Между двух огней” KG34 22.09.2004 
“В поисках "карельской Гипербореи"” KG3 12.01.2005 
“Камбала на ладошке” KG11 10.03.2005 
“Калевала: между гетто и резервацией“ KG12 17.03.2005 
“Калевала объявит политическую забастовку” KG14 31.03.2005 
“Крепость на берегу Онего” KG15 07.04.2005 
“Поруганное детство, поруганная старость” KG16 14.04.2005 
“Бросить бы эти карельские леса...” KG17 21.04.2005 
"Пусть судят…" KG19 04.05.2005 
“Память, память, ты жива...” KG19 10.05.2006 
“Медвежья услуга для медвежьей лапы” KG38 13.06.2006 
“Такая память нам не нужна” KG21 23.05.2007 
“13 миллиардов — раз… 13 миллиардов — два…” KG36 05.09.2007 
“Сто лет тому назад” KG2 09.01.2008 
“В Петрозаводск, как к себе домой” KG2 09.01.2008 
“Трудности перевода” KG3 16.01.2008 
“Финская угроза” KG07 13.02.2008 
“Храни господи трефового короля” KG27 02.07.2008 
“Карелы за "русский"“ KG52 24.12.2008). 
“Непонятные песни” KG4 21.01.2009 
“Пастор страдает за любовь к России” KG35 29.08.2009 







“У нас не Нью-Йорк” KG5 03.02.2010 
“Ветеранам намекнули” KG11 17.03.2010 
“Победительницы” KG18 05.05.2010 
“Ровесницы республики” KG22 02.06.2010 
“Есть два пути. Один – жить нормально, второй – криминальный” KG37 
15.09.2010 
“Легенды нашего города” KG21 25.05.2011 
“Чудо, да и только!” KG47 23.11.2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
